Writing and the Objectification of Language

The Use-Mention distinction is more than a topic in Philosophy of Language--the latter would seem to be impossible without it. For, any discussion of Language entails the using of Language to mention Language. Or, to put it another way, Philosophy of Language entails the objectification of Language. Now, how such objectification is even possible is unclear, i. e. the Referential function of Language falls short of explaining self-reference, as do the other usual characterizations of it--Sense, Extension, Intension, Denotation, Connotation, etc. Instead, a clue to its ground comes from ordinary linguistic activity, i. e. quoting objectifies what is quoted, and, indeed, the Mention of an expression relies on the same convention as quotation--the use of quotation marks. Even within speech, except for someone with great tonal flexibility, quotation is usually difficult to distinguish, so recourse to the expression 'quote. . . unquote' is the standard demarcation of objectification therein. Hence, it is in writing that the objectification of Language becomes fully possible, and, so, the basis of the Use-Mention distinction is the contrast between Speech and Writing. Frege and Russell are usually cited as the fathers of contemporary Philosophy of Language, but the thinker with the deepest understanding of Language is the one who has the greatest insight into the essence of Philosophy of Language. That would be someone generally marginalized by most followers of Frege and Russell, namely Derrida, the pioneer of the exploration of the distinction between Speech and Writing.