The Will to Believe

The expression 'Will to Believe' was coined by William James as a justification of Faith on the Pragmatist grounds that subscription to the hypothesis that God exists, even in the absence of any empirical evidence, has constructive consequences. Peirce's brief but derisive comment on--that a 'Will to Believe' amounts to a 'Will to not Will', an element of death in a vitalistic notion--sounds more like Nietzsche than Pragmatism. In contrast, a Pragmatist critique would focus on James' notion of Belief, rather than on Will. For example, Peirce could assert that James seems to concur with the cardinal Pragmatist Principle that the fixation of Belief is an adoption of a rule of action, but that Faith essentially involves no action at all, other than re-affirmations of it in form or another, e. g. prayer. Still, James could respond that Faith that God exists entails Faith that good deeds will be rewarded, and, hence, does influence action, i. e. the performance of good deeds. To which, Peirce could insist that the hypothesis of forthcoming reward is completely unverifiable, and, hence, contrary to Pragmatism. In any case, James is plainly using the term 'Believe' in a more restricted sense than Peirce intends it, and hence, his 'Will to Believe' is misrepresentative of Pragmatism. Now, Preception entails the interiorization of some prescriptive expression, i. e. 'One should do X' must be translated into 'I will do X', and surely 'Will to Believe' is an accurate description of this interiorization. But such interiorization is the final phase of the fixation of belief by adopting it as a rule. So, perhaps Peirce's best response to James is that the latter's 'Will to Believe' is, while not quite a betrayal, a distraction from a fundamental Pragmatist Principle.