Spinoza, Kant, Purposiveness

In the Critique of Judgment, Kant attributes to Spinoza an explanation of Purposiveness that he regards as inadequate. Kant terms that explanation 'fatalistic'--that different elements of nature are suitable to one another can only be due, according to Kant, to fortuitous circumstance in Spinoza's non-Teleological system, because the latter rules out the possibility that such suitability reflects intentional design. Now, though Spinoza does not explicitly espouse such a position, it does seem consistent with what he does articulate. Spinoza also does not have at his disposal the non-Teleological explanation of natural suitability that arises to prominence two centuries later, namely the process of evolutionary Adaptation. Nevertheless, the latter is not only consistent with his non-Teleological doctrine, but it confirms his thesis that his knowledge of Nature is by no means complete. So, even if the notion of Adaptation is unknown to both him and Kant, Kant is wrong to assert that natural suitability is inexplicable from Spinoza's premises. Regardless, Kant's argument as presented is besides the point. For, his own concept of Purposiveness is a Regulative Idea only, i. e. he explicitly agrees with Spinoza that Efficient Causality cannot ground Purposiveness. Hence, his disagreement with Spinoza regarding Purposiveness must, first and foremost, be in terms of its heuristic value, not its content, and, so, his objection must directly address Spinoza's thesis that it is an idea that is deleterious to the intellect of a Mode. Plainly, Kant's argument is otherwise occupied.