Fact, Value, Temporality

The distinction between Fact and Value has a simple origin that has been so entangled in extrinsic problems from which even Nietzsche does not disengage them.  The origin is briefly glimpsed by Hume in his thesis of a habit of expecting the Future to repeat the Past, but because of his focus on Causality, it slips away.  Instead applying Skepticism to that expectation--the Past is set, while the Future is uncertain.  On that basis, the Past is a Fact, while a Value helps determine Future action.  Accordingly, there are three common confusions of the duality: 1. Evaluating the Past; 2. Conceiving the Future as a Fact; and 3. Conceiving Fact and Value as contemporaneous.  Any Determinism is an example of #2, Kant's Nature-Freedom and Phenomenon-Noumenon dichotomies are examples of #3, and any judgment that has no practical consequences is an example #1.  Another example of #1, of especial interest to Nietzsche, is Ressentiment, in which one is stuck re-enacting the Past, as is also the case with some Freudian Neuroses.  Now, Willing-backwards, i. e. approving the Past, is designed by Nietzsche as a cure for Ressentiment.  However, as an Evaluation of the Past, that involves conceiving it as the Future as well, he only perpetuates the underlying confusion, thereby leaving obscure his Futural concepts--Self-Overcoming, Overman, and Philosophy of the Future.