Sunday, October 17, 2010
Spinoza, Kant, and The Power of Reason
Spinoza and Kant are traditionally classified as being in dispute regarding the possibility of Free Will--Spinoza denies it, holding that every cause, except God, is the effect of a preceding cause, while Kant affirms it, arguing that some events can be interpreted as both having and not having such an antecedent. However, the issue is more complicated. Spinoza, as has been recently discussed, does advocate a concept of Freedom, and identifies Reason and Will. Furthermore, his concept of conatus has a zone of indeterminacy--the endeavor to persist in being does not explain how an entity can seek to increase its strength. Meanwhile, despite his efforts to identify Pure Practical Reason and Free Will, Kant fails, eventually acknowledging that freedom of choice requires a notion of 'Will' that is distinct from Pure Practical Reason. But, one point of agreement seems to be that Practical Reason has the power to overcome heteronomous influences, whether it is the aroma of unhealthy food or money that a false promise could secure. Even in his inability to explain why his Principle of Pure Practical Reason can be motivationally compelling, Kant is implicitly agreeing with Spinoza that when it is so, it exercises a more powerful influence on an entity than a competing force. However, it is unclear if Kant would go so far as to agree with Spinoza that the resistance to Reason and an inadequate idea of a Rational principle are one and the same. Still, the two might agree that the categorical limits that Hume, for example, places on Reason is an arbitrary expression of contingent weakness.
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