Democracy and Responsibility

It is commonly believed that if a member of a Democracy does not vote, they might be foolishly missing an opportunity to influence the general condition, but not that they are evading a responsibility to do so.  But, entailed in such a belief is the concept of the Individual as essentially independent of Society, a concept rooted in that of the supernatural Soul that is a cardinal feature of Medieval Theology.  In contrast, on the premises that every Person is a part of Humankind, and that a Society is only as strong as its weakest Member, each citizen in a Democracy does have a Responsibility to every other, and to the Polity as a whole, to participate in the processes that define it as such.  So, whether or not there is a Responsibility to vote in a Democracy depends on some fundamental presuppositions that are rarely addressed in common conversation.

Dissent, Negation, Variation

The integration of None of the Above into the electoral process transforms Dissent from mere symbolic gesture to active catalyst for change.  But, the negative formulation is misleading: it more precisely calls for Something Different.  In other words, it is not a Dialectical moment, as Marxists would interpret it, but a principle of Variation.  Nevertheless, what Marx perhaps best discerns, more in the French Revolution than in the American, is that the ruled, rather than the rulers, have become the motor of History.

Democracy and None of the Above

If a proposed None of the Above were to receive the most votes, then the election would be required to be re-run, with all those who were outpolled no longer eligible.  With that Dissent option, the disenchanted would be more likely to participate, and parties would be more responsive, thereby improving the presumed Democracy. On the other hand, some might object that with the possibility of an inconclusive outcome, scheduling would become unwieldy.  However, that objection confuses an efficiently conducted Democracy with a Democracy corrupted by expediency, a line arguably crossed in the 2000 election.  Anyway, if party machinery wants to not be inconvenienced, it can preempt any re-run by putting up candidates who are responsive to the interests of voters, not candidates to which voters have no choice but to adapt themselves.

Election Day and Heterocracy

In comparison with that of virtually every other case hitherto, the history of regime-change in the American Experiment has been remarkably stable, with nothing but seamless transitions.  On the other hand, its system is less flexible than those in many polities that have adopted its basic Democratic model, because unlike in those, there is no routine option of dissolving the regime and calling for elections prior to the next scheduled date.  Indeed, evidence that the stability has become sclerotic includes intransigence in considering a change of Election Day to a more convenient weekend day, and the priority of deadlines over a conscientious counting of votes in the 2000 election.  Such privileging of impersonal procedure over acts of Consent and their tabulation is characteristic of Heterocracy, rather than of Democracy.

Voting, Consent, Dissent

What distinguishes Democracy from other systems is the Consent of the Ruled; in all other cases, Rule is imposed, even if benevolent.  Now, a Vote expresses a double Consent--for a candidate, and for the process. Thus, a vote for a third-party candidate does not adequately express a disenchantment with the process. Nor does not voting, which is tantamount to not resisting being imposed upon.  So, the only medium of potentially effective Dissent would be a None of the Above option in every case, with a range of consequences corresponding to the total of that option defined in advance, e. g. a level that would force a new election, possibly with different candidates.

The Right to Not Vote

Perhaps if it had occurred to the Founding Fathers that their experiment in Democracy would be disrupted by a widespread neglect of the opportunity to vote, they might have added a Bill of Responsibilities to the Constitution that includes mandatory voting.  An alleged 'right' to not vote could not, therefore, be a Constitutionally guaranteed Right.  Furthemore, if there is such a thing as a 'natural' Right to not exercise a Right to vote, it is unclear what its ground might be, especially insofar as it seems to lack any corresponding Responsibility.  Now, a refusal to vote, on the ground that the available options are products of an un-Democratic process, e. g. one conditioned by Plutocratic principles, seems substantive. But, that corruption could be rectified by 'none of the above' being offered as an alternative.  Regardless, between the continued difficulties in protecting the universal Right to vote, and the popular assumption that there is a 'right' to not vote, it seems unlikely that this dimension of the deficiency in universal suffrage will be addressed any time soon.

Voting, Right, Responsibility

In many contexts, Right and Responsibility are conjoined concepts.  One in which they are not is Modern Political Philosophy, in which Right is typically a cardinal principle, while Responsibility is hardly ever more than vaguely alluded to. For example, in the U. S. Constitution, there is a Bill of Rights, but no Bill of Responsibilities.  Correspondingly, there is a Right to Vote, but no Responsibility to Vote.  Now, the occasionally proposed making voting mandatory, with 'none of the above' as an option, has usually been met with a hostility that is groundless, even though such a measure would make voter engagement and candidate responsiveness routine in the American political process.  That possibility only exposes the significant deficiencies in actual approximations to 'Democracy' in the American Experiment.

Democracy, Equality, Homogeneity

Initially, Modern Democracy functions to equalize the hitherto inegalitarian: hierarchies such as Monarchies, Oligarchies, Theocracies, etc.  But, whether or not by design, it also homogenizes hitherto heterogeneous elements qua simply diverse.  Accordingly, the American Democracy becomes a 'melting pot' of various ethnicities, nationalities, etc., eventually giving rise to a melting pot in which it is included, i. e. the United Nations.  So, what begins as an experiment in collective Self-Determination eventually morphs into the apparent latter stages of a millennia-long process of the integration of the human species, a transformation reflecting the logical equivalence of Equalization and Homogenization.

American History and United Nations

In Whitehead's system, Process is a Concrescence of a novel entity that incorporates each already existing Real entity, upon the completion of which, the novelty joins the rest in a new Reality.  The United States can be conceived as an instance of that pattern--a confluence of all extant nations that, upon completion, yields a new totality of nations, in which it is included, i. e. the United Nations.  On this interpretation, the U. N. is an essential factor in American History, not just another alliance into which it contingently enters.  Conversely, if there is a respect in which the U. S. is, as some assert, "exceptional", it may be its unique relation to the United Nations.

Manifest Destiny, Nationalism, Cosmopolitanism

"Manifest Destiny" usually characterizes the progress from Atlantic to Pacific of the settling of the North American continent. But, the history of that settlement traces another arc, whether or not by design.  What begins as relatively homogeneous eventually becomes the perhaps most heterogeneous polity in recorded history. Now, while the image 'Melting Pot' that is ofen used to describe this diversity is abstract, it has become concrete at one location within the U. S.--the United Nations.  So, insofar as the latter is considered the manifestation of American destiny, the arc is that of the transition from Nationalism to Cosmopolitanism, a transition that is still in process.

Pantheism, Church, State

In Spinoza's Pantheistic system, the medium of one's relation to God, Intuition, complements the medium of one's relation to others, Reason, each a type of Adequate Knowledge, or equivalently, Self-Determination.  In contrast, the Theology that, in his Political Philosophy, he contrasts with, and defends from, Reason, is constituted by ideas and practices that, in the Ethics, he classifies as Inadequate.  Thus, the possibility of a conflict, implied by the need to protect the exercise of Religion, is a consequence of a Theology based on Inadequate concepts.  Now, though Jefferson's exposure to Spinoza is known, it is unclear to what extent his separation of Church and State is derived from that of latter.  But, regardless, the concept of Religion that informs it is a contingent one, i. e. is not Pantheistic, and is constituted by Inadequate concepts, which, according to Spinoza, characterizes Heterocratic behavior.

Church, State, Vote

The "wall", in Jefferson's words, that separates Church and State, is formulated in the Constitution by two clauses, one prohibiting the establishment of a national religion, the other protecting the free exercise of religion, aka the Establishment Clause, and the Free Exercise Clause, respectively.  Now, the main difficulty with this wall is that "free exercise" is under-defined, which the Supreme Court has since rectified by holding that the verbal expressions of opinions and beliefs are protected exercises, while practices are not. So, on that basis, the refusal, on "religious" grounds, to conduct ordinary business, e. g. serving a particular customer, renting an apartment to a specific applicant, etc., seems plainly to cross Jefferson's wall, while the assertion "I believe that America is a Christian nation" does not.  But a vote, which has actual consequences, unlike a response to a poll, is an act, not a mere verbal expression of an opinion.  So, a vote that the voter believes is an 'expression of the will of God' seems protected, but it is admittedly Heterocratic, not Democratic.  Such a possibility is indicative of the permeability of Jefferson's wall.

American Experiment, Democracy, Theocracy

Theocracy is Heterocratic, and, so, is antithetical to Democracy.  However, in the American Experiment, that relation is not so clear cut, since the U. S. Constitution protects the "free exercise" of Religion.  Accordingly, it is debatable whether or not a refusal, on Religious grounds, of one citizen to do routine business with another is a violation of the rights of the latter.  On the other hand, less equivocal examples of the subordination of America society to Theocratic principles include the assertion that the Ten Commandments is the highest law of the land, the observance of Christmas as a national holiday, and the belief that the Invisible Hand of the Market is an appendage of the deity worshipped by many Americans.  Those cases are evidence from the American Experiment of a susceptibility of Democracy to Theocracy.

Heterocracy and Capitalism

A central factor in current U. S. politics is the insistence on a market-based health-care system, and an aversion to a nationalized single-payer system.  Now, at the heart of Market-based systems, i. e. of Capitalism, is the principle that an Invisible Hand is the source of Justice.  But, such a principle is Heterocratic. Thus, these current events is an indication, and hardly the only one in the course of its history, that the American Experiment is an experiment in a Capitalist society, rather than in a Democratic one.

Heterocracy and Ignorance

As has been previously discussed, Knowledge and Power converge in Know-How.  Now, Know-How is lacking when a voter erroneously believes that a vote for some candidate is an effective Means to some End.  And, there are two main sources of that error, often found in combination: the candidate misrepresents themself, or the voter's familiarity with them is superficial, e. g. based on some demographic classification rather than on ideological orientation.  Thus, in ignorance, an apparent Democratic process can actually be Heterocratic.

Heterocracy, Democracy, Feelings

Voting that is determined by the prior hypnosis by someone else is plainly Heterocratic, not Democratic.  Similarly Heterocratic is voting that is a response to Pavlovian conditioning.  In neither case is a feeling of like or dislike an indication of self-determining behavior. Thus, more generally, being constituted by favorable or unfavorable expressions of opinion is no indication that American political processes are Democratic rather than Heterocratic.  This distinction is much better appreciated by Plato, Aristotle, Spinoza, Kant, and Marx, than by Hobbes, Locke, and Smith, each of whom takes immediate feelings at face value.

Heterocracy and We the People

Heterocracy-the Rule of Others--is overcome by a We.  However, the "We the people" that initiates the American Experiment is falsified from the outset by restrictions, de facto and de jure, of gender, race, and economic status, i. e. has been, more accurately, "We, some of the people".  Still, the abolition of those restrictions does not resolve the deeper antithesis of the formulation--it is a universal concept being applied to a particular political entity, i. e. to a Nation.  That antagonism is currently manifest as the tension between domestic interests and Globalist forces that continues past the recent election controversially.

Democracy and Heterocracy

Though 'autocracy' parses as 'self-rule', comparable to 'autonomy', it has come to mean, to the contrary, 'rule over others'.  Thus, a Democracy is literally a collective Autocracy, a characterization that is prone to misunderstanding in common parlance.  Still, unburdened by that distortion, is 'Heterocracy', meaning 'rule of others', in which 'of' can mean either 'by' or 'over'.  Thus, what is commonly known as 'Autocracy' is, literally, Heterocracy, and, likewise, Heterocracy is antithetical to Democracy. For example, someone who does not vote on the grounds that they are 'apolitical', is, rather, a Heterocrat, since, regardless of presumed indifference, is still conducting their life in accordance with the governance and laws of others, and, so, is anti-Democrat.

American Experiment, Voting Right, Voting Responsibilty

One of the successes of the American Experiment has been its stability--the seamless continuity of its electoral operations for more than two centuries, uninterrupted by even the Civil War.  Only partly successful has been the cultivation of respect for universal voting rights, whether de facto or de jure.  In contrast, a significant failure has been the complement of a Right to Vote--a Responsibility to Vote, the general non-recognition of which proves that failure.  That voting is perceived, by even those who do vote, as an imposition on those who do not, is an implicit indication of a privileging of Oligarchy, i. e. of a Polity in which Many are ruled by a Few.  For, by not voting, one allows others to determine the conditions of one's life, a concession that is not nullified by indifference.

Democracy and Ochlocracy

The concept of Tyranny of the Majority has sometimes been formulated as Ochlocracy--Rule of the Mob, which some have classified as a degenerate form of Democracy.  Now, one dubious aspect of these associations is that, as Aristotle points out, and as has been repeatedly proven throughout History, the use of a mob as a tool of political intimidation is at least as much a feature of Oligarchies as it is one of Democracies.  Furthermore, that the behavior of a mob can be accurately characterized as 'unruly' tends to expose the formulation 'Mob Rule' as oxymoronic, i. e. a mob lacks the capacity for sustained deliberation that ruling requires.  Finally, according to Nietzsche, perhaps the most acute of its critics, the tendency towards degeneracy in Democracy consists in the cultivation of timidity and homogeneity, i. e. the characteristics of a herd of sheep, not those of an angry mob.  So, the possibility that the danger of a Democracy deteriorating into an Ochlocracy seems more an expression of the condescension or fear of an Oligarch than the product of sound analysis.

Popular Vote and Electoral College

Hamilton conceives the Electoral College as a safeguard against a tyranny of the majority--the 'Hamilton Electors' are free to diverge from the constituencies that they represent if they judge that a winner of the popular vote in them is a demagogic threat to the voters who are in the minority.  Now, of the 538 members of the E. C., 100 correspond to the number of Senators in Congress, two per state.  Thus, the discrepancy between the Electoral and Popular votes, controversial in elections such as the most recent one, originates in the structure of the Senate, in which each state has two Senators, regardless of its population.  In other words, the abolition of the Electoral College would not eliminate the disproportion that is ingredient in the everyday functioning of the Senate.  There has also been some confusion in the application of the concept of tyranny of the majority in this election--Clinton being the majority vote-getter, an electoral vote in the name of curtailing potential tyranny of the majority would be one in favor of Trump, the converse of what some have insisted upon.  So, the controversy over the Electoral College in this election has been somewhat misplaced and misinformed.

Democracy, Power, Filibuster

The U. S. Constitution empowers a citizen to vote, a power that can be exercised to a lesser or greater degree, depending on factors such as knowledge of issues, interest in available candidates, etc.  But, voting Power is not ruling Power, primarily because a vote can be a losing one.  In such cases, one can be as powerless in a Democracy as in a Monarchy. Now, what in the U. S. Democracy defends against the tyrannization that can be unconditional in the latter are procedural mechanisms, notably the 60% threshold for ending a filibuster in the Senate.  So, the novel element in the American Experiment consists in neither its Democracy nor its Power to Rule, but in its perhaps unprecedented degree of Empowerment of the Ruled.

Knowledge, Power, Democracy

The expression "Knowledge is power", which has ancient roots, is revived in the Modern era by Bacon.  But, while in the common popular usage, Knowledge and Power are implicitly distinct, e. g. in the interpretation 'Information can be advantageously useful', Bacon asserts an identity, an elaboration of the concept of Know-How.  In other words, he proposes that Knowledge is essentially Practical, and that there is no Power without Knowledge.  Now, while his primary focus is Scientific methodology, the latter clause is applicable to Political Philosophy.  In particular, it applies to the process of voting, when a voter does not fully understand the candidates and issues, either through laziness or being deceived.  In that case, voting is no exercise of Power, so the process is a superficial mockery of Democracy, which, as has been previously discussed, entails the empowerment of all voters.

Democracy and Empowerment

The standard definition of Democracy, 'rule of the people', does not specify which people.  Thus, over the centuries, 'the people' has been delimited according to class, gender, race, etc.  Typically, that delimitation is effected by restricting the vote.  Still, even universal voting can fall short of an actualization of Democracy.  For, a voter can be less than fully engaged in the process, for example, when none of the options are desirable, or when one is inadequately informed about candidates or issues.  Ruling presupposes Empowerment, and in these cases, the possession of Power is deficient in some respect, e. g. not knowing what one is doing is being not in full control of one's behavior.  Furthermore, as has been previously discussed, Democracy is primarily a Political Genesis, not a Structure.  So, an alternative definition of it is: 'The society in which maximum Empowerment entails equality of Empowerment.

Democracy, Political Structure, Political Genesis

Churchill's statement, "Democracy is the worst form of government, except for all the others", implicitly accepts the commonly held concept of Democracy as a structure of a Polity.  It thereby overlooks a different evaluation of Democracy--as a mode of political transition. Its main rivals in that regard are violence and inheritance.  Now, there appears to have never been a substantive debate over the comparative merits of those three. But, before it is taken for granted that voting would be the unanimous choice among intelligent people, at least some Conservatives seem to prefer dynastic rule, and Nietzsche and Marx are among those who are not unequivocally opposed to violent accession to power.  Such uncertainties indicate that the debate over Political Structure should not be abstracted from that over Political Genesis, two categories which Democracy, perhaps uniquely, spans.

Democracy and Hereditary Monarchy

The novelty of the American experiment, at least relative to its recent European antedecedents, is usually conceived to consist in the juxtaposition of its Democracy to their Monarchies. However, that concept does not adequately distinguish the inception of a regime from its structure.  For example, a polity in which a plebiscite chooses a ruler-for-life can be classified as both a Democracy and a Monarchy, and some executive powers of a President are unconditional, while those of a Constitutional Monarch might not be.  Instead, the novelty of the American experiment is with respect to the hereditary dimension of those polities, i. e. with respect to the inception of a regime.  In other words, a Hereditary Democracy is a contradictory notion, an antithesis that demonstrates that Democracy is primarily a mode of Political transition, rather than a Political structure.

Democracy and Experiment

The first experiment in human history, perhaps that of seeing what would happen if the fruit from a certain tree were ingested, entails two experiments--one, the specific content of the experiment, the other, the experiment qua experiment, i. e. seeing what would happen if something unprecedented were attempted, perhaps disobeying a deity.  The distinction might explain why America has been called an 'experiment'.  For, though the generally accepted reason for the latter is its Democracy, America is hardly the first Democracy in a well-documented, even in 1776, History.  Instead, what perhaps distinguishes it from its Athenian predecessor is precisely that it is an experiment, a distinction that becomes clearer as its pioneering Democracy diverges over the next few centuries from its pioneering Experimentalism, e. g. the Soviet Union, has been characterized as a 'Socialist experiment', not a Democratic one.  An aversion to experimentation per se that is deeply ingrained in American History would explain why that tradition has been much less celebrated than the other.

Experiment and Political Philosophy

The four main Modern Political Philosophies are usually considered to be the works of Hobbes, Locke, Spinoza, and Rousseau.  They share a general deductive structure, beginning with some principle taken to be self-evidently true, such as the Freedom of the Individual.  Thus, the American Declaration of Independence follows in this Deductive tradition.  But, if so, then America qua "experiment" is not in that tradition.  Instead, its antecedent, as Jefferson notes, is the originator of Modern Experimentalism, whose Political ideas can be found in the constitutions of several colonies, as well as in a speculative called New Atlantis, which pre-dates the recognized works of the era by at least several decades--Francis Bacon.  Like his pioneering formulation of Experimentalism, that project is completely ignored in contemporary academia, leaving Bacon best known as either a namesake of a painter, or a secret Shakespeare.  Perhaps, Experimentalism is as threatening to a status quo as is Revolution.

Genetic Engineering, Theology, Nature

There is nothing in the concept of Evolution that precludes the possibility of a divine creator of Nature.  What the concept is antithetical to are the specific Theological theses that all Nature is coeval, and that there is nothing new under the sign.  Otherwise, human experimentation is no more 'unnatural' than the unprecedented emergence of opposable thumbs.  Similarly, the modification of human genes, even if in vain or harmful, is not, as some opponents present it, inherently evil, an evaluation that expresses only a specific Theological prejudice.

Genetic Engineering, Experimentalism, Morality

According to a widely accepted narrative, the father of Modern Philosophy is Descartes, by virtue of his refusal to accept the existence of God as the foundational premise of his system, replacing it with I Think, thereby establishing both Certainty and Subjectivism as the cardinal principles of the era, with Rationalism and Empiricism as competing means to those ends.  But, according to one counter-narrative, the more radical break with the preceding Theocratism is formulated by Bacon, an Experimentalism that evokes the pre-Fall curiosity of Adam and Eve, and implicitly embraces Uncertainty. On that basis, the subsequent Empiricist tradition initiated by Locke is reactionary, as is the Rationalist one, at least until Kant, somewhat belatedly, acknowledges Bacon as an influence.  But, it is not until Nietzsche and Dewey begin to codify Experimentalism that Bacon's primogeniture begins to become overt.  In Dewey's case, that codification is formulated as a Logic, while for Nietzsche, Self-Overcoming, and, hence, Will to Power, are fundamentaly Experimentalist, as is the Morality that corresponds to them.  It is that Morality that challenges the blanket repudiation of genetic engineering as 'Ethically questionable'.

Genetic Engineering and Ethics

Nietzsche could not have anticipated the technological advances that have facilitated the possibility of genetic engineering as a means to the creation of superior humans.  However, he does anticipate one of the controversies surrounding it.  While one objection to what is now best known as a "GMO"--genetically modified organism--is that its potential harms remain inadequately diagnosed, another is more generally glossed as "Ethical questions".  But, the latter is precisely addressed by his 'Revaluation of All Values'.  For, those "questions" express a Theological orientation, often presented as absolute, according to which human Techne is conceived as a corruption of 'natural', aka created by a deity, processes.  At minimum, he refutes the Absolutism implicit in the phrase 'Ethical questions', and arguably exposes the unhealthful consequences of adherence to practices typically advocated by it.