Sunday, April 30, 2017

Space-Time and Matter

While, like Copernicus' Sun, Einstein's Speed of Light is the fixed element of his system, unlike it, it is not dynamically related to the variable elements therein. In contrast, some recent Physicists have made the stronger analogous claim that the Speed of Light is the origin of Space-Time, and, hence, functions further as a determining factor of those other elements.  Now, aside from the methodological problems with the concept of Space-Time that have been previously discussed--it is a mere heuristic construct that only approximates to its object, Time is actually the Space of a motion in a measuring device, etc.--there is an unresolved substantive problem with the thesis.  For, Einstein clearly distinguishes Matter from Space-Time, unlike Alexander, for example, which demonstrates the shortcoming of this presumed Monism, i. e.  Matter is not derived from it.  But, the well-known illustration of the proposition that Matter distorts Space-Time does more than demonstrate the independence of Matter from Space-Time, it suggests that the former is located in the latter.  Thus, regardless of how exotic the distinction of Relativist Space-Time from the Absolutist Space and Absolutist Time of Newton becomes, the relation to Matter remains the same.

Saturday, April 29, 2017

Frame of Reference, Sun, Speed of Light

A Frame of Reference can be either fixed or variable.  So, Copernicus' revolutionary insight can be conceived as inverting the naively presumed fixed-variable relation of an Earthly observer and the Sun.  Now, Newton does not deny the existence of Frames of Reference; rather, his Absolutism consists in the thesis that there is exactly one fixed Frame of Reference--the entire system itself--one which is naively accepted as that of each observer.  But, the term 'Relativism' belies the presence in Einstein's system of one fixed Frame of Reference--the Speed of Light--a quantity that, in Newton's system, is variable, i. e. can be acted upon, and, hence, accelerated.  In other words, wittingly or otherwise, Einstein's Physics, is the result of an inversion similar to Copernicus', with the Speed of Light comprable to the Sun.

Friday, April 28, 2017

Description, Interpretation, Infinitesimal

If Modern Physics were descriptive, it would be a dynamic variant of Pythagoreanism, i. e. a description of a universe that is constituted fundamentally by mathematically organized motions.  Now to accomplish that, the basic Physicist unit, Velocity, must be transformed from an average over an inert segment, to a continuous internal property.  Physicists accordingly employ Calculus to effect the transition, i. e. Infinitesimals and Integration.  But, the key phase of the former--'approach to zero'--expresses, and thus exposes, the essence of such an operation: an approximation.  In another words, there is an infinitesimal distinction between the propositions of Modern Physics and its object, not enough to undermine its practical value, but sufficient to mark the enterprise as Interpretation, rather than neo-Pythagorean Description.

Thursday, April 27, 2017

Description, Interpretation, Space-Time

Some Physicists do not seem to consider, perhaps ironically, that Physics is not a description of reality, but an interpretation of it, i. e. is itself a Frame of Reference.  Now, according to one of the pioneering versions of the latter, Kant's, Space and Time are part of the Frame, not parts of its object, and, furthermore, are distinct from one another.  Thus, in the absence of a compelling argument that Physics is indeed descriptive, any belief that 'Space-Time' is the intersection in reality of Space and Time, may be not an expression of the perception of 'a Genius', but the product of profound confusion.

Wednesday, April 26, 2017

Frame of Reference, Space, Time

Physicist Time is quantified Time, which is determined by a displacement of Space, e. g. the rotation of the hands of an analog clock. Thus, Velocity incorporates a Frame of Reference, i. e. the displacement in a timepiece, to which the displacement of the object is referred. Likewise, Acceleration introduces a second Frame of Reference, by doubling the first. So, if in Absolutism, the presence of a Frame of Reference is excluded, then Modern Physics is not Absolutist.  And, given that 'Time' is actually Space to begin with, it is difficult to understand what 'Spacetime', and, hence, 'Spacetime Curvature', might be.  So, insofar as Relativist Physics entails the existence of a Spacetime Curvature, Modern Physics is not easily classifiable as Relativist, either.  This is not to challenge the quantities themselves, merely the attempt to ontologize their relations.

Tuesday, April 25, 2017

Frame of Reference and Center of Action

In a Frame of Reference, the reference is centripetal: from some external motion or object back to a focal point.  This orientation also obtains in a Practical Frame of Reference such as Heidegger's Dasein, for which some object is Ready-to-Hand.  But, as Bergson, perhaps alone, argues, the usability, and, hence, the perceivability of an object is possible only if the focal point has the capacity to move towards it and act upon it,   In other words, a Frame of Reference is fundamentally a Center of Action, i. e. the focus-object relation is fundamentally centrifugal.  Thus, though the Physicist Frame of Reference is presupposed to itself be in motion, also presupposed is that that Motion is not Action directed towards an external object in motion, but it nevertheless presupposes the possibilty of that Action.  Now, as has been previously noted, the introduction of Frame of Reference into the system of Modern Physics is, as is, ungrounded, since Reference is a relation that is not derivable from any of its fundamental laws.  However, if it is derived from Action, i. e. Force, then it is not an ad hoc intrusion.

Monday, April 24, 2017

Frame of Reference and Praxis

An intersection of Physics and Psychology is proposed by Spinoza, for whom the fundamental principle of human behavior--to persist in one's existence--is an application of Newton's First Law.  But, if so, then the human Frame of Reference is fundamentally Practical, i. e. external objects are conditioned by the Frame first and foremost in terms of their usefulness in promoting that principle, as "Ready-to-Hand", rather than as "Present-at-Hand", as Heidegger puts it.  Thus, one shortcoming in Gestalt Psychology is that it does not recognize that the structuring of the world by the mind is governed by Praxis, not by mere Cognition.  Now, Spinoza himself does not develop the Practical implications of his Psychological principle.  But, if he had, he would have discovered a solution to a lingering problem with equating it to a Law of Physics--how to distinguish living from inert entities.  For, the one but not the other has the capacity for Praxis.

Sunday, April 23, 2017

Physicist Relativism, Empiricism, Atomism

Frame of Reference is a problematic concept for Modern Physics, since it is derivable from none of its basic elements and principles.  Rather, it is a heuristic intrusion of an observer into a system.  Nevertheless, it is instructive for empirical perception.  For, it helps show that Motion is neither a Primary not a Secondary Quality, but a Tertiary one, i. e. the resultant of Subjective and Objective interaction, not one or the other.  But, then it follows that Hume's concept of the Self as a Bundle of Perceptions is that Self is essentially related to other entities.  In other words, Physicist Relativism refutes Atomism.  Now, the Atomist can respond that the Motion of a Frame of Reference is independent of the perception of it, which is tantamount to affirming Social Atomism, while rejecting Empiricism, or, in other words, to affirming a variety of Leibnizian Monadism.  But, that affirmation groundlessly presupposes that the Motions of Frames of Reference are not themselves essentially interrelated, a fundamental flaw in Leibniz' version of Atomism.  So, the challenge posed to Atomism by Physicist Relativism stands.

Saturday, April 22, 2017

Speed of Light and Invisible Hand

Einstein's Theories of Relativity are innovative, but with the exception of one feature, his Physicist Relativism is not.  It is preceded by Philosophical Relativisms such as Phenomenalism and Perspectivism, as well as by Newtown's use of the primary Relativist construct in Physics--the Frame of Reference.  Two characteristics of the latter are: the conditioning of any interaction with the rest of the world by its own unique motions, and the absolute dissociation of any two such Frames.  Einstein's innovation is the thesis that the Speed of Light transcends any Relativism.  Still, it is unclear how he reconciles the existence of a plurality of discrete Frames of Reference with concepts like a Continuum, or a Unified Field.  Regardless, his model resembles Smith's, which is constituted by a plurality of independent parts, the  motivation of each of which is transcended by the Invisible Hand.  Of course, the Speed of Light certainly exists, while the Invisible Hand remains fictitious.  Nevertheless, there seems to be no way to prove that C is not a constant within the structure of a Frame of Reference, rather than independent of Relativism, plus, the thesis that it is an absolute maximum seems similarly unprovable.

Friday, April 21, 2017

Genius, Continuum, Quantification

The famous equation with which Einstein is popularly associated is a product of Ingenuity rather than Genius.  For, rather than the expression of a mystical vision of Matter becoming Energy at the Speed of Light, 'E = MC-squared' is derived directly from Newtonian equations in which Matter is already defined in terms of Motion, e. g. the amount that a scale is moved.  Now, Bergson denies the equivalence of Energy and Matter, arguing that the latter consists in a degeneration of the former, manifest as an atomization of an original continuum.  Furthermore, Quantification is possible only where Atomization has occurred, i. e. without some dissociation, points of enumeration are impossible.  Thus, according to Bergson, the Physicist quantity 'Energy', as well as 'Space', 'Time', 'Acceleration', etc., are all Atomist concepts. From that perspective, the Genius of Einstein's work is the generation, out of the paradoxical concept of a 'Space-Time Continuum', of equations that have repeatedly been confirmed.

Thursday, April 20, 2017

Genius and Ingenuity

The common locution 'X is a genius' signifies that 'genius' is a property that is possessed by X.  But, as has been previously discussed, Genius transcends any X who is so inspired.  Instead, the common locution reflects an Atomist reduction that mistakes Ingenuity for Genius.  For example, in the case of Einstein cleverly solving an equation, he is likely ingenius.  In contrast, envisioning reality as a Continuum likely involves Genius, not only because the vision transcends ordinary experience, but also because a Continuum is an anti-Atomist concept.

Wednesday, April 19, 2017

Apollinian Art and Genius

Differences between Dionysian and Apollinian Arts that Nietzsche does not explore are that while the former is a performance at which an audience is immediately present, the latter is the product of a creative process at which an audience is usually not in attendance.  Now, some have posited that the aim of Apollinian Art is the representation of ideal form that transcends the vicissitudes of Becoming. However, just the converse can be attributed to it.  For, what an audience receives is an inert object--a book, a sculpture, a painting--the artistic challenge of which is to make it come alive, i. e. to imply the existence of a vital process of which the apparently inert object is a moment.  The Artist thereby communicates the dynamic creative process of which the completion of the product is one moment, and when sufficiently inspired, the Genius that elevates the Artist is reflected in the product.  There can be little doubt that Nietsche is well aware of the challenge to express a Dionysian Philosophy in the inert pages of a book, i. e. of an Apollinian Artifact.

Tuesday, April 18, 2017

Genius and Sexuality

Genius transcends an Artist, or anyone else that is inspired by it. Thus, it cannot be reduced to some Egoistic principle, and is fundamentally an involuntary experience.  So, characterizing someone as 'a genius', or attributing it to them as a possessed ability, abstracts from that Transcendence, thus falsifying Genius.  Likewise, the Freudian interpretation of it as a 'sublimation' of repressed sexual desire, even granted that it can account for the distinctions between Musical Genius, Poetic Genius, and Mathematical Genius, for example, begs the question by presupposing that 'sexuality' has itself not been reduced, i. e. from a similarly transcendent species' Reproductive drive.  It follows from that interpretation that an Artist is motivated simply by the prospect of satisfying private release, with an epochal influence on an audience an inessential by-product. The pervasive result of Freudian simplification has been the trivialization of Genius, as well as a missed opportunity to ground it in interests of the species, like Reproduction, but distinct from it.

Monday, April 17, 2017

Dionysian Psychology and Artistic Genius

Nietzsche's description, in Birth of Tragedy, of the creative experience of the Dionysian Artist being as if one were oneself the work of Art of some primordial force, resembles Kant's characterization of Artistic Genius.  But, instead of developing a Dionysian Psychology based on Genius as the prototype condition, the theory of his mature period is traditional Atomism, with Will to Power replacing Will to Live as the fundamental principle.  He, thus, avoids having to decide whether or not the Genius of Apollonian Art is itself a Dionysian condition.  If he had, he might have further concluded that Individuation is a Dionysian mode with positive significance, not a Schopenhauerian illusion.

Sunday, April 16, 2017

Artistic Genius and Psychology

Four characteristics of Artistic Genius are 1. Elevated condition of the artist; 2. Imposition of Form on Matter, e. g. on colors, sounds, words, etc.; 3. Novelty of artistic creation; and 4. Exemplariness of artistic creation.  So, because #4 entails communication between Artist and Audience, Atomist Psychology is inadequate to the concept of Genius.  Because #3 entails the destruction of established structures, Gestalt Psychology is inadequate to it.  And, likewise for Kant's hybrid, which seems to have no systematic relation to the "Spirit" to which he ascribes #1.  In contrast, according to Organicist Psychology, the behavior of each Member of a Species is determined by a principle that governs the latter, though, in routine circumstances, that ground tends to be forgotten by them, as has been previously discussed.  But, in extraordinary circumstances, e. g. the initiation of some novel adaptation of a Species to its Environment, the site of the initiation, i. e. some Member, experiences the occasion as an elevation.  So, Artistic Genius is one such extraordinary circumstance, e. g. as the human species begins to achieve a circumambient relation to the planet, Picasso's Cubism stimulates a corresponding novel visual awareness in his fellow humans.  In other words, unlike its rivals, Organicist Psychology is adequate to the concept of Genius.

Saturday, April 15, 2017

Matter-Form and Genius-Taste

Kant privileges Form over Matter seemingly because the former is actively generated while the latter is passively received, e. g. the sensory manifold.  However, that priority still holds in one case where both are actively produced. For, as he acknowledges, Genius creates novelty in the sensory manifold, and, yet, he still subordinates it to Taste, which he defines in terms of the Forms of Cognition.  Now, though he asserts that the source of Genius is "Nature", he does not explore the relation between that attribution and that according to which Nature is a transcendent force that seeks the Perpetual Peace of the human species.  Doing so might have led him to a better balanced Form-Matter concept, i. e. to a more robust Holism.

Friday, April 14, 2017

Gestalt Psychology and Economic Regulation

Gestalt Cognition is anti-Atomist because it imposes structure on an otherwise unrelated manifold in the process of producing the objects of perception.  However, Gestalt Psychology, i. e. the implication of such structuring in behavior, is not necessarily so.  It is anti-Atomist when organizing individual pursuits, but the resultant totality can still remain Egological, and, hence, is Atomist in that respect.  Now, debatable is whether or not a complication of such organization, by the elimination of otherwise more efficient courses of action that take advantage of others, is, as Kant proposes, the effect of an extending of Gestalt operations beyond the Egological scope, i. e. debatable because those operations--Universal Legislation--remain within a mere private intention in his doctrine.  In contrast with those virtual operations are actual ones--actual Legislation, and other means of shaping society.  In other words, it is in Political rule that Gestalt Psychology, and its anti-Atomism, has its greatest scope, e. g. regulation vs. the pursuit of personal wealth.

Thursday, April 13, 2017

Gestalt and Psychology

In the past century, Gestalt Theory has confirmed Kant's thesis that structure in the field of perception neither is given as such nor is an abstraction from an array of Sense Data, but is actively incorporated, by mental processes, into what is immediately perceived.  So, since such studies do not pertain primarily to behavior, they are more appropriately termed 'Gestalt Cognition', rather than the more common 'Gestalt Psychology'.  The latter studies, instead, would begin with the structuring of basic motility, e. g. the coordination of the limbs in walking, and extend to the organization of one's various pursuits and activities, e. g. one's plans and schedules.  Now, Kant's main innovation in this respect, likely influenced by Rousseau's concept of a General Will, is the concept of a Gestalt of all Rational agents, a concept possessed by each of the agents, thus determining the conduct of each.  But, this trans-personal Gestalt remains heuristic, functioning concretely as a constraint on certain desires, e. g. to make a false promise.  So, the actual effect on behavior of that concept of a Gestalt is not a Gestalt, i. e. it does not further organize one's conduct.  In a different context, he does propose that History, terminating in universal peace, functions as a Gestalt of human affairs, even deceivingly, e. g. provoking conflict, so it is in this precursor of the Dialectical concept of History that his extension of Gestalt Psychology to a concrete social scope can be found.

Wednesday, April 12, 2017

Atomist Psychology and Gestalt Psychology

A fundamental feature of Kant's system is the Form-Matter distinction, e. g. his concept of the relation between Reason and Sensibility in Cognition.  So, since 'Gestalt' means 'Form', his concept of Cognition is a forerunner of what a few centuries latter has become known as Gestalt Psychology.  However, the latter has ignored that Kant also applies the distinction to Conduct, under the rubric of Pure Practical Reason, in which the latter provides a Form, of which individual agents are the Matter, and is Practical because, as he asserts, it has motivational power.  Thus, unlike that of his presumed successors, his version of Gestalt Psychology determines behavior, i. e. animates its possessor.  So, since Gestalt Psychology qua Practical influences behavior by integrating individual humans into a larger context, it is the immediate counter to Atomist Psychology, according to which behavior is sufficiently and uniquely determined by some internal Egoist principle.

Tuesday, April 11, 2017

Form, Matter, Atomism

A Whole combines Form and Matter.  Form without Matter is a collapse into a singularity, e. g. a Black Hole, while Matter without Form is absolute disintegration, which is why the discovery of an ultimate indivisible particle continues to elude Physicists.  Thus, the concept of an Atom is only a heuristic device, and the concept of an Atom as independent of any other Atom mistakes the inessentially of any external relation for the inessentially of some particular relation.  So, the error of Social Atomism is that it conceives an individual human as essentially independent of any social structure, with the error of the concomitant Atomist Psychology that some Egoist principle sufficiently and uniquely determines the behavior of such individual humans.

Monday, April 10, 2017

Empiricism, Interactionism, World

Descartes and Locke are competing Epistemological Foundationalists--according to the former, Cogito is that foundation, while according to the latter and his Empiricist successors, it is Sense Data of some kind.  A further distinction between the two is methodological--Descartes arrives at the Cogito via a sequence of abstractions that themselves arbitrarily begin in a chair in front of a fire, while the Empiricists forgo any such prelude and start immediately with Sense Experience.  Now, Heidegger's Being-in-the-World offers an account of what the Empiricists repress--not merely the things from which Sense Data are abstracted, but their concatenation as implicated in Practice. Still, his "the" World is problematic, since the Time that is the horizon of one's involvement in it is always one's own, in which case it is one's World in which one is engaged.  Thus, Heidegger does not adequately restore social relations to the Empiricist model.  In contrast, according to Mead's Interactionist concept of the Psyche, children from the earliest age learn to incorporate the perspectives of others into their own, so that the World of each is indeed the World, is better grounded than in Heidegger's model.  Mead thus shows, if traditional Empiricism is any example, how the Atomist concept of relations as contingent, is, when applied to human society, itself contingent, i. e. the product of abstraction from observable processes.

Sunday, April 9, 2017

Consciousness and Psyche

The concept of Consciousness as the 'ghost in the machine' is that of it as the Psyche itself: the incorporeal source of life in an otherwise inert body.  Now, the main objection to that concept of Consciousness is that it, rather, only serves as a source of information for non-Conscious drives, and, hence, serves in the Psyche in a subordinate role.  Still, despite that opposition, each concept of the Psyche is Atomist.  In more radical contrast with both is what is sometimes called the Interactionist concept of the Psyche, according to which humans are essentially in relation to one another, linked by Communication, the termini of which are the Consciousnesses of those involved.  So, insofar as Consciousness functions to transmit or receive information that is vital to any member of the group, it serves in the Psyche in a subordinate capacity.  But, insofar as one seeks communication with another for its own sake, i. e. to enter into togetherness, Consciousness itself animates the behavior, and, is, thus, itself the Psyche.

Saturday, April 8, 2017

Marxism, Atomism, Organicism

In Organicism, a Whole and its Parts are contemporaneous, and remain so even when the latter forgets the former, and they interpret themselves as Atoms.  So, Rousseau's concept of human society is Organicist, insofar as he conceives it as in a condition of original togetherness, and as governed by a General Will that transcends the sum of its parts. However, Marx is an Atomist, though of an unusual variety.  That position is established in his early advocacy of Lucretius, via the interpretation of the 'Swerve' of the Atoms of the latter as Dialectical, thereby anticipating the Dialectical Materialism of his mature period.  Thus, according to Marxism, while human society achieves Wholeness in the arrival of Socialism, it is not contemporaneous with its Parts in the pre-history of Socialism.  So, the challenge that Darwinism presents to Marxism is a more comprehensive concept of History, in which, from the outset, the Whole and the Parts are both present.

Friday, April 7, 2017

Atomism, Onanism, Organicism

According to Atomist Psychology, the behavior of an individual human is sufficiently determined by an internal drive that seeks satisfaction of some kind.  Thus, according to an Atomist concept of Sexuality, the foundation of all sexual behavior is Onanism, on the basis of which the role of others is as a means to that private satisfaction, often reciprocally, with the occasional contingent by-product of the liaison.  Now, one difficulty for that theory is that it entails that the parts of the body that are the loci of such activity exist primarily for Onanistic purposes.  In contrast, according Organicist Psychology, Onanism is the result of a double abstraction: from the reproductive processes of the species, to non-reproductive activities, i. e. 'recreational' sex involving two or more participants, to solo recreational sex.  Now, one advantage of this theory is that it better explains the physiological loci of those activities--that they are fundamentally organs of the species' reproductive processes, that can also be recreational.  Nevertheless, in predominantly Atomist cultures, such as in the contemporary U. S., Atomist Sexuality prevails.

Thursday, April 6, 2017

Atomism, Organicism, The Environment

Underlying one of the prominent debates in contemporary American politics--whether or not there exists such a thing as human-produced Climate Change--is a more fundamental question--whether or not there exists such a thing as the Environment.  According to an Organicist doctrine such as Darwinism, there is: it is the habitat of a species, and, hence, is common to each of its members.  However, it follows from the premises of Atomism that there is not.  For, according to Atomist Epistemology, i. e. Berkeleyan Phenomenalism, Space is only a private datum, which means that 'the Environment', as connoting a Space common to all subjects, is merely a nominal expression.  Thus, because Smith's system is Phenomenalist Economics, the various arguments of Capitalists against Climate Change--that it does not exist, that it is not caused by manufacturing processes from which they profit, that the Government has no right to interfere in their market activities, etc., tacitly accept the Organicist thesis that there does exist an Environment that is common to all members of the species.

Wednesday, April 5, 2017

Evolution, History, Techne

If Darwinism is correct, then not merely its genesis, but the entire history of the human species is governed by an Evolutionary principle, thereby overriding all concepts of it hitherto.  It also entails that Darwinism, including the discovery itself of this concept of History, is an event within that History.  Now, according to some, such a moment of Reflection is an end in itself, while according to others, it itself constitutes an 'evolutionary' leap.  But, a third diagnosis is less convoluted, and is consistent with the subject matter.  For, throughout human history, Knowledge qua Techne has functioned as a supplement to Instinct as a means to better Adaptation to its Environment.  Likewise, the event of Darwinism can be interpreted as at the service of the Evolutionary principle, as a means to better promote it, e. g. because the Atomism that has prevailed for centuries is losing efficacy in that capacity.

Tuesday, April 4, 2017

Organicism and Darwinism

An Organicist concept of the Psyche is plainly entailed by Darwinism.  For, if the human species is governed by an Evolutionary principle, then, so, too, are not only each of its parts, but also the interactions between those parts. Furthermore, the theory not only rivals the account of Genesis 1, as is widely recognized, but also preempts the events of Genesis 3, and, hence, the theology of Salvation that presupposes that the need to reproduce via sexual congress is a curse that befalls the species, from which individual Souls can be rescued.  Accordingly, so-called 'Social Darwinism' is an Atomist reaction that inadequately abstracts the Darwinist principle from its application to the species, i. e. it presents it as governing the behavior of merely members of the species, in an effort to validate Selfish behavior.  Darwinism is now widely accepted, but its implications, such as an Organicist concept of the Psyche, remain barely recognized.

Monday, April 3, 2017

Individualism and Moral Amnesia

A common grammatical error is an expression of Moral Amnesia: though 'individual' is properly a quantifier, it is routinely treated as a substantive.  In such cases, it is thereby abstracted from what it quantifies.  The usage, thus, furthermore, abstracts from the process that produces the signified entity, which, as is entailed by the concept of Individual, is the Instantiation of some Universal.  But, the human species is a biological whole, not a Universal, so the Logical representation of the generation of a new member is, more accurately, Diversification.  Thus, in several stages, the common use of 'an individual' dehumanizes its referent, i. e. expresses Moral Amnesia.  That diagnosis is not to deny that social homogenization is not an ill requiring resistance and correction; rather, it shows that 'Individualism' is tantamount to a cure by amputation, a welcome development, according to the theology of Salvation that seeks to rescue individual Souls from a cursed species.

Sunday, April 2, 2017

Moral Amnesia

Heidegger introduces a concept of Forgetting the object of which is not something past, but something ever present, i. e. what he calls Being.  Similarly, the term 'Moral Amnesia' can signify the treatment of another as a mere Object. For, as has been previously discussed, that attitude is the resultant of a double forgetting--that one is a Subject of Experience only as a member of the human species, and that the other is a Subject as well as an Object, and, hence, is a fellow human.  In other words, Moral Amnesia is constituted by the concomitant dehumanization of self and others.  Thus, as entailing that another is never more than a contingently related Object, Atomism is a manifestation of Moral Amnesia.  So, too, is Heidegger's concept of Ontological Amnesia, which dehumanizes its object.

Saturday, April 1, 2017

Dionysian, Atomism, Psychology

A main theme of the opening sections of Birth of Tragedy is the emergence of an individual person from a collective Dionysian experience.  So, to whatever extent Human, All Too Human continues that theme, the supplanting in the latter work of Metaphysics by Psychology as the basis of Morality, potentially could, with consistency, propose an Organicist concept of the individual Psyche , i. e. in which the motivations of the individual are fundamentally determined from within the context of the collective that spawns it.  However, the primary influence of the earlier work on the later turns out to be the opening up of a sphere of repressed emotions by Wagner's experiments in Dissonance and Modality.  As a result, even as Nietzsche continues to affirm his allegiance to Dionysus, his otherwise innovative concept of the Psyche is Apollinian, i. e. Atomistic, with his focus on Ressentiment and Pity felt by individual humans.  By implication, it is as individual entities, not as members of the human species, that humans are all too human.