Nothingness and Individuation

Sartre cites, as among the evidence of the existence of a self-negating entity, one's capacity to withdraw from the world at any moment. Now, there is no disputing the occurrence of such a process, but his analysis of it is arbitrary. It is performed by a 'Nothing' only insofar as what is withdrawn from is characterized as 'Being', e. g. only in e. g. an Hegelian scheme. That, in his later work, Sartre refers to the locus of Freedom as a productive 'individual' is not merely an indication of the availability of alternative positive characterizations, but, furthermore, is a symptom of a deeper problem. That an 'individual' is also a 'nothing' reflects the chronic Philosophical lack of a Principle of Individuation which also qualifies as a Principle of Sufficient Reason. In other words, there seems to have traditionally been no explanation as to why a given unity, e. g. God, substance, Will, Being, species, etc. individuates, e. g. produces people, modes, objects, beings, etc., thereby necessitating recourse to either denying the reality of the latter, or affirming it, but only as an absurdity. From that perspective, Sartre is, hence, correct to characterize a particular human as a 'nothingness'. In contrast, the Formaterial System, that has been presented here, supplies such a Principle of Individuation--as has been previously discussed, it is a mode of the System's Material Principle, Becoming-Diverse, that emerges at a specific Evolvemental stage--thereby demonstrating that human Individuality has significance to both the species and the Individual. On the basis of Formaterialism's Evolvemental scheme, the transition from Sartre's earlier self-negating Being to his later productive individual is analogous to a maturation from a rebellious adolescent to an adult beginning to freely assume a social role.