Heidegger and Husserl

To clarify a previous posting, in response to a comment, Husserl is germane to Heidegger's charge that Nietzsche is the ultimate Nihilist, for two reasons. First, insofar as Husserl's Phenomenology qualifies as 'subjectivistic' on Heidegger's definition, is chronologically post-Nietzschean, and is Heidegger's own methodological orientation, it suffices to refute the basis of Heidegger's charge, i. e. that Nietzsche is the final figure of a 'History' that Heidegger himself transcends. None of the three premises seems controversial, and the argument is logically independent of whether or not Husserl ever even addresses Nietzsche or Nihilism. Second, Heidegger ontologizes Phenomenology, that is, he treats Noematic contents as if they were un-'bracketed', e. g. he presents an subjective interpretive scheme as if it were objectively valid 'History'. Now, on Nietzsche's diagnosis, such a procedure qualifies as Nihilistic--it is as much a manifestation of self-denial as is any other projection of a subjective creation as 'objective', e. g. 'God', values, etc., and self-denial is a symptom of Nihilism. So, at minimum, Heidegger's charge against Nietzsche is question-beginning. Thus, as unwelcome to Heidegger as it might be, the inclusion of Husserl in the discussion clarifies the status of Heidegger's charge against Nietzsche. More generally, the question shifts from 'How is Husserl relevant to Nihilism?' to 'How is Husserl not relevant to any of Heidegger's projects?' And, one answer that is difficult to avoid is that once Husserl is purged from academia by the Nazis, he becomes an increasingly, and conveniently, forgotten being to Heidegger.