Conjoined Behavior and Will to Power

In the traditional Free Will vs. Determinism debate, the specific point of contention has always been whether or not some personal behavior has an antecedent external cause.  Thus, not at all considered has been whether or not some conjoined behavior has an antecedent external cause, i. e. individual behavior is presupposed on both sides. Plainly, as is evident in everyday experience, both are possible.  On the one hand, sexual relations can be determined by the drive of the species to propagate, while, on the other, collaboration on some project, e. g. artistic, political, can effect a liberation from antecedent conditions.  Now, if, as Nietzsche asserts, the ground of all human behavior is a Dionysian principle, such as a species drive, then, despite appearances, all behavior is actually conjoined and Determinist, i. e. the illusion of 'freedom' is not that of the falling stone that believes that it is flying by its own efforts, as Spinoza illustrates it, but of a finger that believes that its movements are unconnected to that of other fingers.  Accordingly, not only the Morality that promises the salvation of the Individual Soul, but any Egoist descriptive theory or normative doctrine, e. g. Self-Interest, is fictitious.  It also follows, on that basis, that the concept of a personal Will to Power is, at minimum, problematic, one resolution of which is that it is the product of a distribution of Will to Power shared by all involved in the conjoined behavior.  But, Nietzsche does not entertain any of these implications of his Dionysian principle, so whether or not he would accept such a resolution will remain uncertain.