Synaesthesia and Syn-kinaesthesia

Merleau-Ponty discovers that even specialized lived experience is fundamentally synaesthetic, which imparts a unity to it that precedes the reflective unification that the 'I think' reconstructs. That synaesthesia is experienced as a saturated Consciousness does not imply that it is incorporeal--Merleau-Ponty cites studies that show the body's complicity in the experience. However, his account fails to derive synaesthesia from the 'I can', which, as has been discussed, he, in places, establishes as the basic nature of Consciousness. Hence, the account abstracts from the contribution of motility to the experience. In contrast, a derivation from 'I can' would, at minimum, demonstrate that synaesthesia is primarily constituted by inchoate bodily motions, with the contribution of external objects to be further determined. As is, a term coined here, syn-kinaesthesia', seems to more accurately express the motile nature of the experience than does 'synaesthesia'.