Consciousness and Will

Sartre describes the Emotions as 'magical thinking', because, on his analysis, they are vicarious responses to actual exigencies. However, he seems to miss that the same analysis can apply, at least in some cases, to Consciousness. For example, in comparison with negating the visual perception of some object by closing one's eyes, turning one's head, moving the object, etc. the nihilations that he attributes to Consciousness, e. g. psychic withdrawal, detachment, doubt, etc. are likewise vicarious. Indeed, the comparison bears out that Consciousness is a Lack not insofar as it is not its object, but insofar as it is a disembodied abstraction from other processes that are physically efficacious. Now, the traditional term for those processes is 'Will'. However, Sartre rejects the possibility that Consciousness is an abstraction from Will, arguing, to the contrary, that Will is only a special case of Consciousness, in two respects: first, Will, unlike Consciousness is merely reflective, and, second, it is no more than a means to the ends that only Consciousness can choose. But, on the first point, if he allows that Consciousness has both reflective and unreflective modes, then his restriction of Will to the former mode is arbitrary. And, on the second, that Will does not set ends does not imply that it is merely a means, for, if it is intrinsically non-teleological, then it neither sets ends nor is intrinsically a means to ends that have been pre-established. On the other hand, his attempt to subordinate Will to Consciousness, as is the case with the entirety of Being and Nothingness, offers no explanation as to how the latter, unlike the former, can be conceived as both embodied and physically efficacious.