Language and Extension

The most usual use of the term 'extension' in the context of Philosophy of Language is with respect to theory of Meaning. The 'extension' of a word is generally defined as the set of objects to which the word applies, in contrast with its 'intension', which is either a concept or an expression taken to be equivalent to the word. In some theories, extension is primary, and intension derivative, so they can be described as espousing an 'Extensional' theory of Meaning. This notion of 'extension' is clearly similar, if not equivalent, to 'reference', with the characterization that a word points to the objects to which it applies. Now, as previously discussed, the act of pointing presupposes an act of extension that precedes its referential function, namely the act of one's raising one's arm and straightening out a finger. The latter demonstrates a literal sense of 'extension', namely, someone's stretching themselves out beyond given parameters, which to theories such as Nietzsche's Will to Power, or Formaterial here, expresses a fundamental existential drive to extend oneself, e. g. The Material Principle, 'Exposition', in Formaterialism. Cartesian 'Extension' is nothing more than an hypostasization of this drive. Accordingly, Language, in general, is one mode, along with e. g. locomotility, of existenial Extensionalism. So, the extensional function of a Word is itself an extension of existential Extensionalism.