Transformal Causality and Evolution

According to the Teleological concept of it, Human behavior consists in a transition from deficiency to elimination of deficiency, e. g. from hunger to eating.  Thus, for example, a Means of Production is Teleologically determined, since it serves as a means to producing a good that can eliminate a deficiency.  On the other hand, according to the Efficient Causality concept of it, Human behavior is ultimately a Response to a Stimulus.  However, usually lacking in such 'Behaviorist' formulations is an explicit positing of a governing principle of the Stimulus-Response causal connection.  Usually, the principle is implicitly Teleological, e. g. seeking food after experiencing stomach pangs, or water after experiencing mouth dryness.  Thus, neither Teleological Causality nor Efficient Causality suffices to explain behavior that seeks to surpass a condition of satiation, e. g. an Evolutionary principle.  In contrast, Transformal Causality can accommodate that principle, which can be formulated as a drive to increase Transformal Causality, i. e. via the replacement of a less comprehensive Form by a more comprehensive Form.  The fundamental instance of that increase is in Versatility, which consists in a Unity of a Multiplicity of functions.  Hence, an increase in Versatility is accomplished by an increase in the comprehensiveness of a given Multiplicity, or, in other words by Transformal Causality.  That such Causality applies fundamentally to behavior places it outside the traditional ranges of either Efficient or Teleological Causality.  Likewise, the concept is beyond the scope of the treatments of Causality by Hume and Kant.

Transformal Causality, Cognition, Action

Hume's concept of Causality is, more precisely, an interpretation of the perception, by a detached, or perhaps even disembodied, observer, of the sequence of data commonly characterized as 'efficient causation', his primary aim of which is to dismantle the Rationalist attribution of Necessity to the sequence.  Accordingly, Kant's response accepts the context.  He, thus, bypasses an opportunity to go further, and undermine the context itself.  Thus, for example, he does not recognize from his own example of one's perception of one's drawing a line, prominent in his B revision of the First Critique, the possibility of tracing causal connection to one's own Action.  Then, analyzing the drawing of a line, rather than a drawn line, he could recognize that the connecting of the points is an effect of Formal Causality, and that the action illustrates the synthesis that the Cognitive category of Causality effects. Now, as has been previously discussed, since Form and Matter are complementary, any imposition of structure is actually a restructuring, or, in other words, that Formal Causality is actually Transformal Causality.  Accordingly, if, as Kant posits, Causality is an a priori category of Human experience, then, fundamentally, it is not qua Cognitive and  Efficient Causality, but qua Practical and Transformal Causality.

Four Causes and Transformal Causality

Ancient Philosophy is dominated by Teleological Causality, and Modern Philosophy, by Efficient Causality. Dialectical Materialism, despite a linguistic kinship with Material Causality, seems comparable to Chemical interaction, which is reducible to Efficient Causality.  Regardless, both Aristotle and Kant attribute Formal Causality to Mind, but without recognizing the implied relegation of the Teleological and Efficient varieties, respectively, e. g. Pure Practical Reason plainly consists in the Formal Causality of Reason overpowering the Efficient Causality of the Inclinations, in Kant's doctrine.  Still, not even Formal Causality, as they conceive it, seems adequate to the fundamental Causality of Evolution, i. e. Adaptation-Of, e. g. the modification of a patch of land that yields vegetables.  Instead, as has been previously discussed, Transformal Causality accounts for that Evolutionist dynamic, as well as that of Economics, i. e. manufacturing.

Transformal Causality and Adaptation-Of

From Aristotle to Kant to Gestaltism, Formal Causality has always connoted the imposition of Form on Matter.  The concept thus entails the antecedent Formlessness of the Matter.  However, in all the examples of these traditions, Matter is pre-unified in at least some respect, e. g. contiguity.  Thus, they are not Formless prior to an imposition of Form, e. g. a lump of clay before being molded into a bowl.  In other words, Matter always possesses some Form, so Formal Causality is, more accurately, Transformal Causality.  Thus, the process of manufacturing that converts raw material into a finished product, is an example of Transformal Causality that is essential to Economics.  Likewise, Adaptation-Of, one the fundamental Organism-Environment relations, is essential to Evolutionism.  Accordingly, the distinctive versatility of the Human species is an expression of an unprecedented efficacy of Transformal Causality.

Wheel and Circle

Rudimentary Human tools reflect a continuity with zoological ancestry, e. g. digging implements and claws.  But, as Marx-Engels observe, the tool per se is a novel development.  Thus, the exemplary Human invention qua invention is the wheel, which has no zoological ancestor.  Now, implicit in Platonism, including its Aristotelian variation, is that the novelty of the wheel signifies an origin of the Human species different from zoological ascent, namely a descent from some perfect realm.  For, on that account, the wheel is an application of what for Plato is an eternal Form, and for Aristotle is the essence of perfection--the Circle.  However, as has been previously discussed, the novelty of a thumb that can easily touch fingertips can explain not only the Human discovery of the Circle but the origin of the concept of Form itself.  So, the wheel might not qualify as the first Human invention, but it is the exemplary expression of both Human inventiveness and Human Evolutionary distinctiveness.

Thumb, Mind, Evolution

With a small increment, a line can be transformed into a plane figure, e. g. a curve into a circle.  Similarly, a small increase in the length of an ape's thumb enables touching between the tips of thumb and other fingers.  As a result, a hand with unprecedented capacities to not merely touch an object, but to enclose, flexibly grasp, and manipulate it, emerges.  So, the Evolutionary development that originates the Human species is both homogeneous and a leap.  Furthermore, on the basis of Spinoza's Mind-Body Parallelism, a Mind that does not merely register the existence of an object, but imposes Form on registered data, in preparation for modifying an object, is another emergent from the small increase in the thumb ape.  In other words, Mind as Formal Cause, a concept entertained by Aristotle, and revived by Kant, is a novelty in the Evolutionary origination of the Human species.

Definition and Mind

Any Definition presupposes a Definition of Definition.  But a Definition of Definition must be self-exemplifying, and, hence, axiomatic.  Thus, Spinoza's location of Axioms after Definitions misrepresents their Logical order.  Now, it seems difficult to soundly dispute that any definition is fundamentally verbal, operational, and stipulative, i. e. because to do so requires going beyond the immediately given, which is question-begging, e. g. that a Definition represents a non-verbal eternal entity like an idea, rather than articulating how it is to be used in a given context, no matter how large that context is.  Hence, a Definition can be defined as a provisional fixing of the usage of a term or sequence of terms.  It expresses a limitation of Mental operations by the capacity of Mind, corresponding to the limitation of the manipulation of tools by the capacity of the hand, and codified by Kant's concept of Mind.  But that limitation is an initial limiting condition that neither delimits nor specifically prefigures subsequent operations, e. g. the extent of the scope of a system or the accomplishments of automated tools.

Evolution and Definition

The use of tools requires the manipulation of them, and, hence, of the hand with the unique thumb.  Tools must thus conform to the contour of the hand.  Correspondingly, insofar as mental operations are tools, as Spinoza proposes, they must conform to the contour of Mind.  Thus, the Definition is the fundamental Mind-tool maker.  Hence, according to his Mind-Body Parallelism, the power to define corresponds to the potential of the unprecedented Human thumb. In other words, Definition is the distinctively Human Mental operation, and, so, is a product of Evolution, rather than a Modification of God/Nature, as Spinoza's system entails.  Thus, Definition more than clarifies and makes precise--it promotes mental versatility.

Evolution and Tools

In Improvement of the Understanding, Spinoza likens mental operations to tool-manufacturing, the pattern of each of which is a development of increasing complexity.  Thus, each exemplifies an Evolutionary pattern.  But, the relation between this work and the Ethics is unclear, leaving unaddressed at least five issues: 1. The relation between this Evolutionary pattern and the Persistence conatus of the Ethics; 2. The relation between the analogy and the Mind-Body Parallelism of the Ethics; 3. Whether the distinction between Axiom and Proposition in the Ethics is one of degree of complexity, or one of kind; 4. The place of Method in the sequence of mental tool-development ; and, perhaps most important, 5. Whether or not God/Nature, and not merely Human Modes, develops according to an Evolutionary pattern.  If it does, then insofar as the pattern is Emanationist, as it is sometimes classified as, then it is both Emanationist and Evolutionist.  Accordingly, if the distinction in #3 is one of kind, and #4 locates Method as different in kind from the specific actions that guides, then while the Human thumb is evidence of an Evolutionary pattern from less complex to more complex organisms, the Human invention of Method is evidence of a different kind of Evolutionary pattern.  The standard focus on Spinoza's Epistemological Parallelism has left examination of these wider implications of his works usually unexplored.

Versatility, Evolution, Method

Versatility combines functional Unity and Multiplicity.  So, two main ways that Versatility can increase are by unification of a manifold of functions, and by addition to a given unified manifold of functions.  But, to increase in Versatility is to Evolve.  Thus, Smith's introduction of Division of Labor constitutes an Evolutionary moment, whereas the Marxist collectivization of Property is Evolutionary only insofar as it is a dimension of a collectivization of Labor, e. g. a cooperative business.  Now, a Method unifies a multiplicity of operations.  Hence, the adoption of a Philosophical Method, most prominently by Descartes and Bacon, and implicitly by most others, expresses an Evolutionary development.  Thus, Evolutionism is more than just a variety of Method--it is its principle.

Method, Economics, Evolution

Common to the two founders of Modern Philosophy, Descartes and Bacon, is the employment of Method, of which Rationalism and Empiricism are two types.  But, as the focus of Modern Philosophy shifts to Epistemology, i. e. to immediately given data, how the data is gotten gets obscured.  So, eventually, the presentations of the two main Economic doctrines of the era, Capitalism and Marxism, are haphazardly developed.  On the one hand, despite Smith's Empiricist orientation, the two cardinal features of his system--the Profit-motive and the Invisible Hand--are not grounded on Sense-Data.  On the other, while Marx-Engels subscribe to Dialectical Materialism, it is perhaps as a Method only when they call for Revolution, while committing in the German Ideology to an Empirical procedure that is far from rigorous.  Now, Darwinism is Empiricist, but the practice of Eugenics, which deliberately effects reproduction as a means to the generation of superior organisms, is thus Methodic Evolution.  Likewise, any means to Evolution, including, as has been previously discussed, an Economic system that promotes increase in Versatility, employs Evolution as a Method.

Evolution, Technology, Ecology

As has been previously discussed, Evolution is both Technological--in the common sense of the term--and Ecological.  Now, some believe those to be antithetical, citing Climate Change as an example.  However, that charge mislocates the antagonism that e. g. destruction of the ozone layer expresses.  For, Evolution is the increase in the versatility of the species.  So, insofar as development in automated processes is the manifestation of that increase, Technology is in the service of the species, and, hence, of the Ecosystem of which the species is a part.  In contrast, the goal of the industries that are harming the Ecosystem is private Profit.  Hence, the conflict is between an Atomist Economic system and an Organicist concept of the Human species.  So, the development and actualization of an Evolutionist, i. e. Organicist, Economic system could suffice to end Human-based Ecological corruption.

Education, Economics, Evolution

In contemporary U. S., probably the most Capitalist society in the world, Education is generally a means to a job.  In turn, jobs serve primarily the production of Wealth, which is centralized in the few owners of the Means of Production, and then distributed to the work-force, usually proportioned on the basis of some Supply-Demand relation.  Hence, in this Capitalist system, Education is a means to Economic ends.  In contrast, in an Evolutionist Economics, that relation is inverted.  For, as has been previously discussed, Human Evolution consists in an increase in the Versatility of the species, and, hence, in general Techne, i. e. Know-How.  Thus, the Education of all is essential to Human Evolution.  Accordingly, a primary function of an Evolutionist Economic system is the promotion of Education.  On that basis, Education in contemporary U. S., even the reforms urged by Progressives, is stagnant.

Evolution and Rationality

Kant's dedication in the B edition of the Critique of Pure Reason to Bacon seems to correspond to a substantive revision--Cognition as a constructive process, as signified in the text by the repeated example of the drawing of a line. Nevertheless, his appreciation of Bacon seems to fall short of the full implication of the pioneering method of the latter--that Pure Reason is fundamentally Experimental. On that basis, the Necessity of Reason does not preclude lacunae, either Diachronic or Synchronic.  For, if Reason is Experimental, then the possibilities of failure and incoherence are inherent.  Accordingly, Evolution can be Rational without being Mechanical, and an Ecosystem can be Rational and still entail internal conflict.  Thus, neither regressive or stagnant phases of Human history, nor environmentally destructive Human industrial processes, refute the concept of Evolution--including its Ecological dimension, as has been previously discussed--as Rational.

Evolution and Ecosystem

Armstrong's giant leap is more than one step.  It is the culmination of many steps, by many steppers, and may itself be just another step in a longer development.  So, whether Evolution consists in continuity, or in discontinuity, as is sometimes debated, if Armstrong's achievement is any indication, Evolution is a process than can span thousands of years, involving perhaps an entire species.  Furthermore, insofar as the Evolution of a species is an episode in a more comprehensive history of its planet, and the species is part of a terrestrial Ecosystem, the leap is that of the entire Ecosystem, of which the Human species is a representative, just as Armstrong is a representative of the Human species.  So, the concept of Evolution as the origin of a Species may be no more than a part of a concept of Evolution as either the origin of an Ecosystem, or at least as the extension of an Ecosystem..

Evolution, Means of Communication, Economics

As has been previously discussed, perhaps ironically, Marx-Engels miss that their collaboration exemplifies a Relation of Production that it is not considered in the content of their product.  They also, perhaps ironically, miss how the propagation of that product is itself a factor in the problem that they seek to solve.  For, that propagation is via the printing press, an invention which atomizes its audience, just as Gutenberg's Bible atomizes a flock after centuries of gathering en masse for access to it.  In other words, they do not consider how the Means of Communication might determine the Relations of Production, nor how the Means of Communication contradicts the content of what they are attempting to communicate.  Now, a significant aspect of Armstrong's giant leap--the means of its being communicated, i. e. globally televised--also demonstrates an evolution of the Means of Communication since the eras of Smith and Marx-Engels, an evolution that has continued in the fifty years since, i. e. the first human on Mars might Tweet or post on Facebook.  Thus, the persistence of Capitalism and its Socialist modifications is also a persistence of a contradiction between the still dominant Means of Production and the ascendant Means of Communication.  Diagnosis of current political paroxysms, e. g. Brexit, is difficult without a recognition of the increasing common obsolescence of the otherwise conflicting Economics doctrines that have dominated for centuries.

Evolution and Relations of Production

To Evolve is to increase in functional complexity, or, equivalently, to increase in versatility.  The subject of the process can be a unified entity, e. g. not only a thumb, or a person, but a species as well.  So, the Evolution of a Species involves not only what it can do, but also how it is organized, or, in Marxist terms, not only the Means of Production, but also the Relations of Production.  Now, Versatility combines Unity and Multiplicity.  Thus, e. g. the human thumb is more versatile than that of an ape by virtue of being able to do more without loss of unity.  Similarly, an increase in the versatility of the Relations of Production consists in either an increase in diversity or better organization.  Accordingly, what is lacking in the concept of Division of Labor shared by Smith and Marx is any organic unity, the result of which is potential fragmentation or exploitation.  That deficiency is potentially addressed by the collectivization of property, but Marx-Engels fail to extend that unity to a collectivization of functioning, even as they exemplify it as collaborators.  In contrast, Plato, in the Republic, considers an organic concept of Relations of Production, but not as potentially variable, and, hence, not as capable of Evolving, i. e. of increasing in versatility.

Industry, Revolution, Evolution

An Evolutionist Economics is not a means to survival, to leisure, or to any of the means to those, including wealth, individual or collective. But an Evolutionist Economics is not a means to Evolution, either.  For, Production is a primary factor in Economics, and Production itself has been among the central loci of the development of Human history from Eden to the Moon.  That is, the Means of Production have evolved from rudimentary sewing and cooking, to mechanical machines, to internal combustion engines, to electrical motors, to digital devices.  But even these need to be produced, even as they replace human labor, requiring their own Means of Production and human labor, themselves evolving processes. Thus, Economics is not a means to Evolution, but one of its fundamental expressions.  Accordingly, an Industrial Revolution that fuels the emergences of Capitalism and Socialism, is, more accurately, an Industrial Evolution.

Anthropocentrism and Evolution

The disproof of Geocentricism undermines two entailed theses: 1. The existence of a deity in a realm that is physically contiguous with the Earth, i. e. the sky; and 2. Anthropocentrism.  Now, each loss has had traumatic Nihilism-breeding implications for Humans.  But, while Nietzsche more provocatively addresses the first, i. e. "God is dead", the second, expressed by "Human All Too Human", more profoundly signifies the problem.  For, what has been lost is more than Meaning--it is the presumed privileged status of the favored creature that breeds the Nihilism that permits, e. g. the self-designated superiority of the murderous Hitler.  In contrast, Darwinism offers a better-grounded revision of Anthropocentrism--the evolutionary superiority of the Human species.  However, that revision entails the condition that Humans are not also independent of the Earthly biosphere, but are products of it. Thus, Armstrong's Anthropocentric "one giant leap for Mankind" should be amended as "one giant leap for Earthkind", i. e. because just as Armstrong is representative of Mankind, Mankind is representative of all of the Earth.  Likewise, the Moon landing is a moment in not only Human history, but in Natural History as well.

Evolution and Economics

Such a doctrine as an Evolutionist Economics would promote the kind of development that, as has been previously discussed, constitutes the arc of Human History--the progressive efforts of the species of an Adaptation Of its environment, facilitated by novelties such as a versatile thumb, spanning the sewing of the first clothing, and the rubbing together of two stones to produce fire, to the Apollo mission that lands a Human on the Moon.  Now, very little of such a doctrine is evident in Smith's system, with the closest approximation--Division of Labor--undercut by an emphasis on Market activity as a means to accumulating individual Wealth.  Marxism comes closer, insofar as it promotes a collectivization of ownership of the Human environment, only to revert to the Capitalist goal of individual leisure.  However, Marx and Engels do implicitly present a better approximation of Evolutionist values--as collaborators, in conjunction with those who help publish and spread their writings.  Those efforts anticipate the Collectivist Techne that has characterized Human Evolution.  Still, to date, an Evolutionist Economics is no more than a hypothetical alternative to the two doctrines that have dominated recent Human history.  But, given that between Darwin's discoveries of pre-Human Natural History, and the Human extraterrestrial ventures, Evolutionism has become the most comprehensive concept of the species, from which it follows that the Economic doctrine that it entails is now the most relevant one, with respect to which Capitalism and Socialism are becoming obsolete.

Adaptation and Techne

Adaptation To and Adaptation Of are combined in Techne.  The sharpness of an axe is an Adaptation To the hardness of a tree, the knowledge of which is a pre-condition for an Adaptation Of a tree, via chopping it down, for building, a fireplace, etc.  Likewise, Knowledge of the laws of Gravity and that the Earth spins on its axis, is a precondition for extraterrestrial travel.  In other words, Theoretical Knowledge is an Adaptation To, and putting it to use is an Adaptation Of, the combination of which is Techne, i. e. Knowing-How.  Plainly, that combination has been the motor of Human history, especially the past 500 years, with a potential transcending of its original environment already underway.  So, Techne is an integral factor in Human-Earth Adaptation, as Genesis 3 recognizes perhaps better than Darwinists.

Copernican Revolution and Evolutionist Revolution

For reasons that have previously been discussed, the inversion of the traditional priority of Adaptation To and Adaptation Of can be characterized as an Evolutionist Revolution.  But, it can also be appreciated as a descendant of Kant's Copernican Revolution.  For, the latter signifies an inversion of the Epistemological relation between Subject and Object, i. e. from the traditional concept of Knowledge as an adaptation of Mind to World, to that of it as an adaptation of a manifold to Mental Categories.  Furthermore, Kant's  subsequent inversion of the traditional priority of Theory over Practice, entails the inversion of the priority of a mere representation of the World, over a concrete modification of it, though Kant himself seems not to recognize that extension of his concept of Copernican Revolution.  Accordingly, Evolutionism can be recognized as a continuation of a Modern tradition of the radicalization of the concept of Human that includes the innovations of Copernicus and Kant.

Adaptation, Survival, Evolution

The standard Biological concept of Adaptation has implicitly been that of Adaptation To, because the primacy of that in relation to Adaptation Of  has been taken for granted.  Underlying that dogma is the deeply-entrenched acceptance of the Survival principle, from which it follows that any Adaptation Of an Environment, e. g. cultivation of land, is ultimately a means to Adaptation To it, e. g. staying alive at that location.  However, those orientations are now challenged by the fact of Human departure from its terrestrial environment, which demonstrates that the Adaptation Of the resources of that environment is not necessarily a means to the Adaptation To it.  More generally, the disambiguation of 'Adaptation' grounds that of 'Evolution', and the independence of the Evolutionist principle from the Survival principle, i. e. of increase from constancy.  Accordingly, the distinction between the two principles can be formulated as that between Adaptation Of and Adaptation To, respectively.

Adaptation To and Adaptation Of

In its usual usage, 'adaptation' connotes an extrinsic, unilateral, completed relation between an organism and an environment, as a means to its survival therein, e. g. 'Some marine organisms adapt to land by developing lungs in order to survive there'.  However, that usage involves three oversimplifications.  First, an Organism is constantly in interaction with some Environment, so, what is extrinsic to it is only a specific environment, e. g. water, land, etc., not an Environment per se.  Thus, second, Adaptation with a specific environment, but not per se, is ever completed.  Third, Adaptation can be either to or of an Environment, often simultaneously, e. g. oxygen inhaled by lungs adapted to the atmosphere is incorporated into an organism, and, hence, is a bilateral relation.  Now, Adaptation is not a fixed process, i. e. the quantity of adapted content is not fixed.  The significant example of that is the increase over the course of Human history, of its adaptation of its environment, i. e. its continuing development of the Earth.  Thus, because that adaptation is neither complete nor quantatively unchanging, its principle is not mere Survival, but Evolutionist, i. e. increase in complexity.

Homo Faber and Clothing

A difficulty in conceiving clothing as both a need and an implement is likely rooted in a deeply-ingrained concept of Human as Homo Sapiens, in which the species is conceived as distinctive because of its Knowledge, and that Knowledge is conceived as essentially contemplative or theoretical.  Accordingly, while clothing is easily conceivable as a unprecedented vital need, i. e. in most cases, a thinker needs to be wearing at least something, any use of an implement involves only applied Knowledge, and, thus, is conceived as inessential.  In contrast, the concept of Human as Homo Faber entails that its existence is essentially Practical or Technical.  On that basis, clothing, as the primary stratum of Human engagement with its environment, is both needed for that engagement, and needed qua Practical or Technical.  In other words, given the revision of the traditional concept of Human, it is as an implement that clothing is a vital need.

Clothing, Implement, Need

An implement is an extension of the human body that mediates a modification of its environment.  Thus, clothing is the fundamental implement.  For, it is, merely insofar as being worn, an extension of a body.  Furthermore, it facilitates any extension of occupancy by enabling adaptation to an environmental change, either a variation in a given environment, e. g. a change of weather, or travel to a new and different environment.  In all cases, that extension is the precondition of specific extensions, of the use of specific implements, e. g. a coat put on in order to go outside and shovel snow.  Now, clothing is a vital need for Humans, which distinguishes the species from others.  Thus, it is a need to extend, not merely to maintain or replenish, which is how needs are typically interpreted.  Thus, clothing is indicative of a growth principle, e. g. Evolution, rather than a mere Survival principle.  It is also an implement the use of which is a vital need, and not merely a means to satisfying a vital need.

Utility and Evolutionist Economics

Utilitarianism conflates the criterion of Value--Pleasure--with the preeminent bearer of Value--Usefulness.  Thus, Utility and Pleasure-causing are synonymous in the doctrine, as is evident when Mill struggles to distinguish 'higher' and 'lower' pleasures.  Accordingly, Utilitarianism is merely a variety of Hedonism.  Now, some clothing is, because of the way it feels on the skin, pleasurable.  But otherwise, the Utilitarian concepts of Utility and Usefulness are inapplicable to clothing.  For, the value of clothing usually consists not in its feeling on the skin, but in its effectiveness in facilitating adaptation to an environment--work-boots in mud, a business suit in an office, shorts on a tennis court, a space suit on the Moon, etc.  Thus, traditional Utilitarianism is inadequate to an Evolutionist concept of Economics, which entails an essential relationship between a Producer/Consumer and an Environment.  But that inadequacy does not necessarily apply to the concept of Utility that Utilitarianism distorts--Usefulness, in its ordinary meaning, which can characterize the value of clothing in the promotion of Evolution, e. g. Armstrong's spacesuit that allows him to take a giant leap for the species.

Clothing, Adaptation, Economics

Among the vital Human needs, clothing is distinctive, because it is in immediate contact with an environment.  Hence, it must be adapted to an environment in ways not required of other vital needs, e. g. clothing must be specifically waterproofed against wet conditions, but any food eaten, though in a waterproof container, is the same as that eaten in dry conditions.  So, the versatility of clothing must correspond to the versatility of Human functioning.  Now, whether or not other species can function, as humans can, in  conditions that are as varied as hot, cold, dry, wet, etc., there seems to be none that can also do so extraterrestrially.   So, insofar as the principle of Human History is Evolutionist, i. e. the development of an unprecedented versatility, the production and consumption of clothing must be the foundation of an Evolutionist Economics.

Surplus and Value

Surplus-Value is usually analyzed as the difference between the value of a manufactured product and the value of the raw material prior to the manufacturing process.  However, there is a more fundamental analysis, as is signified by the hyphen--differentiating the surplus in the material, i. e. how it has been modified, and the value of that surplus.  So, that Labor is the source of the modification, does not entail that it has value.  Rather, it has value only insofar as the finished product has use.  In other words, the formulation of the concept 'source of Value' is ambiguous--it might signify the cause of a valuable modification, but it might also signify the act by which Value is ascribed to something.  Thus, absent a disambiguation, the Labor Theory of Value and the Use Theory of Value are not inconsistent.  However, given the clarification, they are, and the latter seems correct.  Which does not undermine the Marxist diagnosis of Exploitation as stealing from the Labor that increases Value by the modification of the given.

Human, Economics, Clothing

According to Smith, Humans are distinguished from other species when negotiating exchanges, while, according to Marx, they are distinguished when producing the means to satisfy basic needs.  These premises ground their respective focuses in Economics--Smith's on the concept of a Market, Marx's on the Means of Production as the medium of Exploitation.  But each also strays from their original vision--Smith's Market becomes an arena of not Exchange, but of Profit-seeking, and Marx advocates the elimination of Human Labor.  Now, as has been previously discussed, the distinctive Human need is, instead, clothing, and the distinctive Human thumb facilitates the solution to that need.  Thus, a concept of Economics that is derived from what is distinctively Human is most clearly evidenced by the production and consumption of clothing.  Accordingly, Smith's concept of Human is derivative, exchange involving clothing presupposes its manufacture, and Marx would eliminate his by replacing workers with machines.

Eden, Clothing, Evolution

Probably because of the traditional Theological focus on Reproductive processes, the absence of some details in Genesis 3 has usually been overlooked, e. g. how Adam and Eve know how to sew, what materials they use to accomplish that, etc.  But the perhaps most significant lack is of an explanation for why they do not need clothing.  Now, one natural account is that the climate in Eden does not require any such protection, e. g. it is constantly warm enough, it does not rain, etc.  But, on the basis of that premise, the logic of the subsequent events potentially changes.  For, preceding the temptation of the serpent might thus be a wanderlust, which would entail travel to a different climate, and, hence, to where clothing might be needed.  Accordingly, leaving Eden is not an unintended consequence of straying from assured survival, but, rather is the initial impulse to begin with.  In other words, once a plausible explanation for the nakedness of Adam and Eve is accepted, Genesis can transform into a proto-Evolutionist account of the earliest days of Human History--the instinct to transcend the given, the zoologically unique need for clothing, the uniquely versatile thumb, knowledge of the use of that thumb to manufacture clothing, and, the eventual departure from Eden.  Perhaps after Evolutionism has been more fully absorbed into Human culture, such a radical revision of one its most influential documents might become more widely accepted.

Clothing and Evolution

The Evolutionist who reads Genesis 3 carefully might notice what seems to have usually been overlooked in not only the popular understanding, but in the Literalist interpretation of this pivotal passage--that the first application of Human Knowledge is to the manufacture of clothing, i. e. to "girdles" made of "fig-leaves", which were specifically "sewed".  In other words, the proto-Human act in this presumed anti-Evolutionist account of Human History involves the use of the distinctive Human thumb to compensate for the lack of fur that most other species enjoy.  Thus, the clothing industry is born, a simple version of the more complex processes to come, processes that have been increasing in both efficiency and effectiveness--in the former case, from a quantity of two products to quantities in the thousands, and the latter case, incorporation of materials from fig-leaves to cotton to the nylon in spacesuits.  Now, except in the case of Adam and Eve, the manufacturers of clothing have themselves been clad.  Hence, the production of clothing has been a means to not merely its consumption, but to the further production of clothing.  But this circularity is not the vicious one that Marx seeks to eliminate--the circle of consumption that barely suffices for a return to another day of drudgery.  This pattern is, rather, that of a virtuous evolving spiral, which typifies the concept of Economics as a means to Evolving, including the Evolution of Economics itself.  And, the initial stages of the pattern can be found in the heart of the document that is generally conceived to be antithetical to Evolutionism.

Evolution and Practice

From the earliest part of its history, perhaps even in Eden, Humans have sought to control reproductive processes--not only by devices such as condoms, but by institutions such as arranged marriages, as well.  Now, Reproduction is the motor of History.  So, insofar as History is determined by an Evolutionist principle, Evolution has been Practical from the earliest days.  Now, though Reproduction has usually been conceived as determined by a Survival principle, eugenics, miscegenation, and the common parental instinct that their children have a life that is 'better than' theirs, are indications that in reproducing, the species seeks growth of some kind.  Thus, even if 'Evolutionism' is commonly conceived, following Darwin, as a Theory, i. e. a description, of the Human species as apes with a better survival potential than other apes, long before the appearance of that theory, Practical Evolutionism, by which the species has grown, is among the earliest of Human methods, even if it still has yet to be recognized as such.

Evolutionist Revolution and Economics

Copernicus' discovery that the Earth spins on its axis with respect to which the Sun is stationary, inspires in Kant what he calls a Copernican Revolution in Epistemology, according to which Cognition is essentially in motion, and, hence, is constituted by the adaptation of external data to the Form of Time, i. e. an Object of Cognition is temporally constructed.  Nevertheless, just as the Sun remains commonly conceived to rise and set, Cognition is still commonly conceived to correspond directly to an independent Object.  Similarly, one of the consequences of an Evolutionist concept of Human History, previously discussed, is what might be called an Evolutionist Revolution in Psychology.  This Revolution inverts the deeply ingrained concept of the relation between Action and Consumption, according to which, Human exertion is a means to eating and drinking, and the value of the Human thumb is as a means to securing food and water.  Instead, according to the inversion, biological replenishment is a means to behavior the fundamental principle of which is further increases in Human functional versatility, to the extent of unprecedented terrestrial adaptation, and, perhaps, beyond.  Nevertheless, despite the evidence grounding an Evolutionist Revolution, Economics remains commonly conceived as a means to Survival, corporeal or incorporeal.

Human History and Survival

Predominant Christianity and Darwinism share two theses: 1. The Human species originates at a single location, and 2. Survival is the fundamental drive of a Human, including qua the desire for immortality.  But, evidence relevant to what is subsequent to the event signified in #1 calls into question #2.  For, plainly since that origin, the species has dispersed to cover the entire Earth, has been integrating those dispersed parts, e. g. via telecommunications, and has ventured beyond the Earth,   Hence, there is strong evidence of a drive other than Survival determining Human existence, and that drive is, as has been previously discussed, Evolution, defined as an increase in complexity, or equivalently, an increase in adaptive versatility.  That #2 remains widely believed is no argument against its being supplanted, as is suggested by  the persistence of the popular beliefs that a deity exists in the sky, and that the Sun rises and sets, 500 years after Copernicus disproves them.

History, Economics, Environment

While, in the predominant Christian doctrine, the Salvation of the individual Human Soul is redemption from the punishment of the species, it is more immediately a liberation from corporeality.  But, then, it is, thus, a liberation from all Corporeality, not only that of the individual, and that of the Human species, but of the entire world.  Accordingly, abstraction from any physical Environment is a characteristic of the concept of Economics derived from the Christian concept of Human History.  Thus, in the latter, environmental influences are only extrinsic to cardinal Economic formulations, e. g. abundance or scarcity of a natural resource, which becomes intrinsic only when theologized, e. g. as a medium of divine reward or punishment.  In sharp contrast, insofar as Human History is an episode in Natural History, Human society is part of the universal ecosystem, so Economics is inherently Ecological.  Hence, the Evolutionist concept of Economics is likewise Ecological.  Thus, for example, current debates about the relation between Human society and Climate Change have their roots in these differing concepts of the relation between the Human species and the non-Human Natural world, and, thus, in the differing concepts of History, with the question of the legitimacy of the regulation of some industries notably at stake.

Christian Human History, Evolutionist Human History, Economics

According to a predominating Christian concept of Human History, the species is originally in a divinely-created Edenic condition which entails no need to reproduce and no need to work to satisfy basic needs.  Thus, the punishment for succumbing to sexual temptation is the revoking of the second privilege.  Hence, in that History, Economics is a science of a what is initially a Fallen condition, which may be the ultimate reason why it has been characterized as "dismal".  Eventually, Economics becomes the medium of the sequel in that History, the theme of which is the Salvation of members, individually, from the punishment of the species.  Thus, Capitalism, in which an Invisible Hand dispenses rewards to self-interested individual members of society, is an event in a Christian concept of Human History even prior to the Protestant appropriation of it that Weber describes, and even where the practice of it is apparently 'secular'.  Now, from the outset, Evolutionism immediately diverges from that History, in three ways.  For, insofar as, first, the Human species originates not as a divine creation, but as an evolution from apes, it, second, also inherently reproduces, and, third, must exert itself in order to satisfy vital needs.  Furthermore, Knowledge-seeking, i. e. discovering how to use its unique physiological characteristics, e. g. its versatile thumb, is essential to that exertion.  And, since this phase of Human History is not a punishment, Salvation from it is not a subsequent phase, so, nor is the isolation of its members a main theme in it.  In other words, an Evolutionist concept of Economics is radically distinct from that entailed in the predominating Christian Human History--it is not Individualistic, it is not a medium of Reward and Punishment, Techne is an asset, and it is not "dismal".

Human History, Theology, Evolutionism

The concept of History consists in a temporally ordered sequence of at least two events.  As Deleuze argues, even a repetition entails a difference between two terms, i. e. the second term, but not the first, has a predecessor, so a Repetition is a minimal History.  Thus, absent a differentiation into phases, the concept of mere Survival is insufficient to ground a History.  Now, the concept of a Human History, as opposed to more localized histories, e. g. national, requires that the terms are all humans, not merely some.  Hence, the Theological tradition according to which the first term is that described in either Genesis 1 or Genesis 2, and the final term is an 'end of days' that precedes some afterlife, offers a Human History.  In contrast, the Dialectical History of either Hegel or Marx does not, since a first term is lacking.  So, by positing a first event that is an alternative to the Theological one, Darwinism presents the foundation of an alternate concept of Human History, though the completion of the sequence remains indeterminate.  One possible completion is that the species settles into Survival, another is that it develops into a new species, and a third is a combination of the two, i. e. in which some Humans, like some apes, remain at that level of development, while others mutate into some unprecedented species.  Regardless of those differences, debates between Theology and Evolutionism have usually focused on the origin of the species, without considering the implications of Darwinism for its subsequent History.

Capitalism, Marxism, Evolutionism

Smith's Economic model is apparently a self-contained universe, with its highest good--Wealth, its behavioral principle--Profit-maximization, and deity--the Invisible Hand, systematically interdependent.  Marx undermines the apparent opacity of the model by asserting that it is merely an hypostasized phase of an historical process, while implying a mutability of behavioral principle that corresponds to the mutability of social structure.  Now, the Evolutionist concept of History outstrips the Marxist one, i. e. conceives Human history as an episode in Natural history.  Accordingly, an Evolutionist concept of behavior outstrips the Marxist concept, i. e. Evolutionist Psychology supplants that of Marxism, as well as that of Capitalism.  Thus, insofar as Human history is, as has been previously discussed, a process of Species-Origination, i. e. leading to some novel species, adapting to a new environment, then three cardinal characteristics of the principle of human behavior are: it is species-grounded, it aims ultimately at the development of a new species, and its concept of that species entails an  environment, i. e. it is not Individualistic, Wealth is not its highest good, and it is not independent of the Natural world.  In other words, Evolutionism, more emphatically than Marxism, conceives Capitalism as obsolete, and, hence, entails a concept of Economics that outstrips both of them.

Human History and Species-Origination

Bergson's concept of Evolution is not Darwinist, but still includes a distinct that is relevant to Darwinism.  He recognizes and distinguishes the possibilities of both Evolution and Survival, positing that some species continue to develop, while others reach a stage of development that they thereafter merely repeat.  The distinction is plainly applicable to Darwinism, i. e. to any species that has ceased to mutate, e. g. apes that have remained as such after the origin of the Human species.  So, the significant question is: which of the two principles applies to Human history?  And, while it may be a long time before it is definitively clear whether or not the Human species has leveled off, there is strong evidence that it has not.  That evidence is that after originating at one location, and then spreading to a degree of control of much of its terrestrial environment, it has recently begun to venture beyond that environment, a development that is already as radical as that of marine organisms venturing onto dry land.  So, if the latter is classified as 'evolving', and not merely 'surviving', then so, too, must the former be.  Accordingly, there is strong evidence that Human history is being determined by an Evolutionary principle, or, in other words, that it is itself a process, ongoing, of Species-Origination, and not merely a postscript to one, subsequently seeking merely the survival of the species.

Human Superiority and Extraterrestriality

The increase in Human longevity over the centuries might be taken as confirmation that Survival is the fundamental principle of Evolution.  However, while such evidence might indicate the superiority of some humans to others, it does not correspond to the fundamental Evolutionist premise of Human superiority with respect to other species.  So, better evidence for that premise might be the likelihood that a human with a rifle will outlive a rhinoceros with a tusk.  Nevertheless, another example of Human survival might be a better indication of its Evolutionist superiority to other species.  This is its ability to adaptively function where, according to the best evidence, no other species has been able to--in an extraterrestrial environment.  Such a change of habitat is even more radical than that of a marine species to land, since the new environment is, apparently, hitherto  uninhabited by any terrestrial life. Now, it might be out of instinctual worry about the long-term inhabitability of the Earth that has driven Humans elsewhere.  But, that such potential uninhabitability seems to be the product of Human invention, e. g. an effect of industrial pollution, itself tends to undermine that popular thesis.  So, the stronger hypothesis is that the extraterrestrial survival, as relatively short-lived as it has been thus far, that is unique to the Human species, is evidence of a superiority that consists in its greater functional complexity, the drive to which is its fundamental principle, i. e. is independent of the inhabitability, or not, of the terrestrial environment.

Evolution and Society

As has been previously discussed, Darwinism can be distinguished from Evolutionism.  For, the fundamental principle of the former is Survival, to which Evolution is a means, while the fundamental principle of the latter is Evolution, which entails Survival, just as Acceleration entails Motion.  But, Social Evolutionism is not merely the result of replacing in Social Darwinism one principle for the other.  For, the concept of Society is extrinsic to Darwinism, i. e. Survival can be that of an organism outside of any relation to organisms of the same species.  In contrast, Social Evolutionism, as has been previously discussed, is a Species drive that seeks Collective Versatility, which is constituted by an organization of its Members.  In other words, the concept of Society is entailed by the concept of Evolutionism, i. e. the qualifier 'Social' is redundant, though useful because instructive.  Any difficulty in grasping that Society per se, and not merely some particular variety of a society, is a product of Evolution, reflects the extent to which Darwinian Evolutionism has strayed from its original attribution to a Species, including in the popular imagination.

Survival of the Fittest and Evolution

Because most of the attention to Darwinism has focused on the data that has served as the basis of the theory, the lack of rigor in the interpretation of it has gone relatively unnoticed.  Thus, for example, taking the phrase 'survival of the fittest' at face value glosses over its double vagueness.  To begin with, while 'fittest' connotes the success of an Organism in adapting to an Environment, it does not distinguish between submission to the latter, mastery of it, or some relation in between--examples of submission as a survival strategy include camouflaging and following orders.  Hence, 'fitness' connotes nothing more than 'survival'. Likewise, the phrase 'survival of the fittest' means nothing more than the, if not trivial, at minimum, uninformative, 'survival of those that outlive others', which could apply to a cockroach in a nuclear holocaust, or a thief with a gun, as has been previously discussed.  Still, the deeper problem with the phrase is that it leaves undefined 'to live'.  Now, a fundamental problem for Darwinism is that it has introduced a definition of 'to live'--'to evolve', meaning 'to increase in complexity', without considering the possible inconsistencies between the two concepts, as has been previously discussed.  Thus, 'survival of the fittest' could connote 'the continuing to increase in complexity of the most greatly complex', but Darwin leaves that possibility undeveloped, as do most of his followers, including Social Darwinists.

Social Darwinism and Social Evolutionism

From the appropriation of Darwinism by Capitalism, i. e. the interpretation of 'survival of the fittest' as 'survival of the wealthiest', it follows that a thief with a gun is superior to their victim.  But any further implication that 'fitter' is equivalent to 'more highly evolved' exposes a fundamental confusion in Darwinism itself--between the Survival principle and the Evolutionist principle.  Illustrating that confusion is the widely-held hypothesis that a cockroach could survive a nuclear holocaust, though few would conclude that a cockroach is, therefore, more highly evolved, i. e. more complex, than a human.  For that reason, Social Darwinism is not equivalent to Social Evolutionism, which leaves the concept of Evolutionist Economics unsettled.  Instead, the fundamental principle of that concept must promote the Evolution of the Species, not the Survival of the Individual.  Now, as has been previously discussed, the human thumb illustrates that the process of Evolving consists in an increase in Complexity, or, equivalently, in Versatility. Thus, Collective Versatility is an example of a fundamental principle of Evolutionist Economics.

Versatility and Capitalism

As the human thumb illustrates, Versatility is a unity of multiple functions, the strength of which is that Unity, rather than in the any of its individual functions, or even in their assemblage.  Likewise, a versatile society is stronger than any assemblage of individuals.  It is thus because individual function, i. e. performance of some isolated entity, is inherently relatively feeble, the evaluation of such an isolated entity can measure only some passive characteristic.  Accordingly, quantity of possession of Wealth is the object of evaluation in an Individualistic doctrine such as Capitalism.  Likewise, the Social Darwinist equation of 'fittest' and 'wealthiest' unwittingly promotes only Evolutionary relative weakness, i. e. on the basis of that formulation a thief whose thumb functions to hold a gun is more highly 'evolved' than one of their victims.

Individuation, Diversification, Versatility

The pioneering expositions of Capitalism, Marxism, and Darwinism share a similar pattern: begin with a definition of Human, and proceed to present a system that focuses on individual humans.  In Wealth of Nations the focus is on the Self-Interest of Market-players; in the German Ideology, it is on the leisure activities of workers who have been liberated from Labor, and in Darwinism, it is on the survival of individual members of a Species.  However, as has been previously discussed, automation exposes the fundamental Collectivist character of Human society, i. e. that the fundamental function of automation is the mass satisfaction of vital needs.  So, restoring the initial Collectivist moment from which each system abstracts, apparent Individuation is revealed as Diversification, the ultimate beneficiary of which is the Whole that has been so diversified, not any of the Parts that have been so generated, and then isolated.  Accordingly, as is the case with the unprecedented human thumb, the fundamental value of Diversification is the increase of the Versatility of the Whole, not Individual profit, leisure, or survival.  The Individualist tradition that dominates Modern Political Philosophy, and informs not only Capitalism, but Marxism and Darwinism, can be revised on that basis.

Automation, Economics, Species

Insofar as a shovel can be used to dig a garden, the manufacturing of one exemplifies Marx's concept of the uniquely human practice of producing the means of satisfying needs.  Also, its handle reflects that it is designed to be used by the uniquely evolved human hand.  But, many tools far exceed those characteristics--automated tools.  The Economic significance of them, according to Marx, is the possibility of replacing human labor, and not merely abetting it.  Similarly, some automation can function without the unique human thumb.  So, what is missed in both the Marxist and the Evolutionist appreciations of automation is the basic function of the great increase in productive capacity, and, hence, in the capacity to the mass satisfaction of needs.  Nor does Capitalism, even though Smith's concept of Division of Labor anticipates the former capacity, appreciate the latter capacity, since the primary value of automation according to the doctrine is as an opportunity for profit.  Thus, what has gotten lost in the incorporation of automation into Economics over the past few centuries is that it expresses a not necessarily exclusively human impulse--a species drive, comparable to, say, a honeycomb.

Barter, Tools, Evolution

According to Smith, what distinguishes humans from other species is the propensity to "truck, barter, and exchange".  According to Marx, the "first premise of human existence" and "of all history" is the "production of the means to satisfy" fundamental needs.  In other words, according to the former, barter, etc. is the defining Human characteristic, while according to the latter, it is tool-making.  Now, according to Darwin, the distinctive Human characteristics are several physiological features, including thumbs of unprecedented versatility.  Plainly, the latter is the pre-condition of the making of and use of tools.  Furthermore, the objects of barter, etc. are all products of some manufacturing process.  Thus, Evolutionism is much closer to Marxism than to Capitalism in two respects--what the defining characteristic of Human is, and that the appearance of that characteristic marks the beginning of Human history.

Capitalism, Socialism, Evolutionism

Social Darwinism is an example of how Capitalists have been quicker than Socialists to incorporate Evolutionist elements.  It derives from Darwin's thesis that Variation has Evolutionary value as a process of determining superior types, with Egoism as a modification of Variation, i. e. via the interpretation of Variation as Individuation.  However, Darwin misses a different Evolutionary virtue of Variation--the promotion of Versatility, which strengthens a species.  So, that strength requires the maintaining of cohesion amongst the varieties, which modification to Egoism undermines, as Smith himself briefly recognizes when expressing worries about the tendency of his system towards social fragmentation.  Thus, there is an opportunity for Marxists to argue that a more cohesive society is a stronger society, and as a remedy for divisive Class Conflict, Socialism is more cohesive than Capitalism.  Likewise, they can argue more generally that a theory concerning the Biological success of a mutable Species has more in common with a doctrine that promotes historically variable Collectivism, than with a doctrine that promotes the individual pursuit of Wealth.

Marxism and Evolutionism

Evolutionary Logic consists in the following pattern: a novel element, e. g. a mutation, is introduced into a given structure, prompting a re-organization into a more complex structure.  So, a special case of Evolutionary Logic is the case of precisely two elements.  In other words Dialectical Logic is a special case of Evolutionary Logic.  Furthermore, there are two other ways that Evolutionism outstrips Marxism.  First, the Evolutionist concept of Natural History includes any concept of Human History, e. g. the Marxist concept.  Likewise, the Evolutionist concept of the Environment-Species relation includes any concept of the structure of Human society.  Accordingly, Marxist principles are subordinate to Evolutionist principles.  Thus, for example, the premise of the superiority of Socialism to Capitalism can be grounded on its greater effectiveness as a strategy of the adaptation of a species to its environment.

Marxism, Internal Critique, External Critique

The stated Marxist critique of Capitalism relies heavily on exposing its internal contradictions, most notably the Class antagonism they invoke to justify Revolution.  However, they not only under-appreciate the effectiveness of a type of external critique, but implicitly apply it themselves.  According to that type of critique, a more comprehensive concept supersedes a less comprehensive concept that it includes.  That criterion is entailed in the Dialectical concept of Sublation, and is utilized by Marxists when they posit that Capitalism is only a transient episode in a Dialectical History.  However, in doing so, they seem to be unaware that their concept of History could be or has been superseded--by the Evolutionist concept, according to which Human history is itself an episode in Natural history, and, so, derived from principles that govern that.  Thus, as effective as an Internal Critique of Capitalism might be, it is itself subject to an External Critique.

Economics and Ecology

One Moral criticism to which Capitalism is vulnerable is that it subordinates Wealth to Health, applicable to both one who profits and one who loses.  The Marxist repudiation of Capitalist Exploitation can be conceived as targeting such a subordination in the case of workers.  Another Moral criticism is that Capitalism dehumanizes all people, since its Atomism expresses a Physicist, i. e. Newtonian, concept of Human that is inadequate to a Biological, i. e. Organicist, concept of them as living beings.  The Marxist principle 'From each according to one's abilities' can be interpreted as implicitly exemplifying that criticism, as has been previously discussed. Now, the concept of Organism entails that of Environment.  Thus, the Biological judgment of an Economic doctrine is from the perspective of a more comprehensive context, i. e. an Ecological context, in which Economic activity is located, or, in other words, that it subjects Economics to Ecological principles.  Marxism does not fully develop such a critique, but does suggest some of its initial premises.

Marxism, Physics, Biology

Dialectical Materialism is a descriptive system, rivaling not only Hegel's Dialectical Idealism, but also the Analytical Atomisms of Democritus and Newton, as is expressed by Marx's Dissertation, and Engels' work on Physics, respectively.  Thus, Dialectical Materialism offers no basis for normative judgments, including any for the rejection of Capitalism and the condemnation of Exploitation.  In contrast, Marx's 'From each according to one's abilities' principle is not derived from Dialectical Materialism, but has another origin, as is suggested by the classification of it as Actionist, as has been previously discussed.  For Actionism can be recognized as an example of a Vitalist principle, and, hence as a Biological principle.  Now, Physicist explanations are mechanistic, and, hence, lack the capacity to distinguish between inanimate and animate phenomena.  Thus, the Marxist rejection of Capitalism, founded on the condemnation of Exploitation, is implicitly grounded on a superiority of Biology over Physics with respect to Economic activity--a capacity to recognize ill effects, e. g. the suffering of the victims of Exploitation.

Economics, Politics, Morality

The difference between Political-Economy and Macro-Economics is that while in the former, Economics is integral to Politics, and perhaps even its basis, e. g. Marxism, in the latter, the sphere of Economics is circumscribed within the Political realm, and, perhaps, is opaque with respect it.  In other words, Macro-Economics is a larger version of Micro-Economics, and similarly private.  Thus, as in the case of another circumscribed, opaque, activity, the sporting event, a Macro-Economic code of behavior might be independent of the Morality of the more general society, e. g. in boxing, Battery is not only permissible, but mandatory.  Accordingly, it is possible that Smith conceives the relation between Economic Self-Interest and Sympathy as that of an opaque specialized Ethos to general Morality.  But, if so, then the circumscription is permeable, given that poverty, for example, exceeds the confines of the Market.  Still, to judge Exploitation on general, not specialized, grounds, presupposes a general context, but it is unclear if Marx offers one.  For, if, as he proposes, Economics is the basis of all human activity, e. g. Leisure is a negation of Labor within that sphere, then the disapproval of Exploitation must be grounded on some Economic principle.  However, Marx seems to take that judgment for granted, perhaps as a tacit concession to one of Kant's Duties.  If so, then there is a larger human context within which Economics is located, opaquely or otherwise, in which case Economics is not the Base of Society or of Politics.  To explain what such a context might be requires a more elaborate characterization than his brief description, in the German Ideology, of hunting, fishing, etc., of what non-Labor life in that larger context might be like.  As is, his condemnation of Exploitation, and, thus, his repudiation of Capitalism, remains ungrounded.

Actionism and Marxism

'Actionism' can be defined as valuing Action for its own sake, with Action conceived as a continual process.  It is thus opposed to any Consequentialism, which privileges the final moment of that process, or any effects of that final moment, e. g. a product, or the enjoyment of a product. Actionism thus conceives food and rest as a preceding, not subsequent to, Action, thereby inverting a standard concept of behavior as a means to satisfying desire, whether vital or otherwise.  Thus, an exemplary Actionist, for whom performance is for its own sake, is a Musician.  Likewise, the athlete who enjoys playing regardless of outcome is an Actionist, while one for whom winning is all that matters is not.  Now, Profit-seeking is not Actionist, but it is unclear whether or not Marxism is.  For, insofar as it locates the source of Value of a product in the Labor that produces it, it is Actionist, but insofar as it aims for the liberation from Labor, to free the worker for leisure, it is not, perhaps because in the latter case, Marx does not distinguish drudgery from skilled work.  Hence, it is unclear whether or not his 'From each according to ones ability' is an Actionist principle, i. e. whether or not it is doubly opposed to Capitalist Profit-seeking behavior--as both Collectivist and Actionist.

Capitalism, Socialism, Collectivism

Smith does not explain the relation between the Profit-motive and Division of Labor.  Presumably, he believes that they are consistent insofar as involvement in the latter is a means to one's profiting.  However, that leaves unclarified the proper treatment of one's co-workers.  Nor does Marx seize upon the point that a collective consciousness might be developed in the context of working with others, instead focusing on the harm done to a person by specialization.  But, perhaps surprisingly, it is Hegel who conceives work relations Dialectically, and, so, posits that Self-Interest develops via that Logic into a General Will, i. e. that the promotion of one's own well-being is that of all others, as well.  Thus, Marx' 'From each according to one's ability', implicit in which is a Collective context, has more in common with Philosophy of Right than the Germany Ideology.  Still, that derivation shares Atomist premises with Smith's doctrine, i. e. that one begins as independent of others, with the difference that Capitalist Atoms remain mutually independent, while Dialectical ones interpenetrate.  Now, more sharply contrasting with those premises is either Holistic Collectivism, according to which the Whole precedes its Parts, or Organicist Collectivism, according to which the Whole and its Parts are coeval.  Still, any of these varieties of Collectivism grounds a Moral alternative to the Egoism that is the behavioral foundation of Capitalism.

Marxism and Morality

As is clear in the German Ideology, for Marx-Engels, Socialism is not an End in itself, but a Means to the elimination of Exploitation facilitated by Private Property, i. e. by private ownership of the Means of Production.  Now, it is easy to conceive Exploitation as a violation of Kant's principle that one should not treat another as a mere Means.  Hence, Marxist Socialism is, despite its other innovations, in that respect, merely an extension of Kantian Morality.  On the other hand, Marx' precept 'From each according to one's ability' does entail something new.  For, it conceives a Person as inherently part of a Collective, rather than as an entity that is essentially isolated from others, entering into relations with them only extrinsically.  The latter Atomist concept of a Person is implicit whenever relations with others are conceived as external encounters, even I-Thou, which is the case of the entire Moral tradition beginning with Aristotle.  In contrast, Marx' precept signals a transition from that tradition to Collectivist Morality, not necessarily restricted to Socialism, but plainly occasioned by it.

Capitalism, Socialism, Is, Ought

Marxism shares with Capitalism a profound methodological confusion--between Descriptive and Normative principles.  Just as Capitalists vacillate between the thesis that Profit-seeking is, as a matter of fact, the fundamental behavioral principle, and it ought to be the fundamental principle, Marxists sometimes posit Socialism as the inevitable Dialectical resultant of the contradictions of Capitalism, and sometimes prescribe Socialism as the cure for Capitalist Exploitation.  Now, clarity regarding a confusion that has sometimes been facilely rendered as the thesis that 'one cannot derive an "ought" from an "is"', can be gained from developing an insight from Hume together with one from Kant.  As the former observes, what 'is the case' is, more precisely, what 'has been the case', and, as the latter posits, there are two 'perspectives' involved.  So, combining them--a Descriptive principle pertains to past events, while a Prescriptive principle pertains to nascent future action.  Thus, not only the latter cannot be derived from the former, the former cannot be 'derived' from the latter via some simple Logical operation, either.  So, Marxism has been deficient in explaining why Capitalist Exploitation should be abolished, and why it should be replaced with Socialism, i. e. deficient in making explicit the Moral principle that it seems to presuppose.

Capitalism, Politics, Morality

Marx' thesis that Economics is the Base of Politics, not an extrinsic concern of it, is exemplified by Capitalism implicitly being a Plutocratic political system.  Thus, while the U. S. is nominally a Democracy, the Constitutional status of a corporation a Person, with its political expenditures Free Speech, makes it not only de facto but de jure a Plutocracy.  Still, Marx leaves unaddressed the status of Morality in his critique of Capitalism, though his rejection of Exploitation does presuppose some Moral principle.  Thus, he offers no diagnosis of the Capitalist principle that one ought to seek to maximize profit, which, as normative, qualifies as a Moral principle.  That classification is not evaded by the descriptive version of the principle, i. e. that Profit-seeking is the fundamental behavioral impulse, since the latter is still subject to normative evaluation, and possible correction, just like any impulse that meets disapproval. Thus, the criticism of that principle as an expression of Greed, previously discussed, is an example of a Moral criticism of Capitalism that has generally been lacking in Political-Economy discourse.

Money, Love, Greed

The popular precept 'Money is the root of all evil' is a gloss of 'The love of money is the root of all evil', from 1 Timothy.  But despite the significant nuance, the actual quote, like many popular precepts, still does not stand up to closer scrutiny.  For, to begin with, any of many counter-examples, e. g. jealousy, falsifies it.  Furthermore, as is, there is nothing obviously evil about loving money.  It thus may be to correct that vagueness that Luther renders the passage as 'Avarice is a root of all evil'.  But, while Avarice is a more clearly defined traditional Vice, and applicable to more than Money, the two quantifiers, 'a' and 'all', in combination with the singular term 'evil', is incoherent.  For example, avarice might lead to stealing, and jealousy to murder, without avarice being a root of the latter murder, and without stealing and murder being the same evil.  So, even pluralizing 'evil' to agree with 'all' does not make avarice the root of a murder out of jealousy.  Regardless, there is also a substantive problem with Luther's equating love of money and avarice.  As Aristotle argues, the latter is a Vice in two respects--a lack of self-control of the one who is greedy, and a deprivation of another.  In contrast, the love of money, or Chrematistic, as Aristotle characterizes it, is symbolized by Midas, i. e. the love of an inanimate object such as money de-humanizes a person, independent of those characteristics of Vice.  In other words, the self-de-humanization in the love of money gets lost in translation, and remains lost in modernity--even Marx seems to miss it.

Barter and De-humanization

The purpose of simple Barter is for each party to exchange what they have  in excess for what they need.  Thus, each has the expectation of an equitable exchange, or, conversely, a disappointment of that expectation would be the end of the practice.  Hence, Equitable Exchange is a fundamental normative principle of Barter.  Furthermore, as a result of an Equitable Exchange, each party has the same quantity of goods as at the outset, except now there is qualitative diversification in their possessions.  So, there has been an increase in the diversification of the Wealth of each, but no quantitative change in the total Wealth between them.  Hence, Smith's principle of an increase in one's personal Wealth, and his goal of an increase in total Wealth, stray significantly from the practice that he characterizes as the unique Human property.  Thus, it is not inappropriate to accordingly characterize that straying as 'de-humanization', i. e. the corruption of Need into Greed.

Capitalism, Exploitation, Lending

The Marxist concept of Capitalist Exploitation consists in Profit from the Labor of another.  Thus, Slavery is a special case of such Exploitation.  But, in turn, Profit from the Labor of another can be conceived as a special case of Gain that entails any Loss of another.  Hence, any lending with Interest is also a case of such Exploitation.  Clearly, the victim of Exploitation is acting involuntarily, whether it is the slave under the whip, the laborer who must accept disadvantaged conditions in order to survive, or the borrower in desperate straits.  Accordingly, Marxist Socialism is only a special case of a remedy for Capitalist Exploitation; others include the abolition of Slavery, the illegalization of lending with Interest, and, in general, the elimination of any interaction in which Profit entails Loss.  Likewise, if Smith had focused exclusively on the general aim of national Economic benefit, he might have recognized that individual Profit-seeking is antithetical to such a doctrine.  Indeed, if he had maintained his initial insight of Wealth of Nations--that the basic unit of any Market is the exchange of vital necessities--and formulated as a fundamental normative Market principle the equitable exchange, i. e. in which both parties are satisfied--the recognition that Profit-seeking is antithetical to that principle might have stopped him from proposing it as his fundamental principle instead at the outset.

Profit-Motive and Usury

The existence of laws against Usury implies that there is a threshold at which Interest becomes harmful.  Furthermore, the variability of that threshold indicates its arbitrariness.  Hence, it is even possible that 0% is that threshold, i. e. that charging any Interest on a loan is harmful.  Now, the comparison with an Interest-free loan shows that the only motive for charging Interest is Profit for its own sake.  Thus, implied in the acceptance of a law against Usury, is the recognition of the inadequacy of the Profit-motive as a fundamental principle.  For, implied is that 'One should seek Profit' is not unconditional, and, hence, does not account for all behavior.  Furthermore, the arbitrariness of the threshold, which does not preclude the possibility that it be 0%, implies that at least some of, and perhaps the entire system that Smith bases on the Profit-motive is Vicious, a possibility that is clearer from the identification of the Profit-motive and Greed, a Vice in many Moral doctrines.  Nevertheless, Capitalists seem not to recognition that their acceptance of constraints on Usury entails constraints on Profit-seeking behavior.

Capitalism and Contradiction

Simultaneous Excess and Deficiency is tautological if two parties are involved, but contradictory if attributed to a single entity.  Thus, the fundamental Contradiction of Smith's system is his promotion of both behavior that creates an Excess-Deficiency combination, i. e. the Profit-motive, and a unitary Economic entity, i. e. a Nation.  In other words, it promotes both Zero-Sum transactions and a non-Zero-Sum goal.  Now, Exploitation can be conceived as simultaneous Excess and Deficiency.  But, studying it as such, Marx misses casting it as a Contradiction, i. e. by attributing it to a Whole, and, hence, as systematically related to Dialectical Materialism.  Similarly, subsequent Capitalists have avoided the potential internal Contradiction by simply de-emphasising the holistic component of Smith's system.  Accordingly, the American resistance to the presumed inevitability of Socialist Revolution that has stymied some Marxists, is due to the relative lack of such a holistic component in a relatively new society that is too young to develop any entrenched common tradition, resulting in an unusually resilient Individualism.

Profit, Excess, Interest

Profit is a Surplus with respect to an initial investment.  But it is also an Excess--with respect to breaking even.  Thus, as has been previously discussed, the Profit-motive is open to the diagnosis that it is an expression of Greed, and, hence, a Vice.  Now, as the fundamental principle of Capitalism, it is a factor in all transactions.  But, one transaction in particular expresses the characteristic of a fundamental principle that it is for its own sake--charging Interest on a loan.   That expression is sharply defined since Interest quantifies the Excess entailed in Profit-seeking, i. e. with respect to an Interest-free loan.  Thus, Interest is the primary exemplar of Capitalism.  Now, Interest entails not only Excess, but Deficiency, i. e. that of the payer.  Thus, Interest is a Zero-Sum relation, or, in other words, the Profit that it entails is one-sided, not general.  Accordingly, by missing that Profit is an Excess, Marx also overlooks that the fundamental Capitalist contradiction is that between Excess and Deficiency in what is purportedly a unity, i. e. a Nation.

Profit-Seeking and Freedom

The Profit-motive is sometimes defended as 'free' behavior, and, so protected as such.  It follows from that thesis that one is free to choose between breaking even and realizing a profit.  Furthermore, since Profit-seeking is accepted by those defenders as the fundamental behavioral principle, the choice is independent of any ends that might condition it.  But, according to Aristotle, any pursuit of Excess, e. g. seeking more than breaking even, is behavior that is out of one's control, and hence, is not 'free'.  So, absent a response to the Aristotelian analysis, as well to the Spinozist exposure of its inadequacy, the association of 'freedom' and Profit-seeking remains groundless.

Profit-Seeking and the Critique of Capitalism

Marx attacks Capitalism in two, not necessarily related, ways: 1. Via Dialectical Materialism, leading to an exposure of the internal contradictions of the system; and 2. Via an etiology of Profit, leading to an exposure of the Exploitation of Labor.  However, in the latter case, he leaves unexamined the phenomenon of Profit itself, thereby missing the possibility of a more direct, more coherent, criticism of Capitalism.  For, as has been previously discussed, the foundation of Capitalism--the Profit-motive--is shaky in two respects.  First, the proposed identity of traditional Egoism and Profit-seeking is without justification.  Second, healthiness of Profit-seeking behavior is taken for granted.  So, Marx misses an opportunity for a simpler, more decisive undermining of the foundation of Capitalism, perhaps because it would not entail Socialism as a remedy.  He thus leaves unchallenged the dogma that Profit-seeking is sound behavior, a dogma the acceptance of which has become widely and deeply entrenched since.

Greed, Goodness, Capitalism

Greed is a Vice, according to Aristotle, simply on the grounds that it is a disordered condition of a Soul.  So, Aristotle would unequivocally reject the thesis that 'Greed is good'.  Now, that phrase has been associated with the excesses of the resurgent Free Market Capitalism of recent decades, primarily via the film Wall Street, which may have some factual roots.  In any case, because of that specific association, the possibility of an inherent relation of Greed to Capitalism has gone unaddressed.  So, generally unconsidered is that the fundamental principle of Capitalism--the Profit-motive--is equivalent to Greed, in either its descriptive or normative versions.  For, entailed in it is that simply meeting one's needs may be deficient in some respect.  Now, there may be cases in which realizing a profit is necessary to meeting one's needs.  But the formulation is indifferent to any such specification--it ascribes to Profit a Goodness that is unconditional, without a derivation from a Rational principle.  Thus, the Profit-motive in itself is a Vice, according to Aristotle.  So, not only Greed, but Capitalism itself, and not merely the variety that has emerged in recent decades, is Bad, according to Aristotle--for the Profit-seeker, independent of the harm done to any others.

Capitalism, Consequentialism, Ethics of Character

Consequentialism can be contrasted with what might be called the Ethics of Character.  The latter includes what are better known as the Ethics of Virtue, the Morality of Intention, and Deontic Morality, in which the bearer of evaluation is how one conducts oneself, independent of the consequences of one's conduct.  One graphic example of the contrast is the respective diagnoses of Greed--an internal loss of control vs. harming others.  So, what differentiates them is the case of an attempt to steal from another that fails.  For, according to the Consequentialist, no harm was actually done, so there is no disapproval of the attempt in itself.  But, according to the Ethics of Character, even a failed attempt consists in a loss of control, and, thus, meets disapproval on those grounds alone.  Now, one significant application of the distinction is to the Marxist critique of Capitalist Exploitation--an ill simply because of the harm done to its victim vs. that ill plus that of the character of the exploiter.  In other words, according to the Ethics of Character, Capitalism harms all, with different types of ill corresponding to the difference between Exploiter and Exploited.  Thus, Marxism tends to undermine the scope of its doctrine when it focuses on championing the victims of Capitalism.

Capitalism, Formal Causality, Greed

Mill's 'higher' vs. 'lower' contrast is beyond the scope of Consequentialism.  Instead, it is based on a concept of Character that has a long tradition, originating with Plato and Aristotle.  Now, though the latter classifies it otherwise, the control by the 'higher', i. e. Reason, of the 'lower', i. e. animal impulses is an instance of Formal Causality.  Accordingly, the evaluation of Character is in terms of the efficacy of Formal Causality, e. g. Vice consists in a failure of Reason to control impulses.  Thus, for example, Greed is a Vice, according to Aristotle, primarily because it consists in a lack of such control, independent of consequences, such as the violation of the well-being of another.  Likewise, seeking more than one needs, e. g. Profit-seeking, is, on the basis of Formal Causality, a Vice, even if, on the basis of Teleological Causality, e. g. for a Consequentialist like Smith, it is a Virtue.  In other words, according to an Ethics of Character, what Ends do not justify is Vice.  So, Mill does not recognize the broader implications of his 'higher'-'lower' contrast, which he seems to regard as a minor ad hoc device, implications that include a criticism of Capitalist behavior that is independent of its inconsideration of the General Happiness.

Capitalism and Formal Causality

While for Smith, Profit-seeking is a normative principle, according to other Capitalists, it is a descriptive principle, i. e. signifying that Profit-seeking is the fundamental behavioral instinct in humans.  One challenge to the latter position, but not the former, is the apparent existence of sympathetic instincts, which Smith recognizes, as well as the parental instinct to nurture and protect a child, recognized by many people, and evident in most other species.  Another potential counter-example is to both principles, presenting a more radical challenge.  As Kant recognizes, at least some artists, and possibly other agents in other endeavors, are motivated by Genius to create, often overriding more pecuniary impulses, examples of which are not adequately repudiated by cases of 'artists' who produce works simply in order to sell them.  Now, the artist is driven to shape material; hence, their fundamental impulse is Formal Causality.  Furthermore, in the creative process, an 'end' is simply the last moment of a continuum, e. g. the final note of a song, the final dab of paint on a canvas, etc.  On that basis, a Means-End interpretation of artistic behavior is an abstraction.  But, both versions of the Profit-motive are Consequentialist.  Hence, neither of them is applicable to artistic behavior, while conversely, each can be shown to be arbitrarily derived from a Formal Causality pattern, i. e. with the attainment of Profit merely the final and not necessarily privileged moment of a continual process.  Thus, Capitalism is not as well-grounded as either of its types of proponent take it to be.

Capitalism, Means, Ends

It is unclear if he realizes it, but Mill abandons Consequentialism when he asserts that 'higher' pleasures are superior to 'lower' ones.  For, as the tautological appearance of the assertion belies, a deeper, contingent, thesis is being obscured.  That deeper thesis contrasts different means to pleasure, e. g. reading a book vs. drinking whiskey, i. e. the 'higher'-'lower' contrast is actually that of two different means to pleasure, one 'Spiritual' in some respect, the other 'Physical', in some respect.  But, if the Means to an End is the bearer of Value, then Consequentialism is abandoned.  So, the status of Means in Utilitarianism is problematic.  Now, Capitalism is Utilitarian, i. e. one ought to maximize Profit, because the maximization of Profit is the best Consequence.  But, then it devalues the Means to Profit, so Capitalism does not inherently distinguish between, say, profitable labor, profitable chance, profitable stealing, or profitable enslavement.  In other words, the popular charge against Marxism--'The ends justify the means--does apply to Capitalism.

Capitalism and Slavery

A theoretical proposition is falsified if it entails a contradiction.  Thus, a universal theoretical proposition is falsified by the existence of one counter-example.  Now, the normative proposition 'One ought to do A' can be rendered as the universal theoretical proposition 'Every doing A is Good'.  Thus, the normative proposition is falsified by any occurrence of A that is not Good.  Now, Profit is the difference between Expense and Receipt.  So, in the case of 'One ought to seek to maximize Profit', an instance of seeking to maximize Profit is enslaving another person, i. e. since it entails a minimization of Expense.  But the widespread illegalization of Slavery strongly indicates that it is not Good.  So, since 'One ought to seek to maximize Profit' is a cardinal principle of Capitalism, that Slavery is not only allowed, or even encouraged, but possibly even required in some circumstances, by Capitalism, suffices as a repudiation of that doctrine.

Wealth of Nations and Plutocracy

Selfishness vs. Sympathy is an open question in Smith's oeuvre because he leaves their relation unaddressed.  Thus, the more fundamental question may be--why does someone familiar with Hume, Rousseau, Locke, and Aristotle leave the relation of Wealth of Nations to Political Philosophy and Morality unaddressed? One answer is that he takes some received treatments of those topics for granted, and conceives the scope of Economics to be subordinated to them, much as the ethos of a sports competition is restricted to the event itself.  Another answer is that his ambition for Wealth of Nations is even greater than an innovative Economic system.  Rather, he might be projecting it as the foundation of a Plutocratic Political and Moral doctrine, thereby breaking with a long tradition according to which Wealth is, at best, a subordinate Good.  The latter answer seems to be accepted by some of Smith's followers, notably those who adapt Theology, Evolutionism, or Democracy, to Capitalism, e. g. some Calvinists, Social Darwinists, and some American Conservatives, respectively.  Implicit in that acceptance is an answer to the first question--Selfishness preempts Sympathy.

Profit, Loss, Morality

Scholars attribute to Smith an unresolved conflict between Selfishness and Sympathy.  But this interpretation misses a more specific, concrete, potentially Morally significant, consequence of his advocacy of Selfishness.  For, as has been previously discussed, the Profit-motive in the context of a Competition entails harm to others.  Smith obliquely addresses this consequence when he attributes to the Invisible Hand the power to equalize all inequalities, but otherwise seems oblivious to the possibility that he is advocating harming others.  In contrast, some subsequent Capitalist address the possibility, and justify its actuality.  For example, Theological Capitalists attribute economic failure to divine punishment, and Social Darwinists attribute it to a law of nature.  In any case, few in a Capitalist society such as the contemporary U. S. even question this feature of everyday life.

Profit-Seeking and Competition

In a legal context, if P intends A, A entails B, and both A and B occur as a result of P's effort to accomplish A, then P is usually held responsible for B, with the degree of mitigation due to their not knowing that A entails B dependent on circumstances.  Now, Capitalists, beginning with Smith, advocate the cardinal principles 1. that one seek exclusively one's profit, and 2. free market competition.  But, Competition entails both a winner and a loser, or, in an Economic context, both someone who profits and someone who loses.  Thus, the combination of those Capitalist cardinal principles entails that the profit-seeker is responsible for someone's suffering of a loss.  Accordingly, the Capitalist thesis that one is responsible for only oneself is contradicted by the consequences of Capitalist cardinal principles.  The neglect of those consequences is a fundamental ingredient of e. g. contemporary American society, a neglect that, given the general refusal to recognize them, approaches deliberate harm.

The Value of Competition

As has been previously discussed, while Smith and more recent Capitalists each hold Competition in high esteem, their reasons for doing so are not the same.  For the former, the value of Competition is as offering variety as a corrective to Monopoly.  For the latter, Competition spurs an increase in the quality of a product.  However, each also seems to over-value it.  For Smith, the relation of Competition to Monopoly is analogous to that of Democracy to Monarchy, but just as there have been Presidents who are inferior to some Kings, Competition is no guarantee of a superior product to that of a Monopoly.  Nor does it seem easy for a contemporary Capitalist to argue that there is a one-to-one correspondence of Quality to commercial success, the Highest Good of their Free Market.  Furthermore, there is a notable exemption from Competition that all Capitalists seem to respect--when a patent is involved, e. g. for a product or for a manufacturing process.  For, when a producer has such a patent, the market is exclusively theirs, and how beneficial that status is to Demand might depend entirely on the degree of benevolence of the producer, a characteristic not promoted by Capitalism.  So, Competition is not quite the unconditional Good that Capitalists, of one sort or the other, often seem to take it to be.

Competition and Division of Labor

The prefix 'com' means 'together'.  Accordingly, most literally, to 'compete' means to 'seek together'.  Thus, 'competition' is, most literally, between collective rivals.  Now, within a competing collective, there can be only cooperation, not competition.  Likewise, according to Smith, the governing internal principle of the productive process is, insofar as it involves a plurality, is Division of Labor, not Competition.  So, if the competitors are Nations, as in an inter-National Free Market, then the governing domestic principle is Division of Labor, not Competition.  And, if the human species happened to be in competition with, say, another terrestrial species, or a race from another planet, then their internal governing principle would be Division of Labor, not Competition.  So, the concept of a Cosmo-Economics, i. e. involving all humans, exposes the contradiction in Capitalism between Competition and Division of Labor, and hence, the inadequacy of that system to that scope.

Free Market, Competition, Profit, Loss

The Surplus-Value that a Good has acquired in the Labor process becomes Profit once it is sold.  On the other hand, if it is not sold, its Surplus-Value remains unactualized, so the investment in it is lost.  Thus, in a Free Market, consisting in Competition, there are both Profits and Losses, with the latter perhaps greater in the case of multiple competitors.  Thus, Free Market principles are inconsistent with both National Wealth-accumulation and the image of a 'rising tide lifting all boats.

Free Market, Competition, Advertising

Smith projects that the greatest weakness of a Free Market is its susceptibility to Monopoly.  Specifically, in his estimation, this Monopoly is of Supply.  Accordingly, his solution is to promote variety in Supply, the means of which is Competition.  In other words, the currently popular concept of the value of Competition, as consisting in a means to the production of a superior product, is not Smith's.  Furthermore, as is plainly evident, the decisive factor in actual Free Markets is usually advertising, the correspondence to which of product quality is contingent, at best.  Instead, advertising has become the medium of monopolistic forces, so, Smith's greatest concern has been actualized.

Profit-Motive and De-Humanization

It is difficult to conceive how an instinct to de-humanizing behavior could be the basic human principle.  Now, as has been previously discussed, Usury de-humanizes, in more than one way.  So, just as, according to Aristotle, Chrematistic practice is not "natural", Usury is inhuman.  Furthermore, since charging Interest is extrinsic to any benefit to a borrower, it can be the manifestation of only one motivation of the lender--seeking Profit.  Thus, Profit-seeking de-humanizes the seeker, in more than one way.  But, then, it could not be the basic behavioral principle of a human.  Hence, Smith and his followers are profoundly mistaken in their thesis that it is such a principle.  The mistake is an example of a fundamental flaw of Empiricism--interpreting an observed fact as an immutable law, equivalent to interpreting a chronic disease as a 'normal' condition.  Capitalism thus reinforces the interpretation of de-humanizing behavior as 'normal'.

Usury and De-Humanization

'Human' can connote either an internal characteristic of a person, e. g. fallibility, or their membership in the species.  Likewise De-Humanization can consist in the negation of one or the negation of the other.  Thus, Usury--lending at any interest rate greater than 0--is De-Humanizing in two respects.  First, insofar as the practice aims at an increase in wealth for its own sake, it exemplifies Chrematistic behavior, which, as Aristotle proposes, is illustrated by Midas.  In other words, Usury de-humanizes the usurer.  Second, insofar as it involves the gain of a lender at the expense of a borrower, it consists in a dissociation of two members of the species.  Now, the likely argument that borrowing can be beneficial to the borrower, and, hence, is an example of neither of those two respects, is easily refuted by the point that the Interest dimension of the transaction is extrinsic to any benefit, i. e. that a gift or an interest-free loan is sufficiently beneficial.  So, the deeply-entrenched acceptance of Usury at any rate is an indication of the normalization of De-Humanization in a society.

A Rising Tide and Usury

The phrase 'A rising tide lifts all boats' entails that 'a rising tide' cannot be a Zero-Sum condition.  It seems to connote a period of universal growth, but concrete details are usually lacking when the phrase is uttered.  Nevertheless, one Economic process that it cannot involve is Usury, i. e. lending at a rate greater than 0%.  For, plainly, Usury at any rate is a Zero-Sum transaction, regardless of time-lapse or circumstance, i. e. because gains exactly the increment that borrower repays.  Thus, Usury cannot be part of the kind of period of universal growth signified by the image.

Gestaltism and Cosmo-Economics

The Figure-Ground concept of Gestaltism is useful to Holism, since it can ground the compossibility of Part and Whole in a single Experience, i. e. as foreground to background, e. g. the selective perception of a tree from its forest.  It thus offers an effective argument against Atomism, according to which subsistent Individual entities are given as such.  For example, it provides a reminder that the Sense-Datum that is the foundation of many Empiricisms is arrived at by a process of isolation from a whole experiential background, not discovered as such.  Likewise, the Individual person, including oneself, is given against a backdrop of a society, if not the entire species.  For example, the Cartesian I is the product of not only a series of doubtings, but of the isolation of a room in a building full of other people, etc., the abstraction from which precedes his settling into his chair.  It is similarly applicable to the previously discussed implicit critique of Egoism by Utilitarianism--that self-interested pursuit occurs against a background of General Happiness that gets obscured in the process.  Hence, Gestaltism can be useful in the transition from a Nationalist- to a Cosmo-Economics, in which one's economic activities are conceived by one as part of a global network of production, exchange, etc.

Utilitarianism, Egoism, Altruism

By arguing that selfish motives better promote the General Good than benevolent ones, Smith implicitly acknowledges that there are impulses other than selfish ones.  Thus, his Egoism is normative not descriptive, and, so, diverges from the long tradition according to which even Sympathy is selfish, e. g. on the grounds that it is pleasurable.  Regardless, it is traditional in one respect--it implies that self-oriented behavior and other-oriented behavior are mutually exclusive and antagonistic , an implication that grounds the traditional Egoism vs. Altruism debate.  However, Mill's Utilitarianism challenges that presupposition.  For, he proposes that all behavior aims at General Happiness--a descriptive thesis--which is comprised of the Happinesses of both one's own and that of others.  Hence, on that basis, Selfishness and Benevolence are each special cases of Utilitarian behavior, abstracted from the General calculus, i. e. with the de-emphasised components valued at 0.  In other words, each of those is narrow-minded behavior, and any apparent antagonism is actually contingent and derivative, i. e. in cases when one or the other conflicts with General Happiness.  So, even under Zero-Sum conditions, e. g. when Profit is the specific object of Self-Interest, General Happiness is the goal, according to Mill.  Accordingly, Profit-seeking is subject to the criticism that it is small-minded behavior, as might be, in some cases, Altruism.