Spinoza and Bergson.

Bergson's system is sometimes classified as Pantheistic, because, like Spinoza's 'natura naturans', his 'Elan Vital' is an immanent creative principle. However, Bergson diverges from Spinoza in holding that Matter is nothing more than degenerated Elan Vital, and, furthermore, that both Spinozistic Extension and Thought are only an arrangement and a structuring of Matter. Hence, he rejects the thesis that Extension and Thought are attributes of the fundamental creative impetus. Similarly, since Body and Mind, as Spinoza understands them, are modes of Extension and Thought, they, too are extrinsic characterizations of individual conatus, which, on Bergson's account, is localized Elan Vital. Now, for Bergson, Freedom consists in the liberation of Elan Vital from Matter, and Reason, even as an organizing principle, is an accommodation of Mind to Matter, notably to the Emotions, which, on Spinoza's own account, are no more than physical interactions. Thus, for Bergson, while Reason can serve as a means to Freedom, it cannot be its ground. However, Spinoza need not accept this divergence from his own theory of Freedom as a critique of it, because it is based on a premise to which he does not subscribe, namely that Matter is degenerated natura naturans. Furthermore, that premise precludes an interpretation of Extension and Thought that Bergson apparently does not appreciate--that they are dynamic powers, not static properties.