Kant and Transcendentalism

The casual use of the term 'transcendental' obscures both its Kantian roots and the important distinction that Kant attempts to draw with it. In common parlance, it seems to vaguely refer to extraordinary experience, while for Kant, it indicates, more precisely, what is beyond experience. But for him, there are two ways that something is unencounterable in experience, which he distinguishes by the characteristics 'transcendent' and 'Transcendental'. The first is 'things-in-themselves', namely things as they are outside of any experiential context, and it is these are 'transcendent'. The second cannot be encountered within experience either, but are still part of it, because they are the formal structures of any experience--these are 'Transcendental', which he defines as 'pertaining to the innate structures of any cognition'. So, contrary to the common use of the term, what the Kantian term indicates is not merely not extraordinary, but what is prevalent in experience. The historical significance of Kantian 'Transcendentalism' is that it revives the Form-Matter distinction, without Forms inhabiting some transcendent realm, as they do in e. g. Platonism. However, despite the significance in his System of this distinction, he does not seem to go further and invoke Formal Causality, even when discussing Beauty, and seems content with Efficient and Final as exhaustively treating Causality. So, Peirce seems to have no interest in Formal Causality, and while Dewey does, it remains only an implicit theme. Formaterialism obviously makes it explicit, and with the Formal Principle defined as 'Becoming-the-Same', Form cannot be construed as transcendent to Experience in this System.