Beyond Eternal Recurrence

The transformation of him into a self-described 'immoralist' by the doctrine of Eternal Recurrence, has encouraged some to characterize Nietzsche as an 'Egoist', others to see him as advocating criterion-less instinctual behavior, and even a few to interpret him as renouncing the value of action entirely. But, the preponderance of the evidence suggests that that description is ironic. As an explictly Life-affirming doctrine, Eternal Recurrence establishes the evaluation of conduct on the basis of the degree to which it is life-enhancing. Furthermore, his definition of 'Life' is 'Will to Power', and Power generally has a disreputable status in the Moral tradition that Nietzsche seeks to overcome. Hence, it is only from the perspective of that tradition that Nietzsche's new doctrine is 'immoral', which has prompted Deleuze to classify it as 'Ethics', in constructive contradistinction to 'Morality'. However, the doctrine of Eternal Recurrence effects another, perhaps more substantive, break with the tradition, one that does not merely substitute one set of values for another. It is also a repudiation of Teleology in Morality, i. e. of the tradition of positing some ulterior 'Good' on the basis of which Life, in general, and concrete actions, in particular, are evaluated. While Nietzsche is well-aware of this element of his doctrine, he fails to draw out its fullest implication--the ascendance of the Formal Cause, as a replacement of the Final Cause, as the primary determinant of Conduct, even though it is already in effect whenever one choses an action on the basis of whether or not one can will its eternal recurrence. Evolvementalism, presented here, elaborates on the role of Formal Causality in Conduct, and, to more clearly distinguish this concept of Conduct from that of the Moral tradition, the term 'Phronetics', better than the baggage-laden 'Ethics', has been offered to classify it.