Meaning, Use, and Expression

In his Use theory of Meaning, Wittgenstein likens a word to a tool--the meaning of either is a function of its specific use in a context. Just as what as screwdriver is is determined by its use in the insertion or extraction of a screw, the word 'check' means one thing when uttered in a restaurant, another, during a chess match. But, there is more to the physical presence of a screwdriver than an edge which fits the notch on the head of a screw--it also has a handle. So, as the word 'handle' suggests, a screwdriver also physically signifies what not merely transcends any particular use, but what is presupposed by any use, namely, a hand that can wield it. Likewise, even a word outside of any context still bears some physical phonetic or graphic characteristic that befits its utterability, which, hence, signifies an utterer, even an indefinite one. So, because such meaningfulness not merely transcends any context, but is presupposed by any use of a word, i. e. by its utterability, it is beyond the scope of Wittgenstein's Use theory of Meaning. In contrast, Cassirer's Expression theory of Meaning can be extended to accommodate it. In the primitive structure of linguistic Expression, which Cassirer applies primarily to the study of the names of gods in Mythical experience, the god is taken as present in the name, so the signified is compresent with the sign. Likewise, the signifying of an utterer, or of a hand, is compresent in a word, or screwdriver, i. e. any word is not merely a sequence of sounds or scribbles, but is a signifier of an utterer, even an indefinite one. Therefore, Wittgenstein's Use theory of Meaning presupposes an Expression theory of Meaning.