Preception and Imagination

In what little analysis that there has been of the process that I am calling 'Preception'--the carrying out of any linguistic instruction, of precepts, imperatives, recipes, etc.--the relation between a proposition and some behavior seems to be based on the notion of constant conjunction. That is, learning at the earliest age to associate a phrase with some bodily movement, we can follow similar or more complex instructions as adults, on such an hypothesis. Now, Peirce seems to have noticed that on such account, behavior is never more than mechanical, leaving no room for voluntary Preception. Hence, he suggests that we can also voluntarily use a Belief to develop new habits, but he falls short of adequately explaining what this voluntary element, which would mediate between a Belief and an inculcated habit, consists in. Clues to what it might be come from two of those few aspects of the Kantian System that Peirce does not incorporate into his own. Those are--Form and Imagination. With all his attention on Efficient and Final Causality, Peirce seems to fail to appreciate the significance to Kant of Formal Causality, which is certainly relevant to the process of, say, the forming of a habit. Furthermore, while he does note the role played by Imagination, specifically Productive Imagination, i. e. Schematism, as mediating between Sense and Understanding for Kant in the acquisition of knowledge, he misses its potential mediation in the converse process, between the understanding of a Precept, and its physical instantiation. In contrast, on the Formaterial analysis of the Individual, Imagination is the fundamental Formal Cause of behavior. As has been previously discussed, syn-kinaesthetic processes serve homeostatically to regulate physical movement, producing a bodily image. Such production of a bodily image is the fundamental function of Imagination in its reproductive mode. But, with the development of higher degrees of self-awareness, Imagination becomes Productive as well, e. g. any projection of a possible course of action entails the production of a bodily image that vicariously rehearses a possible scenario. So, on the Formaterial analysis of Preception, a precept is cognized, it is associated with the Productive Imagination, and the Productive Imagination shapes the subsequent motions. Because association therein can be free, and because Productive Imagination is creative, Preception is not a mechanical process.