Spinoza and Individuality

Previously discussed here has been the distinction between the common connotation of 'individual', i. e. 'discrete', and its rarely used literal meaning, i. e. 'undivided'. That the two meanings are not equivalent is clear from the fact that the former type of 'individuality' entails finitude, while the latter does not. Though Spinoza does not dwell on the usages of the terms themselves, his system expresses his appreciation of the significance of the distinction between them. For, as he argues, modular individuality is defined by the persistence of its effort to exist, which entails continuity. In contrast, the idea of oneself as a discrete entity is only an inadequate idea, nor does a mere aggregate of such ideas add up to an adequate one. Instead, experiential continuity is possible for Spinoza only as rational development, and the primary principle of Rationality is internal coherence, i. e. non-contradiction. Hence, 'individuality', meaning 'undivided' is indicative of adequacy, whereas 'individuality', meaning 'discrete', is indicative of inadequacy, in a system one cardinal principle of which is the distinction between adequate and inadequate knowledge.