Beauty, Good, Heautonomy, Autonomy

Kant's assertion, in #59 of the Critique of Judgment, that "the beautiful is the symbol of the morally good", seems difficult to reconcile with what otherwise appears to be a main theme of his Aesthetic theory, summed up in his assertion, in #58, that "beauty is not a characteristic of the object when taken in its own right."  For, according to the latter, the bearer of Beauty is not an object of some experience, but of an experience itself, i. e. the experience in which the enjoyment of the contemplation of some object is universally communicable.  Furthermore, the implied analogy of Beauty and the Good falsifies the latter, because the experience of the former is contemplative, while moral experience is, at least according to the doctrine as hitherto presented, is not.  However, a beautiful experience involves one process that does directly correspond to one involved in moral experience--what Kant calls 'Heautonomy', which, as he briefly explains, in part V of the Introduction, is the self-prescribing power of Reflective Judgment.  Accordingly, while 'symbol' might be an inappropriate characterization of the relation, a systematically coherent analogy between beautiful experience and moral experience is that between the Heautonomy of the former, and the Autonomy of the latter.

Spirit, Progressive Reason, Morality

Because Kant's principle of Pure Practical Reason is to be implemented for its own sake, regardless of any ends that might eventuate from it, it is a non-teleological principle.  Now, the interpretation of the principle as that of one of the non-teleological varieties of Reason surveyed--Distributive Reason--has already been discussed.  Alternatively, as that of the other variety--Progressive Reason--it is consistent with the theses that Spirit and Reason are identical, and that Spirit animates originality.  For, on that interpretation, the principle animates creative conduct just as Spirit animates innovative Art.  So, since novelty is relative to antecedent conditions, the content of Progressive Reason is necessarily contingent, e. g. with respect to historical conditions, in which case the abstractness of the principle is a virtue, not a deficiency, as Hegel, for one, charges.  Furthermore, because varying degrees of novelty are always possible in principle, the proper evaluation of progressive conduct is, likewise, in terms of degrees of originality, i. e. as more or less original.  In other words, traditional dualist Moral axiology, e. g. '"good" vs. "evil"', is inappropriate for a Progressive Morality, a doctrine which is implied by the concept of Reason that Kant briefly, though unarguably, entertains in the Second Thesis of his Idea for a Universal History.

Spirit, Communication, Art, Teleology

While Communication, according to Kant, plays an important role in the judging of Art, he does not seem to consider that it also functions in the production of a work of Art.  So, in the absence of any contravening consideration, it seems difficult for him to deny that what Spirit specifically animates in the artistic process is the communication, to others, via aesthetic ideas, of a content that, in the final analysis, is Spirit itself.  Furthermore, since, according to his classification, that process is "purposeless", it follows that Spirit functions in it non-teleologically, as opposed to, say, Hegel's concept of it.  Hence, insofar as Spirit is identical to Reason, it also follows that it is, likewise, one of the non-teleological varieties of the latter, which have been previously surveyed here, that is a factor in Kant's Aesthetic theory.

Reason, Teleology, Dialectics

As has been previously discussed, four varieties of Reason are Distributive, Progressive, Totalizing, and Unifying, any further systematization of which seems problematic, since that would apparently require a question-begging privileging of one of the varieties.  Still, as is, an important distinction can be drawn between the first two and the last two--the latter are teleological, while the former are not.  That is, neither Distribution nor Progression are inherently delimited, while Totalization and Unification are.  So, for example, while prominent versions of Dialectical Reason are teleological, at least one is not.  In particular, Marxist Reason, which totalizes society, and Hegelian Reason, which contracts Reality to the self-consciousness of Universal Spirit, are inherently delimited processes.  In contrast, Adorno's Negative Dialectics is an, in principle, incompletable process, so it can be classified as 'Progressive' Reason.

Varieties of Reason

Four distinguishable varieties of 'Reason' can be termed 'Distributive', 'Progressive', Totalizing', and 'Unifying'.  The first entails a transition from an individual to a universe of individuals.  The second is distribution qua increase.  The third is progression to an inherent maximum.  The fourth is a transition from a manifold to an individual.  Examples of the four are the processes of, respectively, dispersion, emanation, organization, and contraction.  Now, while Hegelian Reason appears to organize, it is contractive, since, all its developments are eventually revealed as moments in the achievement of the self-consciousness of one entity, Universal Spirit.  In contrast, Kant's principle of Pure Practical Reason seems to elude conclusive classification.  For, as has been previously discussed, there are grounds for interpreting it as Distributive, as Progressive, and/or as Totalizing, while Hegel contributes the further possibility that it is a unifying ruse of Universal Spirit.  Hence, Kant seems less certain of the nature of Reason than Hegel is, though, of course, if Schopenhauer is correct, what the four varieties have in common is that they are each, alike, illusory.

Spirit, Sense-Object, Expulse, Communication

If, as Kant conceives it, Spirit is an "animating principle", then the first moment of a 'phenomenology' of Spirit is not a sense-object, as it is for Hegel, but what can be called an 'expulse', which connotes better than 'impulse' that Animation generates manifest motion.  However, the difference between Expulse and Sense-Object  is no mere expression of a difference of interpretation of one and the same datum.  Rather, it entails a correction of a fundamental falsification of immediate Experience that Hegel, following Descartes and Hume, repeats.  For, what is self-evidently given in each of those projects is not some private element, but a process of writing.  Accordingly, the first moment in such a phenomenology is an Expulse to Communicate.  Now, because he conceives Spirit as a trans-personal principle, Hegel can accept, more easily than his predecessors can, as the foundation of Experience, an event in which the existence of a plurality of subjects is implied.  However, because he also conceives Spirit as a principle of Knowledge, and not of Action, he cannot recognize that event as essentially an act of communication, initiated by an expulse.  He, thus, inverts Kant's concept of Spirit.

Practical Reason, Progressive Reason, Experimental Reason

In the Second Thesis of Idea for a Universal History, following his introduction of what, as has been previously discussed, can be termed 'Progressive Reason', Kant further characterizes this faculty as requiring "trial, practice, and instruction in order to gradually progress".  Thus, the appreciation for Experimental Reason that he expresses in the Preface to the B edition of the 1st Critique is more than extrinsic whimsy.  Indeed, if, as has been previously proposed here, Pure Practical Reason is Progressive Reason, i. e. is an animator of innovative conduct, and Progressive Reason proceeds by trial and error, then Pure Practical Reason is also Experimental Reason.  This interpretation of Kant's concept is not easy to glean from a focus on his Deontological and Theological writings that ignores the Idea for a Universal History.

Practical Reason and Progressive Reason

As has been previously discussed, Pure Practical Reason is Spirit applied to personal conduct--it promotes example-setting processes, e. g. the generating of laws.  But, like Artistic Spirit, the only example that, in the final analysis, it sets is its own innovativeness.  Thus, the principle of Pure Practical Reason is a formula for universal innovative personal conduct.  Now, novelty is always relative to antecedent conditions; hence, the latter are always entailed in the former.  In other words, Innovation is always Progression.  Thus, Pure Practical Reason is Progressive Reason, applied to personal conduct.

Spirt and Practical Reason

Kant's principle of Pure Practical Reason defines an act of legislation, i. e. according to ii, a Rational agent creates laws.  Thus, a Rational agent can obey a given law only by re-legislating it, for, otherwise, mere law-abidingness contravenes the principle.  Furthermore, to establish some conduct as a law is to set it as an example, i. e. maxim-universalization is example-setting.  In other words, Practical Reason originates exemplary action in the same way that Spirit originates exemplary artistic works, thereby reinforcing the thesis, only briefly entertained by Kant explicitly, that they are one and the same.

Spirit and Progressive Reason

According to the Critique of Judgment, Spirit is the animating principle of an original process that produces exemplary works.  So, if, as Kant suggests at #5, Spirit and Reason are one and the same, Pure Practical Reason is, likewise, an animating principle of innovative, exemplary conduct.  As such, the maxim-universalization prescribed in its law is an example-setting, not an inclination-constraining, formula.  Now, while the interpretation of Reason as creative seems at odds with the deontological, and, even, conformist, tenor of the Groundwork and the 2nd Critique, it is more consonant with the progressive model of Reason that he presents in the Second Thesis of the Idea for Universal History: "Reason in a creature is a faculty of widening the rules and purposes of all its powers beyond natural instinct; it acknowledges no limits to its projects."  Noteworthy in this characterization is its brief glimpse of Reason as indefinitely progressive, and, therefore, as not only transcending any status quo, but as unconstrained by any utopian telos that retrospectively converts progress into a determinate 'history', such as the one that he eventually introduces, in anticipation of Hegel's and Marx'.

Spirit, Art, Reason

The concept of 'Spirit' is crucially undetermined in the Critique of Judgment, its only appearance in Kant's Critical trilogy.  For, as the animating principle of artistic creativity, it is the cause of both the quickening of the faculties culminating in judgments of Taste, and of further original productivity.  If so, then Aesthetic Judgment  is not sui generis, as his theory has it.  Furthermore, the relation between Spirit and Reason remains unexplored, beyond a few casual allusions to their identity.  Now, if they are one and the same, then Pure Practical Reason is an animating principle, and not merely a constraint on inclination.  In that case, both the standard interpretation of the Moral Law, and Kant's concept of Freedom, are inadequate to the creative originality of Reason.  So, in the absence of elaboration, his concept of Spirit seems to pose a significant challenge to two cardinal features of his system.

Art, Morality, Fecundity

Implicit in Kant's systematization of Art in relation to Morality is that the value of the former ultimately consists in its function as cultivating the latter, e. g. Poetry as Moral fable or parable.  Accordingly, while much of the 3rd Critique is devoted to isolating the supersensible components of Aesthetic experience from the empirical, much less attention is paid to distinguishing Art from pedantic Moral sermonizing.  The main ingredient for the latter exposition is present in Kant's theory--what might be called the 'fecundity' of Aesthetic ideas, i. e. their "rich material" (#47), that "prompts much thought" (#49).  However, the development of such an exposition would seem to conflict with Kant's marginalization of Genius, the source of such fecundity.  Furthermore, since the animating principle of Genius is Spirit, according to Kant, and Spirit is supersensible, a more elaborate analysis of Fecundity would require an explanation of the relation between Spirit and Reason, which seems lacking in his system as is.

Beauty, Pleasure, Creativity

At various places in the 3rd Critique, Kant considers five different responses to the consciousness of a beautiful object: 1. restful satiation; 2. an effort to "reinforce and reproduce" (#12) the representation of the object; 3. an effort to universalize the experience; 4. an attempt to productively imitate the object of beauty; and 5. the creation of a new beautiful object.  Now, #3 is, according to Kant's theory, the paradigmatic Aesthetic experience.  Accordingly, the harmonization of the cognitive faculties involved in that experience, is esteemed, in the theory, as the paradigmatic Aesthetic 'pleasure', an event that Kant's method immunizes from causal analysis.  In contrast, if #5 is recognized as the fully developed response to a beautiful object, then mere cognitive enjoyment is revealed as an effect, of diminished intensity, of the exhilaration of the creative process that the object of cognition conveys.

Contemplation, Satiation, Excitation

At #24 of the Critique of Judgment, Kant characterizes the contemplation of Beauty as "restful".  In contrast, at #12, he portrays that contemplation as not so restful, but, rather, as accompanied by an effort to "keep us in the state of having the representation" of the beautiful object.  There is no casual vacillation between the two passages: in the first, the 'pleasure' experienced is satiation, while in the second, it is excitation.  So, once it is recognized that the impulse to keep the representation continues as an effort to share it with others, then it becomes clearer that the universalizability that is, according to Kant, a characteristic of the experience of Beauty, is a wishful product of excitation.  In other words, Kant's theory augments the long tradition that esteems Contemplation teleologically, i. e. as private satiation.

Genius and Contemplation

As has been previously discussed, Kant distinguishes between 'following' Genius, i. e. producing another original work, from 'imitating' it, i. e. merely copying some of its features.  Elsewhere than in the context of drawing that distinction, he proposes a third possible reaction to a work of Genius--the contemplation of it, a "restful" response, as he characterizes it at #24 of the 3rd Critique.  Now, it is this latter reaction that is paradigmatic according to his theory, one problematic implication, therefore, of which is that being inspired by a work of Genius to produce another such work is a relatively inappropriate response to it.

Genius and Representation

The ostensible ground for Kant's subordination of Genius to Taste is its un-universalizability.  However, that attribution is difficult to reconcile with his earlier recognition of the exemplariness of Genius,  Instead, a more consistent basis for the status of Genius in his Aesthetic Theory is implied by his ascription of inimitability to Genius, namely that it is unrepresentable.  For, in a theory that conceives Fine Art as fundamentally Representational, as a branch of a system that conceives Experience, in general, as Representational, Unrepresentability is a sufficient ground for a diminished status, if not for non-status.

Firstness, Oneness, Genius, Taste

The title of #40 of the Critique of Judgment is 'Fine Art is the Art of Genius', and the first sentence of the section is "Genius is the talent . . . that gives the rule to art.". At #50, Kant states that "art . . . deserves to be called fine art only insofar as it shows taste", later adding that "taste . . . consists in disciplining (or training) genius.  It severely clips its wings . . ."  So, by denying that Genius governs Art, #50 plainly contradicts #46.  Indeed, the attribution, by Taste, of 'Beauty' to an object, is, according to Kant's theory, independent of whether or not the object is a product of Genius.  That is, the theory distinguishes the singularity of the experience of such objects, from the originality of the genesis of such objects, privileging only the former.  In other words, a beautiful object is a One, but not a First, contrary to the character of the highest value in the theory of Fine Art that Kant briefly entertains at #46.

Firstness, Oneness, Genius

One clear example of Firstness in Kant's system is the "inspiration" that produces a work of Genius.  Accordingly, any subsequent originality that has been inspired by that example is not so much a Second, but a Second First.  In contrast, the mechanical imitation of a work of Genius is an uninspired One that has reduced its object to mere Oneness.

Firstness, Oneness, Noumenon

The incapacity of human knowledge to explain why humans respect Reason is not a defense of the absence, in Kant's theory, of an explanation of how that respect entails a bridging of the noumenon-phenomenon chasm.  Indeed, that absence might reflect an impossibility that refutes the posited heterogeneity of the two realms.  Instead, the difference between the realms might be one of degree, like that of the continuum between his categories of Negation and Reality, or of that between Firstness and Secondness, rather than one of kind, such as that between Oneness and Twoness.

Oneness, Firstness, Causality

A fundamental ambition, at least in its earlier stages of development, of Kant's concept of Pure Practical Reason, is to attribute Firstness to Oneness, i. e. to establish the causal efficacy of the principle of Consistency.  According to his exposition, at least initially, the specific moment of that causality occurs when, in a rational being, the idea of Consistency effects respect for Consistency.  Eventually, however, he breaks that causal link, when he interposes freedom of choice.  But even prior to that modification, respect for Consistency means nothing more than constraint from an inconsistent course of behavior.  In other words, no effect follows from the idea of Consistency, thereby perfectly exemplifying Oneness as a principle of stasis, i. e. as no First.

Reason, Oneness, Firstness

The distinction between Totalizing Reason and Distributive Reason is derived from that between Oneness and Firstness, respectively.  For, the constraint of inconsistent behavior, required by Totalizing Reason, is based on the Parmenidean ideal of changeless unity, while the setting of an example, prompted by Distributive Reason, is an expression of the source of dynamic universal creativity.  Thus, the inherent productiveness of Firstness exposes the inadequacy of Totalizing Reason as 'Practical', i. e. exposes it as a Theoretical principle applied to Practice.  Furthermore, that Firstness, at minimum, presents an alternative to Oneness, exposes the undefended subscription, e. g. Kant's, to the latter as arbitrary, so the Reason that is derived from Oneness is not necessarily 'Pure'.  In contrast, the priority of Ordinal Numerality over Cardinal Numerality, previously argued for here, applies to that of Firstness over Oneness, e. g. Oneness, like Cardinality, lacks the very concept of Priority that such an argument entails.

The One and The First

On the basis of Parmenides' The One, Motion and Multiplicity are irreal.  In contrast, on the basis of Plotinus' The One, which he conceives as the source of Emanation, Multiplicity is not irreal, but remains less real than Oneness.  Thus, Plotinus' more significant break with Parmenides is to conceive Motion, i. e. the process of Emanation, as fully real, which Bergson seems to appreciate better than most of his modern peers.  Still, the concept 'one' is static and self-contained, and, therefore, remains problematic as the source of a dynamic process.  Instead, a more appropriate characterization of Plotinus' principle is 'The First'.

Morality, Imitating, Following

At #32 of the Critique of Judgment, Kant distinguishes "following" an example from "imitating" one.  Later, at #47 and #49 he proposes that the former does not entail the implementation of a determinate rule, thereby implying that the latter does.  So, insofar as the adoption of his principle of Pure Practical Reason is interpreted, as it most prevalently is, as entailing the concept of a maxim of conduct as an instance of a determinate universal law, that adoption 'imitates' the principle.  In contrast, insofar as, as has been proposed here, it is interpreted as entailing the concept of a maxim of conduct as setting an example, that adoption 'follows' the principle.  Likewise, the formulation of a rival Moral principle, e. g. that of Utilitarianism, can be interpreted as, paradoxically, 'following' Kant's example.

Distributive Reason, Morality, Mimesis

Since imitation can be conceived as a type of adaptation, the emergence, in Darwinism, of Adaptation as a fundamental psychological principle suggests that Mimesis transcends its traditional Aristotelian restriction as an 'Aesthetic' topic.  Thus, for example, insofar as Representation is imitative of its object, Mimesis is an Epistemological topic, as well.  Likewise, insofar as, as is plain from earliest childhood behavior, imitation mediates interpersonal relations, it is not only a Moral topic, but, perhaps, the basis of all Morality.  But, imitation presupposes an exemplar.  Thus, Distributive Reason, i. e. the setting of an example, entails a recognition of the Moral significance of Mimesis.

Distributive Reason and the Principle of Pure Practical Reason

Kant's principle of Pure Practical Reason is, to all known appearances, unprecedented, i. e. there is no evidence that it antedates him.  Thus, his formulation either makes explicit what is eternally implicit, culminates recent intellectual developments, or is simply an untimely product of genius--his own theory of History seems to suggest that he himself subscribes to the second hypothesis.  In any case, as a novel phenomenon, that he clearly projects as universally applicable, the principle is a product of example-setting Distributive Reason.

Distributive Reason, Totalizing Reason, Convention

The Platonization of the trial of Socrates transforms a critique of conventional interpretations of the concepts of 'impiety' and 'corrupting the youth', into a triumph of Soul over Body.  Likewise, Kant's pitting Totalizing Reason against individual inclination, finds common ground with conventional Deontology.  In contrast, Distributive Reason, which originates examples, is a potentially more effective vehicle of liberation from convention, and, thus, is closer to Socratic than to Platonist Reason.

Distributive Reason, Legislative Reason, Duty

Instead of reinforcing conventional Moral of Duty, by casting Rational Morality as structurally deontological, Kant might have taken the opportunity to present a critique of the former, i. e. by showing that the only duty worth acting upon for its own sake is rational duty.  To that end, instead of treating focusing on the subsumability of maxims under the formulations of Legislative Reason, he might have emphasized that maxims themselves are the source of laws.  For, as the basis of the creation of a law, a maxim is clearly independent of antecedent convention.  Thus, more generally, Distributive Reason, as the form of Examplification, more effectively liberates an individual from convention than does a Totalizing Reason, to the product of which one might have a 'duty' to submit.

Distributive Reason, Moral Copernican Revolution, Heliocentrism

Children imitate adults; adults serve as examples for children.  In other words, moral development entails a transition from Mimesis to Examplification.  So, as the expression "shining example" suggests, if there is a Moral 'Copernican revolution' to a heliocentric model of Rational conduct, it is to Distributive Reason, in which Reason sets examples, in the same way that the Sun distributes light throughout its system.  Accordingly, Autonomous Deontology, e. g. Kant's doctrine, constitutes an  incomplete stage of such a revolution.

Totalizing Reason and Distributive Reason

While Totalizing Reason unifies a multiplicity, Distributive Reason generates a multiplicity, for which the source is a universal entity.  Now, for Kant, Theoretical Reason is plainly Totalizing Reason.  However, in some respects--the Moral Law, qua first introduced by Kant; the universalization of a maxim; and the concept of a perfectly rational individual--his Practical Reason is, arguably, interpretable as Distributive Reason, while in others--the Kingdom of Ends, Soul, Deservedness, and God--it is Totalizing Reason.  Given that Totalization and Distribution are inverse processes, the admixture is potentially problematic for his Moral doctrine.  Specifically, their contrast with the productivity of Distributive Reason exposes those Totalizing elements of the doctrine as Theoretical, and not Practical, ideas.

Reason, Examplification, Pluralism

'Distributive Reason' can be defined as a process in which a singular entity becomes a universal by virtue of inspiring imitations, e. g. an archetype.  It is, thus, a pluralizing process.  Now, the concept of Examplification, i. e. the concept of the process of setting an example, entails that of inspiring imitations.  Thus, Examplification is a process in which Reason pluralizes.  In contrast, Kant's concept of Reason, which can merely constrain individual behavior, on the grounds of inconsistency, lacks any inherently Pluralistic factor.

Reason, Examplification, Causality

The concept of 'examplification', i. e. setting an example, entails that of the universalization of a singular moment, and, hence, is a product of Reason.  Furthermore, it also equivalent to the concept of setting a precedent, and, therefore, of that of causal efficacy, i. e. Spinoza's concept of Adequate Causality and Kant's Schema of Causality each entail the following of one event upon the performance of another.  Thus, 'Examplify!' can be at least as suitably characterized as a 'principle of Pure Practical Reason' as is Kant's formula, i. e. its source is constitutive Reason.

Reason and Moral Genius

One of the few passages in which Kant devotes attention to Action per se is in his examination, in the 3rd Critique, of Genius, one characteristic of which is its exemplariness.  Now, if he had proceeded to analyze the latter, he might have recognized that to set an example is to universalize, from which he might have concluded that Taste is entailed in Genius.  Likewise, since his Moral Law entails the universalization of a maxim, it can be understood as a formula of Moral Genius, in which Reason functions as the form of Exemplification.  So, Whitehead's observation, that the history of Philosophy is a series of footnotes to Plato, abstracts from Plato's role as a propagator of the example set by the Moral Genius of Philosophy, namely Socrates.

Reason and Action

According to Kant, the imperatival form of his principle of Pure Practical Reason expresses the discrepancy between a hypothetical perfectly rational entity and an imperfectly so one.  Hence, the "Act" of the formula is extrinsic to the concept of perfectly rational performance, therefore, leaving unexplained the motivation, and, thus, the self-motivation of that rational ideal.  In contrast, Spinoza can ascribe activation to the attribute of Extension, a structural component of a rational entity that has no obvious analogue in Kant's system, leaving Action as an empirical concept in it.

Reason and Causality

Without causal efficacy, the ideas of Reason remain Theoretical and regulative, not Practical and constitutive.  Now, while Kant demonstrates that it is not impossible that Reason can be a cause, and asserts that it is a cause, he not only does not explain how it is a cause, but insists that the impossibility of such an explanation is a virtue.  However, that immunization against the demand for an explanation is based on two premises--that Reason is supernatural, and that its causality is of the Efficient category.  In contrast, if, as previously proposed here, Reason is fundamentally proprioceptive, and its causality is of the Formal variety, then its efficacy is not only a plain fact of experience, but one that can be explained.

Practical Reason and Proprioception

Kant's effort to demonstrate the applicability of Reason to Action is much less conscientious than that of the applicability of the Understanding to concrete Cognition.  In particular, in comparison with the focal point of the latter, i. e. the Schematism, his variously proposed focal points of the former--a feeling of 'respect', a power of choice--seem no less ad hoc devices than a pineal gland might.  In contrast, a more substantive tertium quid has been previously proposed here--Proprioception.  That is, if Reason is conceived as a highly developed homeostatic system of guiding motility, then it is conceived as truly practical, thereby satisfying Kant's ambition for it.

Reason, Consistency, Sufficiency

Kant's concept of 'imperfect duty' is a challenge to his thesis that 'rational' conduct is governed primarily by Consistency, since it requires him to explain how something that does not exist, i. e. a non-performed act, entails a contradiction.  Accordingly, he concocts maxims of impulsive negligence to serve as the bearers of inconsistency.  He thereby circumvents examination of the possibility that conduct can be 'rational' by virtue of maxims that are derived not from impulse, but from Reason itself.  In such cases, Reason is governed by what has here been previously termed a 'Principle of Practical Sufficient Reason', in which Reason is itself creative.  On that basis, Consistency is only a necessary condition of the Rationality of conduct.

Reason and End

If Pure Reason is, fundamentally, the process of unifying a multiplicity, then it entails no concept of 'end', which is, as Spinoza argues, the product of a concept of Reason as fundamentally teleological.  Likewise, it entails no concept of 'end in itself'.  Now, in a variety of places, Kant espouses, either implicitly or explicitly, a concept of Pure Reason as a principle of unification.  On that basis, contrary to what he frequently asserts elsewhere, Reason does not have or set ends, and neither Reason nor a rational being is an end in itself. Rather, as admirable as is his declaration that humans should never be treated as mere means, it is an empirical principle. 

Standpoint and End

To 'transfer' oneself, as Kant characterizes the process, at #40 of the Critique of Judgment, as part of his development of his Aesthetic Theory, to the standpoint of some other, entails, at least heuristically, a relocation in space, to the experience of a radically, because private, different set of empirical objects.  In contrast, to transfer oneself to a "universal" standpoint simply entails the abstraction from the empirical components of experience, to its a priori components.  In that process, not only is no spatial relocation involved, but the otherness of the other is abstracted from, as well.  Likewise, according to the Groundwork, as part of the development of his Moral doctrine, to treat an other as an 'end in itself' is to respect and promote a set of empirical interests, that are radically, because private, different from one's own.  In contrast, his thesis, "Rational nature exists as an end in itself", abstracts from all empirical differences, and, hence, from not only the contingent private interests of others, but from the very otherness of others, as well.  In other words, his concepts 'standpoint of others' and 'end in itself' are similarly ambiguous, i. e. each admits of both a universalistic and an particularistic interpretation.  One perhaps surprising distinction between the two is that it is the Aesthetic concept that receives from Kant a universalistic emphasis, while it is the particularistic sense of 'end in itself' that predominates in his Moral doctrine.

Standpoint, Universality, Plurality

At #40 of the Critique of Judgment, Kant discusses thinking from a "universal standpoint", i. e. "from the standpoint of everybody else", achievable only by "transferring" oneself to the "standpoint of others".  Now, given that 'standpoint' essentially connotes 'particularity', the concept of 'universal standpoint' is, at best, problematic.  Furthermore, the distinction between Appearances and Things-in-Themselves, which is fundamental to his system, entails that the object of a 'universal standpoint' can only be a thing-in-itself, a classification which seems unhelpful to a theory concerning aesthetic judgments about appearances. In any case, in the notion of transferring oneself to the standpoint of some other, there is brief evidence of a process of Pluralization, a process that gets suppressed by Kant's eventual effort to universalize the standpoint.

Reason and Communication

Kant introduces the concept of 'communicability' in the 3rd Critique, primarily to explain Aesthetic Judgment.  However, it is clear from his exposition that it is not only aesthetic feeling that he regards as 'communicable'.  For example, at #40, he asserts that a "moral feeling , , , can be communicated universally , , , by means of reason."  What is significant in this passage is that it implies that Reason is not a content of communication, but is, itself, a medium of communication.  In other words, Kant is here evinced as conceiving Reason to be a specific linguistic pattern, rather than a pre-linguistic process that contingently gets verbally expressed.  The passage is, thus, evidence that Kant conceives Reason to be essentially linguistic, from which it follows that Cognition is essentially linguistic, and that Language is an a priori capacity, which Cassirer and Chomsky seem to appreciate better than many other neo-Kantians.

Reason, Judgment, Duty

In the Groundwork, Kant distinguishes between a maxim that is inconceivable as a universal law, and a maxim the universalization of which is, while internally conceivable, is inconsistent with the internally conceivable universalization of some other maxim.  The significance of that distinction to his system is that it is the basis of the difference between the concepts of 'perfect' and 'imperfect' duty, and, subsequently, of that between those of 'Justice' and 'Virtue'.  Now, as has been previously discussed here, at #40 of the 3rd Critique, he draws a distinction between "judgment", which is thinking from a "universal standpoint", and "reason", which is "consistent" thinking.  On that basis, it is Judgment, specifically, that is the source of the universalizability of a maxim, and Reason, specifically, that is the source of the consistency between universalizations.  Accordingly, in Kant's system, it is Judgment, specifically, that is the source of the concepts of Perfect Duty and Justice, while it is Reason, specifically, that is the source of the concepts of  Imperfect Duty and Virtue.

Reason, Consistency, Pluralism

In #40 of the Critique of Judgment, Kant, digressing from the main exposition, distinguishes: 1. thinking for oneself; 2. thinking from the standpoint of everyone else; and 3. thinking always consistently.  He characterizes these, as, respectively, "unprejudiced", "broadened", and "consistent", thinking.  He also classifies their sources as, respectively, "understanding", "judgment", and "reason",  Now, practical correlates of these three can be discerned in his fundamental principle of Pure Practical Reason, respectively: acting on a maxim, the universalization of a maxim, and the non-contradictoriness of a universal law.  Hence, these distinctions confirm what has been previously proposed here--that the Pluralism of his doctrine does not derive from Reason, specifically, i. e. the criterion of non-contradiction that governs Reason does not entail a multiplicity of thinkers.  In fact, if, as Leibniz argues, the principle of Contradiction is derived from the principle of Identity, Pluralism is antithetical to Reason

Reason, Objectivity, Universality, Pluralism

The concept of Subjective Universality, that Kant introduces in the 3rd Critique to characterize the interpersonal communicability of judgments of Taste, bears out that the Object-Subject distinction is not equivalent in his system to the Universal-Individual one.  The priority of the former contrast to his Moral theory is evinced at the outset of his exposition, in the Groundwork, of the concept of Imperative, which he there introduces as a relation between a perfectly rational entity and an imperfectly so one, i. e. between objective necessity and subjective contingency.  Now, no multiplicity of rational entities is entailed in that relation, nor is it entailed in the fundamental formulation of the principle of Pure Practical Reason, in which the only multiplicity entailed is that of maxims.  In other words, the concept of Subjective Universality bears out that the Pluralism of Kant's doctrine is not derived from Pure Practical Reason, or, at least, not from how he fundamentally conceives it.

Legislative Reason and Deontic Logic

The emergence of neo-Kantian Deontic Logic tends to obscure the insufficiency, for Kant, to his Moral Law, of the universalization of maxims.  For, as he makes clear in the 3rd Critique, mere subjective universality suffices as a criterion for judgments of Taste.  In contrast, his Moral Law requires the elevation of a maxim to objectivity, i. e. requires conceiving it not only as universal, but as a law, as well.  Furthermore, it is only as explicitly legislative that Reason is causal, i. e. that it is constitutive.  So, Deontic Logic, the focus of which is the practical syllogism, the major premise of which is a proposition that is universally quantified in some respect, e. g. subjects or worlds, remains no more than an exercise in formal calculation, that abstracts from the decisive innovations of Kant's Moral doctrine.

Judgment and Experimental Reason

If Kant had conceived 'Judgment' as he does his 'Transcendental Deduction', i. e. as legalistic, he might have anticipated Dewey in locating it as the termination of a process of examination.  As such, 'pronouncement', more precisely than 'utterance', characterizes the expression of a judgment.  For, 'utterance' also classifies the initiation of that process, which, likewise more precisely, can be termed a 'proposal', thereby avoiding, as well, the further ambiguities of the notion 'proposition', that figures prominently in many Epistemological and Logical theories.  Now, a proposal is implicitly questionable, and, hence, can be classified as an interrogative expression, i. e. it expresses 'What if?', with respect to which the pronouncement of a judgment is the settlement.  But, as has been previously discussed here, the source of such questions, is Experimental Reason.  Thus, the 'Theoretical' Reason that is the main topic of Kant's 1st Critique is a subtopic of Experimental Reason, i. e. it examines Knowledge in abstraction from the quest for it.  The preface to the 2nd edition, introduced by a quote from Bacon, suggests, at least briefly, his acknowledgment of the primacy of Experimental Reason.

Judgments and A Priori Knowledge

The possibility, previously proposed here, that, for Kant, judgments are utterances, would seem to conflict with his affirmation of the existence of a priori Knowledge.  For, if judgments are both utterances and the fundamental mode of expression of Knowledge, it would seem to follow that all knowledge is a posteriori, i. e. because utterances are a posteriori.  However, that conclusion depends on what Kant means by 'a priori Knowledge'--1. 'knowledge of truths that are independent of empirical experience', or 2. 'knowledge possessed pre-natally'.  Now, there is little evidence that he joins Plato in subscribing to #2, and even if his position is that humans are pre-programmed with certain 'pure' concepts, the latter are not to be confused with the knowledge that is the product of a process involving them.  On the other hand, there is no incompatibility between a truth and the utterance of it, which is the distinction entailed in the contrast between interpretation #1 and the thesis that all judgments are utterances.  So, that Kant asserts the existence of a priori Knowledge is not necessarily an argument against the possibility that he affirms the latter, as well.

Judgment, Language, Private Knowledge

At B 97 of the 1st Critique, Kant uses the word "say" to introduce an expression that he classifies as a 'judgment', the significance of which is that it is evidence, in an otherwise indeterminate exposition, that he conceives judgments to be utterances, in which case, they serve a fundamentally social function.  It follows that insofar as judgments are the modes of expression of Knowledge, Knowledge is fundamentally social, which accords with the concept of the essential sociality of Rational beings that becomes explicit in the 2nd Critique.  But, it is implicit in the 1st Critique, as well.  For, the a priori transcends the a posteriori, e. g. personal differences.  Accordingly, the 'I think' is not only the ground of the unity of Knowledge, but, as anonymous, it is the ground of its sociality, as well.  So, the linguistic character of judgment underscores that for Kant, there is no private Knowledge, as there is in systems that recognize the possibility of intuitive Knowledge.

Moral Pluralism, Heliocentrism, Solipsism

Kant's Moral doctrine is Pluralistic, populated by a multiplicity of rational beings, each of which, as an end-in-itself, is a noumenal entity.  Now, according to the standard interpretation of his 'Copernican revolution', the subject of Experience is analogous to a heliocentric system, with Reason as its 'Sun'.  However, as stated, in Kant's doctrine there are a multiplicity of such subjects.  Hence, granting the standard interpretation of his 'Copernican revolution', it follows that the astronomical metaphor that is appropriate to Kant's doctrine is a galaxy, not a solar system, which, as literally 'solipsistic', is antithetical to the doctrine's Pluralism.

Other Minds, Reason, Morality

Some philosophers have been challenged by the problem of the existence of other minds, primarily because immediate evidence of such an existence seems lacking.  Now, according to Kant, entailed by his principle of Pure Practical Reason is the principle to treat an other, because rational, as an end-in-itself.  In other words, he implicitly classifies the question of the existence of other minds as a Moral, not a Cognitive, problem, and solves it accordingly.

Reason, Morality, Lying

Kant's four examples of 'duty' are often regarded as more interesting than rigorously convincing, primarily because of the difficulty in corresponding a logical contradiction with a concrete event.  Still, the example of false promising has been appreciated as more instructive than the others, since it entails both the construction and the breaking of a social convention.  But, that example is distinctive in another respect--it is fundamentally linguistic.  Hence, on that interpretation, false promising is a special case of lying, which is fundamentally immoral, because it undermines the effectiveness of language, the medium of communication, and, hence, it undermines the very basis of social harmony.

Reason, Morality, Constructivism

While 'Constructivist' is often used to characterize Kant's Cognitive theory, it is rarely applied to his Moral doctrine.  Since autonomous Reason, qua legislative faculty, can ground the cultivation individuals, and the building of their society, the rubric seems appropriate.  However, Kant, instead, emphasizes the 'supernatural' facets of the doctrine, beginning with the abstraction of maxims from their actualization, thereby rendering the products of Reason extrinsic to the evaluation of its exercise.  Furthermore, his inclusion of an eternally existing deity as a member of a rational society makes it difficult to conceive that collective as 'constructed'.  But, with the integration of maxim and action, that concept becomes clearer, as do that of the autonomy of self-cultivation, and of society-building, with respect to which it is the existence of a deity that becomes extrinsic, if not irrelevant.

Reason and Atomism

Perhaps Kant's primary contribution to the Rationalist tradition is his concept of Reason as intrinsically Universal, likely based on the equivalence of 'impersonal' and 'universal'.  Thus, the role of Reason in conduct becomes inherently social, e. g. the coordination of maxims with laws, whereas, for Aristotle and Spinoza it is only extrinsically interpersonal, while for Plato, Descartes, and Leibniz it remains an essentially private process.  In other words, the Kantian concept of Reason is anti-Atomistic, and anticipates the nascent Dialectical tradition of  Hegel, Marx, Fichte, etc.

Reason and Ersatz Freedom

The paradox of heteronomous behavior is that is not experienced as such.  For, such behavior is preceded by a feeling, which is a private event, so that what ensues seems to have a private origin, and, thus, appears to be 'free'.  Hence, as Spinoza argues, liberation from heteronomous influence can begin with the recognition of it as such.  Now, insofar as Reason, for Kant, prompts one to conceive oneself as a member of a macroscopic society, it transports one out of the vulnerability of unwitting privacy, and, hence, from heteronomy.  However, he does not join Spinoza in appreciating the liberating effect of directly recognizing heteronomy for what it is, which may be why he misses that the apparent 'choice' to disobey Reason constitutes a relapse into ersatz 'freedom'.

Reason, Morality, Philosophy of Language

While the attention to Kant's 'Categorical Imperative' tends to focus on its classification as 'categorical', its more significant component is that it is an imperative.  For, as an imperative, it is verbal, thereby evincing that Reason, specifically the Principle of Pure Practical Reason, is, essentially, linguistic.  That is, the essential moment of the Principle--its role in determining a course of action--is as a linguistic formulation, evaluating other linguistic constructions, i. e. maxims.  In other words, Kant's doctrine is constituted by a perhaps unprecedented convergence of Reason, Morality, and Language, in which Language emerges crystallized as Reason, representing itself as the a priori autonomous basis of social cohesion.  As such, the doctrine can be characterized as a 'Philosophy of Language', meaning: not 'a theory about Language', but: a 'doctrine, the source of which is Language'.

Heliocentrism, Reason, Empowerment

The Sun is central to human experience not only insofar as it enables visibility, but also insofar as it is source of physiological energy, i. e. via photosynthesis.  Thus, the Sun not only enlightens, but it empowers, as well.  Now, many of the Heliocentric interpretations of Kant's system, e. g. Silber's, recognize only the first as analogous to the influence of Reason on human experience.  But, that Reason is causal, which Kant labors at great length to establish, suggests that the second solar property is the more fundamental analogy in his doctrine.  So, the empowerment by Reason is the focal point of the Copernican transformation of a passive Subject to a dynamic Agent.

Reason, Choice, Bi-Heliocentrism

Silber interprets Kant as effecting a Moral 'Copernican revolution', i. e. as inverting the traditional concept of Reason as conforming to independently set 'goods'.  His analogy, thus, abstracts from the "motions" that Kant ascribes to the source of Reason, thereby falling short of the 'Copernican revolution' that has been proposed here--from passive Subject to dynamic Agent.  Accordingly, Silber settles for Heliocentric imagery, with Pure Practical Reason as the 'Sun'.  Now, as has been previously argued, Silber fails to make the case that Freedom of Choice is derived from Pure Practical Reason.  Hence, a more accurate characterization of that imagery is 'Bi-Heliocentric', because that failure leaves the model with two 'Suns'--Pure Practical Reason and Freedom of Choice.  In that respect, Silber's representation of the outcome of Kant's effort to reconcile rational morality and popular morality, is accurate.

Reason, God, Freedom of Choice

Having undermined, in the 1st Critique, all traditional proofs of the existence of God, it is historically significant that Kant's alternative effort, in the 2nd Critique, be sound.  Now, that proof entails the proposition that Virtue is the worthiness to be happy, which, in turn, entails the thesis that humans possess a power of freedom of choice.  However, that that power includes the possibility of choosing to disobey Reason, which Kant does not dispute, seems to present a serious challenge to his ambition, i. e. because that thesis seems to be a premise that is independent of the resources of Reason.  While Kant himself seemingly remains oblivious to this potentially conclusive lacuna in his procedure, Silber, in his introduction to Religion Within the Limits of Reason Alone, in his attempt to bridge that gap, agrees that freedom of choice is irrational, proposing that "the irrational is a mode of the rational".  However, given the absence of any further elaboration, that seemingly contradictory proposition achieves the opposite of what Silber intends--it reinforces the suspicion that Kant's proof of the existence of God is as unsound as the others that he refutes.

Retributive Justice, Karma, Property

The concept of Retributive Justice--entailing reward as well as punishment--presupposes a concept of Property, i. e. the concept of an action as 'one's own.'  Hence, it is a variation on the popular notion of 'Karma'--a contrivance that effects what occurs naturally in the latter, namely, a return of an action to its source.  Thus, Retributive Justice can be conceived as a special case of respect for property rights--the process of returning something to its owner.

Deservedness, General Will, Monarchy

Kant's argument that Reason requires a synthesis of Virtue and Happiness does not suffice to establish that that synthesis is constituted by a relation of Deservedness.  One possible independent proof of the latter is based on the relation of proportionality entailed by Deservedness--insofar as Proportionality is equivalent to Ratio, with the latter, arguably, a mode of Reason, Deservedness is a rational concept.  Now, proportionality presupposes the commensurability of its terms, and the only indication of the commensurability of Virtue and Happiness in Kant's exposition is that the former entails self-constraint, and, hence, a sacrifice of happiness.  It follows that Deservedness for Kant is compensation, as the Utilitarians suspect.  Now, insofar as Reason requires the possibility of divine intervention to effect such compensation, the arc of Kant's exposition of Practical Reason, from the Groundwork, to the 2nd Critique, to Religion, constitutes a critique of Rousseau's concept of Democracy.  For, Kantian Practical Reason begins as a representation of Rousseau's General Will, which is the basis of the latter's concept of Democracy.  So, if a Kingdom, with a deity as its monarch, emerges as the ideal collectivity according to that Reason,, Kant's exposition serves to demonstrate that a such a Monarchy serves as a corrective to the flaws of that Democracy.

Reason, Deservedness, Action

In Kant's system, 'Virtue' and 'Justice' are distinguished in terms of 'inner' and 'outer'.  Now, 'worthiness' is a kind of  'justice'.  Thus, his contention that "virtue is the worthiness to be happy" does not, in itself, accomplish the totalization of the Good, which is why a mediating 'God' is necessary for the synthesis.  However, in his system, there is a more fundamental chasm between inner and outer--that between intention and action.  So, if there is anything that Virtue fundamentally deserves, it is its outer efficacy.  Similarly, the primary function of a 'God' that is conceived within the limits of reason would be to actualize Reason.

Morality, God, and The Limits of Reason

If Reason had a Deity, it would be the ancient Logos, not to be confused with the Christianized variation.  If it were the basis of a Moral doctrine, 'good' would be either rational processes, or whatever promotes rational processes.  Likewise, 'evil' would be either irrational processes, or whatever promotes irrational processes, including whatever is detrimental to rational processes.  Now, since the satisfaction of need can breed complacency, individual happiness is not necessarily a rational 'good'.  Hence, even as a reward for rational conduct, happiness is not necessarily a 'good'.  Therefore, Kant's concept of Deservedness, which combines rational conduct with happiness as its reward, as well as what he derives from it--the existence of 'God', and an appropriate Religion--are, from the outset, outside the limits of Reason.

Reason and Freedom of Choice

One of Kant's controversial theses is that humans possess a freedom by which they can wittingly disobey Reason, a thesis which, consequently, grounds the existence of 'Evil' in such 'freedom of choice'.  He, thus, opposes Aristotle and Spinoza, who contend that malfeasance always entails an intellectual error of some kind.  The closest that Kant approaches to a proof of the existence of that faculty begins with the proposition that Deservedness is a Rational concept, so that the capacity, entailed by that concept, to choose Vice as well as Virtue, is, likewise, a Rational concept.  However, that proof betrays itself.  For, the presumed Rationality of Deservedness presupposes that of individual Happiness, one of its components.  But, explicitly and implicitly, in its formulation, the principle of Pure Practical Reason is indifferent, at best, to any concept of Happiness.  Hence, the ascription of a concept of 'freedom of choice' to Reason constitutes an intellectual error.  Furthermore, that the concept of Deservedness grounds his subsequent proof of the 'existence of God', encourages the diagnosis that Kant's thesis of the existence of a 'freedom of choice' is the product of a vestigial irrational Theological prejudice.

Force, General Will, Pure Practical Reason

Kant's concept of Pure Practical Reason is inspired by Rousseau's notion of a 'general will', and his concept of Autonomy potentially clarifies one of the apparent difficulties entailed in the latter, i. e. how the expression of collective interest does not suppress the interests of the individuals who comprise that collective.  He could, for example, follow Spinoza, and analyze Autonomy,say, as the mutual enhancement of forces inhering in differing locations.  However, by admitting a supernatural entity into the collective, as its ruler, Kant not only converts a Democracy into Kingdom, if not into a Theocracy, but transforms his initial concept of Autonomy.  For, what begins as a struggle of Reason against external influences gets re-configured, by the introduction into scheme of a power to choose between the participants in that struggle, a power which, as independent of them, can have only a supernatural origin..  Accordingly, what begins as Rousseau's innovative concept of political self-rule, ends, in Kant's oeuvre, i. e. in Religion Within the Limits of Reason Alone, as a traditional theological 'problem of Evil'.  Kant, thus, squanders an opportunity to join Plato, Aristotle, and Spinoza, in grounding Political Philosophy in Reason.

Attraction, Repulsion, Social Antagonism

Three basic occasions of sub-atomic Repulsion are: the Proton, which, in itself, is a repulsive force; the interaction of two Protons, i. e. of two repulsive forces; and the interaction of two Electrons, i. e. of two attractive forces exerted in opposing directions.  Now, as has been previously discussed, the Rational resistance to Sympathy entails the latter interaction.  Hence, it is not to be confused with the social antagonism that is constituted by two repulsive forces, e. g. the struggle between entrepreneurs and laborers for the profits that some product has generated.

Reason, Sympathy, Depersonalization

Kant's emphasis on the deontological aspects of his doctrine--universalization, duty for duty's sake, a categorical imperative, etc.--tends to reinforce the popular reputation, based on the self-evident privacy of feelings, of Reason as a depersonalizing faculty.  In contrast, the representation of Reason and Sympathy as forces illustrates, to the contrary, that it is Sympathy that depersonalizes, while it is Reason that empowers, the individual.  For, as has been previously argued here, Sympathy is a trans-personal attractive force, which Reason, as an intrapersonal attractive force, can counter.  Furthermore, the apparently impersonal universalization effected by Reason has been shown to actually be the product of an intrapersonal repulsive force.  In other words, the source of Reason is within the individual, while that of Sympathy is external to it, on this representation of them.  Now, Kant attempts to make the same point regarding that distinction with his Autonomy-Heteronomy contrast.  However, the vestigial supernaturalism of his doctrine, which entails that Reason is a mysterious visitation, only undercuts that effort, thereby reinforcing the popular reputation.

Attraction, Sympathy, Reason

The contemporary emphasis on Epistemology has obscured how for Kant 'Rationalism' is not only a Cognitive orientation, in contrast with 'Empiricism', but a Moral one, as well, in contrast with 'Sentimentalism'.  Now, Sympathy, the fundamental principle of the predominant Sentimentalist doctrine of the era, i. e. Hume's, as unifying different people, is, plainly, an attractive force.  So, insofar as Kant rejects the suitability of Sympathy as a foundation of Morality, because it entails the possibility of ignoble behavior as occasioning compassion, e. g. when a criminal commiserates with an arrested associate, he conceives his Rational principle as capable of resisting the pull of a sympathetic feeling.  But, such resistance is effected by an attractive force in the opposite direction, i. e. inwardly.  In other words, for Kant, Reason can function as an attractive dynamic natural force.

Heliocentrism, Morality, Repulsion

As has been previously argued here, the Copernican thesis that Kant conceives as analogous to his Epistemological inversion is that of the Earth spinning on its axis, not that of the Earth orbiting the Sun, as the standard interpretation has it.  However, that argument does not preclude completely the influence of the Heliocentric image on Kant's doctrine, just that it is not part of any 'revolution'.  For, Heliocentrism prevails in ancient Philosophy, not as an Astronomical thesis, but as a metaphor for Morality, i. e. the Sun is the image of the 'Good' for Plato--immobile, like all Platonic Forms, with respect to which any behavior that it can effect is transient.  Likewise, Kant's principle of Pure Practical Reason is the fixed source of virtuous conduct.  So, the Heliocentric influence on Kant's Moral doctrine is directly inherited, not mediated by a Copernican inversion.  Now, the emanatory power of the Sun can be classified in Kant's system as a 'repulsive' force.  Hence, his Practical Reason can likewise be conceived as a repulsive force.

Reason, Universalization, Repulsion

On the standard interpretation of Kant's principle of Pure Practical Reason, the one that he very likely intends, the specific function of Reason is to effect the universalization of a maxim, from which a compelling of respect eventuates.  In other words, the 'causality' that that reading ascribes to Reason is one that mysteriously inheres in its role as a supernatural faculty, i. e. as the source of universal representations.  In contrast, the universalization of a maxim can also be conceived as a process of what is here called 'Examplification', i. e. of setting an example, in which one wittingly projects oneself towards others.  In other words, the causality that the alternative interpretation ascribes to Reason is a palpable one, that consists in its functioning as a dynamic repulsive force, i. e. as generating outward projection.  So, absent, as has been previously discussed here, his commitment to theological supernaturalism, Kant might have fully embraced the concept of a more palpable natural Reason, and, hence, the classification of it as a dynamic force.

Examplification and Repulsion

Previously here, 'Examplification', i. e. actively 'setting an example', was introduced as a contrast to 'exemplification', i. e. passively 'being an example'.  Now, setting an example is an efferentially radiatory motion, and efferentially radiatory motion is, in Kant's system, characteristic of Repulsion.  Thus, Examplification can be classified as a 'repulsive' dynamic force.

Reason, Attraction, Repulsion

Absent the premise that Reason--i. e. Pure Practical Reason, its fundamental mode, according to Kant--is a supernatural faculty which he maintains on perhaps only theological grounds, as has been previously discussed, it can be re-conceived in his system as a 'dynamic force'.  As such, functioning as a constraint on impulses, it can be classified as an 'attractive' force.  Or, alternatively, functioning as resistance to external stimuli, it can be classified as a 'repulsive' force.  So, there is at least prima facie evidence that Reason, like any other existent, is constituted by Attraction and Repulsion.

Reason, Faculty, Force

Kant's subordination of Practical Reason to Theoretical Reason entails that of Agency to Subjectivity, and, hence, that of the concept of Reason as dynamic force, to that of it as transcendental faculty.  But, a dynamical force is, in his system, a 'natural' force.  Thus, his concept of Deity as rational, supernatural, and efficacious, is problematic.  Accordingly, the absence of a full development of a concept of Agency, one in which, e. g., Space is a Form of Action, not of Intuition, perhaps reflects Kant's theological commitments.

Repulsion and Solidity

The thesis that all Matter is a product of Attraction and Repulsion is difficult to reconcile with the ordinary experience of 'solid' objects.  However, that the 'subject' of experience is actually an agent, i. e. is itself constituted by repulsive and attractive forces, transforms 'solidity' into another repulsive force, i. e. to a resistance to the repulsion of an agent.  In other words, 'solidity' is what Kant calls an 'appearance', i. e. it has no subsistence independent of the context of the interaction of two repulsive forces, even if Kant's failure to completely re-conceive Subjectivity as Agency prevents him from similarly re-conceiving Appearance as the product of Dynamic interaction.  Likewise, if Locke had conceived his subject of experience not as a passive slate, but as constituted by dynamic Primary Qualities, he might have arrived at a concept of Secondary Qualities as resulting from the interaction of subjective and objective Primary Qualities.

Electricity, Repulsion, Attraction

Electricity is generally conceived as constituted by two types of 'charged' particle--one 'positively' charged, i. e. the Proton, the other, 'negatively' charged, i. e. the Electron.  In turn, 'charge' is typically characterized in mechanical, i. e. external, terms--oppositely charged particles attract, like charged particles repel, and charge is represented in terms of meters and kilograms.  Furthermore, the 'particle' to which charge is attributed is, likewise, characterized in mechanical terms, i. e. as possessing 'Mass', which is defined in terms of Acceleration.  However, underlying these mechanical characteristics are dynamical, i. e. internal, processes--the Proton is repulsive, and the Electron is attractive, which, with 'particle' being no more than a mechanical construct, are, therefore, nothing more than forces.  In other words, Electricity is nothing more than a specific combination of Repulsion and Attraction.

Fundamental Particles and Electrical Charge

As Physicists continue to seek fundamental particles, they may have already discovered a fundamental notion.  The erstwhile 'fundamental' particle, the atom, has, in recent centuries, been determined as constituted by protons, electrons, and neutrons, each of which is characterized as possessing as type of 'electrical charge', i. e. 'positive' or 'negative'.  A neutron, too, is constituted by a combination of positive and negative charge, for it possesses a net charge of zero, which is not to be confused with being charge-less.  Furthermore, the constituents of these particles, e. g. quarks, all possess charge.  So, while the subdivision of particles continues, the nature of 'electrical charge' seems to remain unanalyzed.

Chenistry and Dynamics

The Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science precedes the systematization of Chemistry, pioneered by Lavoisier, so Kant's concept of Chemistry as a mere "art", despite his occasional references to it to illustrate his own theory, is justified at the time.  But, not only could he not have anticipated the ascendancy since of Chemistry as a science independent of Physics, he could not have appreciated his own prescience.  That is, insofar as the fundamental elements of modern Chemistry are entities constituted as, and distinguishable by, specific combinations of attractive and repulsive forces at one location, that science exemplifies Kant's theory of Dynamics.

Peripatetic and Sedentary

Because of his conducting classes while walking about, Aristotle has been dubbed the 'Peripatetic'.  In contrast, a doctrine that is substantively 'Peripatetic' might begin with walking about as a paradigmatic experiential scenario.  Now, perambulation entails two main primary components--Motility and Proprioception, i. e. motor processes, and the regulation of them.  Arguably, Aristotle's Good--activity governed by the 'Golden Mean'--is conceivable as 'Peripatetic' in that sense, i. e. as a special case of the exercise of motor processes under the guidance of a homeostatic principle.  However, in Aristotle's doctrine, that Good is outranked by Contemplation, which abstracts from Motility.  So, Aristotelianism  is more 'Sedentary' than 'Peripatetic'.  Likewise, the peak experience in Heidegger's system, the revelation of Being, is independent of the perambulatory scenario of some of his works.

Subjectivity and Agency

The second edition of the Critique of Pure Reason is often interpreted as either a tweaking of, or a shifting of emphasis in, the system presented in the first.  However, there are also indications of a more radical variation, verging on an entirely different doctrine.  Between the two editions, Kant produces both a theory of Practical Reason, and one of Natural Science, each of which studies an entity which is dynamic.  Thus, his repeated interest, articulated exclusively in the second edition, in examples of the self-cognition of a corporeally active subject, may be more than coincidental, i. e. may reflect the results of his more recent research.  Those examples illustrate the concept of a Subject of Experience that is not merely one to which objects conform, but, one which is, furthermore, in motion, thereby suggesting an analogous variation on the standard interpretation of the 'Copernican revolution', as has been previously discussed here.  So, what is nascent, even if not fully developed, in the second edition, is a concept of dynamic Subjectivity, i. e. of Agency, that is in contrast with not only that of the static Subjectivity of the first edition, but with the privileged status of the detached observed that dominates Philosophy both before and after the Critique of Pure Reason.  Now, Agency entails an irreducible motile factor, with which any cognitive factor, beginning with Proprioception, is fundamentally coordinated, a coordination that, therefore, conditions any theory of Consciousness, and of Knowledge.  So, even if Kant verges on a concept of Agency, his adherence to a concept of Space that is suited to passive observation, not to motility, shows that his concept of Subjectivity, as innovative as it is, ultimately remains rooted in tradition.

Proprioception and Attraction

As a homeostatic process, Proprioception centers the Motility of an organism.  Thus, it can be conceived as an attractive force counteracting a repulsive force.  In other words, the human organism can be classified in Kant's system as a body constituted by fundamental dynamic forces.  So, just as such a body is so constituted independent of whether or not it remains at one location, a human organism combines Proprioception and Motility whether or not it is walking, lying down, or sitting in a chair doubting that it is corporeal.

Proprioception and Homeostasis

As an awareness of motor processes, Proprioception is best examined in the context of motile activity.  Therein, under normal circumstances, like one's clothing, it is absorbed into the background of activity, becoming discernible only in the event of a disruption.  Thus, the primary function of Proprioception is revealed on the occasion of e. g. stumbling while walking--as homeostatic, i. e. as restoring physiological balance.  In other words, it is like the preferred setting on a thermostat--a normative ideal that becomes a descriptive representation only upon satisfaction.  Thus, since that satisfaction has usually been achieved with the body in an immobile position, the Proprioceptive process is easily overlooked by the philosophical tradition in which the sedentary observer is the paradigmatic subject.

Proprioception, Kinaesthesia, Detachment

In theories of Consciousness such as Leibniz' and Phenomenalism, there are seeming proprioceptive elements, i. e. apparently internal data that are construed as independent of any external entity.  However, the contemporary concept of Proprioception exhibits what distinguishes it from such other theories that also accommodate a mode of inner sensibility--its kinaesthesia.  That is, the immediate objects of Proprioception are motor processes, from which corporeality is difficult to abstract.  So, the lack of recognition in even those theories may be due less to analytical omission, than to the their commitment to the paradigm of a detached subject that is entrenched in modern Philosophy, i. e. a paradigm that is not easily reconcilable with the concept of either a motile subject, or an embodied one.

Proprioception and Outer Perception

Closing one's eyes helps reveal Proprioception as a substratum of all Experience.  Re-opening them shows how easily Outer Perception can conceal that dimension.  Alternatively, retaining the perspective of  the substratum while re-opening one's eyes, shows how Vision can be incorporated into Proprioception, such that a presumed 'outer' object, e. g. a color, can be construed as an inner datum.  However, rather than confirming, for example, a Lockeian theory of Secondary Qualities, the alternative, more conclusively, demonstrates that all Experience is constituted by the compresence of  Proprioception and Outer Perception, to varying degrees of relative emphasis, with the suppression of the former by the latter the most common combination.

Proprioception and Sedentary Observation

Descartes' segue from sedentary observer to disembodied consciousness might be less seamless if he took into account the prequel to this prototypical philosophical scenario--e. g. his walking into the room, and lowering himself into the chair.  For, he might then not as easily abstract from Proprioception, of which the awareness of one as seated is a special case, in the process.  Accordingly, insofar as his procedure helps establish the 'detached' observer as the paradigmatic subject of modern Philosophy, that tradition suppresses Proprioception from its outset.

Proprioception and Soul

Proprioception is often experienced as an awareness of an 'I' existing within one's body.  This experience is often interpreted as revealing the existence of a 'ghost within the machine', i. e. of the existence of an entity that is independent of the body.  Accordingly, it has often been adduced as evidence of the existence of an incorporeal substance, typically termed 'Soul', and, in some cases, as sufficient proof of the latter, i. e. that the existence of Soul is the exclusive adequate explanation of that experience.  So, insofar as Proprioception is constituted as an empirical cognition, i. e. as a cognition of physiological processes, it, at minimum, provides an alternative, explanation of the 'ghost in the machine', and, at maximum, disproves dualistic doctrines that are based on the stronger interpretation of the significance of that image.  Given that Proprioception, verified by contemporary Neuro-Psychology, continues to go generally unrecognized by Philosophical systems, both challenges to Dualism remain unmet.

Physics and Metaphysics

Kant seems to conceive 'physical' as synonymous with 'material'.  If so, then Attraction and Repulsion are 'physical' forces.  Now, as has been previously argued here, the perception of matter presupposes the exercise of a repulsive force by the perceiver.  Thus, insofar as his foundations of natural science entail perceptual activity, how they are 'metaphysical' is problematic, at best.

Proprioception, Ghost in the Machine, Natural Science

Kant's apparent inattention to Proprioception might reflect his agreement with the thesis, common to his era, that its object, sometimes characterized as 'the ghost in the machine', is non-empirical, and, hence, is not the object of a cognition that can be classified as 'perceptual'.  Regardless, contemporary neuro-psychology, by ascertaining the presence of a cerebral 'homunculus' image, reinforces the thesis that Proprioception is an actual empirical cognitive faculty.  If so, then Kant's 'foundation' of the Natural Sciences is physical, not metaphysical.  For, as has been previously discussed, in his system, mechanical forces are derived from dynamical ones, the cognition of which presupposes the awareness, in the observer, of repulsive forces, i. e. presupposes Proprioception.

Proprioception and Dynamics

For Kant, an object of 'outer' perception occupies "another region of space from that in which I find myself" (1st Critique, B 38).  So, since the objects of 'inner' perception occupy moments in time, his theory of Perception does not accommodate the object that occupies the region of space in which one finds oneself--one's lived body--the awareness of which can be termed 'Proprioception'.  Hence, he cannot consider that the object of Proprioception constitutes a Volume, and not a mere Capacity, as do the objects of outer perception.  Furthermore, the body's Motility, e. g. pushing one's foot against the ground as the initiation of taking of step, provides immediate evidence in proprioception of a repulsive force inhering in this Volume, just as inhalation provides immediate evidence of an inhering attractive force.  In contrast, the presence of these Dynamic forces in outer objects is only inferred., e. g. a repulsive force is inferred from resistance to pressure, an attractive force from the spatial delimitations of some matter. On the other hand, proprioception  grounds such outer perception.  So, Proprioception is an awareness of "observed movements . . . in the spectator" (B xxii, note a), and the ground of Dynamics, as well as of the rest of the system of Physics that is derived from Dynamics.

Perception and Repulsion

According to Kant, proof of the presence of a repulsive force in a space occupied by apparently immobile matter is resistance to penetration by an external force.  However, he does not further consider that such an external force is itself a repulsive one.  Hence, he does not entertain that insofar as any sense datum is experienced as filling a space, any act of perception is constituted by a subjective repulsive force encountering an objective one.  Nor is that thesis considered by most other Epistemological theories, which generally treat sensory processes as passively undergone, even Causal theories of perception.

Radial Motion

The prototypical motion of modern Physics is that of an object under the influence of Gravity.  Since that motion is conceived as rectilinear, modern Physics inverts Aristotelianism, by positing rectilinear motion as fundamental, and circular, i. e. curvilinear, motion as derivative.  However, what Repulsion and Attraction, e. g. expansion and contraction, cause primarily are not linear changes, but variations in volume.  Thus, those effects might be classified neither as rectilinear nor as curvilinear, but as 'radial motion'.  Now, since Gravity is a universal attractive force, the linearity of an object falling towards the Earth is an abstraction from the general radial influence of the latter.  Likewise, insofar as linear mechanical motion is caused by a repulsive force, e. g. impact, it, too, is a species of radial motion.  Thus, the presupposed fundamental motion of modern Physics is radial, not linear, i. e. neither recti-, nor curvi-.

Intensive Magnitude and Depth Perception

Kant's thesis that matter fills its space is grounded in the principle, that governs the "anticipations of perception", i. e. that an "object of sensation has intensive magnitude, that is, a degree".  Now, though he never explicitly uses the phrase, implicit in his examples is that the type of consciousness governed by this principle is often termed 'depth perception'.  But, if so, then he has not responded to Berkeley's challenge that 'depth' is merely an intellectual construct, without sensory correlate.  In other words, a deduction of the very possibility of depth perception seems to be lacking in his exposition, without which his study of Dynamics, and of any Physics that presupposes it, is ungrounded.  Now, one such deduction begins by recognizing that depth is perceivable only via the penetration of some matter, by a perceiver.  But, such penetration is a repulsive force in the perceiver, externally directed.  So, depth perception, on this deduction, presupposes that the perceiver is, itself, constituted by a dynamic force, i. e. by Repulsion, a presupposition that is not easily ascribable to Kant's system, but without which, his Anticipations of Perception, and his Dynamics, seem problematic.

Intensive Magnitude and Moment of Gravity

At B210 of the 1st Critique, and then again at B211, the expression "moment of gravity" is included in Kant's explanation of his concept of Intensive Magnitude.  He uses it to refer to a cause that occurs in an instant, within which the cause can be conceived as always being diminished to a lesser degree, the range of which is 'intensive magnitude'.  However, whatever 'gravity' connotes in the expression, it is, at minimum, unhelpful in this context.  For, in its meaning that is most closely associated with causality, 'gravity' is a constant, and, therefore, is inconceivable as an intensive magnitude.

Intensive Magnitude and Magnitude of Intensity

Kant's concept of 'Intensive Magnitude' connotes 'degree of fulfillment'.  Hence, it is a concept that is appropriate to 'matter filling a space'.  Now, as has been previously discussed, Capacity, but not Volume, entails a separation of contour from content.  Hence, Intensive Magnitude is applicable to Capacity, but not to Volume.  Furthermore, 'intensity' usually entails 'pressure', directed either inwardly or outwardly.  But, in either case, pressure is independent of Capacity--inwardly, it is the product of the interplay of Attraction and Repulsion within a quantum of space, while outwardly, it is exerted on an external body, and, hence, exceeds its given quantum of space.  Thus, a concept that can be characterized as 'Magnitude of Intensity' applies to a Volume of forces, i. e. to a Force Field, and, so, is not to be confused with Kant's concept.

Repulsion, Attraction, Intensive Magnitude

As previously discussed, Kant vacillates between characterizing Repulsion as 'filling a space', and as 'extending infinitely'.  Now, his characterizations of Attraction are also inconsistent--on the one hand it 'empties space', while on the other, it 'reduces matter to a point', which is still an occupation of space.  The two discrepancies reflect a significant shortcoming in his effort to derive those dynamic forces from the concept of Intensive Magnitude.  At the source of that shortcoming is an attempted application of a pure Concept to a non-sensible manifold--e. g. to the interior constitution of matter--which violates his own principle governing the application of any such Concept to Experience.

Volume, Capacity, Density

Since the limit of the extensity of a body can be internally pre-inscribed in its matter, the previously proposed criterion for distinguishing 'Volume' from 'Capacity'--source of delimitation as internal vs. external--is inadequate, though it still follows that any externally imposed circumscription is a capacity.  So, an alternative characterization of that contrast is that Capacity, but not Volume, connotes a heterogeneity of contour and content, such that content is conceivable as variable with respect to contour.  Thus, the standard definition of 'density', which conceives the 'mass' of a body as variable with respect to a cubic unit, entails Capacity, properly, not Volume.  In contrast, 'density', as conceived as how 'tightly packed' the parts of a body are, i. e. conceived in terms of its internal relation of Repulsion to Attraction, maintains the actual integrity of Volume.  Now, clearly illustrating the distinction between Volume and Capacity is the contrast between solids, on the one hand, and liquids and gases, on the other, respectively.  Hence, the standard definition of 'density' is more appropriate to liquids and gases than to solids.

Volume and Capacity

There are two main ways that a repulsive force can be counteracted--by an attractive force acting on the same matter that is being repelled, or, by an external, e. g.  compressive force.  Hence, the quantum of space in which some matter exists can be either internally constituted, or, externally imposed.  Thus, the Kantian pure space, as given a priori to any matter that fills it a posteriori, is externally imposed on that matter.  Accordingly, a volume of matter can be determined either intrinsically or extrinsically.  So, to distinguish the former from the latter, 'Volume' can be contrasted with 'Capacity', respectively.  Now, the standard concept of spatial 'dimensionality' entails elements of pure space--points, lines, and angles, primarily.  Thus, the cubic meter, as representing three-'dimensionality', is a construction of pure space.  Hence, the cubic meter represents, more properly, Capacity, rather than Volume.

Space, Quantum, Repulsion

As has been previously argued here, the fundamental quantum of Space is Volume, rather than Point, as is prevalently held, or even Whitehead's Region.  However, it does not follow that Space is essentially quantized, as Kant shows, perhaps unwittingly.  For, in one place he asserts that "matter fills its space by the repulsive forces of all its parts" (Metaphysical Foundations of the Natural Sciences, ch. 2, prop. 2), while he elsewhere observes that "if no other moving force counteracted this repulsive one, would be held within no limits of extension, i. e. would disperse itself to infinity" (MFNS, ch. 2, prop. 5, proof).  In other words, Repulsion, when not counteracted, exceeds any quantum, entailing a more fundamental Spatiality--a process of indefinite extending, the sole 'dimension' of which is, therefore, 'outside of'.  Thus, it is only as a product of the counteracting of Repulsion that Space first becomes quantized.

Space and Volume

As has been previously discussed, while Kant characterizes the interplay of the two fundamental forces, Attraction and Repulsion, e. g. a particle, as 'filling' a space, here that characterization is, alternatively, 'creating' a space.  So, there is no disagreement that the fundamental quantum of space is Volume, a fundamentality that is reflected neither in geometries in which a 'point' is the basic quantum, nor in anti-Atomistic ones, such as Whitehead's, in which a 'region', i. e. a surface, is basic.  Furthermore, the standard concept of spatial 'dimensionality' is constructed in terms of lines and angles, which are derived ultimately derived from points, in both those types of geometry.  Hence, Volume can be distinguished from the measure of Volume, the standard of which is a cubic unit, i. e. is derived from lines, and, thus, from points.

Dynamics, Mechanics, Locomotion

While Mechanics studies Locomotion, i. e. movement between locations, Dynamics studies, primarily, localized motion, i. e. Repulsion and Attraction, at a single location.  Hence, insofar as Locomotion is independent of localized Repulsion and Attraction, Mechanics is independent of Dynamics.  However, the simplest human locomotion originates with a step, and a step begins as a pushing against a surface, i. e. as a localized repulsive force, and likewise for other modes of locomotion.  In other words, motion between locations is a special case of extending from a location.  Thus, Locomotion is a a mode of Repulsion, and, so, presents no exception to the classification of Mechanics as a branch of Dynamics.

Dynamics, Mechanics, Experience

According to Dynamics, Nature is constituted by Force Fields, of varying densities.  In contrast, according to Mechanics, Nature is constituted by discrete solid bodies, separated by nothingness.  Now, this distinction between Dynamics and Mechanics is not merely of interest to theoretical Physics--it is implicated in everyday experience, as well.  For, ordinary activity is often conceived mechanistically, e. g. as the motion of a solid body, from point A, through empty space, to point B.  However, Dynamics instructs about what is easily forgotten in that concept until, e. g. the wind picks up, or breathing at a high altitude becomes labored--that the human body is surrounded by, not nothingness, but at least one Force Field, that happens to be of lesser density than the body, and which the body penetrates en route to point B.  In this way, Dynamics presents a reminder of what is commonly abstracted from in everyday experience, without resorting to the potential mystification of Bergsonian 'Metaphysics', or of Heideggerian 'Fundamental Ontology'.

Density, Dynamics, Mechanics

As Kant shows, the dynamic forces Repulsion and Attraction combine as bodies of infinite possible degrees of density, ranging from absolutely solid, to absolutely empty.  In contrast, the bodies that populate fields of mechanical causality are all absolutely solid, separated by absolutely empty spaces.  Furthermore, Newton's 2nd Law of Motion, holds only for absolutely solid bodies, for, e. g., when impacted upon, a body of lesser density might get smashed and remain where it is, thereby violating the Force-Acceleration correspondence entailed by that Law.  Thus, Mechanics is derived from Dynamics, as a special case of the latter, a relation that is implicit, but remains underdeveloped, in Kant's classifications of the natural sciences.

Force Field, Unified Field Theory, Human Sciences

Entailed in some ambitions of a 'Unified Field Theory' is the reduction of the 'human sciences' to the 'physical sciences', e. g. of the study of 'conscious' activity to that of electrochemical events.  Now, while the success of the most prominent version of such a project remains debatable, previously presented here has been an alternative version, in which the concept of Force Field has been shown to be derived from Physics, and to be applicable to Biology, Psychology, and Morality.  What distinguishes this attempt from the standard effort is its fundamental principles--Repulsion and Attraction, the fruitfulness of which is entailed in Kant's classification of them, though he does not pursue the elaboration that has been developed here.  In that classification, whereas the ground of the standard model of Physics is mechanical external causality, Repulsion and Attraction are dynamic internal forces.  Thus, the concept of Force Field, i. e. of the interplay of Repulsion and Attraction, can be applied to an activity without reducing it to a dehumanized mechanical event.

Force Field and Morality

As has been previously discussed here, a species can be conceived as a Force Field.  So, insofar as Morality, as is typically the case, serves as a corrective to social dissolution or antagonisms, i. e. to repulsive social forces, it functions as an attractive force in such a field.  On the other hand, insofar as it serves as a corrective to conformism or totalitarianism, as it does for Existentialists, it functions as a repulsive force.  Thus, in general, Morality can itself be conceived as a Force Field, i. e. as an interplay of Attraction and Repulsion, in which the human species seeks a balance between homogeneous and heterogeneous tendencies.

Force Field and Psychology

Psychology is the study of behavior, which is primarily constituted by the interplay of sensory functions and motor functions, i. e. the interplay of the intake of information and physiological output.  In other words, it is constituted by an interplay of afferential and efferential processes.  But afferential processes and efferential processes are types of Attraction and Repulsion, respectively, and, as has been previously discussed, the interplay of Attraction and Repulsion constitutes a Force Field.  Thus, Psychology is the study of a kind of Force Field.

Force Field and Species

The applicability, as has been previously discussed here, of the concept of Force Field to Biology, i. e. to an individual organism, opens the possibility of its applicability to pluralities of organisms, i. e. to a species, as well.  For example, the species instinct that is often attributed to the patterned motions of insects and birds can be classified as an 'attractive' force, and, therefore, as an indication of the presence of a Force Field.  Likewise, any 'survival' instinct of a species that governs the behavior of its members is an attractive force in a Force Field.  Thus, the interplay of a 'war of all against all' and a Leviathan exemplifies the Repulsion-Attraction constitution of a Force Field, as do post-Hobbesian models of the human species in which the repulsive component happens to be less emphatic.  Also, that the interplay involved in such concepts is between a 'natural' repulsive force and an 'artifactual' attractive force, is no argument against their constituting a Force Field--any effort to construct political institutions can be just as instinctive as is individual anti-sociality.  In other words, a tendency to socialize is as much an attractive force in a species as is the actualized sociality that is usually ascribed to insects.

Force Field and Organism

Since, as Kant briefly suggests, 'body' is a type of space-filling force, then, it, too, constitutes a Force Field.  Furthermore, an organism is a type of body.  So, for example, the annual addition and retention of a tree ring can be conceived as an interplay of Repulsion and Attraction, and, hence, as constituting a Force Field.  In other words, growth is a combination of repulsion and attraction, i. e. an extending in which cohesion with the antecedent condition is preserved.  Thus, the concept of Force Field is applicable beyond, as usual, Physics and Chemistry, to Biology, as well.

Gravity and Repulsion

When an object falls to the Earth, it will often smash, leaving an imprint on the ground.  On the other hand, when two liquids are placed in the same location, e. g. a beaker, they will sometimes combine to form a different liquid.  The contrast demonstrates that a gravitational field is only relatively attractive, and involves relative impenetrability.  In other words, a gravitational field involves repulsive forces.  Hence, the widely-held thesis that 'Gravity involves no Repulsion, and only Attraction' is inaccurate, at best.  Accordingly, any denial of the universality of Repulsion, on the basis of the absence of repulsive forces in a gravitational field, is ungrounded.

Unified Field Theory and Heterogeneity

Attraction and Repulsion can combine in an infinite variety of ways, i. e. resulting in a range from predominantly contractive, to predominantly expansive, interactions.  Thus, since any combination of the two constitutes a Force Field, there are an infinite variety of  Force Fields possible.  Furthermore, since different combinations produce differently constituted Fields, any two differently constituted Fields are mutually heterogeneous.  Thus, for example, a Force Field and one that it is part of are mutually heterogeneous, which is why the internal integrity of the former, e. g. a particle, can remain unaffected by its external interactions in the latter.  Now, three such mutually heterogeneous types of Force Field are nuclear, electromagnetic, and gravitational fields.  Thus, the efforts of contemporary Physics to formulate a 'Unified Field Theory', by homogenizing fields that they erroneously call 'forces'--Strong and Weak Interaction, Electromagnetism, and Gravity--are misguided, beginning with the assumption that a 'unified field theory' precludes the possibility of heterogeneous fields.

Force, Big Bang, Black Hole

Kant suggests that in the absence of a counter-force, Repulsion would effect infinite expansion, and that Attraction would effect contraction to a point. What seems erroneous in the latter is that since matter is infinitely divisible, the contraction that Attraction would effect would, likewise, be infinite.  Furthermore, what he misses in both possibilities is that each would occur instantaneously, since any time-lapse would imply the presence of a counteractive force.  So, a 'big bang' and a 'black hole' are not so much actual events but imaginative approximations of the two theoretical extremes, i. e. of Repulsion and Attraction, respective, taken in isolation.

Force Field and Unified Field Theory

As has been previously developed here, on the basis of Kant's premises--Attraction and Repulsion are the two fundamental, complementary forces, any combination of which constitutes a 'Field', a special case of which is a 'particle'.  Together, these propositions comprise the basis of what could be called a 'Unified Field Theory'.  Of course, though, that rubric is better known as referring to four so-called 'forces'--Gravity, Strong Interaction, Weak Interaction, and Electromagnetism--most of which involve, arguably, attraction, while some of which involve, arguably, repulsion, with various particles as their independent substrata.  So, the standard version of the theory is plainly more incoherent that the proposed alternative, beginning with a confusion of 'force' and 'field', i. e. if it is granted that Attraction and Repulsion are fundamental 'forces', then Gravity, etc. are distinguished as 'fields', not as 'forces'.  Furthermore, the alternative already surpasses the standard by accounting for the existence of Matter, without recourse to conceptual gimmickry such as 'anti-matter' or 'dark matter'.  Thus, given that it is generally acknowledged that the standard theory remains stalled in achieving its ambition, perhaps a more systematic approach, such as the one proposed here, might be an improvement.

Force Field, Space, Contour

A Force Field is constituted by an interplay of Repulsion and Attraction--the former opens it up, while the latter delimits the opening.  That interplay thus defines, a posteriori, the 'space' of a Force Field, independently of any a priori division of 'Space', qua form of outer appearances, as Kant's theory has it.  That independence is clear from his own example of a 'body' as a space-filling force, for, plainly a body 'fills a space' only by virtue of being a Force Field the contour of which is a product of its internal interplay of Repulsion and Attraction.

Repulsion and Space

According to Kant, in the Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science, "matter fills its space by the repulsive forces of all its parts."  That matter "fills its space" follows from his doctrine that infinitely divisible Space is given a priori to any such phenomenon.  However, Repulsion effects a process of separation, and a process of separation opens up a gap between what it separates.  Hence, Repulsion fills a presumed a priori given space by creating a space a posteriori.  Thus, Kant's concept of Repulsion seems to present a formidable challenge to his theory of Space.

Force Field

Kant, in the Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science, defines Force, i. e. Attraction or Repulsion, as fundamentally occupying a single space.  Though, since his primary focus in the work is motion in multiple spaces, his examination of chemical penetration, as an example of a space-filling force, amounts to a minor digression.  However, substitute 'space' with 'field', and the broader implications of the seemingly minor notion become more apparent--it plainly pioneers the concept of Force Field that has subsequently become significant in the representation of not only chemical events, but of gravitational and electromagnetic ones. as well.  Furthermore, another example of a space-filling force that he briefly discusses is 'body'.  So, since an organism is a special type of body, Force Field is also a structure with potential application to Biology.

Matter, Force, Particle

In the Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science, Kant first defines 'matter' as that which is "movable in space".  Furthermore, it is "movable insofar as it fills a space".  Now, it fills a space by virtue of a "special moving force", namely, Repulsion.  More precisely, it "fills its space by the repulsive forces of all its parts."  However, by virtue of Repulsion alone, matter would "disperse itself to infinity".  Hence, it fills a determinate space only by virtue of Repulsion in coordination with a counter-force, namely, Attraction.  So, likewise, any determinate part of matter, i. e. any particle, is the product of a combination of Repulsion and Attraction.  If so, then it follows that particulate matter is not the substratum of motion, which, in the absence of any other concept of matter, contradicts the initial premise, a contradiction which the thesis of the infinite divisibility of matter does not circumvent.

Chemistry, Physics, Cause, Force

Kant's analysis of chemical penetration appears in the context of his study of 'Dynamics', in the Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science, suggesting that he conceives it as a special case of Attraction, one of the two fundamental 'Forces' that he studies in the chapter.  In contrast, 'Causality' is not introduced until the subsequent chapter, on 'Mechanics', thereby suggesting both that Force is more fundamental than Causality, and that the lack, in the work, of a Causal classification for Chemical events, reflects that priority, rather than expresses a neglect of, or a befuddlement over, such classification.  Likewise, what is widely interpreted as a supplanting, by Newtonian Physics, of Aristotelian Teleological Causality by Efficient Causality, is, more accurately, a replacement of the concept of Cause with that of Force, a replacement generalizable to all Sciences, including Chemistry.

Chemical Penetration, Causality, Intussusception

In the Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science, Kant distinguishes between 'mechanical' and 'chemical' penetration, observing that the former "does not act by its own force", thereby implying that the latter does.  However, since he proceeds to develop a theory of Causality for mechanical events only, he leaves undetermined the status of chemical penetration in that regard.  Perhaps he anticipates that Newton's Third Law of Motion, which he grounds in the concept of reciprocal causality, cannot account for chemical penetration.  For, perhaps he recognizes that reciprocal causality entails distance between its factors, whereas chemical penetration consists in 'intussusception", as he terms it, i. e. in no distance between its factors.  So, in segregating Chemistry from what is generally known as 'Physics', he leaves it without a concept of Causality.

Chemistry, Physics, Locomotion

'Chemistry', as a condition of simultaneity obtaining between several components, would seem to be distinct from 'Physics', the components of which, i. e. Cause and Effect, are successive.  However, some Chemic events, e. g. the melting of ice by the application of hear, involve causal successiveness, while Kant's Category of Community, from which he derives Newton's Third Law of Motion, entails the simultaneity of causal relations, so the fundamental distinction between Chemistry and Physics is not a temporal one.  Rather, among their modern versions, at least, the difference is a spatial one--while the primary theme of Newtonian Physics is Locomotion, Chemic events are not essentially constituted by such change of location, i. e. even insofar as they involve microscopic motions, distance is not a germane factor in them.  So, on the basis of that spatial feature, the two Sciences are mutually independent.