Inference and Representation

For Peirce, all mental activity is inferential, i. e. has a basic syllogistic structure, but how he holds the Sign-Object-Interpretant relation to be syllogistic is unclear. Some passages suggest that a Sign functions as a Middle Term between Object and Interpretant, with similarities to each. But, the representational relation between Sign and Object entails that they are different in some respect, and Inference abstracts from this difference, so, as such, that relation cannot be reduced to a type of Inference. Furthermore, Peirce's System resists the treatment of a Sign as a Middle Term; rather, it is the Interpretant which is a Middle in the System. For example, if smoke is taken as a Sign of fire, it is, seemingly following Hume, only because an Interpretant conjoins fire and smoke. Still, Representation is more than mere conjunction, which is indifferent to the distinction between representation and represented. Now, on the Evolvemental analysis, a representation interiorizes what it represents, an analysis that is applicable to the commonest example of a Sign-Object relation. What transforms sounds emitted from someone's mouth into words, is that they are taken to contain meaning, as if they were the wrapping around the latter. No doubt that unwrapping must occur before meaning is conveyed, but such unwrapping presupposes a wrapping. Likewise, in order for something to be taken to be a Sign, and no mere phenomenon, it must, at the outset at least, be interpreted as containing, in some respect, an Object. Now, it is Peirce himself who introduces the relation of Inclusion into contemporary Logic, so insofar as Representation is Inclusion, it is an element of a Rational structure. But if that structure is: Sign includes Object, Intepretant includes Sign, therefore, Interpretant includes Object, then a Sign functions as the Middle Term in mental activity.