Saturday, February 6, 2010
Pragmatism and Semiotics
One basic articulation of Peirce's Pragmatism is the Principle 'The meaning of propositions lies in the future', e. g. the meaning of 'A is B' is 'If one were to examine A, one would perceive that it possesses the characteristic B'. His notions of Mathematics and Logic, as consisting of operations to be performed, thus exemplify the Pragmatist Principle, as does his category Thirdness, insofar as it pertains to law-like formulations with predictive potential. But, in general, Thirdness, as well as the rest of his Phenomenology is merely descriptive of given mental activity, and so seems at odds with his Pragmatism. His Semiotic seems to likewise vacillate between Phenomenology and Pragmatism. On the one hand, his Mathematics and Logic are Pragmatistic, but, on the other, his explanation of an Interpetant, as mediating between a given Sign and a given Object, is plainly descriptive. Also, conspicuously absent from his attempt to establish that a Sign precedes its Object is an easy Pragmatist analysis along the following lines: A proposition is a Sign, and its meaning lies in the future, but an Object of a Sign is the Sign's meaning, so, therefore, Signs precede their Objects. A further development of a Pragmatist Semiotic might observe, as does Evolvementalism, that any prescriptive language is a Sign that precedes its Object, e. g. as a recipe precedes the action that it directs. Furthermore, insofar as any proposition, including a prescription, is logically General, its actualization is logically its Instantiation, i. e. the prescription-action relation is Syllogistic.
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After posting this, I subsequently discovered that, in his later writings, Peirce does in fact pursue the line of development of a Pragmatistic Semiotic that I sketch towards the end. He proposes that the formation of Belief is the ultimate Interpretant, with Belief as the basis of subsequent action. Whether he notices that such action thereby becomes both the Object of, and an Instance of, that Interpretant, is unclear.
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