Consciousness, 'I Can', 'I Have'

Ordinary language expresses the proprietary character of 'I can' in three ways. First, 'I can' means that I 'have' an ability. Second, it implies that I 'have' previously exercised that ability. And, third, to have an ability is to possess a 'habit', which, as Merleau-Ponty notes, is etymologically related to 'have'. Hence, 'I can' is fundamentally 'I have', so, if as Merleau-Ponty asserts, Consciousness is 'I can', then, accordingly, it is fundamentally 'I have'. Likewise, as Bergson, pre-eminently establishes, Consciousness is not just passing observation, but a process of retention. Furthermore, that Consciousness is 'I have' is expressed by Kant, Hegel, Merleau-Ponty, and Deleuze, though less explicitly so by Sartre, when they ground Self-Consciousness in Self-Recognition, e. g. in the derivation of Self-Consciousness from the Consciousness of an object on the basis of the object's being 'mine'.