Sartre, Nothingness, and Evaluation

In Sartre's account, 'Nothingness', has a variety of manifestations. He first presents it as Consciousness, insofar as Consciousness is the negation of its object, which possesses Being. Then, Nothingness is lies between Consciousness and any of its objects. But the Consciousness of any object is also self-consciousness, so Nothingness, furthermore, separates the Nothingness that is the subject of self-consciousness from that of its object. Later, Nothingness is Freedom, insofar as any new action negates its given circumstances. Sartre never explicitly systematizes these various types, but he does intimate that they are all moments of the same negating process. However, another type that is not as easily assimilable to these others is dissatisfaction. For, unlike the others, dissatisfaction is normative, i. e. it is the Consciousness of a lack, and descriptive Consciousness and evaluative Consciousness are traditionally regarded as categorially distinct. While Being and Nothingness seems to leave the relation between dissatisfaction and the descriptive modes unresolved, by Critique of Dialectical Reasoning, he seems to have incorporated the latter into the evaluative process. That might explain why in the later work he uses 'existential', rather than 'phenomenological', to classify descriptive Consciousness, i. e. Phenomenology is an intrinsically and exclusively descriptive methodology.