Sartre, Nothingness, and Value

Sartre's rejection of the 'Dialectical' theory of Nothingness pertains to only part of its logical dimension--that Being and Nothingness are reified complements. However, he does retain three of the theory's other features. First, Being precedes Nothingness phenomenologically. Second, negation is sublation, i. e. it preserves what it negates, e. g. Consciousness preserves the object that it negates by revealing it. Third, negation seeks to negate itself. The combination of the latter two features yields what Sartre calls 'Value', i. e. Being-in-itself-for-itself, which is both intrinsic to the dynamic of Nothingness, and, yet, is as impossible as is the synthesis of Being and Becoming. One embodiment of Value is 'God', e. g. a Being that is both perfect in itself, and, yet, seeks to go beyond itself, though Sartre stops short of pursuing an argument for Atheism on the basis of this impossibility. Another possible exemplification of this structure, that is more relevant to specific action, is the Consciousness of satisfaction, which Freedom cannot help but seek, but which is impossible to attain, since Consciousness is itself dissatisfied. Now, though Sartre never explicitly presents it as such, this theory of Value--that values are intrinsic to the structure of Freedom--is a notable alternative to both of two prominent predecessors, Plato's--that Value is derived from self-subsistent Ideas, and Nietzsche's--that Value is an extrinsic instrument of Will to Power. On the other hand, it is more reminiscent of one of Nietzsche's earlier considerations, i. e. that even Dionysus needs Value, no matter how illusory. However, like the later Nietzsche, Sartre seems to eventually abandon his earlier theory of Value, in favor of that of Dialectical Materialism.