Bergson, Retrospection, Intuition

Bergson characterizes Intellect as 'retrospective' consciousness. So, since retrospection is necessarily subsequent to its object, any object of Intellect is necessarily complete and immobile. He thus sharply opposes Intellect to Intuition, the object of which is dynamic and ongoing. His examination of retrospection, however, seems to gloss over an important distinction--between its object being given as already complete, and the immobility of its object being the product of Intellect's own hypostasization of whatever it encounters. The latter uncertainty cannot be resolved by an appeal to direct examination, which can only beg the question. But, in cases where Bergson stipulates the mobility of an object, and, hence, the inadequacy of Intellect to it, the Intellect is exposed as effecting its own hypostasization of the object, and Bergson has no grounds for assuming that it does not function likewise in all cases. Now, as Bergson himself characterizes it, the object of Intuition is immediately given. So, insofar as it is given, an object of Intuition precedes the Intuition of it. In other words, Intuition is no less retrospective than is Intellect, and its object is no less a product of hypostasization than that of the latter.