Beyond the Gaze

The point of departure for Phenomenological processes is sometimes termed the 'Gaze', a descendant of Cartesian 'Thinking'. While the latter serves as a foundation for, primarily, Metaphysics and Epistemology, as well as their derivatives, Phenomenologists have expanded the scope of the Gaze to Ontology and Psychology, most notably. Despite its privileging by Husserl, the primacy of the Gaze is open to challenge from a variety of directions, e. g. that it is no more than a means to some other ends, that the visual metaphor is arbitrary, or that, as Husserl's occasional 'I turn my gaze to . . .' phrase implies, there is an 'I' that is even more fundamental than the Gaze. Regardless, the easy response for the Phenomenologist is that the source of these challenges is still the Gaze itself, seeking to expand its purview. But, such a response exposes a chronic blind spot in Phenomenology, and in the Contemplative tradition, in general. The Archimedean point of any such response, any argument defending the doctrine, any Phenomenological description is not the Gaze, but the attempt to articulate them, i. e. writing or speaking. In other words, it is not the Gaze that is the methodological foundation of Phenomenology, and of Philosophy, in general, but a corporeal, social action.