Kant, Teleology, and Theology

While 'purposeless purposiveness' is central to the study of Aesthetic Judgement in the first part of Kant's third Critique, the second part, the study of Teleological Judgement, relies on 'purposeful purposiveness'. By interpreting mutual mechanical relations in Nature as reciprocally purposeful, Kant shows how Nature can be conceived of as not merely including organisms, but as itself an organistic system. Now, in Formaterialism, Organism is a special case of System, so any organism can be defined in terms of Formal, independently of Efficient and Final, Causality. However, the one purposive notion in the third Critique that seems recalcitrant to explanation in terms of Formal Causality, a notion to which the entire work seem preparatory, is that of Deserved Happiness--the answer to the question 'What can I hope for?', that Kant sometimes describes as the main theme of this Critique. Since Happiness is the satisfaction of all physical needs, in Kantianism it is an exclusively mechanical concept, but since Deservedness entails both an evaluation of the purposeful Conduct of a Rational being, and an evaluator, i. e. a Divine Judge, Deserved Happiness combines both Efficient and Final Causality. On the other hand, Kant had introduced the notion previously, in the Critique of Practical Reason, as a concept of Pure Practical Reason, as the Highest Good for a person. He argues there that while adherence to Pure Practical Reason is unconditional, i. e. cannot have Happiness as an ulterior motive, nevertheless, Rational Virtue is incomplete without Happiness. So, Pure Reason also requires Happiness, but only on the condition that it is caused by Virtue, which is only possible, according to him, on the supposition of the existence of a Divine rewarder of Virtue. Such constitutes Kant's 'Moral' proof of the existence of God. But, as I argue elsewhere, that impersonal Reason regards Happiness, of any sort, as a Rational Good, is unjustified not only within his System, but in Spinoza's more rigorous Rational System, in which Virtue is its own reward. Kant does address Spinoza in the third Critique, but while he argues persuasively that Happiness can reinforce the propensity to Virtuous behavior, he falls short of demonstrating the decisive point, namely, that impersonal Reason, in principle, requires Happiness over and above Virtue. So, minus Kant's Theological commitments, his study of Teleological Judgement, like that of Aesthetic Judgement, can be a demonstration of how Formal Causality integrates Theory and Practice, as an alternative to both Efficent and Final explanations. As such, Kant arrives at the conception of Humanity as Homo Faber.