Descartes, Certainty, and Uncertainty

Often ignored in the attention to Cartesian doubt is the original problem that is its condition, i. e. the end to which Descartes designs it as a means, namely Certainty. The historical backdrop of Descartes' project is familiar--with the demise of Medieval Philosophy, perhaps prompted by the emergence of Copernican cosmology, Descartes seeks to rebuild Knowledge. Reconstruction requires a sound foundation, and Certainty is, for Descartes, the criterion of foundational stability. Abstractly, his plan seems reasonable, but, concretely, 'Certainty' is too vague to be accepted at face value. For, it is unclear whether Certainty is a state of affairs, or an attribute, and, if the latter, whether it is a subjective aspect of experience, or a property of an object of experience, and, in either case, whether it is part of sense experience or of intellectual experience. For example, 'S is certain that X' often refers to a feeling experienced by S, while 'X is certain' refers to a property of X. Now, Descartes seems aware that the subjective feeling of certainty is inadequate as a foundation, since its apparent solidity is fleeting. Hence, only intellectual certainty is acceptable, because only the intellect can make guarantees that transcend the moment. But, such certainty cannot be a subjective aspect of experience, which is in flux, so it must be a property of an object of experience. As it turns out, Descartes determines it to be a property of doubting, but not qua subjective experience, rather qua object of experience, i. e. of reflection. That is why Sartre is correct to note Descartes' equivocal treatment of doubting, i. e. it vacillates in his argument between subjective experience and object of experience. But, the equivocation is ultimately a function of the uncertainty of Certainty, which Descartes resolves by objectifying 'I doubt'. And, since, 'I doubt' is an expression of uncertainty, Cartesian Certainty, the foundation of his reconstruction of Knowledge, is his Uncertainty.