Contemplation and Legislation

Typically in American academia, Philosophy and Political Science Departments are separated, one consequence of which is that Ethics and Political Philosophy are pedagogically severed.  Accordingly, the final passages of the Nichomachean Ethics, in which Aristotle transitions from one study to the other, is in intellectual limbo.  Thus typically unrecognized is that he overrides his apparent conclusion of his earlier work--that the Highest Good is Contemplation--with the acknowledgement that humans also need external Goods, which requires community.  The Politics thus begins by continuing the inquiry into the Highest Good by asserting that it can be achieved only by the best political organization.  Furthermore, he cites Legislation as the means to that end.  But Legislation is the same process by which private standards are effected, as has been previously discussed.  Thus, the superiority of Legislation over Contemplation as a process engaged in by Mind is also established in the transition, a feature of Aristotelianism that easily falls through the cracks in academia, as does the reason why someone who seems to advocate an apolitical Individualism is also one who asserts that "man is by nature a political animal".

Mind, Form, Standard

Aristotle's study of Mind does not reveal the Form of this Form of Forms.  Rather, It attempts to establish standards for it, i. e. to prescribe its proper functioning.  For example, his Definition of Definition presents criteria for the formation of the latter, or the Law of the Excluded Middle legislates for patterns of argument.  But, most important, the Ethical status of Contemplation in human conduct is contingent upon the process of setting it as Normative, i. e. the selecting and applying to Conduct a concept of Diety as paradigmatic.  Hence, Contemplation, as a Good, is inferior to that process, which, as the ultimate determing factor in establishing the Highest Good for humans, must itself be that standard for the Form of Forms.

Mind and Form

In On the Soul, III, 8, Aristotle characterizes Mind as "the form of forms", likening it to the hand as "the tool of tools".  So, in this clear reflection on Mind, the Form of Mind is revealed to be the Form of Forms.  But, then, contrary to what he claims in Metaphysics XII, 9, in the Self-Contemplation of Mind, Subject and Object are not identical. For, the Object is the Form of Forms, and the Subject is the Form of the Form-of-Forms.  The distinction is not trivially linguistic; rather, it is typical of a suppression that inheres in most concepts of Reflection--presenting them as 'identical' abstracts from not only all the particular Forms that originate from Mind, but the Matter of each as well.  Similarly, presenting the hand as the 'tool of tools' abstracts from the Matter on which each tool works.  Thus, the thesis that is at the heart of his system--that thought-thinking-itself is Immaterial, is the product of analysis, and not existentially true.

Contemplation and Deity

Aristotle's concept of Active Mind, as generating the particulars of a class, seems a likely reference to Deductive Reasoning, and, perhaps, to the pre-Christianized Logos, the deity of some Philosophers.  Now, the motion of such a Mind is inexorable and flawless, and thus neither requires not includes an occasion to pause for second thoughts.  Thus, it includes no occasion for the process of Reflection that humans engage in, perhaps to deliberate before acting, perhaps to learn from past mistakes.  In other words, in the absence of an adequate derivation, Aristotle's self-contemplating deity seems more a product of anthropomorphization than a description of divine nature.

Techne and Contemplation

The Ethical superiority, in Aristotle's system, of Contemplation over Techne, is derived from the Theological superiority of divine Contemplation over divine Active Mind.  However, the latter relation is problematic.  For, he presents Active Mind as superior to Passive Mind, and as entailing the essential complementarity of Form and Matter, likening it to an Art that produces a multiplicity of particulars, perhaps an allusion to Deductive Reasoning.  In contrast, Contemplation is reflective and Immaterial.  Thus, because Contemplation is passive, it is inferior to Active Mind, and its Immateriality violates the thesis of Form-Matter complementarity.  Unfortunately, he does not seem to address this apparent problem, so if there is a resolution that would meet his approval, it is unclear what it might be.  One direction is to conceive Contemplation as an active, rather than a passive, doubling, in which case, what transpires is not a thought of an already present thought, but, inversely, a reproduction.  In any case, in the absence of a more coherent account of the two mental processes, Techne is Ethically superior to Contemplation.

Geocentrism, Hierarchy, Formal Causality

The classification Geocentrism abstracts from the more important characteristic of Aristotle's system, one inherited by the Medieval Theology that absorbs the system, eventually debunked by Heliocentrism.  That characteristic is its hierarchical order, in which Up-Down is Superior-Inferior.  Accordingly, its supreme being must exist at the outer limits of the system, which, as its circumference, necessitates from Aristotle a deification of circular motion.  Furthermore, Up-Down means Lighter-Heavier, and, since Heaviness is caused by Matter, the supreme being is Immaterial.  But, then, it can only be pure Form, thereby severing the presumed complementarity of Form and Matter.  Thus separated from Matter, this deity has no efficacy with respect to it, in which case it cannot be a Formal Cause.  As a result, the Causality of this pure Form, according to Aristotle, is Final, with the longer term consequence that Formal Causality disappears from Philosophical consideration until at least Kant.

Geocentrism, Heliocentrism, Decentrism

Heliocentrism replaces Geocentrism in one respect--as a theory of the astrophysical relation between the Earth and the Sun.  But, it does not replace the implicit Anthropocentrism, nor the entailed Theology, of the earlier theory, thereby leaving Humanity adrift, and displacing Deity completely.  Furthermore, Geocentrism is a Cosmological theory, in which the Earth is the center of the Universe, whereas in Heliocentrism, the Sun is the center of merely one segment of the Universe.  Hence, Heliocentrism is equivalent to Decentrism, i. e. since there is now no privileged point in the Universe.  Accordingly, there have been two main responses to this Decentrism.  One, a more radical Geocentrism--Egocentrism, e. g. the Cartesian Cogito, and the immediate Sense-Experience of Empiricism and Phenomenalism, which often includes a relocating of Deity, sometimes via a 'proof'.  The other, the deification of Decentrism--Spinoza's Pantheism, in which his God is everywhere, and Humanity is in some of its places.  This contrast is obscured by standard Rationalism vs. Empiricism classifications.

Geocentism, Geoaxiality, Geotemporality

Perhaps Aristotle's most significant error is not Geocentrism per se, and, hence, not something that Heliocentrism per se rectifies.  Rather, it is the thesis that the Earth is immobile, and, hence, that it does not spin on its axis at a specific angle in relation to the Sun.  Consequently, he is wrong about fundamental Geotemporality, i. e. diurnal and seasonal periodicity, and, hence, about the biological implications of the latter.  The former periodicity is independent of both Geocentrism and Heliocentrism, since the spin determines the alteration of day and night regardless of which of the Sun and the Earth is orbiting the other.  However, Heliocentrism is a factor in seasonal variation, which is determined by the tilt of the Earth's axis with respect to its orbit around the Sun.

Circular Motion and Gravitation

Geocentrism has not been completely falsified in recent centuries--it still applies to the Earth and its one Moon.  Of course, the underlying causes of the juxtaposition are quite different. For, according to Aristotle, the heavier-lighter contrast between the two bodies does not causally determine the spatial distinction entailed, i. e. the orbiting of the Moon, like that of other celestial bodies, is internally driven, reflecting its semi-divine Cosmological status.  In contrast, according to Modern Astrophysics, that orbiting is explained by the laws of Gravitation and Centripetal Force.  It is thus due in at least part to his ignorance of the latter two that Aristotle attributes Divinity to circular motion.

Circle, Mean, Center

While the mathematical image of Aristotle's concept of Contemplative Virtue is the Circle, the Mean is that of his concept of Practical Virtue.  Now, the two seem heterogeneous, from which, therefore, no relation between them is immediately inferrable.  However, a Mean is a mid-point, and a Circle has a mid-point--its Center.  Thus expressed is a common underlying principle that can be called Centricity. Furthermore, not only is his priority of Theory over Practice not obviously derivable from the principle, that the Centricity of the Mean is explicitly given, while that of a Circle is only implied, suggests that the inverse is inherently the case, whether or not he recognizes it.

Contemplation and Techne

Aristotle's concept of divinity, Thought-Thinking-Itself, has had less of an impact on the Theological tradition that has appropriated Aristotelianism, than has the Cosmology of which it is the apex.  Instead, it's primary influence on subsequent generations has been to reinforce Contemplation as the Highest Ethical Good, and, accordingly, the superiority of Theory over Practice. Thus eclipsed has been the perhaps most important feature of his concept of Practical Virtue--that it consists in not a To What End?, but a How?  Consequently, generally unrecognized has been that the source of his answer to that question--conduct determined by a Mean--is Techne.

Circle, Teleology, Evolution

For Aristotle, circular motion is a characteristic of divinity because it is complete, i. e. "perfect", and in a Teleological system, completion is the highest attainment.  But, as surely the author of Prior Analytics is aware, not all Circles are so exalted, e. g. that of the fallacious reasoning of Question-Begging.  Regardless, as Bergson observes, in an Evolutionary system, the repetition of a completion can be the expression of "torpor", i. e. arrested development.  In contrast, the image of Evolutionary divinity might be the ever-widening spiral, which combines completion, advance, and increase in complexity.  Thus, just as Evolutionism refutes the Aristotelian thesis that species are fixed, it overrides the supremacy of the Circle.

Unmoved Mover and Self-Moved Mover

In Aristotle's antiquated system, the Sun is the moving mover of Water, Earth, Air, and Fire, itself moved by an Unmoved Mover.  Now, he recognizes a plurality of Unmoved Movers, with the Prime Unmoved Mover being Thought-Thinking-Itself.  But, the characterization 'Unmoved' is misleading--the Prime Mover is the Active Intellect, and, hence, is in motion.  In other words, 'Self-Moved' is more accurate than 'Unmoved'.  That correction thus opens up to potential problems that have otherwise been ignored.  First, since, as the supreme being, its motion must be perfect, it can only be circular, according to Aristotle's exposition of Motion.  But, circular motion can be either clockwise or counterclockwise, and, hence, by his own formulation of Perfection = having no contrary, the motion of this supreme being is imperfect.  Now, in On the Heavens, he does address the problem of contrary rotation, but too briefly for an adequate defense of his claim that either circular direction is perfect.  Second, as has been previously discussed, he does not consider that a Circle presupposes a Center, which leaves open the possibility that any of his rotating Movers, including the Prime one, is indeed moved by something else, i. e. a Center.

Archephysics and the Sun

As has been previously discussed, in On the Heavens, Aristotle introduces his Arche-element, leaving it nameless, though some believe that he has in mind Aether, while others have dubbed it Quintessence.  But, in On Generation and Corruption, though he does not explicitly state it, it seems very likely that the entity in question is the Sun.  If so, one problem that has arisen gets easily resolved.  That is, as has been previously discussed, his attribution of circular motion to the element leaves unaddressed the Center that a Circle presupposes.  But, of course, what he takes to be a body in orbit has since been proven to be a Center.  So, if his Arche-element is indeed the Sun, he has a more compelling, even if not definitive, Archephysics.  At minimum, there is strong textual evidence that Aether is not his 'fifth' element, and, therefore, that 'quintessence' accurately characterizes it.

Water and Circular Motion

Part of Aristotle's Archephysicist argument against Thales is that his nameless Arche-element is more fundamental than Water, since circular motion is more fundamental than rectilinear motion, and that the motion of his element is circular, while the natural motion of the Water--which he claims is falling--is rectilinear.  However, he does not consider that Water also radiates from a source, which is therefore the Center of a Circle, and, hence, is prior to the latter.  Nor, therefore, does he recognize the potential relevance of the fact that the body that is at the Center of his Cosmos is 70% covered with Water.  Now, there are more, concrete, reasons for challenging Thales' thesis, e. g. that it seems difficult to derive Fire from Water, upon which Aristotle's does not seem to improve.  Instead, his imagery draws attention to the unaddressed possibility of a 'center' of his circular Thought-Thinking-Itself.

Archephysics and Aether

Aristotle's continuation of the pre-Socratic Archephysics tradition appears in On The Heavens, where he proposes his candidate for fundamental element. He leaves it unnamed, but some have called it 'Aether', while others have called it 'Quintessence', each of which is partly misleading. The former does evoke a somewhat similar concept of that name in the Timaeus, but not much to do with the controversial 'Aether' of Modern Physics.  The latter does accurately numerically connote that the element is an addition to the traditional Water, Earth, Fire, and Wind, but for Aristotle, it is the first among them, not the fifth. In any case, most important, and open to interpretation, is the status of the element in his system.  For, his characterization of it as in circular motion corresponds to what he attributes to one of the cardinal features of his system--Thought-Thinking-Itself.  At minimum, the correspondence indicates that a cardinal feature of the system is not supernatural, which is why 'Archephysical' is less ambiguous than the standard 'Metaphysical'.

Archephysics, Water, Gracefulness

Aristotle's study of First Principles has more in common with what might be called the 'Archephysics' of the pre-Socratics, starting with Thales, than with the 'Metaphysics'--a term that he himself does not use--of the Dualists who appropriate his doctrine for Theological purposes.  Now, 2500 years later, Thales' thesis that the fundamental stratum of existence is Water might seem quaint, and certainly seems inadequate to explain the existence of Fire.  Still, that the earliest phase of human life occurs in amniotic fluid, and that the human body is 60% water, indicate that his proposition is not entirely without merit.  It also suggests that the wide appreciation of fluidity of motion, i. e. gracefulness, has a deeper organic origin than what is connoted by the common classification of it as an 'Aesthetic' pleasure, i. e. enjoyed by the external senses.

Skill and Swimming

As advocating Transience over Permanence, Bergson is often conceived as a successor to Heraclitus, in conflict with the Parmenidean tradition.  Less well-recognized is the partly more ancient antecedents of a different theme: Fluidity vs Discreteness.  The prototype of the former is Thales' Water, and that of the latter is Democritus' Atoms.  For, the representation of the former by the latter exhibits some of the main distortions of Duration as Space.  However, while Water is overt, and Atoms a substratum, for Bergson, it is fluid Duration that is the substratum, with the overt stratum of ordinary Experience constituted by discontinuity.  Now, the reason for this inversion is that he conceives exoteric experience, i. e. the engagement with the environment, as essentially entailing the process of division--selecting from the environment the raw materials for survival.  Thus precluded is the possibility of recognizing fundamentally fluid exoteric experience, the prototype of which is swimming.  Hence, he cannot recognize that fluid motion, i. e. skilled performance, is esoteric to only the unskilled.  Ultimately, it is perhaps because the ancient element with which he associates the human body is Earth, rather than Water--which constitutes 60% of it--that he conceives fluid experience as esoteric.

Skill and Duration

A main aim of Time and Free Will is to reveal Duration as the substratum of all inner Experience, usually hidden in fragmentary practical pursuits.  In preparation, Bergson early on cites the grace of an externally observed dancer as exemplifying the fluidity and continuity that characterize Duration.  However, in doing so, it does not seem to occur to him that the dancer, and, indeed, any skilled performer, is internally enjoying Duration as they externally produce corporeal fluidity and continuity.  The skilled performer thus does not need to read Bergson's revelation, since they are already familiar with it, not as a hidden substratum, but as the overt stratum of the internal aspect of the performance, i. e. internal fluidity and continuity as they produce externally graceful motions.  Hence, his presumed revelation of a pervasive truth is actually a generalization of an abstraction--from a practical corporeal experience to an observational incorporeal one.  Furthermore, the generalization is inadequate, since he shows only that Consciousness is Durational when deliberately sought, not that it is in-itself ever-present, i. e. his evidence only confirms the thesis that observed Duration is a reflection of the continuity of a specific physiological act of observation.  Thus, the Experience that he privileges in his system may actually be that of the inner awareness enjoyed by the skilled performer.

Skill and Metaphysics

In Bergson's system, the fundamental contrast, if not antithesis, is between dynamic, indivisible, fluidity, and static, divisible, solidity.  Exemplifications of that contrast that he offers include Duration-Space, Spirit-Matter, and Metaphysics-Physics.  But, also exemplifying it are Water-Earth, and skilled activity-unskilled activity.  Now, as has been previously discussed, Skill transcends Newtonian Determinism, so the alignment of such a process with 'Metaphysics' is not inappropriate.  However, Water is Material, so Bergson's association of indivisible fluidity with Spirit, a concept long associated with immateriality, reflects an hostility to corporeality.  So, while his privileging of the first set of characteristics inverts the orientation of a long tradition, he compromises his otherwise Naturalistic innovation with some unnecessary mystification, if not prejudice.

Morality, Intention, Skill

Perhaps the fundamental challenge to Kant is that his acceptance of Newtonian Physics entails an acceptance of Newtonian Determinism, which seems to preclude the possibility of Morality.  His solution is a Morality of Intention, according to which the bearer of Value is the Why? of behavior, which can be determined independently of the What?, an event that is part of a mechanical Causal sequence.  But, one weakness of this solution is that by severing the Intention from the Action, it leaves them unrelated, with Intention reduced to mere Wish, thereby trivializing Morality.  In contrast, an alternative solution to the challenge is a Morality of How?, which evaluates an Action on the basis of how skillfully it is performed, thereby avoiding Kant's flaw, i. e. it maintains a connection between an Action and the locus of its Value.  And, just as the source of a suitable Intention is, in Kant's system, Pure Practical Reason, Skill is an expression of Technical Reason.

Intention, The Road to Hell, Techne

One popular counter to "It's the thought that counts" is "The road to hell is paved with good intentions", i. e. Consequentialism.  Now, the two positions agree that an Action can be preceded by a 'Good' Intention, and followed by a 'Bad' Consequence, but disagree as to which is the important bearer of Value.  They also thus both accept the concept of Intention and Consequence as inherently unrelated, and, in particular, accept the concept of Intention as a mere object of observing Consciousness.  But, an Intention is no mere wish; it proposes, guides, and coordinates a course of Action.  Thus, a discrepancy between Intention and Consequence is a failure of Techne, or what Spinoza calls Inadequate Causality, i. e. a not knowing how to accomplish an aim.  Thus, the bearer of Value is the entire process, not either its initial or final moment.

"It's The Thought That Counts"

Eluding easy reduction to either Free Will or Determinism is the experience alluded to in the popular phrase "It's the thought that counts".  For, on the one hand, attributing value to "the thought" in the phrase, as well as in the Morality of Intention, and in the Theological thesis that it is the object of the judgment of a deity who is privy to such an inner datum, indicates that it is freely adopted.  On the other hand, since Will is a type of Cause, and hence has an Effect, while the attribution abstracts from any Effect, indicates that the thought is not a Will.  So, the occurrence of a value-bearing Intention can be classified as a type of Indeterminism.  Now, insofar as he holds that a Maxim of an Action, regardless of what actually occurs, is the bearer of Value, Kant seems to be such an Indeterminist.  However, he also holds that a Good Maxim serves Will in constraining Inclination, by preventing e. g. suicide, false promising, etc., i. e. has an Effect, he is a Self-Determinist.  So, perhaps Consequentialists are correct, and in Kant's doctrine, it is not the thought that counts.

Independent Will, Techne, and Goodness

If a child who is trying to prepare a meal on their own burns the food, they are considered to be still dependent on an adult to accomplish that task.  Similarly, if, in order to resolve a dispute, someone shoots someone else, they might have the skill to use the weapon on their own, but not the know-how to adequate resolve the dispute on their own.  In other words, Evil behavior lacks Independence and Techne, contrary to the analysis of a long tradition.  Thus, in particular, if Kant segregates Technical Reason from Pure Practical Reason and Autonomous Will, on the grounds that the latter are inherently Good, while the former is not, it is at least because, at minimum, his concept of Techne is underdeveloped, and further, possibly continues the hostility to it that originates in the standard interpretation of Genesis 3.

Autonomous Will, Independent Will, Reason

According to Kant's version of the Independent-Dependent contrast, Autonomous vs. Heteronomous, an Autonomous Will is Pure Practical Reason.  Now, when he first introduces the latter, in the Groundwork, there is no reference to Technical Reason.  But when he later does eventually address its status, he classifies it as a "Theoretical" faculty, even though it functions as directly guiding physiological motions.  So, since that classification occurs after he has made room in his system for a traditional deity, he is vulnerable to the suspicion that his concept of Autonomous Will is designed to conform to the traditional Theological concept of a divine-sourced Free Will, rather than to observable Independent Will, which, as has been previously discussed, typically involves Techne.

Free Will, Determinism, Independent Will, Techne

Because knowing how to do something can replace relying on others to achieve a goal, Techne is at least a sufficient condition of an Independent Will.  In contrast, in the Determinist concept of behavior, e. g. Behaviorism, there is no explanation for the Causality involved in a response to a stimulus that is facilitated by Techne, i. e. the directing and coordinating of multiple physiological motions by an attentive mind.  Furthermore, because, according to Genesis 3, Techne is acquired by humans in an act of disobedience to a deity, it is not to be confused with the Free Will that the latter endows them with.  So, the concept of Independent Will accommodates Techne, which neither side of the traditional Free Wil vs. Determinism debate does or can.

Independent Will and Free Will

The concept of Independent Will that has been discussed here is distinct in two important respects from one of the prominent traditional versions of Free Will--the one conceived as a divine endowment in humans.  Accordingly, that latter power is inherently Free, and functions primarily in the determination of the afterworldly destination of the Soul of its possessor.  In contrast, an Independent Will can also be a Dependent one--in some cases it can achieve its aim through its own power, while in others, outside assistance is required.  Furthermore, it is not only children who are in a condition of dependency--in fact, most activities, aside from those of a hermit, are collectively interdependent.  In other words, an Indepedent Will is potentially social, whereas the traditional Theological Free Will is a vehicle for Salvation from a curse on the entire species, and, so, is essentially anti-social.  Thus, the concept of Independent Will is an example of a concept of Volition that is beyond the Theological premises that continue to influence presumably 'secular' human experience.

Independent Will, Biology, Education

Relations of dependency and independency are concrete and easily observable in both humans and other organisms, especially in among children and adults.  So, there are grounds for conceiving Independent Will as a fundamentally Biological phenomenon, and the Dependent-Independent dichotomy as rooted in the immaturity-maturity, rather than in any of the Physicist or Theological terms that are typical of the traditional Determinism-Free Will debate.  Furthermore, that dichotomy is not absolutely heterogeneous; rather, the transition from immaturity to maturity can be effected by a process of Education, and, in particular, by the acquisition a skill that can replace a dependency.  Thus, Independent Will calls for an educational process very different from those appropriate to the usual terms of the traditional Determinism vs. Free Will debate, e. g. if Newtonian Determinism is correct, then Education is a process of behaviorist conditioning, and if there is either divine Predestination or a divine source of Free Will, then Education is a process of preparation for an afterworld.

Independent Will and Techne

Substituting 'independent' for its accepted synonym 'free',  Free Will becomes Independent Will.  Accordingly, the antithesis of Free Will becomes Dependent Will.  Now, the contrast of Independent Will and Dependent Will can be recognized in that of Spinoza's Adequate Cause and Inadequate Cause, or, in plainer language, in not requiring assistance vs. requiring assistance.  So, for example, in order to achieve the goal of eating, a child requires the preparation of a meal by an adult.  In contrast, at a certain age, the child learns to prepare their own meals.  Thus, an Independent Will involves Techne, and further Techne can replace other dependency, e. g. on an adult to purchase food to be prepared.

Independence, Dependence, Determinism

Though 'freedom', 'liberty', and 'independence' are often used interchangeably, the latter is significantly different from the first two.  For, while what the first two negate is an involuntary condition, that is not the case with 'dependence', which is beneficial in some respect, e. g. a child that depends on a parent for food, shelter, etc.  Accordingly, 'independence' connotes a replacement, not an escape, e. g. being able to support oneself.  Similarly, the American Declaration of Independence signals replacing British rule with self-rule, which is eventually actualized via the Constitution.  So, in cases in which 'Determinism' signifies a relation of Dependence, the antithesis is not Free Will but Self-Determinism.

Freedom, Choice, Finitude

While having a choice is usually taken as an indication of Freedom, it also entails constraint--not being able to achieve both options.  Accordingly, an infinite being can be conceived as acting in all directions at once, e. g. the Emanation of Plotinus, and, perhaps, of Spinoza.  Unlike Leibniz' deity, Emanation does not have to choose between possible worlds, i. e. for it, they are all actual, with each equivalent to the perspective of a Leibnizian Monad.  On the other hand, that there appears to be only a single actual world could be taken as proof of the non-existence of an infinite deity.  In any case, having a choice means having to choose, so, thus constrained, is only relatively less unfree than behavior that is compelled from without.