Wittgenstein, Games, and Tools

While attempting to defend his contention that 'game' is indefinable, Wittgenstein, at one point, entertains the objection that there must be some common characteristic possessed by all games. His response is an insistent "Don't think, look", thereby directing attention to what he believes is evidence that all activities called 'games' do not share something specific in common, but are merely linked by a system of loose resemblances. Now, as has been suggested here, a game is an activity performed for its own sake, but, to suspend that hypothesis, and to follow his instruction to instead "look", still leads to the conclusion that he fails to justify his use of Game as a metaphor for Language. For, looking at the main examples of 'language-games' presented in the Investigation, e. g. the interaction between a builder and an assistant, discovers nothing game-like about those activities. Instead, another metaphor, which he only briefly entertains, namely, words as tools, seems more suited to the examples that he presents. So, perhaps there is a case to be made for construing Language as a Game, but the Investigations is more coherent as a demonstration of an Instrumental theory of Language, and, as such, is no less an effective counter to the Logistic theory advanced by the Tractatus, Russell, etc.