Spinoza, Kant, Virtue, Reward

Both Spinoza and Kant believe that personal Virtue consists in Rational conduct. But, whereas the former holds that Virtue is its own reward, Kant regards it as an incomplete Good without Happiness. Spinoza's formulation that 'Virtue is its own reward' is slightly inaccurate, because Virtue is accompanied by a certain degree of Pleasure, and it is the latter which seems to be the actual locus of the satisfaction that he attributes to the attainment of Virtue. Hence, his judgment regarding Virtue is contingent, as Kant's dissatisfaction with that Pleasure bears out. In contrast, Kant maintains that the insufficiency of that Pleasure can serve as a disincentive to acting Rationally, i. e. that it is insufficient to counter other miseries that can interfere with Rational conduct. Furthermore, he argues that the Highest Good, which entails Virtue, is incomplete without Happiness. However, both of these points seem to undermine his Rational Principle. For, according to that Principle, one should obey Reason for its own sake alone, regardless of circumstances or consequences, and, hence, independently of the degree of Pleasure involved, of the strength of temptation to do otherwise, or of any hardship that might ensue. So, while his denial that Virtue is its own reward might have merit, Kant cannot ground it in his Rational Principle. Without this buttress, he encourages the suspicion that his disagreement with Spinoza reduces to a theological issue--his attempt to rescue the possibility of afterwordly rewards that is precluded by Spinoza's Pantheism.