Intentionality and Object

The central thesis of Intentionality is that Consciousness is intrinsically related to an object that is external to it. But, then, what is probably the most common characterization of that relation, namely, that Consciousness 'aims' at its object, if not outright undercuts the thesis, at least misleadingly represents it. For, that Consciousness aims at an object implies that it pre-exists the object, as, at most, a potential to aim, without a determinate target. Instead, the only way that having an object can be intrinsic to Consciousness is if it first arises in an encounter between a subject and an object, or if it is that encounter itself. Hence, Consciousness is primarily the revelation of resistance, e. g. even the perception of a color is primarily the experience of an impediment to more extensive vision. In other words, if Consciousness is intrinsically the Consciousness of an external object, and the Consciousness of an external object arises as an encounter with the latter, then Consciousness presupposes the locomotility of the subject of Consciousness, i. e. the motion to which an object presents resistance. Ironically, Sartre reproaches other Phenomenologists for ignoring the 'coefficient of adversity' that objects possess, i. e. their capacity to resist projects, without himself recognizing the fundamental role that their resistance plays in the very constitution of the Consciousness of them.