Consciousness, Habit, Space

At one point, Merleau-Ponty asserts that Consciousness is an 'I can' rather than an 'I think', a formulation which he attributes to Husserl. How the assertion is consistent with either any aspect of Husserl's theory, or his own thesis of the experiential primacy of Perception, is unclear. Regardless, the specific reference of the formulation is to Habit, which, according to Merleau-Ponty, is the intrinsic corporeal possession of knowing how to proceed, rather than the product of a visitation to a mechanical body by an incorporeal Consciousness supervening on it some theoretical knowledge. However, such an analysis seems unaware of Dewey's argument that even the most basic habit is the product of a shaping of an impulsion, which is more patent in the case of the cultivation of a new habit. So, for example, one's ability to walk towards someone else is preceded by the process of one's learning how to walk. Likewise, the concept of intra-subjective space precedes the concept of inter-subjective or objective space, confirming a point recently argued here.