Spinoza, Reason, Intuition

The preceding discussion distinguishes between two interpretations of Spinoza's notion 'Adequate Idea'. According to one, an Adequate Idea is knowledge of an effect the cause of which is also known, or, equivalently, it is the conclusion of a valid deductive process. According to the second, an Adequate Idea is knowledge of the relation itself that obtains between a cause and an effect, or, equivalently, between a premise and a consequence. However, these are not conflicting interpretations of Spinoza's notion; rather, the first is a characterization of what Spinoza calls 'Reason', while the second, of what he calls 'Intuition', i. e. his 'second' and 'third' kinds of Knowledge, respectively. These characterizations correspond to his example of the two knowledges of a mathematical ratio--one the result of an orderly derivation from Euclidean premises, the other, the result of a direct insight into the numerical relation itself. More precisely, the idea of a relation as Causality or Reasoning per se accords with Spinoza's definition of an Intuition as 'an idea proceeding from the essence of God's attributes', i. e. from Extension or from Thinking, respectively, understood as dynamic powers, not as static properties.