Will, God, Writing

According to Spinoza, every adequate idea has causal efficacy, and, so, initiates some action. Hence, his highest good, the intuition of God, is no terminal moment of disembodied contemplation, as he sometimes seems to suggest, and as he is sometimes interpreted as asserting. Rather, some action must ensue from that intuition, and, in Spinoza's case, it is likely that that action is the process of the writing of the Ethics, which is, thus, a product of that peak experience, and not a mere extrinsic representation of it. Now, a process of writing is impossible without what Spinoza calls 'Extension', or what here is the principle of Motility, Will. Hence, the Ethics demonstrates that the highest good consists in empowerment, not in enlightenment, i. e. consists in the performance of an action that has the characteristics of a divine performance, which would explain why a deity is sometimes credited with the writing of religious scripture. Of course, Spinoza is a unique Mode, so the writing of the Ethics is only one example of divinely-inspired action. More generally, the intuition of God transforms a Mode into an active participant in a divine/natural work-in-progress.

Will, God, Humpty Dumpty

Despite its originality and idiosyncrasies, e. g. its Pantheism and its Parallelism, Spinozism exemplifies a traditional paradigm that has been previously called here 'Humpty Dumptyism'--a program of first demeaning, and then overcoming, fragmentation. The pattern is evinced by Spinoza's diagnosis of corporeal individuality as the source of human suffering, with the mental integration with the rest of God/Nature as the cure. Implicit in that diagnosis is the judgment that the differentiation of Substance into discrete physical Modes constitutes a cosmic deterioration--i. e. substance is perfect, while Modes are imperfect--if not a calamity, a judgment shared by most systems, 'Eastern' and 'Western', Ancient and Modern. A more pious alternative would respect that differentiation as a positive cosmic development, a respect expressible in an associated ethical program by a cultivation of variation, not an escape from or a suppression of it. For example, here, the Material Principle, i. e. Becoming-Diverse, is equiprimordial and equi-valent with the Formal Principle, i. e. Becoming-the-Same, so the ethical program involved promotes a balanced combination of Will and Comprehension, the Material and Formal Principles, respectively, of the sphere of Personhood. An adjustment of Spinozism along analogous lines would begin with the recognition that the divine attribute Extension, understood as the dynamic process of Extending, is such a Material Principle.

Will and Immortality of the Soul

Despite his thesis of Mind-Body Parallelism, which holds that to every mental sequence there is a corresponding physical sequence, Spinoza allows for the survival of at least some ideas in a Mode on the occasion of corporeal death. However, he does not similarly acknowledge the survival of at least some bodily parts, each of which has its own 'mind', on that occasion, e. g. the skeleton. Thus lacking in his argument that Mind survives corporeal death, is any elaboration of the possessive pronoun, e. g. 'our', with which he qualifies 'Mind', thereby avoiding a possible trivialization of the purportedly most profound moment in his doctrine. In contrast, here, possession is a product of what has previously been called 'propriation', i. e. the process of interiorization effected by Comprehension. On that model, as has been previously discussed, the immediate matter of Comprehension is always Will, i. e. Motility. In other words, here, possession is a relation that is peculiar to a specific combination of the Formal and the Material principles of the system, namely, to the Comprehension-Will combination that constitutes Personhood. Thus, in contrast with Spinoza's line of reasoning, from the fact that possessiveness is the product of a combination of instances of impersonal processes, it does not follow that it transcends that combination, i. e. it does not follow that the combination that the produces it is a priori 'one's own', a point made in other terms by Kant, Heidegger, and Sartre, among others.

Will and Passivity

While in common parlance, 'passive' means 'inactive', for Spinoza, it means 'partially active', i. e. in definition II of book III of the Ethics, he asserts that being passive means "being only the partial cause". This concept of passivity thus entails that all behavior includes at least some contribution that originates in the performer, the degree of which can vary indefinitely, as the qualifier 'partially' connotes. Here, that irreducible variable factor is Will, i. e. even the most deeply ingrained habit is at least partially voluntary. For Spinoza, that factor is conatus, which is independent of its degree of contribution to some specific course of behavior.

Will and Adequacy

Spinoza's definition of an 'adequate' idea is seemingly paradoxical--such an idea has "all the marks of a true idea", independently of any correspondence to its object, which is the mark of a 'true' idea, according to the first book of the Ethics. Some prominent interpretations of this definition, e. g. Wolfson's and Deleuze's, speculate that the marks of adequacy are internal features such as certainty, clarity, distinctiveness, or expressiveness. However, none of these seems relevant to the distinctive internal structure of at least one example of an adequate idea that Spinoza presents--the genetic definition of Circle. Furthermore, those interpretations seem to ignore a fundamental respect in which an idea is 'true' in Spinoza's system--as an aspect of God's creativity. Accordingly, the distinctive mark of a true idea in a genetic definition is its formational role in the production of an object, a role which is independent of any correspondence to that object. So, since such production requires Motility, to which the formulation applies, one mark of a true idea in a Spinozistic adequate idea is its applicability to Will, the principle of Motility.

Will, Parallelism, Causality

Spinoza's Parallelism entails not only the simultaneity of the mental and the corporeal sequences, but their non-communication, as well. In other words, it entails, for example, that Mind is never the origin of Motility, which, he suggests, always has a physical cause, even if the mechanism involved remains undiscovered. In contrast, here, that explanation is not adequate enough to override the plain and familiar evidence that one can initiate a physiological process with a mental command, i. e. that Will, the principle of Motility in Experience, originates mentally and eventuates physiologically. Furthermore, Spinoza leaves unexamined how, in either sequence, one and the same element in the concatenation can be both cause and effect, i. e. can be first the effect of a prior cause, and then the cause of a subsequent effect. In contrast, here, a fundamental significance of the distinction between cause and effect is that the former initiates a sequence, while the latter terminates it, an irreducible distinction that is derived from that of the two principles of Experience, Will and Comprehension, respectively. So, insofar, as each of Spinoza's two sequences are causal concatenations, his Parallelism of Body and Mind presupposes, and abstracts from, a more fundamental interaction of the two.

Will, Mode, Alterity

For Spinoza, inter-Modal alterity is a potential source of harm to a Mode, correctable by Reason, which promotes inter-Modal commonality. In contrast, here, inter-personal alterity is an opportunity for personal growth, accomplished by the incorporation of a novel perspective into one's experience. That incorporation is a two-stage process, combining Will and Comprehension--the former effects an extending of oneself towards another, while the latter integrates what one encounters with the products of past experiences. Hence, such personal growth entails a process of active extending. In other words, Spinoza's lack of appreciation of the value of inter-Modal alterity is one consequence of his failure to develop a notion of active Modal Extension.

Will, Mode, Extension

For Spinoza, 'Ethics' is a program of a Mode's realization of its divine nature. That realization consists not, as it sometimes taken to be, in the cognition that it is natura naturata, i. e. a created being, but in its actualization of its creativity, i. e. as part of natura naturans. Now, since there are two aspects to one and the same process of God's creativity--Thought and Extension--Modal creativity, too, consists in both Thought and Extension. Thus, for example, the cultivation of active intellectual processes, i. e. Reason and Intuition is one dimension of a Mode's realization of its creative nature. However, Spinoza devotes little attention to the corresponding physiological dimension, a neglect typified by his continued rendering of that dimension of a Mode as 'Body', i. e. as a created static entity, with no consideration of the processes of the active extending aspect of creativity. In contrast, for example, here, Will, the principle of Extending in Experience, has been developed and examined in detail. So, in the absence of an analogous exposition, the culmination of Spinoza's program reduces to the achievement of a moment of immobile, if not disembodied, contemplation.

Will, Parallelism, Disembodiment

Spinoza seems to distinguish the process of intuiting that a circle is 'the figure described by the line whereof one end is fixed and the other free' from the process of drawing a circle in accordance with that intuition. It is perhaps such a distinction that informs his speculation that a Mind can survive the death of the Body, i. e. because the contrast exhibits the possibility of a disembodied mental act. However, the relation between such possible disembodiment and his Parallelism thesis--that a mental sequence and a physical sequence are two aspects of one and the same process--is unclear. One interpretation of the apparent inconsistency is that it demonstrates that the parallel of the two sequences is happenstance, and not necessary. For example, here, as has been previously discussed, Will and Comprehension, the two principles of Experience, occasionally coincide, but often do not. Thus, on that model, the drawing of a Circle in accordance with the idea of a Circle, combines two fundamentally distinct processes, one of which can produce an idea of a Circle without its necessarily being implicated with the Motility of drawing one.

Will, Parallelism, Joy

Spinoza's 'Parallelism' proposition, that 'the order and connection of ideas is the same as the order and connection of things', is, in his system, fundamentally a cosmological thesis, following from the status of Thought and Extension as two aspects of one and the same Substance. However, he, and many of his successors, tend to present it as an Epistemological principle, i. e. as a characterization of an 'adequate idea' as a representation that accurately corresponds to its object. The implicit de-emphasis, in the latter version of Parallelism, of the role of Body in experience, i. e. of the body of the subject of representation, becomes more blatant when he later proposes that a Mode can achieve joyous unity with God via a possibly incorporeal Intuition. In contrast, a notion of monadic Joy that is more consistent with Cosmological Parallelism is the achievement of exact Mind-Body coincidence in an experience. For example, here, peak experiences are constituted by the occasion of a balance, e. g. of simultaneity, between Will and Comprehension, the two fundamental principles of Experience, a balance that is exemplified by some artistic or athletic performances, ones that are sometimes characterized as 'divinely inspired'.

Will, Comprehension, Parallelism

Some events seem to exemplify Spinoza's 'parallelism' thesis that ' the order and connection of ideas is the same as the order and connection of things', e. g. the process of drawing a circle in accordance with the definition of a 'circle' as 'the figure described by any line whereof one end is fixed and the other is free'. However, other events seem to fail to exemplify the thesis, e. g. the sequence of events that transpires while the ideas 'praying to god' and 'it is raining' are successively occurring. Spinoza's accommodation of the latter possibility involves qualifying the thesis as applying to only adequate ideas, but another approach is to treat both the proposed rule and its apparent exception as special cases of how the two orders can be related. For example, here, Will and Comprehension, the two principles of Experience, can combine in an infinite variety of ways--often with either preceding the other, but, occasionally, they occur simultaneously, therein achieving what can also be characterized as 'parallel' ordering. Similarly, what Spinoza considers to be a necessary archetype may be only a contingent, albeit important, special case.

Will, Denial, Beneficial

Spinoza's use of 'will' seems equivocal insofar as he classifies conceiving an idea, and conceiving an idea as beneficial, each, as volitional. However, the two processes are apparently united by the implicit thesis that a true idea is necessarily a beneficial idea, so that to conceive an adequate idea is to conceive it as beneficial. However, remaining unexplained is, as has been previously argued, his classification of Denial as both volitional and an alternative to conceiving, which he identifies with Affirmation. That is, he leaves unexplained how it is possible to deny an adequate idea, a process which is not merely a systematic possibility, but is entailed as actual in the process, which he recognizes, of rejecting one beneficial idea in favor of a more beneficial one. In contrast, here, Will is the principle of Diversification. So, insofar as denial is abstracted from the process of positing an alternative, it is volitional. In contrast, because to conceive is to synthesize, it is an inverse of Will, and hence, is not volitional. Furthermore, to conceive an idea as beneficial entails the adoption of it as a plan of action, and, hence, presupposes Will qua Motility, as a distinct process. Finally, the conceiving of one idea as more beneficial than another entails the denial of the less beneficial of the two. So, the difficulties with Spinoza's theory of Will begin with his attempt to classify conceiving as a volitional process.

Will, Individuation, Mode

As has been previously discussed, Individuation is a two-stage process--indefinite diversification from some given, and specification. So, for example, on the Formaterial model, Individuation in Experience consists in an exercise of Will, i. e. in Motility, in combination with some determining plan of action. Similarly, Descartes' 'I am' is an Individuation of an entity--indeterminate 'I doubt' in combination with its representation as 'thinking being'. Accordingly, Spinoza's rejection of the first stage, i. e. of spontaneous volition, entails an undermining of a possible process of Individuation, thereby rendering his notion 'Mode' problematic. For, in the absence of a theory of Individuation, his modes are Schopenhauerian illusions, not concrete expressions of his 'substance'.

Will, Affirmation, Denial

Spinoza argues, apparently against Descartes, that a dubious perception is only an inadequate one, i. e. it is not the product of some power of 'free will' that has the capacity to suspend judgment regarding the truth of a perception. On the other hand, he elsewhere classifies the capacity to affirm or deny as 'volitional'. Hence, the relation between the power that he rejects and the capacity that he recognizes is unclear, as is the basis of the "or" that relates affirmation and disjunction. Furthermore, his equating of affirmation with conceiving, a synthesizing process that, fundamentally, represents bodily modification, leaves unexplained the constitution of a corresponding process of denial. Hence, he does not consider that, as is proposed here, 'denial' is an abstraction from Will, the process of diversification in Experience, and is, therefore, volitional, whereas affirmation is not. Accordingly, he does not consider that affirmation and denial are alternatives only insofar as denial is the generation of an alternative to some affirmation.

Will and Questioning

The process of Questioning has more in common with Descartes' procedure than does the common notion of doubting, i. e. it is intellectually methodical, as opposed to a vague feeling of unease. Questioning also exhibits some of the characteristics of Will, as conceived here. First, it spontaneously diverges from some given. Second, it is not necessarily a teleological process, i. e. while in many cases it eventuates in an answer, in others it does not, and need not. Third, on the other hand, it more immediately admits of formal causality, i. e. insofar as some interrogative pattern provides it with a definite structure. Finally, it often activates further processes, e. g. inquiry. As such, Questioning has more in common with Lucretian Swerve than with Heideggerian Ontological Call.

Will and Soul

Descartes' characterization of 'thinking being' as 'mind' or 'soul' constitutes, conversely, a re-definition of the traditional concepts of the latter. At the same time, the term that he uses for it, 'animus', perhaps inadvertently indicates that he is less conscientious than are his philosophical and theological forerunners in explaining how mind animates body, e. g. the Meditations lacks any discussion of Motility. Deriving 'I think' from 'Agito', i. e. from 'I activate' is a promising step in providing such an explanation, but one that is ultimately abortive insofar as he adheres to a separation of mind and body. In contrast, for example, Will, the principle of Motility here, is a unitary process that originates mentally and eventuates physiologically, i. e. is a process that is prior to any mind-body severance. Thus, while Descartes' concept of soul is innovative, it is also enervated.

Will, Existence, Essence

The contrast between Existence and Essence is often presented as that between 'that one is' and 'what one is'. As such, therefore, they stand in a Matter-Form relation. Now, in Formaterialism, the Material Principle of Experience is Will. Accordingly, 'I exist' is equivalent to 'I will'. Furthermore, in the system, the Material Principle and the Formal Principle are equiprimordial. Hence, in it, unlike in some others, neither Existence nor Essence in principle precedes the other.

Will, I Think, I Am

'A, ergo B' usually signifies a relation of inclusion obtaining between a property represented in A and a property represented in B. Accordingly, Descartes' 'I think, therefore I am' actually expresses a relation of inclusion between two attributes of 'I'--'a thinking being' and 'am'--which he derives from the sundering of the unitary process 'I think' into 'I' and 'think'. If so, then though the explicit sequence of his project is, first, the establishment 'that I am', and, then, the determination of 'what I am', the latter implicitly precedes the former. One alternative case in which the inference is valid is when A and B are identical. For example, insofar as Cogito is, as has been previously discussed, a mode of Will, the assertion that 'I am' and 'I think' are equivalent could be an expression of the thesis that to Exist is to Will, i. e. that to Exist is an indefinite dynamic process, a 'that' that indeed precedes, in the order of Descartes' presentation, its 'what'. However, it seems unlikely that this is the interpretation that he intends.

Will and Teleological Doubt

Peirce conceives the relation between Doubt and Belief as teleological--the former is a condition of cognitive dissonance, the latter one of cognitive consonance, and the former seeks the latter. Now, Descartes seems likely to be suffering from a theological crisis, at least part of the root of which is the cognitive dissonance occasioned by the irreconcilability of dogmatic Medieval Cosmology and Copernican Heliocentrism. So, given that that dissonance motivates a procedure that eventuates in his affirmation that God exists, it can be classified as 'Teleological Doubt'. In contrast, his methodological Doubt can be classified as 'Material'. For, that method is implicated in a second procedure, one that is a descendant of Stoic Detachment and a forerunner of Husserlian Epoche--the process of self-dissociation from the world. That process, as has been previously discussed, is effected by Will, the principle of Diversification in Experience, and, hence, by a Material Principle, in a system in which 'Material' means 'becoming-diverse'. Accordingly, the arrival of the belief 'I am a thinking being', in the context of Descartes' exercise of Material Doubt, is not a teleological outcome, but is an intervention effected by a distinct principle, the Formal Principle of the system. In other words, the Meditations entails two projects--the resolution of theological confusion, and the search for an epistemological foundation--which do not coincide as well as Descartes presumes them to.

Will and the Doubting of Doubt

The logical soundness of Descartes' pivotal assertion 'I cannot doubt that I am doubting' entails simultaneity, i. e. that 'I doubt' and 'I am not doubting' cannot both occur at the same time. So, insofar as Descartes does indeed make the assertion on logical grounds, the proposition is vulnerable to the phenomenological challenge that doubting, and the attempt to doubt that doubting, are, in fact, successive, not simultaneous, events. However, the phenomenological report is inaccurate, so the challenge is flawed. For, as previously discussed, the proper object of doubt is a belief, i. e. the actual experiential sequence is: 1. doubt the belief of X, 2. believe not-X, 3. doubt the belief that not-X, rather than: 1. doubt X, 2. doubt the doubting of X, as the standard phenomenological report has it. Thus, a third interpretation of Descartes' assertion is that it unwittingly expresses his discovery that he cannot doubt in the absence of some affirmation. On that interpretation, underlying the discovery is the realization that Doubting, as a mode of Will, the principle of indeterminate Diversification in Experience, lacks the capacity to generate a determinate Belief. Accordingly, the lacuna in Descartes' procedure is his transition from 'I doubt' to 'I am a thinking being', which requires straying from the method to which he has adhered until that point.

Will, Doubt, Ontological Difference

Descartes' assertion, 'I cannot doubt that I am doubting', can be interpreted either as phenomenological or as logical, i. e. either as 'Despite all my efforts . . . ', or as 'It is contradictory that . . . '. That he does not, in the course of his project, submit Logic to Doubt suggests that the latter is his ambition. If so, then Heidegger's interpretation of him as a 'subjectivist' misses the mark, i. e. Descartes is not, contrary to that interpretation, asserting that he is the measure of his existence, or of any existence that can be inferred from it. That interpretation misses the mark because of the one-sidedness of the criterion on which its is based, i. e. Heidegger's 'Ontological Difference', the attention of which is to the appropriation of beings by Being, to the neglect of, and, perhaps, with the suppression of, the inverse, namely, the differentiation of beings from Being. Hence, Heidegger does recognize Will, the principle of Differentiation in Experience, of which Cartesian Doubting is an example.

Will, Comprehension, I

Descartes' assertion 'I am' seems to beg the question, since 'I can doubt' is one of his premises. Regardless, it is his other conclusion, namely 'I am a thinking being', that has generated controversy over the subsequent centuries. As, perhaps, Kant best shows, the problem is not whether or not the I exists, but what the I is, for, e. g. in his system, it can denote a synthesis of appearances, the synthesizer of appearances, or the initiator of a physiological process. Similarly, Formaterialism's recognition of two I's--the origin of Will and the terminus of Comprehension--on the grounds that there are some irrefutable features of ordinary experience that 'I' denotes, the nature or natures of which are open to further clarification, suffices to establish the existence of an I.

Will, Comprehension, Habit

According to the Formaterial model of Experience, Will exceeds its antecedents, while Comprehension, in its fundamental homeostatic function, restores connection of the novelty with the given, e. g. via a plan of action the first moment of which is the given situation that Will exceeds. Now, Repetition, as has been previously discussed, can be analyzed as a case of minimal differentiation, i. e. because a second cycle is distinct from a previous one. It can, thus, also be understood as a combination of Difference and Sameness in which the latter predominates. Now, 'a' habit is, in fact, a generalization of a repetition of a behavioral sequence. Hence, Habit is an experiential episode constituted by a predominance of Comprehension over Will.

Will and Individuation

While adolescence is typically characterized as a general rebellion against upbringing, adulthood is achieved by the subsequent assumption of some definite social role, perhaps one that had previously been the target of rebellion. Similarly, Descartes' general doubt is followed by his commitment to a specific set of beliefs. Formaterialism recognizes, in each case, the two-stage pattern of 'Individuation'--the first stage effecting indefinite divergence from the given, the second achieving determinacy by the selection of one of the alternatives opened up by the indefinite divergence. Furthermore, the system recognizes Individuation as more than a phase of personal development or as the structure of a pivotal work in the history of Philosophy. Individuation is a fundamental rhythm of Experience--Will exceeds given circumstances, and becomes concrete action with the choice of a plan of action.

Will, Doubt, Pain

It seems easier to doubt the existence of a distant, contained fire than of that consuming the stake to which one is tethered. To someone in the latter plight, the most immediate likely options are to either recant one's heresy or to resist the compulsion. In contrast, the exercise of Cartesian Doubting, is, in the context, at best a feeble third possibility. But, if so, then it is revealed as a volitional alternative to either eliminating or enduring the cause of suffering. So, if Descartes had applied his method to the extreme agony, he might have arrived at the indubitability of 'I will'.

Will, Certainty, Autonomy

While Descartes presents his project as a quest for Certainty, it can also be interpreted in Ethical terms--a quest for, in Spinozistic terms, Adequacy, or in Kantian terms, Autonomy--an interpretation encouraged by Descartes' own ascription of Doubting to a process derived from 'Agito', i. e. 'I activate'. Accordingly, the pivotal transition from the certainty of 'I think' to that of 'I am a thinking being', can also be interpreted as autonomy-preserving, i. e. as a transition from an active process to an active idea. Hence, insofar as a belief that Descartes proceeds to derive from that foundation maintains Certainty, the adoption of the belief for practical purposes is guaranteed to be autonomous, though Spinoza and Kant, as well as Aristotle, develop other principles of Autonomy, i. e. the idea of God, the law of Practical Reason, and the Golden Mean, respectively. Here, the thesis that 'Will is the immediate matter of Comprehension' is an analogous attempt. For, the positing that Belief functions fundamentally in combination with the exercise of Will, establishes it as primarily at the service of the Voluntary principle of Experience.

Will, Impulse, Habit, Doubt

For Dewey, Impulse is both a constituent of, and a breaker of, Habit--as a plastic force Impulse can be organized into a repeatable behavioral pattern, but as fundamentally independent of any organizational influence, it can break free of any established pattern. Now, Descartes' ascription of Doubting to Cogito, derived from Agito, suggests that it is a species of Impulse. Furthermore, here, Impulse is interpreted as Will, and is classified as a Material Principle, with the imparting of determinacy to it the effect of its accompanying Formal Principle. In those terms, the system of beliefs that Descartes eventually establishes and develops--starting with 'I am a thinking being', and proceeding to 'God exists', Mathematical propositions, etc.--are adoptable Formal Causes. Hence, the arc of the Meditations can be interpreted in terms of Impulse--from the Habit-breaking of Doubting to the Habit-formation that begins with 'I am a thinking being'.

Will, Doubt, Habit

Descartes' exercise in Doubt is offered, and is usually interpreted, in Epistemological and Metaphysical terms, i. e. as a demonstration that 'I think' is the basis of Knowledge, and that Mind and Body are separate. However, with a different set of premises, the project takes on Psychological and Moral significance. For, given that sense-experience is belief about sensory input, that such belief is part of the formation of a plan of action, and that doubt is effected, as Descartes himself implies, by Agito, then such Doubting effects a disruption of behavior, i. e. it is nascent digression from a course of action that would begin with one's current circumstances. More precisely, insofar as Action combines Will and Comprehension, i. e. combines indeterminate Motility and some cognitive representation that imparts structure to it, Doubting disengages the former from the latter, thereby dismantling Action. Thus, insofar as Doubting can disrupt behavior, it can disrupt habitual behavior, which has Psychological significance, and insofar as habitual behavior is undesirable, Moral significance.

Will and Belief

James' notion 'Will to Believe' is often regarded as conflicting with his Pragmatism. For, while the notion entails a leap of faith, without evidence, to the affirmation of the proposition 'God exists', the Pragmatist concept of Truth requires the verifiability of an assertion, the possibility of which seems lacking in James' expression of religious belief. His main defense, that that proposition is a working hypothesis, still does not explain how it can be tested, but, furthermore, it reflects a deeper problem for him--that while he and his pioneering colleagues have formulated a distinctive Pragmatist criterion of Truth, they, nevertheless, continue to accept, from a tradition from which they otherwise divergence, the concept of 'belief' as fundamentally truth-aspirational. In contrast, here, a Belief functions primarily as structurer of Will, i. e. it provides indeterminate Motility with organization, thereby resulting in concrete action. Thus, on this model, to believe that 'God exists' is to adopt it as a plan of conduct, one that might, e. g. influence how one treats others. So, a Belief, in this sense, can be evaluated in terms of, for example, effectiveness, but whether or not it is 'true' has no meaning in the context. Hence, Belief, as a determinant of Will, is more authentically pragmatic than a psychological state that aspires to Truth.

Will and Non Sequitur

'Non sequitur' literally means 'does not follow', but in some contexts, e. g. in Logic, it means, more precisely, 'does not follow according to the rules'. By contrast, in other contexts, it is not necessarily a lapse, for a well-placed non sequitur can enhance an artistic or a comedic project. Furthermore, where it is taken intellectually seriously is as a Zen Koan, by which a teacher attempts to stimulate the wakefulness of a student. This provocative capacity of a non sequitur is not as extrinsic as it can seem. For, it is a pure expression of Will, the principle of Variation in Experience, and, hence, as such, it can occasion the disruption of automatic thinking patterns, and of mechanical behavior, in general. It is thus a virtue of a non sequitur that it eludes formularization.

Will and Negation

In systems of Dialectics, doubting is a species of Negation, which, in coordination with a synthesizing process, i. e. Sublation, produces Absolute Knowledge. For Dialectical Materialists, thinking is, essentially, negative--it negates existing 'material' conditions, i. e. it expresses a conflict with them. Implicit in this Materialist concept of Negation is the notion of obliteration. Now, while obliteration can be glossed as the absolute elimination of its object, in actuality, the destruction of something does not effect its complete disappearance, but consists in the transformation of it into another state, e. g. to ashes or to dust. In other words, obliteration in experience is never more than a variation of conditions, which requires Will, the principle of Diversification. Accordingly, Dialectical 'Negation' is a mode of volitional thinking, just as 'the negation of X' always means ' other than X'.

Will, Thinking, Counter-Example

While Descartes holds that volition and thought are distinct processes, for Spinoza, they are one and the same. Now, insofar as, Will is a principle of Diversification, as it is defined here, and 'thinking' is a process of synthesizing, volition and thought are not only distinct, but are inversely related. On the other hand, insofar as Exteriorization is, following Levinas, experiential Diversification, and Cartesian doubting is a departure from the given, 'thinking' qua 'Cartesian doubting' is volitional. Likewise for Spinozistic 'thought', insofar as it is conceived as deduction, emanation, or expressive, each of which entails the explication of what is implicit in God, i. e. explication is a type of exteriorization. However, both varieties of thinking remain circumscribed by the scope of the given that they modify. In contrast, a more decisive transgression of the given is effected by the thinking that generates counter-examples, a truly agitative process that not only introduces a rogue element, but often provokes a subsequent quest for a more comprehensive theory that can better accommodate the novelty. Such 'thinking' better exemplifies the concept of Will than does that of either Descartes or Spinoza.

Will, Doubt, Belief

While walking, one might pause because one suddenly suspects that the pavement directly ahead might be covered in black ice. Entailed in that hesitation is--an impulse to step, a belief that the pavement ahead is as stable as that behind has been, and a doubt that the pavement ahead is as stable as it appears to be. By comparison, Descartes' doubt that his situation is as it appears to be is exposed as abstracting not only from some ongoing Motility, but from the context of the appearance--that it is the content of a belief. In other words, the immediate object of Cartesian doubt is not some data, but some belief regarding that data, a belief that is in the service of Motility. Thus, by suppressing the role of Belief in his meditative scenario, Descartes effects the abstraction of Intellect from its more fundamental function as a structurer of Will. Similarly, just as the hesitancy to step is a prelude to skirting the patch, the doubt of given data is an abstraction from nascent variation of Motility, and is not the effecting of detachment from corporeality, as Cartesianism and other doctrines have it.

Will, Epistemology, Foundationalism

Many of Descartes' successors disagree with his thesis that 'I am a thinking being' is the basis of Knowledge. Nevertheless, they remain Cartesians insofar as they conceive Philosophy fundamentally as a project of Epistemological Foundationalism, and insofar as they accept sedentary meditation as the prototype of Philosophical activity. Now, just as every sound itinerary begins with one's current location, every sound plan of action entails a perception of one's given situation. In other words, sedentary meditation is abstracted from its organic involvement in Motility, i. e. from its role in supplying the intellect with information that is essential to its structuring of Motility. Thus, the tradition of Epistemological Foundationalism--Rationalism, Empiricism, Phenomenology, etc.--presupposes and abstracts from the functioning of Will, the self-activation principle of Experience.

Will, Intellect, Praxis

To prove, against Hume, that Causality consists in more than a conjunction of images, Kant contrasts an 'objective' succession of images with a 'subjective' one--the former can not be experienced as otherwise, while the latter can be. In other words, the order of the objective succession is necessary, while that of the subjective one is not, and, that order is determined by a rule. However, he does not entertain that the objective succession might have been otherwise, e. g. something that rotates clockwise, rather than counterclockwise. Furthermore, he does not consider how the subjective succession per se is rule-governed--even if I might have walked counterclockwise around an object, insofar as I do walk clockwise around it, my Motility is rule-governed, i. e. is governed by the plan of action 'walking clockwise around the object'. This neglect is characteristic of the entire Cartesian meditative tradition--the failure to consider the role of Intellect in ordering Will qua Motility. If he had been interested in the intellectual structure of Action, Kant might have devised a set of Categories for Practical Reason.

Will, Doubt, Aporia

Descartes' demonstration of the unreliability of the senses is easily interpreted as a continuation of the Platonist tradition. However, a more careful examination of his philosophical DNA suggests a different genealogy. His 'I am certain that I am a doubting being' is more immediately akin to Socrates' 'I know that I know nothing', which might have become more generally recognized if he, too, had maintained his original impiety, i. e. doubting theological dogma, in the face of a likely stake-burning. Entailed in that recognition is a possible comparison of Cartesian Doubt with Socratic Aporia, revealing, for example, the former as an active version of the latter. It also involves the reminder that the immediate matter of Cartesian Knowledge is the process of Doubting, i. e. that the foundation of Knowledge is Will, the source of Doubting.

Will, Method, Meditation

Any plan of action, just like any itinerary, begins with one's current circumstances, and provides a structure to Will, i. e. to the Motility involved in the action. Now, a method is just a generalized plan of action, and an analysis of a method could be called a 'discourse' on it. In contrast, to 'meditate' connotes to 'calmly reflect', which can thus be sharply distinguished from 'cogito', derived from 'agito', i. e. from Descartes' original characterization of his method. In other words, Descartes' project can be divided into two phases--the first, in which he analyzes the structures of action, and the second, in which he calmly reflects on those structures. Subsequently, the rubric 'Cartesian' becomes attached to those structures insofar as they are objects of meditation, not insofar as they are structures of Volition.

Will, Doubt, Practical Reason

Kant's 'I think', meaning 'I synthesize', is the inverse of Descartes' 'I think', meaning the dissociative 'I doubt'. On the other hand, his 'I reason', meaning 'I detach myself from an intention', parallels Descartes' 'I detach myself from a perception'. These, more precisely, are based on the possibility of doing otherwise, and of perceiving otherwise, respectively. So, while Kant shows more explicitly than does Descartes that Doubting is an expression of Will, Descartes' accepts the validity of his principle as self-evident, i. e. he adopts it as a method without either defending its possibility, or casting it as an objective rational law, as Kant does.

Will and Skepticism

The ancient Skeptics, e. g. Zeno, were Parmenideans whose methods were in the service of Stasis and Unity. That Cogito is rooted in Agito reveals that Descartes is not one such Parmenidean, but a bold adventurer with allegiances elsewhere. For, he can be regarded as a Heraclitean attempting to determine if one can swim in the same water twice, with the discovery that one remains the same swimmer even if the water does not remain the same water. What follows from that discovery is the establishment of the seaworthiness of other stable structures, especially of beliefs such as the existence of God and the principles of Mathematics. He thus demonstrates that Skepticism is rooted in dynamic Will, not in static Cognition.

Will, Doubt, Modality

Descartes' unquestioning acceptance of logical principles, in combination with his methodological emphasis on 'can' doubt and on certainty, suggests that his deity is a modalized version of the Logos. For example, the various objects of doubt are Possible, the ongoing 'I think' event is Actual, and the hypostasized 'I am a thinking being', of which he is certain, is Necessary. These classifications are derived from the previously discussed modality of Volition, in which Will opens up indefinite possibilities of Motility, one of which determinate structure actualizes, and the settled past, as immutable, is a necessary precondition of all that ensues. One implication of this analysis is that the 'God' that Descartes proves to be the cause of his existence is Necessary only insofar as it is part of his immutable past, i. e. he proves only that that God must have once existed, not that it exists eternally. This implication conforms to one involving the more conventional concept of Necessity, i. e. Descartes does not show that this 'God' exists at a world where no thinking transpires.

Will, Doubt, Logic

With his doubt of Mathematics, Descartes' investigation surpasses the sphere of sensory information. However, he leaves unquestioned at least some of the principles of Logic. The thesis that he cannot doubt that he is doubting presupposes the validity of the Law of Contradiction, as does his reliance throughout on inferences, including those involved in his proofs of the existence of God. Without such presuppositions, his method illustrates the Logic of Will--indefinite diversification.

Will. Cogtio, Mathematics

As previously discussed here, the quantification of Will is not an extrinsic contrivance, but is an expression of the essence of Volition. For, quantification is a product of Counting, and Counting entails the generation of novel units, which is effected by Will, the principle of Diversification in Experience. Now, to doubt is to diversify, i. e. 'I doubt X' means 'X may be otherwise than it seems to be'. Hence, Cogito is, likewise, intrinsically quantifiable. Thus, Descartes has the resources to derive Mathematics without the mediation of the belief that God would not deceive him about the truth of its propositions.

Will, Doubt, God

Descartes' eventual assertion that God is not a deceiver, leaves his previous Doubting without a divine source. In other words, his proof that God is the cause of his existence does not suffice as a proof of that God is the cause of his self-evident ability to originally doubt that God is not a deceiver. In contrast, Spinoza distinguishes God qua natura naturans from God qua creator of Modes, and Nietzsche distinguishes Dionysus from Apollo. Common to each of the former of the two pairs is that they entail volition, in one sense or another. Likewise, Cartesian Doubting is a mode of Will, as defined here--a process of diverging from the given, which, as has been previously discussed is accurately expressed in the literal meaning of 'cogito', i. e. 'I activate myself'. However, here, Will is a special case of the Material Principle of the system, whereas, without a demonstration of how doubting the honesty of God is a gift of God, Cartesian doubting remains impious.

Will, Certainty, God

Since valid proof is truth-preserving, it is also certainty-preserving. Thus, Descartes adheres, at least in principle, to his method, as he first certifies 'I am', and then, derives from it 'God exists'. At that juncture, however, he abandons any method, by first affirming that 'God is good', and, then, that 'A good God would not deceive me'. The first is problematic, since he has not submitted 'is good' to any methodical examination. The second is problematic, since, even granting the first, that a good God would not deceive him for his own good is groundless. Now, it is unclear whether Descartes' acceptance at this juncture of dogma that he had previously called into question is sincere or is an expression of prudence under hostile conditions. Regardless, what he demonstrates is that what he henceforth accepts--the laws of Mathematics, the existence of the physical world, etc.--are meaningful only as the beliefs of an cogitating 'I', i. e. as structures that supply Will with determinacy.

Will and Certainty

Descartes' inference from 'I think' to 'I am' suppresses a transition from 'I think' to 'I am a thinking being', a transition which plainly entails a reification of the preceding process of Doubting that 'I think' denotes. Now, reification fixes what it refies, and, hence, makes it certain. In other words, in the suppressed transition, Descartes demonstrates a power to certify that is as native as is the ability to doubt. These two powers are manifestations of the two fundamental principles of Experience--Will, which effects Uncertainty, and Comprehension, which, as the example shows, effects Certainty.

Will, Cogito, Dualism

Descartes cannot doubt 'Cogito', which, as has been discussed, means 'I set myself in motion'. Thus, the only corporeality that he can doubt is a representation of body, not any involved in Motility. Similarly, the duality that he establishes is that of Will, the source of Motility, and Representation. Thus, to characterize that duality as Body-Mind entails the problematic classification of Thinking as a non-mental process. In contrast, on the model being developed here, the duality of Will and Representation is that of Material Cause-Formal Cause, with each entailing both a Mental pole and a Corporeal pole.

Will, Doubt, Think

Descartes' project in the Meditations is based on the premise that Doubting and Knowing are both species of Thinking. In contrast, according to the model of Experience being developed here, they are incommensurate with one another--Doubting is a discrescent process, while Knowing is concrescent. That is, according to this model, Doubting is a mode of the Material Principle of Experience, i. e. of Will, and Knowing is a mode of its Formal Principle, i. e. of Comprehension. On that basis, Descartes' inferences, first from 'I doubt' to 'I think', and then from 'I think' to 'I know', entail an equivocation. In particular, insofar as 'cogito', derived from 'agitare', as has been previously discussed, means 'I set in motion', the second inference, which initiates the constructive phase of the Meditations, remains ungrounded.

Will and Cogito

'Cogito' derives from 'co-agitare', with 'agitare' meaning 'to set in motion'. But, setting oneself in motion is Motility, and Motility is Will. Thus, 'cogito ergo sum' , at bottom, means 'I will, therefore I am', with the standard 'I think' losing the dynamic connotation of 'I cogitate'.

Will, Doubt, Morality

According to the standard modern interpretation of the passage in the Republic best known as 'Plato's Cave', its main theme is Epistemological, i. e. it demonstrates the unreliability of sense information. However, given the contrast in the passage between the Good and the chains of conditioned behavior, the broader topic is plainly Moral. The progenitor of that modern interpretation is Descartes, when, instead of pursuing a Moral theme in the Discourse and the Meditations, he concerns himself with the establishment of Knowledge. That is, instead of 'I can doubt that X is true', he might have examined 'I can doubt that X is good', by which he could have detached himself from heteronomous influences, e. g. from received dogma, as well as from external stimuli. The two projects have the same basis--Doubt is an expression of the ability to do otherwise, i. e. of Will, as has been previously discussed. So, with a subtle inflection he could have explored detaching himself from a set of practices, rather than from one of cognitions.

Will, Dubitability

As Sartre, notably, emphasizes, what Descartes asserts is not 'I doubt', but 'I can doubt'. Hence, what he establishes as indubitable is not that he doubts but that he can doubt. Now, an ability to doubt entails an ability to consider that a situation is otherwise than it is given to be, which entails an ability to modify the situation, e. g. that one may be dreaming entails that one can wake up and discover oneself to be lying in a bed, and to be not sitting in a chair in front of a fire. So, Descartes' 'method of Doubt' entails Will, i. e. an ability to change a given situation.

Will, Method, Power

Descartes' establishment of a foundation of Knowledge is preceded by his adoption of a method that empowers him to effect that establishment. Like, any method, his supplies the raw energy of Will with determinacy, thereby facilitating concrete performance. In other words, the fundamental principle of his doctrine is 'I can, therefore I am', from which he abstracts his more famous thesis. His empowerment is the real inception of Modern Philosophy--a liberation from Medieval dogmatism, even if not necessarily from the theological substance of that dogma. But, it is not Doubt per se that is the source of that liberation--that freedom is already accomplished by his adoption of and commitment to his own method.

Will and Method

Though Descartes is widely recognized as the 'father of Modern Philosophy', probably a majority of his successors do not accept his principle 'I think, therefore I am'. Under-appreciated is that that principle is the product of a more fundamental innovation--his making Method an explicit Philosophical topic. Indeed, his true legacy seems to be his 'Methodism', which is pervasive in Rationalism, Empiricism, Criticalism, Dialecticism, Phenomenology, Pragmatism, etc., regardless of the status of 'I think, therefore I am' in a doctrine. Now a method is opposed to haphazard procedure, or, in other words, it supplies otherwise indeterminate Will with structure. Furthermore, since a commitment to a method supersedes any results, Methodism is independent of Teleology. Thus, the Formaterial model of Experience being developed here codifies what has perhaps been the central implicit theme of the post-Cartesian era.

Will, Schematization, Intelligent Behavior

Traditional concepts of intelligent behavior seem to have it as consisting of a conjunction of two distinct components, a means and an end, derived from two different sources, reason and instinct, respectively. Now, while a journey might be casually characterized as consisting of a route and a destination, it is inarguable that, in actuality, it originates with a first step from a given location, guided by some plan, the initial stage of which is a representation of that location. Likewise, intelligent behavior, in actuality, combines Will, as originating Motility, and a Schematized Intention, the first moment of which is a representation of one's given situation. Furthermore, just as travel entails these initial components whether or not some pre-set destination is arrived at, the achievement of a pre-set goal is extrinsic to intelligent behavior. In other words, the traditional teleological model of intelligent behavior abstracts from the Will-Schematization combination of actual intentional conduct.

Will, Intention, Schematization

An Intention is a plan for Motility, and a plan, at some point is originally devised. Any such process of devising is, at least in part, improvised, and, hence, as has been previously discussed, entails Schematization, for its coherence. Hence, any intentional behavior, premeditated, or otherwise, combines Will, i. e. Motility, and Schematization.

Will, Schematization, Experience

Kant's Schematism 'temporalizes' his Categories, thereby facilitating their application to empirical cognitive processes, which he also temporalizes. Those Categories are, thus, presumably applicable to similarly temporalized 'spatial' representations. However, his temporalization of 'space' does not touch upon the Spatialization that, as has been previously explained here, first produces Space, and cannot touch upon it, because Spatialization and Temporalization are inverse processes. Accordingly, the Schematization of Will, the process of Spatialization in Experience, involves not a mediation, but a coordination of two independent principles, a coordination that is part fortuitous, part cultivable. Unlike the Kantian concept of 'experience', which is merely cognitive, the model of Experience being developed here entails Motility, and is truly binary, combining, without mediation, Will and Schematism, with neither, in principle, reducible to nor subordinate to the other.

Will and Schematization

Will indeterminately diversifies the course of Experience, requiring, in order to become actualized as a concrete performance, structuring. Usually, the representation of a purpose serves as such an organizing influence, thereby encouraging the traditional subordination of Formal Causality to Teleological Causality. However, the example of an improvising musician demonstrates the independence of the former from the latter--the player produces new notes while, concomitantly, organizing the flow, without any prepared arrangement to satisfy--an example that can be generalized to the performance of any type of act. This process of creative structuring can be called 'Schematization', evoking the Kantian Schematism, which, as either subordinate to the Understanding, or as 'free', is, however, cognitive, only. In other words, Kant does not consider that Schematization is effective in a motile context, combining with Will to produce concrete action, nor does he consider that cognitive Schematism might be a special case of motile Schematization.

Will, Voluntary, Retribution

'Voluntary', as distinguished from 'involuntary', is primarily a category in a system of Retributive Justice, i. e. the drawing of the distinction functions as a determination of class of culpability, and, hence, of the type of punishment to be meted out. In contrast, 'voluntary', as admitting degrees of variation, is an element in Ethical evaluation, with Ethics understood as a program of self-cultivation. Self-cultivation produces what has previously here been termed Evolvement, i. e. personal growth, which entails the exercise of Will, the principle of Excession in Experience. Since one can evolve to a greater or lesser degree in a specific experience, Will can be exercised to a greater or lesser extent in it. So, since 'voluntary' pertains to the exercise of Will, an act can, for purposes of Ethical evaluation, be characterized as more or less voluntary. Thus, insofar as jurisprudential assessment recognizes the possibility of mitigating circumstances in the performance of an act, its use of 'voluntary' acknowledges its Ethical sense, but simplifies it for the convenience of retributive processes.

Will, Voluntary, Variation

According to the traditional concept of 'free will', any exercise of 'will' is ex nihilo, and, hence, the sufficient cause of any ensuing act. In contrast, here, Will is the Material Principle of Experience, i. e. its principle of Diversification, and, hence, effects a variation of given circumstances. In other words, an act that ensues from an exercise of Will incorporates the variation into those circumstances. So, unlike a 'free' act, a 'voluntary' act does not preclude the contribution to it of preceding conditions, which might complicate an attempt to attribute responsibility, but accurately reflects the details of Experience.

Will, Voluntary, Spinozism

According to Spinoza, Reason is volitional, and is free of external influence. Hence, the standard characterization of him as denying the existence of Free Will is inaccurate. What he does reject is the possibility of Will qua Motility, as well as that of the voluntariness of any apparent spontaneity of locomotion. However, he does allow that a Mode can, via an Adequate Idea, cause not only the maintaining of its strength, but of its increase of strength, as well. Hence, God/Nature must possess the capacity to increase strength. But, an increase entails a novelty in relation to what precedes it, while Reason can only derive what is implicit in its antecedents. Now, one source of such novelty is Modal Motility. So, in the absence of a better explanation, Spinoza's system can be interpreted as entailing personal non-rational voluntary processes.

Will, Voluntary, Imperative

Central to Kant's doctrine is the distinction between a 'categorical' and a 'hypothetical' imperative--the adoption of the former can be only 'free', while that of the latter can be only 'unfree'. The unfreedom of the adoption of a hypothetical imperative derives, according to Kant, from the predetermination of the purpose that motivates it. In contrast, according to the Formaterial model of Experience, and the definition of 'voluntary', the acting on the basis of an adopted imperative is always voluntary, for a variety of reasons that have been previously discussed, starting with its thesis that Will, i. e. Motility is a principle that is independent of any other experiential factors. The contrast also illustrates the unwieldiness of the strict 'freedom-unfreedom' dichotomy that Kant inherits from Hume, if not from tradition, in general. Even granting that one is unfree to resist the drives that are the sources of one's purposes, as Kant seemingly agrees, the choice of means to those ends is free, so, to that extent, the adoption of a hypothetical imperative is also free. Thus, that adoption, on Kant's own interpretation of it, combines free and unfree elements, with the reductionism of the dichotomy forcing him to ultimately classify it as unfree, as a reflection of which element is the predominant one. In contrast, the 'more voluntary'-less voluntary' spectrum that has been proposed here more flexibly characterizes the adoption of a hypothetical imperative as simply 'less voluntary' than that of a categorical imperative.

Will, Voluntary, Habit

Habitual behavior, as occurring automatically, might, therefore, be classified as 'involuntary'. However, 'automatic' does not clearly distinguish between rapidity of response and mechanical causality--while the latter might be involuntary, habitual behavior consists in the former. More important, the determining characteristic of Habit cannot be an aspect of a current actual process alone, but must lie in the relation of that process to previous sequences. In other words, Habit is defined by Repetition of behavior. But, as has been previously argued, following Deleuze, Repetition is a special case of Differentiation, i. e. it is minimal differentiation. Now, a voluntary act is an exercise of Will, and Will is the principle of Diversification in Experience. Hence, habitual behavior is not involuntary, but minimally voluntary.

Will, Voluntary, Compulsion

According to Aristotle, a 'voluntary' act is one performed without 'compulsion', with 'compulsion' defined as movement originating outside the agent. However, he seems unwilling to, accordingly, deny that the tossing of goods from a ship, to lighten its load during a storm, has an involuntary dimension. In contrast, the unequivocal application of his classification distinguishes between pulling a trigger while another gun is pointed at one's head, and pulling it during sneezing as an allergic reaction to pollen. At bottom, Aristotle definition of 'compulsion' fails to distinguish between the perception of some external phenomenon and an external efficient cause of a physiological event. Even the direst of circumstances does not transform an exercise of Will into an involuntary act. Thus, any response to compulsion e. g. qua perceived threat is voluntary.

Will, Voluntary, Knowledge

According to Aristotle, a 'voluntary' act is one in which the agent has knowledge of its consequences. On that formulation, if A serves B a dish that includes peanuts, and unbeknownst to A, B is allergic to peanuts, then the act is 'involuntary' if it is characterized as 'harming B', but 'voluntary' if it is characterized as 'feeding B'. Thus, Aristotle's definition leads to one and the same sequence of movements being both voluntary and involuntary. Plainly, his formulation conflates a volitional component, Will, with a cognitive one, Knowledge, thereby muddling the kinship of 'voluntary' with the former alone. In contrast, 'deliberate' or 'intentional' more appropriately characterizes the cognitive dimension of such acts.

Will, Voluntary, Somnambulism

The traditional identification of 'voluntary' with 'deliberate' or 'intentional' reflects a conflation of two distinct types of mental process--volitional and cognitive, e. g. Sartre's 'Consciousness'. Rarely explored evidence of that distinction is somnambulism, which entails Motility with minimal awareness. Since Motility is Will, somnambulism is volition with minimal cognition. Furthermore, since 'voluntary' denotes volition, somnambulism is, therefore, voluntary, though not deliberate or intentional. Similarly, dreams sometimes seem to be 'unconscious expressions of a wish', because what they actually express is Motility that occurs during sleep, and Motility is Volition, i. e. it is wishing in general, not some specific wish, that a dream expresses.

Will, Voluntary, Matter

The standard association of 'voluntary' with 'deliberate' or 'intentional' reflects the combined legacy of two theses--that Matter is inert, and that Consciousness is immaterial. Accordingly, only a perception, image, or thought can set one's body in motion, and can, therefore, be the source of voluntary action. In contrast, in Formaterialism, 'Matter' is an hypostasization of the Material Principle, and Will is the Material Principle of Experience. On that model, the self-activation that qualifies an action as 'voluntary' is independent of either a preceding perception, or a concomitant image or thought that guides its execution. As has been previously discussed, examples of one's formulating a goal simply to facilitate the exercise of Motility validate that model. They, therefore, also justify the distinction of 'voluntary' from 'deliberate' or 'intentional'.

Will, Voluntary, Deliberate

A 'voluntary' act is often characterized as one the consequences of which are considered in advance, by the performer, as possibly eventuating. That notion presupposes another--the forethought of there being any consequences at all. The latter entails a process of externalization beyond any thought of the imminent performance itself, i. e. it entails Will. Hence, what is primarily 'voluntary' in some consequential act is not the anticipation of one or another specific consequence, but in the recognition of consequentiality, in general. In contrast, an act performed with a specific outcome in mind is, more accurately, a 'deliberate' one. Thus, a deliberate act is a species of voluntary act.

Will, Voluntary, Volunteer

'Voluntary' behavior is typically characterized as one or more of the following: 1. 'Intentional', i. e. the outcome corresponds to some mental image that guided the performance; 2. 'Self-controlled', e. g. one was not intoxicated; 3. 'Chosen', i. e. the course of action was preferred to some feasible alternative; 4. 'Uncompelled', i. e. one was not forced to act by some external influence. Common to these concepts is that each is a retrospective characterization, and, hence, each is subtly teleological. In contrast, the related term, 'to volunteer', better expresses the essence of Will--self-activation, without ulterior motive. So, to formulate a 'voluntary' action as that for which one 'volunteers', while not suitable as a formal definition, still accurately emphasizes that the most focal feature of such a process is at its initiation, not at its termination.

Will, Voluntary Action, Dualism

'Voluntary' is most commonly used in jurisprudential contexts, in opposition to 'involuntary'. However, the sharpness of that categorial polarity belies the indefiniteness of at least most of the cases under consideration, nor of behavior, in general, which is often similarly subjected to traditional 'Freedom-Determinism' dualism. Efficiency of classification might be justified in legal procedures, but the oversimplification of Philosophical issues is at least sometimes intellectually lazy. A theory of Experience that fails to recognize that actions can be more or less voluntary reflects a greater fidelity to some conceptual scheme, perhaps Manichean, than to the facts themselves--especially the plain fact that Experience is comprised of a combination of factors, including Will.

Will, Volition, Voluntary

Just as the exercise of Will is 'volitional', it can also be characterized as 'voluntary'. Similarly, since, as has been previously discussed, Will can be quantified, and, thus, vary in degree of volition, an act can be more or less voluntary. The use of 'voluntary' thus has at least one advantage over that of a term such as 'free', the considerable baggage of which includes limitation to only two values.

Will, Utilitarianism, Common Good

Berkeley's divergence from Locke's Epistemological theory has potential implications for the latter's Political Philosophy that have seemingly rarely been explored. For, Phenomenalism, by conceiving externality as irreal, completely privatizes Experience, thereby rendering as specious any concept of Commonality that Lockeian Democracy entails. Similarly, Utilitarianism privatizes the Good--evaluations are all private feelings, of which the 'greatest happiness of the greatest number' is an aggregate. In other words, Mill, like Berkeley, recognizes no Common Good, nor can he. For, the recognition of Commonality requires Will, i. e. the principle of self-exteriorization, which, as the moment of the origination of action, has no value in a teleological doctrine such as Utilitarianism.

Will, Utilitarianism, Phenomenalism

The similarity of Mill's thesis 'To be valuable is to be valued' to Berkeley's 'To be is to be perceived' suggests that Utilitarianism involves an application of Phenomenalism. Accordingly, just as a Coherence Theory of Truth is the criterion of a non-representational cognition, such as a Phenomenon, the Utilitarian 'greatest happiness of the greatest number' principle is a Coherence Theory of the Good for non-representational valuation. In particular, just as Berkeley denies the Lockeian thesis that primary qualities exist in nature independently of a percipient, Mill denies the Lockeian thesis that Freedom is an intrinsic natural Good, i. e. that it has value independent of a valuer. Hence, the Utilitarian valuelessness of Will, the experiential source of Freedom, is, at least in part, a reflection of Mill's Phenomenalist orientation.

Will, Utilitarianism, Economics

It is generally recognized that Mill's Utilitarianism diverges from Bentham's by asserting that the 'good' consists in collective, and not personal, happiness. However, if, as is commonly accepted, Bentham conceives the doctrine on the model of Capitalist economic behavior, then Mill is revealed as also grounding it. On the economic interpretation, Bentham conceives 'happiness' as analogous to 'profit'. In contrast, on that interpretation, Mill is offering a theory of Evaluation that the notion 'profit' presupposes, namely, that the value of a product is determined by what one would pay for it, i. e. its 'exchange' value. Hence, the Marxist critique of Utilitarianism is analogous to the Ethical one that has been presented here--the Utilitarian suppression of 'intrinsic' value. Now, according to Marxism, the intrinsic value of a product is a function of the processes that transform its raw materials. Furthermore, according to the model of Experience being proposed here, Will is the basis of any variation of the given, and, hence, of the transformation of raw materials. Thus, contrary to pervasive stereotypes, a notion usually classified as 'individualistic', Will, is aligned with one usually classified as 'collectivistic', in opposition to an economic model usually associated with 'individualism'.

Will, Utilitarianism, Prejudice

Utilitarianism entails uncritical respect for the face-value authority of expressions of like or dislike. It thus is incapable of recognizing prejudice, i. e. it cannot distinguish judgment from pre-judgment. More generally, it cannot distinguish conditioned responses from spontaneous ones. Hence, 'the greatest happiness of the greatest number' can amount to a reinforcement of prejudices, possibly harmful ones. Since prejudice, and pre-conditioned behavior in general, is a species of Heteronomy, the corrective requires appreciation of the Moral significance of Autonomy, entailing the cultivation of Will, the principle of spontaneity in conduct. However, such appreciation requires the jettisoning any commitment to Teleology, which Mill seems unwilling to do.

Will and the Refutation of Utilitarianism

An Ethics of Empowerment not only presents an alternative to Utilitarianism, it refutes it. For, the self-activation process that the former proposes to cultivate, as the initiation of action, is irreducible to the end states which, according to Utilitarianism, are the bearers of Moral value. Hence, it stands as a counter-example to the Utilitarian claim that all Morality is fundamentally end-oriented. Furthermore, the implication that only the results of action are praiseworthy tends to stifle the liberation of Will from its subordination to Purposiveness. Thus, the refutation of Utilitarianism serves not merely to defend one rival doctrine from it, it is a substantive phase within that alternative doctrine.

Will, Teleology, Freedom

The effectiveness of Utilitarianism derives from the continued predominance of Teleology in Moral doctrines, and the Psychological models that they presuppose. The best evidence of that predominance is the pervasiveness of, as the standard focal problem of Morality, the coordination of the ends of subjects. That pervasiveness thus entails a concept of Subjectivity as constituted exclusively by the pursuit of ends. Hence, those doctrines ignore the volitional facet of Subjectivity, i. e. Will, the process of self-activation, which, as has been previously discussed, is independent of Purposiveness. Kant's Rational principle offers a brief glimpse of a non-teleological Moral doctrine, i. e. as the formulation of the cultivation of personal Freedom, before he eventually compromises it with concerns about Ends and Happiness. Similarly, the promotion of Creativity is another possible non-teleological Ethical program. Furthermore, insofar as the pursuit of ends compromises self-activation, anti-teleological arguments are part of the content of the promotion of Rationality, Freedom, Creativity, etc., and not merely an aspect of its validation.

Will, Freedom, Consequentialism

According to Atomistic Empiricism, to which Mill subscribes, 'B is the consequence of A' is an example of Efficient Causality. Thus, Mill's teleological formulation 'The value of A is determined by B' presupposes Consequentialism, but supervenes on it. So, one difficulty for a Utilitarian interpretation of interpersonal interaction is when 'A' is an exhortation to someone to act freely, and B is free action', because a reduction of the sequence to Efficient Causality requires a question-begging abstraction from its entailed 'freedom'. Thus, insofar as Kant's Rational Principle is such an exhortation to act freely, his doctrine, minus its teleological elements--that a rational being is an 'end-in-itself' whose Happiness is a 'good'--eludes reduction to Utilitarianism. However, it remains susceptible to the latter insofar as it continues to classify its exhortation as either Efficient or Teleological Causality. Now, an alternative has been proposed here--Material Causality, i. e. the process of Becoming-Diverse, the instance in personal experience of which is Will, the process of self-activation. Thus, the promotion of the Freedom of another can be Causal without being reducible to Utilitarianism.

Will and Swerve

'Swerve', for Lucretius, is a principle of Variation in Nature. Hence, Swerve is a manifestation of what has here been introduced as the 'Material Principle', i. e. the process of Becoming-Diverse. One important distinction between Swerve and the Material Principle is that while the former is an exception to the rule of regular motion, the latter, following Deleuze's demonstration that Repetition is a special case of Differentiation, conceives all motion as varying what precedes it, to a greater or lesser degree of similitude. Aside from that distinction, the two principles agree that spontaneity is not to be confused with unconditionality--an occurrence of Variation can be spontaneous, and, yet, its effects are conditioned by what precedes them, i. e. Difference is always relative to some given. Now, since Will is the Material Principle of Experience, it can be characterized as 'self-Swerve'. In contrast, most traditional concepts of 'freedom', notably Sartre's, fail to appreciate Swerve, since they equate spontaneity with unconditionality, and, hence, are processes more of escape than of variation.

Will, Utilitarianism, Asceticism

A significant limitation of Utilitarianism is exposed in a comparison with Nietzsche's criticism of Asceticism. While Nietzsche can argue that an incorporeal ideal is the product of merely minimal Will to Power, Mill has no response to Asceticists who assert that a 'kingdom of heaven' is the unique realization of the 'greatest happiness for the greatest number' Utilitarian principle, nor, seemingly, is any Consequentialist doctrine capable of such a response. In contrast, a Eudaimonism based on the concept of Pleasure proposed here, i. e. that it is the feeling of Will, is irreducible to the a priori supernaturalistic Morality that Mill seems keen to challenge.

Will, Utilitarianism, Emotivism

While Mill contends that the value of an action is a function of its consequences, the only consequence that, for his Utilitarianism, is ultimately decisive in the determination of the value of an action, is whether or not it is liked. Hence, the more accurate classification of his doctrine is 'Emotivist', rather than 'Consequentialist'. If it were the latter, he would further question the consequences of liking or disliking an action, which might lead him to the discovery that like and dislike, are, in turn, prompts to either a repetition of or an alternative to, respectively, the object of those feelings. In other words, it would reveal that Will, the activation of any subsequent behavior, is the ground of Emotivist evaluation, which even Stevenson does not seem to consider.

Will and Quantifying Pleasure

As previously demonstrated here, Will can be heuristically quantified, i. e. in terms of volitional units, or 'Vols'. So, insofar as Pleasure is a feeling of Will, as has been proposed, it, too, is quantifiable. Now, Will is also the principle of Diversification in Experience, and Diversification ranges from bare repetition and replication, to indefinitely extensive novelty and creation. Accordingly, one measure of Pleasure is the degree of creativity of the felt act along the range of Diversification. One application of that criterion is to a problem that vexes Mill--how to quantify the distinction between 'higher' and 'lower' pleasures. For, 'lower' pleasure can, accordingly, be analyzed as the feeling of an effort to merely continue its ephemeral occasion, e. g. the savoriness of food, while it is characteristic of a higher one that it is the feeling of an irresistible creative impulse. However, even if such an explanation improves on Mill's factually questionable observation--that everyone who has enjoyed both types prefers the higher ones--its non-Consequentialist interpretation of Pleasure is not one that Mill is likely to embrace.

Will, Pleasure, Happiness

Mill's attempt to reduce Kantianism--primarily its thesis that a rational being is an end-in-itself who deserves Happiness--to Utilitarianism suffers from an equivocation. For, what Kant means by 'Happiness' is a 'totality of satisfactions of need', whereas Mill's equation of 'happiness' and 'pleasure' implies that the former, like the latter, can obtain as a discrete localized experience. Furthermore, the distinction is not merely quantificational, for, while Happiness arrives as the moment of closure of a process, Pleasure, which, as previously argued here, is the feeling of Will, or, in Kant's system, of Freedom, occurs at a moment of experiential destabilization, i. e. at the moment of self-activation. So, sharpening the distinction between Pleasure and Happiness does not eliminate Consequentialism from Kant's doctrine, but it helps demonstrate that the latter is not Hedonist.

Will, Pleasure, Teleology

The traditional concept of Pleasure, to which Mill subscribes, is teleological, i. e. it understands Pleasure to occur subsequent to some process. Spinoza, in contrast, suggests a non-teleological alternative, which Nietzsche develops--that Pleasure is the feeling of an increase in strength. On that basis, Pleasure is distinct from the feeling of a replenishment of strength, or from relief from discomfort, each of which can be more accurately characterized as 'Satisfaction'. Now, while the replenishment of strength and the relief from discomfort, as completions of what precedes them, are plainly teleological, an upsurge in strength occurs, to the contrary, at the outset of a process, i. e. it is the moment of self-activation. In other words, Pleasure is the feeling of Will. Furthermore, the thought of Pleasure is a powerful motivator not as an anticipation of some eventuality, as it is usually conceived to be, but as itself a sufficient enough replication of the feeling of an upsurge of strength to initiate Motility.

Will and the Hedonistic Fallacy

Moore's charge that Utilitarianism commits a 'naturalistic fallacy' is perhaps fatally compromised by his question-beggingly positing a distinction between 'natural' and 'non-natural', one that Mill can easily reject. It also obscures a converse issue, one that can be called the 'Hedonistic Fallacy'. For, Mill's equation of 'pleasant' and 'good', rather than reducing the latter to the former, can be interpreted as reducing the former to the latter, thereby ascribing to 'x is pleasant' an evaluative connotation lacking in mere Hedonism. Entailed in that ascription is a denial of the teleological concept of Pleasure--for, an evaluation is at least partly prescriptive, and, hence, is preparatory to subsequent behavior, i, e, is no mere End. That denial, in turn, opens Pleasure to the analysis, following Spinoza, that it is a surplus of strength, and, thus, is incipient Motility, i. e. Will. So, the 'Hedonistic Fallacy' is the interpretation of Pleasure as a mere End, a fallacy which Mill partly exposes when he presents 'pleasant' as equivalent to an evaluative term.

Will, Utilitarianism, Descriptive Ethics

The claim that a Moral principle is descriptive is vulnerable to two challenges. First, it does not suffice to defend against the assertion that such a principle ought to be prescriptive. Second, it presupposes the objectivity of the Good, absent which, it is susceptible to the charge that it is an expression of 'bad faith', i. e. of a disowning of one's own creation. On the other hand, the exhortation 'Act!' is ironic--to fulfill it involves the self-activation of Will, for which any antecedent, including an exhortative utterance, can be no more than a describable phenomenon. Thus, it is unclear whether Mill's insistence that his Utilitarian principle merely describes the Good is an expression of naivety, of irresponsibility, or of an appreciation of the irony entailed in the alternative.

Will and Promoting Greater Happiness

Mill often seems to insist that his Utilitarianism is a descriptive theory, not a prescriptive doctrine. Nevertheless, implicit in his efforts to explain that the 'Good' is the 'greatest happiness for the 'greatest number, is the presumption that awareness of the correct thesis of the true nature of the Good conduces to the promotion of that Good. Now, it seems unlikely that he believes that such knowledge qua merely theoretical suffices to that end. Hence, he must project that the value of his thesis is practical, i. e. that it consists in its potential influence on behavior. Furthermore, insofar as his concept of Utilitarianism rivals that of Bentham, i. e. the thesis that one must promote one's own happiness, the influence on behavior that Mill projects must entail extending oneself, beyond one's self-interest, to that of others. But, Will is the other-oriented principle of Experience. Hence, Mill's Utilitarianism formulates a cultivation of Will.

Will, Utilitarianism, Libertarianism

While Moore, Kantianism, and Dewey offer significant criticisms of Utilitarianism, perhaps the most decisive one comes from elsewhere in the oeuvre of Mill himself. For, in contrast with the descriptivist Universalism of his Utilitarianism, is the prescriptivist Individualism of his own Libertarian doctrine. In the few passages in which he seems to recognize that conflict, he accords priority to Utilitarianism, i. e. by arguing that even personal freedom is conditioned by its consequences for general happiness. In so doing, however, he briefly exposes the prescriptivism of his Utilitarianism, i. e. by arguing that, in some circumstances, one should not perform an entertained possible action. In the process, he, furthermore, reveals how Utilitarianism entails Will. For, the argument that one should consider more than one's own interests entails that one should extend oneself towards as many others as possible, i. e. will is the principle of self-extending in Experience.

Will and Utilitarianism

According to Utilitarianism, the value of an act is determined by its consequences, specifically the subsequent pleasure and pain that it causes. As is widely recognized, the prime target of this Consequentialism is Kantianism, for which the value of an act is determined by the antecedents that motivate it. Less appreciated is that Utilitarianism precludes the possibility that Will, i. e. the performance itself of the act, can be a bearer of value. One problem that that preclusion presents to the doctrine is that the performance itself can be pleasurable. Furthermore, even if that pleasure were to be classified as a 'consequence' of the performance, it still does not take into account how that pleasure can be a function of some antecedents of the performance--e. g. to what extent the performance is innovative in the biography of the performer, whether or not it is an accomplishment of what was initially intended, etc. Hence, Utilitarianism does not, and, apparently, cannot account for at least some of the pleasure involved in the performance of an act.

Will and Sympathy

'Sympathy' is typically spoken of as if it were a unitary feeling that forges a bond between two people. However, it is actually an experience that rapidly combines four distinct moments. First, one extends oneself towards another. Second, one comprehends their projected situation. Third, one emotionally reacts to that comprehension. Finally, one compares that emotion with that evinced by the other. Hence, Sympathy denotes not a feeling, but a similarity of feelings. Furthermore, it does not create a bond between two people, but is an expression of Will, i. e. of the original extending of oneself towards another. Accordingly, insofar as Morality is construed as consisting in the forging of interpersonal fellowship, and Sympathy is conceived to be the basis of that forging, Will is the foundation of Morality.

Will and Altruism

Initially, an encounter is an obstacle to Motility, i. e. to Will, but it can develop as an opportunity for novelty. Similarly, an encounter with another person begins as interference, but with the potential for growth, via access to an otherwise inconceivable perspective. Thus, in contrast with traditional concepts of 'will' as an expression of Selfishness, Will, here, is not only enhanced by benefiting others, but is the very ground of altruistic conduct.

Will and Prejudice

In some circumstances, the assertion 'We are all the same inside' is an expression of a metaphysical doctrine, i. e. that a single substance, e. g. Mind, underlies a diversity of its manifestations. But, more usually, it is offered as a corrective to prejudicial behavior. As such, it is based on the presumption that the hatred of differences is best treated by the denial of Difference. Plainly, to prescribe the denial of difference to cure the hate of Difference only validates the hate-ability of it. In contrast, the non-evasive corrective to the hatred of Difference is the cultivation of an appreciation of it. In other words, the effective cure of prejudice entails the cultivation of Will, the mode of comportment towards another qua other. It also may entail a rejection of metaphysical Monism, insofar as such a doctrine is the source of antipathy towards Difference.

Will and Duties Towards Others

Rational agents are equal before Kant's Moral Law. Hence, the distinction that he draws between duties towards oneself and duties towards others is problematic within his system. The very distinction between self and others presupposes a principle of Differentiation in Experience, i. e. Will. On that basis, the fundamental duty towards another consists in a cultivation of respect for them qua other, i. e. a cultivation of Will as being-towards-others. Non-interference in the Freedom of another is one expression of that respect, to which the closest that Kant can approximate is non-interference in the Freedom of a rational being, who must remain anonymous, according to his rational principle.

Will and Other as End-in-itself

Kant sometimes conceives an other as an 'end-in-itself', the promotion of whose happiness is one's duty, a duty which one does not have towards oneself. This concept is the product of a questionable teleological representation of Freedom, beginning with an inference from the prohibition of interference in Freedom, to the obligation to promote the happiness of the possessor of Freedom, i. e. that of a rational agent. On empirical grounds alone, the inference is invalid, because the promotion of the happiness of an other can sometimes support their Freedom, e. g. the provision of food can strengthen them, but can, on other occasions, amount to the same indulgence that seems to be Kant's reason for not obligating one to promote one's own happiness. More likely, the inference is based on his thesis that a rational agent 'deserves' Happiness, a thesis which, as has been argued previously, questionably presupposes that the happiness of an individual is of interest to impersonal Reason. So, absent the admirable but unconvincing teleological interpretation of Freedom, an other, to Kant, is a self-activating entity, i. e. is a possessor of Will.

Will and the Motility of Others

What, for notably Sartre and Levinas, plainly distinguishes the Look or the Face from other phenomena are elements of animation. Thus, the positing of the existence of another entails the attribution of Motility to an entity, i. e. of self-activation, just as does the ascription of a 'soul' to any fauna. But, Motility is Will. Hence, in at least those cases, the ground of the positing of the existence of others is their presumed possession of Will.

Will, The Look, The Face

The occasions that for Sartre and Levinas are encounters with alterity only betray the methodological priorities of each. For Sartre, the consciousness of the 'Look' of another is the basis of Being-for-Others, while for Levinas, the 'Face' of another constitutes an interpersonal demand on one. Sartre, therefore, implies that there is no being-for-others in the presence of a blind person, while Levinas implies that a cry in the dark is a merely impersonal phenomenon. In other words, both cases attest only to the fidelity of each thinker to the privilege of vision in experience, which, if a legacy of Berkeleian Phenomenalism, also entails the denial of the reality of depth in Experience. Furthermore, that an auditory experience can also be the occasion of an encounter with another confirms that the decisive dimension of such an encounter is Will, i. e. how one extends oneself towards an object of an encounter on the basis of what is given in the encounter.

Will and the Existence of Others

The question of 'the existence of others' is typically classified as a cognitive problem, i. e. as a possible fact requiring methodical grounding. Even for Levinas, for whom it is the fundamental problem of Ethics, that existence is given as a phenomenological datum, i. e. the Face of an other. In contrast, for both Aristotle and Kant, the existence of another is a practical problem, i. e. posited in the treatment of another as the same kind of 'Self' that one is. The shortcoming of such an analogy is that it assimilates an other to oneself. In contrast, in Will, the principle of indefinite Diversification, one comports oneself toward an other qua irreducibly other, i. e. what it posits is the existence of a truly 'other'.

Will, Perspectivism, The 'Look'

As previously discussed, the Perspectivism of Heidegger entails Will, because it entails the positing of the existence of 'the' world that exceeds that of one's own world, and Will is the principle of Excession in Experience. More generally, Perspectivism also entails Will, insofar as it entails the existence of alterior perceptual fields. because Will is the principle of Diversification, i. e. any projection beyond one's own world to that of another entails Diversification. Without such a projection, even the awareness of being looked at, which Sartre and Levinas each cite as proof of the existence of others, remains only an uncomfortable phenomenon. In other words, insofar as each remains committed to phenomenological methodology, for which projections such as analogies and inferences are not evidentiary, the 'look' that each attributes to an 'other' never transcends the interiority of a for-itself.

Will, Phenomenon, Thing-in-Itself

According to the model of Experience being developed here, a phenomenon represents immediately an encounter of Will with some object to it. Hence, the proper characterization of a basic phenomenal datum is 'I have encountered something', not, as is traditionally the case, some quality. Further refinement of that basic datum often yields a proposition in which a constructed 'object' serves as the logical subject. Now, it is easy to conceive that the actual object of an encounter is modified by the encounter, e. g. an ice cube will immediately begin to melt when touched by a warmer finger. Hence, it is unproblematic to distinguish an object qua 'appearance' in an encounter from that qua 'in-itself', i. e. from its condition outside of the context of an encounter. In other words, on this model, a phenomenon is neither equivalent to an appearance nor does it represent a thing-in-itself. This concept of a phenomenon plainly diverges from that of most Phenomenalisms, and, seemingly from Kantianism, as well. On the other hand, that the product of Kantian cognitive processes is a proposition, not a thing, suggests the possibility that this concept is implicit in that system.

Will, Comprehension, Individuation

As previously discussed, 'individual' has two meanings--the common one, 'discrete', and the literal one, 'undivided'. The two are not equivalent--the discreteness of A and B from one another does not entail that either is internally coherent, while the internal coherence of A does not entail the existence of any other entity. In the context of personal Experience, discrete individuality can be characterized as 'public', and coherent individuality as 'private'. Heidegger exemplifies a typical confusion of public and private individuality, when he treats the totalization effected by Being-towards-Death, a private process, as public individuation. Similarly, some influential contemporary political Egoisms, e. g. Rand's and Goldwater's, believe that private selfishness suffices to establish social opacity. In Formaterialism, private individuation is a product of Comprehension, while the public variety is effected by Will, in a process in which, as has been discussed, the establishment of one's own individuality entails the recognition of that of others. This analysis that public individuation is not exclusionary, confirms the result of Kant's different procedure that demonstrates that the 'I' only has objective validity as universalized. So, Rand's hostility towards Kant is understandable, but its groundlessness is not justified.

Will and Self-Objectification

Among the objects that Will encounters, and perhaps the most frequent ones, are parts of one's body, e. g. when one's right hand touches one's left wrist. Such an encounter itself is to be distinguished from the Comprehension of it, i. e. from the representation of the entire process, on the basis of which the existence of the object of touch can be inferred. But, an encounter entails the resistance of an object to Will, which in this case is the Motility of the left wrist, i. e. of Will itself. Hence, the event entails a double encounter, including, as well, one in which the right hand is an object to the left wrist, which, in turn, is also represented, by another exercise of Comprehension. An intra-corporeal encounter can thus be characterized as 'self-objectification', which is not to be confused with the more fundamental process in which Will is the matter of Comprehension.

Will and Individuation

Self-individuation deliberately effects secession from the world. However, while Heidegger presumes that his 'Being-towards-Death' produces self-individuation, what it actually accomplishes is an interiorization of one's involvements with the world. It, thus, entails, like the Cartesian phenomenalism that it continues, a nihilation of any external realm. The fundamental flaw of this approach is that self-individuation requires not interiorization, but exteriorization, i. e. Will. For, individuation is a two-place relation, i. e. it is only in the process of extending oneself towards others in the recognition of their individuality that one distinguishes oneself from them.

Will, Death, Extension

Heidegger's 'Being-towards-Death' serves the same individuating function as Doubt does for Descartes, but without disembodying the Individual. However, he accomplishes the preserving of Corporeality by interpreting Extension teleologically, thereby ensnaring him in a notion of Death which, as has been previously argued, is convoluted and ultimately specious. What he misses is the process of Extending that he, as much as Descartes, hypostasizes as Extension. In contrast, here, Will is the process of Extending in personal Experience, and its Material Principle, thereby suggesting that the Formal Cause-Material Cause pair affords a more effective characterization of Individuation than does Teleological Causality.

Will, Death, Certainty

Just as Descartes finds Certainty in Doubt, Heidegger discovers one's ownmost possibility of being-in-the-world in the thought of one's own Death. The parallel exposes Heidegger as located where he presumes he is not--within the Cartesian tradition that can be characterized as the 'History of Self-Certitude'. Now, as has been previously discussed, Heidegger never succeeds in presenting the thought of one's own Death as anything other than anonymous and empty. Consequently, the entire concatenation of involvements constituting being-in-the-world, for which that thought serves as the telos, similarly dissolves. What remains is Will, i. e. the principle of indefinite Motility in Experience, which Heidegger either neglects or suppresses en route to his securing an Understanding of Being.

Will, Perspective, Point of View

A 'perspective' is often understood to be a facet of some object. But, in the context of the expressing of an opinion, that it is the implicit 'whence' of the expression--a point of viewing more precisely than a point of view--becomes more obvious. In turn, a point of viewing is, most generally, the point of departure of viewing or of expressing that is implicit in any represented facet of an object. Now, as proposed here, Will is the dimension of Experience that proceeds from a point of departure. Hence, Perspective entails Will in this respect, as well as in that previously discussed.

Will, Being-in-the-World, Perspectivism

'Perspectivism' is a theory that can accommodate the experiential structure 'being-in-the-world', though it is unclear if Heidegger would accept the classification. For, a perspective is a uniquely personal locus of experience within a larger transpersonal arena. One main difficulty for Perspectivism is to ground the positing of a larger arena on the given inner locus. The model of Experience presented here offers such a ground--Will, as the principle of Excession, is the process of transcending the given, and, hence, is the origin of the possibility of a realm beyond what one perceives at any given moment. Thus, at least one coherent concept of being-in-the-world entails Will.

Will and In-the-World

Also problematic for Heidegger's notion 'being-in-the-world' is the 'in'. For, its implication that all experience is intra-mundane seems to preclude the possibility of the private features, i. e. 'one's ownmost possibilities', that are central to his doctrine. In contrast, here, a 'world', as a totality of phenomena, is antecedent to the Comprehension of it, i. e. what is represented necessarily precedes the representation of it. Hence, such a totality has been interiorized by a subject, as part of its immediate past, as one's own world. On the other hand, Will is the exteriorizing principle of Experience that, in its encounters with other entities, exceeds its given world. In other words, Will is always outside a world, and, so, one is never currently 'in' a world. The contrast demonstrates that with the 'in' of 'being-in-the-world', Heidegger's ambition to challenge the traditional concept of a possible purely private experience, e. g. Leibniz' Monadism, overshoots its mark, i. e. it precludes any private dimension whatsoever.

Will and World

Heidegger's notion 'being-in-the-world' implies the existence of a unique transpersonal world. In contrast, here, 'world' can be defined as 'the totality of encounterable objects', i. e. as 'the totality of objects to Will'. So, since, Will is one's own, the world which correlates to it is, likewise, one's own, i. e. there are a plurality of worlds. Accordingly, as Heidegger progressively discovers that the horizon of Experience is 'one's own possibility', he seems to fail to appreciate that the status of 'the' world becomes increasingly problematic.

Will, Comprehension, Being

In Being and Time, Heidegger pioneers a model of Experience in which cognition is not discrete from other organic processes. Accordingly, with some modifications of that model, the homeostatic function of Comprehension can be appreciated as 'Ontological'. The first of those modifications is the transformation of one's engagement with one's environment from a deficient mode to the expression of a positive principle, i. e. of Will. Second, a cumulative concept of Temporality replaces his 'ec-static' one. Finally, 'Being' is understood, in all cases, to be the Being of some specific person, which Heidegger insists upon in B & T, but seemingly strays from later, when 'Being' appears in contrast to 'beings'. The result of the modifications is a concept of Being as fundamentally a process of growth, entailing Will introducing experiential novelty, and Comprehension as integrating the novelty into the ongoing development of Being. As such, Comprehension re-stabilizes Being, a homeostatic process that can thus be classified as 'Ontological'.

Will, Cognitive Dissonance, Data-Processing

Moments of 'cognitive dissonance' are like stumbling while walking--a struggle to integrate a new encounter into ongoing experience. They thus demonstrate the homeostatic function of Comprehension. Accordingly, the eventual resolving of the dissonance, resulting in a representation of the encounter, demonstrates that any phenomenon, like the maintaining of balance while walking, is the product of a stabilizing absorption of a disruption to Will. It is only upon subsequent analysis that a phenomenon is abstracted as a 'datum', and that Comprehension is construed as 'data-processing'.

Will and Phenomenon

While Experience for both Heidegger and Sartre is both phenomenological and temporal, neither seems to recognize that the two principles conflict. Each inherits a model of the Consciousness-Phenomenon relation from Brentano, i. e. while a phenomenon is relative to a specific consciousness, it is, nevertheless, independent of it. Thus, though the course of Experience may be inter-phenomenally temporal, a specific phenomenon is experienced, intra-phenomenally, as a-temporal, e. g. Sartre's characterization of a phenomenon as 'being-in-itself', i. e. as unaffected by the temporalizing consciousness that entertains it. The systematic ramifications for each of their commitments to this uneasy hybrid are significant, e. g. Heidegger can present his readings of other doctrines as both interpretive and descriptive, and Sartre can conceive Consciousness as both a retentive and a dissociative process. In contrast, here, a phenomenon is a representation, the product of a synthesis the manifold of which is the process of Will conforming to an object that it encounters. Accordingly, a phenomenon is retained by the Comprehending mind, with the dissociation from it accomplished by a different process. And, a reading of a specific philosopher is as interpretive as the general historical theme in which it is framed.