Alexander and Color

At first glance, Alexander's thesis, that Color emerges from underlying physico-chemical processes, seems aligned with Locke's theory of Secondary Qualities. However, it diverges from the latter in one significant respect--whereas for Locke, the emergence occurs in a perceiver, Alexander locates it in the object itself, independent of any perceptual act. Perhaps because of the ample scientific evidence that tends to support Locke's theory, Alexander defends his divergence with an appeal to common sense, i. e. that a color appears as existing in an object, at a distance from a perceiver. However, the same argument is ineffective for the appearance of a color in a mirror, plus, an appeal to common sense, in the context of an argument that unperceived physico-chemical processes exist in the same location as a perceived color, seems anomalous. Furthermore, Alexander does not even entertain one of the strongest presumed counter-examples to his position--cases of color-blindness, which seem to demonstrate that the perception of color is a function of the condition of perceptual processes, independent of any perceptual object. Thus, his reluctance to reject the possibility that Color emerges in the perceiver, from the physico-chemical processes that constitute the interaction of an object with a perceptual apparatus, seems based less on the merits of the thesis itself, and more on his contention that it is the tertiary qualities, Goodness, Beauty, Truth, that emerge from subject-object interaction.