Descartes, Thinking, Willing

Descartes' proof that he exists is comprised of both objective and subjective dimensions. The main steps of the objective dimension are: 1. X is certain if and only if X cannot be doubted; 2. It is impossible to doubt that one is doubting; 3. Therefore, it is certain that one thinks; 4. Therefore, it is certain that one exists. The main steps of the subjective dimension are: 1. He is a willing being, i. e. he possesses the power to choose; 2. His criteria for choosing to believe X is that X is clear and distinct; 3. It is certain that he exists; 4. Therefore, it is clear and distinct that he exists; 5. Therefore, he exists. But, once Descartes begins to examine 'I will', the nature of his incorporeality becomes more problematic. For, according to his analysis, Willing is detached from his corporeality, and has wider scope than Thinking, but can be influenced by the latter. One systematization of these propositions is to distinguish Soul and Mind, which he seems to identify, with 'I will' as the most general expression of the Soul, and with Mind, i. e. 'I think', as one of its special functions. Such a concept of Soul stands in contrast to Aristotle's, which is not exclusively incorporeal, and in which volition is located in the animal part, beneath the rational part. Or, with 'I think' reserved, as is the case with Kant, for intra-psychic and, yet, impersonal functions, the Soul could be conceived as consisting of subjective and objective divisions, i. e. 'I will' and 'I think', respectively. In any case, the Thinking-Willing relation seems to present Descartes with some systematic complications.