Perspective, Particular, Morality

In Beyond Good and Evil #10, Nietzsche briefly expresses an advocacy of Perspectivism, but without developing it.  Continuing in that direction: a Perspective does not falsify Reality; rather, it presents a part of it, which is false only if taken as the whole.  Accordingly, the subject of a Perspective can be classified as a Particular.  Now, a Particular has internal characteristics qua Particular, and characteristics qua Part of a Whole.  So, Morality can be conceived as a program for how Particulars qua Particulars relate to one another, for the benefit of the Whole, e. g. more or less diversely, depending on circumstances.  Thus, Nietzsche could have explicitly jettisoned the concept of the member of the human species as an Individual, and replaced it with Particular.  On that basis, a Self is a Particular, Selfishness a tendency toward greater diversity among Particulars, e. g. as a corrective to enfeebling conformism, and Morality, with the Moralist as its mouthpiece, not a fiction.  As is, this development of Perspectivism remains only a possible interpretation of Nietzsche's later doctrine.