Language and Games

Close to the outset of the Investigations, Wittgenstein explicitly defines "language-games" as "language, and the actions into which it is woven". In contrast, he not only never defines "game", but seems to argue that the indefiniteness of the concept is a virtue. Now, here, it has been previously suggested that one characteristic of a game is that it is an 'activity performed for its own sake', and a detailed explanation of 'for its own sake' has been offered. Still, if Wittgenstein were to remain dissatisfied with such a delimitation, if not outright definition, of 'game', he could not argue that crossword puzzles, acrostics, etc. are in fact called 'word-games'. Furthermore, Poetry, as an activity performed for its own sake, qualifies here, on the basis of that characteristic, as a 'language-game'. Such examples are in clear contrast with the uses of Language that Wittgenstein classifies as 'games', because the latter are explicitly non-linguistic activities in which Language serves an ulterior purpose. Even the use of Language in activities which are commonly classified as 'games', e. g. the call 'strike one' in baseball, is purposeful, and, hence, is not the performance of Language for its own sake. Thus, as provocative and as fruitful as Wittgenstein's notion of 'language-games' has proven to be, he falls short of justifying its classification of Language as a 'game'.