Sartre, Consciousness, and, Causality

One central debate between Hume and Kant is regarding the efficacy of Reason. For Hume, the only function of Reason in behavior is, through its calculations, to assist in the determination of the best means to the ends that only Passion can set. In contrast, Kant presents his Principle of Pure Practical Reason as an example of the efficacy of Reason, and, hence, of its Freedom, because he defines Freedom as an uncaused cause. Now, according to Sartre, the 'Freedom' of Consciousness consists in its withdrawal from the world, the revelation of its objects, and the imaginative projection of new possibilities. Furthermore, the unachievable ideal of Consciousness is an entity capable of self-causation, and, towards the end of Being and Nothingness, he indicates that the problem of the efficacy of Consciousness is a 'metaphysical' topic which the preceding has not resolved. Later, in Critique of Dialectical Reason, Need is the fundamental motivation of human behavior. Hence, Sartre's theory of the efficacy of Consciousness seems to align him with Hume, in which case the 'Freedom' that he attributes to it does not qualify as 'Freedom' in the Kantian sense. On the other hand, as part of the discussion of metaphysics, Sartre very briefly alludes to 'Gestalt form' as possibly relevant to the efficacy of Consciousness. Now, Formaterialism, as has been previously discussed here, presents Mind as the Formal Cause of Conduct. But, it is complemented by a different function of Mind in that respect, namely, as the Material Cause, which, as has been discussed, is not to be confused with any of the traditional senses of 'material'. The distinction in Formaterialism between Material and Formal Cause suggests that Sartre has conflated two functions of Consciousness--Consciousness as nihilation is Material Causality, while Consciousness as revelatory is Formal Causality. So, if Sartre had ever pursued conceiving Consciousness as Formally efficacious, he might have encountered some further complications. In any case, it is difficult to grant that his theory of the freedom of Consciousness, as is, qualifies as 'Freedom' in the Kantian sense.