Thursday, December 31, 2009

Aristotle, Kant, and Logic

Aristotle's treatment of 'Logic', in his case, 'Syllogistic', appears in a work called Organon. In contrast, Kant explicitly characterizes his concept of Logic as a 'canon'--while an 'organon' describes the basic patterns of knowledge-presenting procedures, a 'canon' distinguishes between proper and improper patterns of those processes. Hence, Kantian Logic is part of his more general Critique of Pure Reason. But, contrary to the common use of the term 'critique', an expression of denigration, for him it refers to a process of distinguishing proper from improper. Or, in other words, the activity of Critique is nothing but a process of Definition, and what Kant's Critical project ultimately aims at is an answer to the question 'What is Man?' The answer that he arrives at includes the thesis that Human Pure Reason is properly Practical, which facilitates a definition of Humans as autonomous beings. Now, as has been previously discussed, Human Autonomy is an Evolvement beyond mere Particularity. Hence, Kantian Logic is an Evolvement from Aristotelian Logic.

Wednesday, December 30, 2009

Aristotle and Number Theory

The standard gloss, 'Ancient Philosophy' tends to obscure that, in some respects, the definitive criticism of Platonism comes from Plato's most famous student himself, Aristotle. For sure, some aspects of Aristotelianism are Platonistic, especially its honoring of Contemplation as the highest state, and, more generally, the priority it accords Theory over Practice. But, Aristotle's contention that Unity is a Predicate cuts right to the heart of Platonistic Mathematics, by challenging the premise that Mathematical entities subsist in an eternal realm beyond the physical, i. e. it implies that e. g. ' a triangle' is a reification of 'is triangular'. Furthermore, since Mathematical entities are the archetypes of all Platonic Forms, the debunking applies to them as well--they are all reified Predicates. Hence, according to Aristotle, the entire realm of Platonic Forms is fictititous. But, this is no Nominalistic rejection of Platonism. For, Aristotle's own concept of One, "to be the first measure of a kind . . . the starting-point of number qua number", anticipates the Constructionism of Kant, or the Intuitionism of Brouwer, more than the Nominalistic Cardinalism of Russell. It also anticipates the Formaterial concept of One--that it is both an end and a beginning--that is the basis of the Evolvemental concept of Individual, more than it does the exclusively terminal concept of One implied by Aristotle's own Teleology.

Tuesday, December 29, 2009

Modern Math Logic and Kantianism

Platonism holds that Numbers are self-subsistent entities that inhabit the realm of Forms. Its historically primary opponent, Nominalism, denies the existence of any such realm, and, instead, treats Numbers as abstractions from empirical experience. In contrast with both, for Kant, possibly echoing Spinoza's notion of Definition, Numbers are rules of construction. The extent to which modern Mathematical Logic, originated by Frege, is a reaction to Kant, can be gleaned from the fact that its most eminent expression, Principia Mathematica, is a collaboration of a Platonist, Whitehead, and a Nominalist, Russell. Likewise, contemporary Analytic Logic, inspired by these attempts to reduce an active process such as counting to intellectual abstraction, is generally oblivious to some of its Philosophical pre-suppositions, e. g. the priority of Theory over Practice, that are common to Platonism and Nominalism. As such, they remain under-Evolved doctrines.

Monday, December 28, 2009

Math Logic and Political Philosophy

Any notion of 'Individuality' entails some concept of 'One'. For example, its prevalent connotations, Self-Sufficiency, Independence, etc. imply Cardinal Oneness, namely, self-subsistence and an absolute separation from other Numbers. In contrast, Ordinal Oneness, i. e. Firstness, entails a continuation beyond 'One', and, hence, is intrinsically other-directed. Hence, Individuality that entails Firstness entails the intrinsic Self-Insufficiency and Interdependence of paticular persons. And, just as, as has been previously argued, Cardinality abstracts from Ordinality, the prevalent American notion of Individuality, e. g. 'the Rugged Individual', is a partial, because under-Evolved, type of Individual, and the society that presents that notion as paradigmatic of membership in it, is an under-Evolved version of Democracy. More generally, Mathematical Logic and Political Philosophy are Systematically related, contrary to what is implied by the usual arrangement of Academic departments.

Wednesday, December 23, 2009

Platonism and Oneness

Plato seems on occasion to regard the Form of the Good as the most important Form. Even if so, the essential Form is, plainly, the Form of Oneness, since the essence of Form is Unity. Further, since the Forms are self-subsistent entities, so too is The One. Thus, for Platonism, since the One is also a Cardinal Number, all Cardinal Numbers are self-subsistent entities, and Mathematics is a purely analytical science. But, in Formaterialism, the One is a derivative notion, an abstraction from both the Formal Principle, Many-becoming-One, and the Material Principle, One-becoming-Many. Counting entails both, so, likewise, do the Ordinal Numbers. For one neo-Platonist, Plotinus, The One is explicitly the master Form, and, furthermore, is the source of an Emanation that generates all Reality. In Formaterial terms, Emanation is, hence, actually a Material Principle, and if other Platonists had considered the Mathematical implications of Plotinus' Theory of The One, Platonism might have arrived, at minimum, at the position that Ordinal Numbers are not inessential derivatives of the Cardinals.

Tuesday, December 22, 2009

Cardinal and Ordinal Numbers

Since the meaning of a number like '2', and the truth of an expression like '2+2=4', seem completely independent of personal or empirical experience, Mathematics has long been considered to exist in an abstract realm. Accordingly, any debate over the Ontological status of Mathematical entities has concerned just whether that abstract realm is the infrastructure of reality itself, as per, e. g., Pythagoras, or is in the Intellect, as per, e. g., Russell. In either case counting and measuring are considered applied modes of Mathematics, and, likewise, Ordinal Numbers are construed as derived from Cardinals. But, 2+2=4 is easily refuted by 2 apples + 2 oranges=? In other words, presumably 'pure' Mathematical formulas implicitly quantify homogenous items, e. g. '2+2=4' is actually '(x)(2x+2x=4x)'. So, Numbers cannot escape being quantities, which means that they originate in Counting. Likewise, Ordinal Numbers are original, and Cardinals derivative, which is reinforced by the consideration that the latter lack an ordering principle, i. e. a principle that places e. g. the distinct entity 1 before, not after, the distinct entity 2. In other words, Counting is not '1, 2, 3, . . .' but 'first, second, third, . . .,' from which the former are abstracted. Russell's mistake is to believe that his 'Successor Function' generates the Cardinals, whereas it is the Ordinals that are successive. That the Successor Function is recursive, i. e. is applied, in turn, to each new successor that is generated, shows that Counting is cumulative, and, hence, is an Evolvemental process. Or, to put it more familiarly, Counting involves the introduction of a new item, and its subsequent integration into the given group, which is the Evolvemental process of Diversification without loss of Unity.

Monday, December 21, 2009

Theories

In some contemporary circles, 'Logic' is the 'Theory of Theories'. For example, 'Mathematical Logic' organizes Mathematics structurally in a manner reminiscent of Euclid's systematizing of Geometry. The structure involved is nowadays formally characterized as a 'Theory'. A 'Theory', in general, is any set of statements pertaining to some associated phenomena. Typically, those statements are either Axioms or Theorems, Axioms being statements that are self-evidentally True, and Theorems being statements that are derived from Axioms by an inference rule or rules. The two criteria for the evaluation of a Theory is Consistency and Completeness. Consistency is presumably guaranteed by strict adherence to inferential procedure, i. e. any properly derived Theorem cannot contradict any other statement in the Theory. Completeness can also be guaranteed if a Theory concerns a finite range of phenomena, such as in Mathematics, when 'Infinity' is treated as a Cardinal Number. Usually, though, the range is indefinite, and ever-increasing, so there is no guarantee that the description of some previously undiscovered phenomenon will not emerge as inconsistent with the established statements of a Theory. Such an inconsistency, at minimum, challenge the Theory, and if it is compelling enough, can force the formulation of a new Theory. So, while Completeness for at least empirical Theories cannot be guaranteed, a Theory can be more or less Comprehensive, and evaluated on the basis of explanatory power, e. g. Einsteinian Physics explains better high-velocity phenomena than does Newtonian. In Formaterial terms, Comprehensiveness is Complexity, so Theories can be evaluated as more or less Evolved.

Sunday, December 20, 2009

The Honesty Policy

There is less than meets the eye to the popular Principle 'Honesty is the best policy', for 'honesty' means merely 'honorable conduct', which is hardly illuminating in the context. What it more obviously means is 'truthfulness', but the latter is still ambiguous. For some, 'being truthful' means to 'forthrightly express one's feelings'. But this entails the expression of hate and bigotry, which, undeniably, have been honored in American society in recent decades, and, so, may qualify as a 'best policy' only if one's aim is to breed antagonism. Given that many of today's hate-mongers seem taken aback when not welcomed in societal spheres outside their own, breeding antagonism cannot be their aim. The most common use of the Principle, rather, is in the context of Self-Interested activities, in which profitable lying is an option, to advise that Truthfulness is always the best means to gain. Given the ample empirical evidence to the contrary, the basis of that advice is unclear, and its advocates are often reduced to invoking some vague formula of Cosmological Justice to validate it, e. g. 'Karma', 'The Invisible Hand of the Market', etc. That the profitability of Truthfulness is not self-evident is an indication that Truth exceeds the sphere of personal interests. A policy of Truthfulness, in a broader sense, would advise the pursuit of Truth itself, i. e. would be a Principle of continual learning. In other words, to be Truthful is to Evolve, a sense in which Honesty is indeed the best Policy.

Saturday, December 19, 2009

The Marketplace of Ideas

Even though it is considered to be an ancient notion, the phrase 'marketplace of ideas' was actually coined in 1967, as part of a U. S. Supreme Court decision. The venerablility of the phrase attaches to its connotation, the 'free exchange of ideas', which is plainly Evolvemental both for Individuals and for society as a whole. However, in the context of contemporary American Economics, the phrase easily takes on a malign connotation, as well. For, the American 'marketplace' is an arena in which products have a monetary value, which implies that a 'good' idea is one that sells, and the 'best' idea is the one that is the most expensive to purchase. Perhaps nothing demonstrates the equivocality of 'marketplace' than that in current American debates such as Health Care and Climate Change, Scientific Truth is having to negotiate with Corporate Profitability. In Evolvementalism, as well as other doctrines, a more comprehensive idea has more Value than a less comprehensive one, even if the latter fetches a higher price than it does.

Friday, December 18, 2009

Zero-Sum

In Game Theory, a 'zero-sum' Game is an activity in which total gains and total losses are equal, whereas a 'non-zero-sum' Game is one in which they are unequal. As Smith conceives it, Capitalism is a non-zero-sum Game, because it entails the possibility of each participant profiting. In contrast, Marx's critique of Capitalism begins with the premise that profit is not spontaneously generated, but is derived from someplace, which he traces to the difference between wages paid to labor, and the added value to a product that is the precise equivalent of the labor-energy expended on its refinement and manufacture. Hence, for Marx, Economics is a zero-sum Game. Ironically, the Physics theories underpinning the two systems are just the opposite--the Newtonian Physics in the background of Capitalism, with its Principle that the total energy of a System is constant, is zero-sum, while Marxian Dialectics is a Principle of emergent growth. In any case, the ongoing contemporary conflict between Capitalism and Marxism rarely seems to be expressed in terms of zero- vs. non-zero-sum debate. Empirical evidence as to which of the latter is a more accurate characterization of Economic activity is, at best, inconclusive. Capitalist Economies stagnate, while Socialist ones grow. While the American Economy of the 1990s was plainly growing, it is difficult to distinguish between real growth, due to Digital innovation, and 'growth' merely on paper, i. e. profits from loan interest. In Evolvementalism, both maintainance at a constant level and expansion are degrees of Evolvement, hence, both zero-sum and non-zero-sum, respectively, phases are possible. More significantly, perhaps in contrast to both Capitalism and Marxism, Evolvementalism does not regard Economics as autonomous sphere, rather, it regards Economic activity as no more than a quantification of certain aspects of collective activity in general. Hence, whether or not Economics is or is not zero-sum, is a expression of the more general Evolvemental condition of a society.

Thursday, December 17, 2009

Cartesian Evolvement

Because his 'I think, therefore I am' notion initiated a trend in which concrete thinking, and no longer an abstract Universal such as God or a Platonic Form, is the measure of Philosophizing, Descartes is often considered the 'Father of Modern Philosophy'. Given that traceable to that Principle are the more general modern trends of Secularism, Humanism, and Subjectivism, he could also be considered the 'Father of Modern Civilization', which would not be honorific coming from those who regard those trends as decadent. But any characterization, even Heidegger's, of Descartes as 'Subjectivistic' is hasty if it ignores his other profound contribution to modern civilization--the 'Cartesian Plane'. This Descartes initially intended to illustrate the Arithmetization of Geometry, which went on to facilitate the quantification of Physics that is the basis of all modern Science, and which is, more commonly, the forerunner of every graph. Not only would admirers and critics alike be hard-pressed to classify this innovation of his as 'Subjectivistic', this aspect of Cartesiansim suggests an alternative interpretation of his theory of Selfhood. The fact that the significance to him of the 'I think' is its indubitability shows that its importance lies not in its Subjectivism, but in its Objectivity, i. e. no matter how hard he tries, and regardless of what he wishes, he cannot doubt the existence of 'I think'. Regardless of what trends followed Descartes, the result of his analysis is more accurately a self-Objectivization, which in Evolvementalism, is the beginning of Individuality.

Wednesday, December 16, 2009

Prisoner's Dilemma

'Game Theory' studies decision strategy in determining an optimal course of action in situations involving multiple participants and multiple variable factors. The best-known Game Theory model is the 'Prisoner's Dilemma'. The scenario of the basic version of the model is--two associates are arrested on suspicion of having committed a crime, placed in separate cells, and each is told that: if only one of them is ratted out by the other, the sentence will be 10 years imprisonment; if both are ratted out, then they will each receive 5 years; and, if both remain silent, then they will both go free. What most interests Game Theory analysts is that acting on the basis of Self-Interest will likely result in 5-year sentence for each, because each will choose the optimal course of action in their power, namely to rat out the other. In other words, the Principle of Self-Interest is self-defeating in the context, because it cannot accommodate the one option, namely proceeding on the basis of mutual trust, that would in fact yield the optimal Self-Interested outcome. Or, as Evolvementalism puts it, collective interest is an enhancement, not an exclusion, of Individual Interest. And, more generally, Game Theory demonstrates how Wisdom is a function of breadth of perspective.

Tuesday, December 15, 2009

Education Reform

For Aristotle, the purpose of Education is to cultivate good citizenship. If such a notion seems anachronistic today, it may only be because the de facto character of being a 'good American' is not usually made explicitly honest. A telling familiar expression on the topic is 'a productive member of society', which is a clue that 'good citizenship' is defined in Economic terms, which, in turn, sheds light on the real role of Education in this society. For most, Education is a means to a career, and, for most of those who are slow to learn that, the first educational-loan repayment installment is usually an effective remedial lesson. What the U. S. Education System, both lower and higher, impresses on a student, without having to make it explicit, and, therefore, that much more effectively so, is the ethos of Economic 'Individualism', namely the Principle of Economic Self-Interest. Now, as has been previously discussed, such 'Individualism' does not express the literal meaning of the term, 'undivided', but expresses what would be more accurately characterized as 'Reactive Particularism', namely, a definition of what something is strictly in terms of a sort that it is not, e. g. being 'not part of the crowd'. And, as has been previously discussed, Reactive Particularity is an under-Evolved form of true Individuality, an adolescent version of an adult. It is the latter, becoming an Individual, and an Evolving Individual, that is the purpose of Evolvemental Education. But insofar as Education is a function of the prevailing ethos of 'good citizenship', Education reform is futile without a reform of the latter. In other words, until U. S. society Evolves by e. g. making voting mandatory, thereby reforming the ethos of Economic Self-Interest, Education, regardless of what is substantively taught in a classroom, will remain an investment in a career.

Monday, December 14, 2009

Rousseau and Nietzsche

There is an underappreciated parallel in the developments of Rousseau and Nietzsche. For both, an ecstatic Festival experience was the foundation of a theory of human nature. In the earlier phase of their subsequent careers, both produced a devastating and influential indictment of prevailing decadence. And, both eventually offered a constructive alternative. One difference that emerges in the latter phase is that Rousseau's Principle, the Social Contract, is Egalitarian, while Nietzsche's, the Will to Power, is not. But, on the one hand, Rousseau's Egalitarianism is derived from his formative ecstatic experience. On the other, while Nietzsche's is generally thought to be likewise, i. e. that Will to Power is a manifestation of Dionysus, the genealogy does not support such an interpretation. For, according to Nietzsche himself, the Dionysian Festival is an eradication of all Particularity, which amounts to an egalitarianism amongst the revellers. Hence, the Inegalitariansim of his Will to Power derives from a subsequent Principle, probably the Apollinian. In a Phronetocracy, there is no intrinsic contradiction between its Egalitarianism, and the possibility of a distinction between leaders and followers. But, as is the case in the formation of the views of both Rousseau and Nietzsche, Egalitarianism is primary.

Sunday, December 13, 2009

Conditional Propositions

Two main premises of Analytical Logic are, first, that every well-formed Proposition is either True or False, and not both; and, second that the Truth-Value , i. e. True or False, of a compound Proposition is a function of the Truth-Values of its constituent Propositions. One continued irritant to Analytical Logicians is the problem of the Valuation of Conditional Propositions, i. e. 'If A, then B'. For, for example, 'If John resides in Boston, then John resides in Massachusetts' is True according to Analytical Logic, and to the layman seems to involve cogent reasoning. But that Truth does not depend on the Truth-Value of its constituent Propositions, i. e. the reasoning still seems cogent even if John is in fact a resident of Worcester MA, in which case 'John resides in Boston' is False, and 'John resides in Massachusetts' is True; or even if John actually resides in Hartford CT, making both the antecedent and the consequent False. The effort to resolve this problem has become a cottage industry in Analytic Philosophy, and the general aversion to jettisoning those two main premises of the Logic excludes the suggestion that in Conditional Propositions, the constituents are neither True nor False. For, as Husserl might put it, the 'If' suspends the Actuality of the Proposition, meaning that it suspends any question of correspondance between the suspended Propositions and the actual world. Now, within the suspension, 'True' could denote a coherence between the Propositions, e. g. Boston is in Massachusetts, but the coherence notion of 'Truth' is at odds with the correspondance notion of 'Truth' that determines whether e. g. 'John resides in Boston' is True. But, even if Analytical Logic were to rely on a hybrid notion of Truth, internal coherence does not restore Truth-Value to each of the suspended constituent Propositions. Evolvemental Logic regards the problem as irresolvable, because it regards Conditional Propositions as fundamentally practical, in which case they do not refer to Actuality, and, so, not merely do they have no Truth-Value, in the correspondance sense of the term, but the very question of Truth, in this sense, is inapplicable them. Analytic Logic's appropriation of Conditionality suppresses, but does eliminate, this inapplicability.

Saturday, December 12, 2009

Political Representation and Proportionality

The Phronetocratic unit is a Polity of maximum Complexity, i. e. a leadership of a maximum number of followers. When a Polity becomes too numerically diverse for effective unification, Representation must be implemented. While what that maximum might be is circumstantial, a necessary condition of a sustainable Representative Phronetocracy is proportionality. A Representative Democracy must preserve the Principle of One Citizen-One Vote, which it can only accomplish by uniform proportionality of Representation, i. e. via sub-Polities of equal population, and of equal power within a Polity, which is nothing more than their unifier. Now, measuring the proportionality of U. S. Representativity is difficult, because it is so labyrinthine--a typical citizen is part of a municipality, a district, a county, a state, and the nation, entities that are often incommensurate with each other. But one glaring disproportionality in the system, one that is occasionally a target of criticism, is the equality of the number of U. S. Senators in a state, regardless of how populous the state might be. Hence, a citizen of a less populous state has a greater voice in the U. S. Senate than does a resident of one that is more densely populated. And, since how many Electoral College votes a state has is a function of how many U. S. Senators it has, a Presidential vote of the former likewise carries greater weight than that of the latter. Hence, the U. S. would Evolve by eliminating the Electoral College, and by at least considering that the Principle of 'States' Rights' may no longer be as effective a protector of Individual Rights as it was originally intended.

Friday, December 11, 2009

The Economy

A main topic of popular discussion these days is 'The Economy', usually specifically regarding its 'bad' shape. This kind of talk suggests that first, there is a unitary phenomenon corresponding to the term 'The Economy', and second, that the judgement of 'badness' is the product of a methodical evaluative procedure based on unequivocal criteria. But what this 'The Economy' is is not made in the least bit clear by these discussions of it. It is said to have its 'leading indicators', such as Unemployment rates, the Dow Jones Average, the National Deficit, Interest Rates, the Exchange Value of the Dollar, the Rate of Inflation, Sales of Homes, etc., each of which have their own evaluative criteria, but what unifies them is unclear. Some Economists seem to have mathematical formulae that homogenize all these data, but, again, if these equations are more than quantificational abstractions, they would have some unambiguous referent. In Formaterialism, every entity, every event, is a System, and the soundness of a System is measured by its degree of Evolvement, i. e. its rate of growth, with a minimum degree being mere maintainance. So, according to Formaterialism, the lack of any definitive phenomenon answering to the term 'The Economy' means that no such System actually exists, which might go a long way to explaining why 'it' seems to be in such 'bad' shape. That while 'The Economy' is said to have been 'growing' in the 90s, a significant portion of the American citizenry was not benefitting from the trend, only underscores its fictitiousness.

Thursday, December 10, 2009

Atomism and Adamism

Though 'atom' and 'Adam' are only coincidentally homophonic, Analytic Philosophy, and its Logic, is both Atomistic and, in a sense, 'Adamistic'. Its Atomism is rooted in Aristotelian Metaphysics which has, as the ultimate constituents of Reality, individual Substances. It is 'Adamistic', because, as was the case with Adam in Genesis, Language begins with the naming of individual creatures. Language is henceforth constructed out of such Atoms--the names of individual items combining with the names of predicates, to form Propositions, and Propositions combining with other Propositions to produce a 'World'. Both Atomism and Adamism have been widely criticized for a variety of reasons, and some specific problems with its central combinatory process, Inference, have previously been addressed here. Many have argued against its Metaphysical premises, maintaining instead that, e. g. Events are more fundamental than static Substances, or, as in Evolvementalism, that Individual Humans are cumulative processes, entailing nothing constant to which a fixed name corresponds. Others have argued against the Epistemological premise that cognition of an item occurs in isolation, e. g. Gestaltism, which shows how the perception of an item always entails a background of at least other items in its proximity. Likewise, some Philosophies of Language have noted that the objects of childhood naming are not things but situations. And others, e. g. Structuralism, insist that names, and particular words in general, are empty sounds or scrawls without reference to every other word in a language. Especially because it presents its versions of 'Philosophy' and 'Logic' as exclusive, the predominant school of Academic Philosophy, Analytic Philosophy, is that much more impoverished.

Wednesday, December 9, 2009

Economics and Ecology

Typical discourse concerning current events would seem to suggest that 'Economics' and 'Ecology' are two spheres of human activity that intrinsically are potentially in conflict with each other. For example, 'Ecological' concerns, such as air pollution, are often presented as contrary to 'Economic' issues, such as profits and employment. If there is an intrinsic conflict, its nature is not apparent from the two terms themselves, which are as etymologically similar as they seem--'household management' vs. 'the study of households'. A better clue as to their differences might come from the association of 'Ecology' with the 'Environment'. But, the natural resources that are industrially extracted and refined are just as much a part of the 'Environment' as are the waste products of those processes. In fact, one meaning of the term 'waste' suggests at least an intersection of Economic and Ecological concerns, namely the squandering of natural resources. However, the other main property of waste, consequential toxicity, does seem to be at the heart of the conflict. But, the use rubric 'Economic' in these debates obscures the real conflict by glossing over its almost exlusive reference to the private sector alone. In other words, the Economics vs. Ecology conflict is primarily one of private sector profits vs. public health concerns, regarding the consequences of toxic waste produced by the processes of the former. Furthermore, the indifference to the Environmental effects of for-profit enterprises is also rooted in Spiritualist doctrines that conceive Humanity as ultimately immune to the physical world into which they are 'incarnated'. Evolvementalism rejects such Spiritualisms, and deems the private sector indifference to the public sector as under-Evolved. For it, rather, Economics and Ecology are no more in conflict than are inhalation and exhalation.

Tuesday, December 8, 2009

Derrida and Rousseau

The best-known features of Rousseau's Political Philosophy are the idea that society is a corruption of the 'state of Nature', and his promotion of Government based on a 'social contract'. Given that the former seems to imply an advocacy of Anarchism, the two are easily taken as contradictory. However, the first is representative of the earlier, deconstructive, phase of his thinking, while the latter, his later, constructive, offerings. Thus, conspicuously absent from Derrida's own deconstructive study of Rousseau, which successfully targets the Atomistic premises of the latter's phonological Naturalism, is its relevance to Rousseau's later phase, and, hence, more generally, is any constructive dimension of his own efforts. So, contrary to Derrida's reputation as being in the vanguard of contemporary thinkers, he is actually a reactionary, albeit an unorthodox one. For, among the central Philosophical developments of the past half-millenium is Kant's redefinition of Humanity as 'Homo Faber', from 'Homo Sapiens', i. e.representing the asendancy of Practice over Theory. And, while Pragmatists, Marx, and the later Nietzsche were drawing out the implications of this Kantian turn, Phenomenologists, both Hegelian and Husserlian, as well as those trying to escape the shadow of the latter, notably the later Heidegger, the earlier Sartre, Levinas, and Derrida, fall short of making that turn. In contrast with Derrida, his peer Philosopher of Difference, Deleuze, understands that original Difference is a Principle of 'Becoming-Active'. Hence, unlike in Evolvementalism, with its active Principles of Difference, i. e. Becoming-Diverse, and its Individual mode, Expostion, Derrida's 'Differance' does not seem to make much of a constructive difference.

Monday, December 7, 2009

The Logic of Greater and Lesser

Whether or not it is the essence of Philosophy, Logic is at least extremely important to it. For, the Wisdom, of whatever sort, that Philosophy seeks, is presumed to apply most generally, and, hence, is expressible as a Principle, i. e. in 'Universal' terms, e. g. "All Reality is such-and-such", "All Humans must do such-and-such", etc. And, the evaluating of Principles centers on their applicability to Particular cases, e. g. "All men are Romans" fails as a Principle, since Socrates is Greek. So, since the heart of Logic has generally been the Universal-Particular relation, or vice versa, Philosophy seems unthinkable without it. Therefore, the adequacy of Logic has depended on the presumption that its scope is finitistic, namely, is between closed totalities and irreducible atoms, a presumption to which Science no longer subscribes. Furthermore, the Universal-Particular relation is not even itself most fundamental. Rather, it is a special case of the Greater-Lesser relation, which is the essence of all relations of inclusion, that is, the essence of all Logical relations. Evolvemental Logic--the characterization of the movement between lesser and greater Complexity--is based on this perhaps more modest, but more essential scope, and, so, presumes to be more adequate to 'Reality' than traditional Logics. Likewise, by its own Logic, it does not presume itself to be the final word on the topic.

Sunday, December 6, 2009

Patriotism

Patriotism is widely, perhaps universally, recognized as a civic Virtue. However, the term has three different meanings, only one of which has Phronetic worth. The first, which could be called 'Populist', refers to an intersection, if not union, of interests of the inhabitants of the same geographical region. The second, 'Totalitarian' refers to the priority, in principle, of the interest of the regional collective, as a unit, over that of any participant. And, in the third, 'Martial', the benefit of the regional collective entails the detriment of some other regional collective. In the latter, a citizen is treated as a Particular, i. e. as a member of the home polity, and as not a member of some foreign one. In Totalitarian Patriotism, personal difference is completely suppressed. So, it is only in the Populist variety that participants are treated as Individuals, such that Patriotism is an enhancement of each's Individuality. Hence, it is only in this case that Patriotic activity is an occasion of Individual Evolvement. Of course, what is probably the commonest use of 'Patriotism', namely, as empty rhetoric, insults the intelligence of an Individual, and, has no Phronetic worth.

Saturday, December 5, 2009

Political Philosophy and Humpty Dumptyism

Complicating debates in Political Philosophy over the status of the 'state of Nature' is equivocation. In some cases, 'Nature' is synonymous with 'Physical World', and, hence, 'Natural' is contrasted with 'Metaphysical'. In others, it denotes a condition of original Innocence, and, hence, 'Natural' is contrasted with 'Artificial'. In the latter case, 'Artificial' has a derogatory connotation, but, in the former, it can be ameliorative. So, for example, in Kantianism, 'Natural' is of the first type, to which the artifice of Politics is an imperfect corrective. But, in Rousseauism, 'Natural' is of the second type, so the artifice of Politics is corruptive. Common to the two types is the Humpty Dumpty pre-Fall vs. Fallen paradigm, with the state of Nature as Fallen in the first case, and pre-Fallen in the second. In contrast, Theories that do not implicate 'Nature' in Humpty Dumptyism--Aristotelianism, Evolvementalism, possibly Spinozism--have less trouble defending the constructive role of Political activity in Human development. More generally, these considerations further expose the inadequacy ofTheorizing that abstracts the Political sphere from more comprehensive Philosophical, i. e. Systematic, concerns.

Friday, December 4, 2009

Possible Worlds

The notion 'Possible World' came to Philosophical prominence with Leibniz' assertion 'This is the best of all possible worlds', famously ridiculed by Voltaire. For Leibniz, it is a Theological concept, referring to the capacity of God's Intellect to consider alternatives before deciding, on the basis of 'Bestness', which World to create. In contemporary Philosophy, the term is most prominent in a branch of Analytic Logic, Modal Logic, which shares few of Leibniz' concerns. Even though Modal Logic is typically presented as a Theory of 'Possible Worlds', its main objective is to define Analytic Logic's useful operator Necessity, which it ultimately equates to the classic Logical quantificational notion Universality, i. e. 'in all cases'. Possibility is, correspondingly quantificational Particularity, i. e. 'in some cases', whereas a 'World' is simply a set of entities. 'Bestness', unless it is implicitly defined as 'Necessity', is of no concern to this Modal Logic, and, that in the latter, the Actual World also qualifies as a Possible World, even trivializes the very concept of 'Modality'. In Evolvementalism, Actuality is what has become the case, Possibility is an option that could become the case, whereas Necessity applies only to some features within Actuality. In other words, what distinquishes Possibility from mere compresent alternality is its deliberative context, just as it was for Leibniz.

Thursday, December 3, 2009

Political Philosophy and the State of Nature

A crucial element in most Political Philosophies has been the concept of 'Nature'. For Plato and Aristotle, Aristocracy is a fulfillment of Nature. For Hobbes, Nature is a condition of universal belligerence to which Political organization is an arbitrary artificial construct that serves as a corrective. For Rousseau, Nature is a state of original Goodness that had been corrupted by Political artifice. While Kant agrees with Hobbes that Nature is disharmonious, his solution, Rational organization, is an artifice based on Ideality. For Marx, the 'state of Nature' is a piece of fiction, so Political structure is a product of only the Dialectic of Economic History. Hence, the value of artifice in a Political Philosophy is a function of the value that it accords Nature. In Evolvementalism, artifice is no more 'unnatural' than the building of a house, so for it, deliberate Political construction is an artifice that is part of Human Nature, i. e. a 'Natural' extension of it. And, any critique of 'Artificiality' by a Political Philosophy should begin by considering whether or not it itself is artificial.

Wednesday, December 2, 2009

Analytic Logic

The focus of Analytical Logic, the most prevalent type of contemporary Academic Logic, is 'Valid Inference'. An 'Inference' is a transition from one or more assertions to another one, and a 'Valid' Inference is one that is 'Truth-preserving', namely one in which given the Truth of the initial assertions, the subsequent one cannot be False. Unlike in its ancestor, Aristotelian Deductive Logic, the nature of Valid Inference is vague in Analytic Logic. Aristotle's Deductive process reflects, as Dewey has shown, the pattern of connections described by his scientific classficatory technique, which captures the Genus-Species relation in Nature, i. e. a container-contained relation. Hence, Valid Inference for Aristotle is an accurate description, and, accordingly, Invalid Inference imagines a connection that does not obtain in actuality. But with the rise of Modern Science, with its shift in focus from the Genus-Species relation to Cause-and-Effect, on the bases of the innovations of Bacon, and the debunking by Hume, Inductive Logic emerged as best capturing the patterns of Scientific description. Thus, despite the admirable efforts of the likes of Russell, the relevance of Deductive Logic has dwindled over the centuries, to the extent that Analytic Logic often seems little more than a game of symbol-manipulation referring to nothing other than itself. For example, in it, a False assertion followed by a False assertion qualifies as a Valid Inference, which it attempts to justify by reference to 'possible worlds'. Now, the process of adding a True assertion to pre-given True assertion is an Evolvement. But if Analytic Logic is to recognize itself as a special case of Evolvemental Logic, it will have to begin by examining its own premises.

Tuesday, December 1, 2009

Evolvemental Logic

While Logic is regarded by some as the essence of Philosophy, the term has hardly been univocal. It might be defined generally as 'the study of Consequence', namely of the following of something from some given condition or conditions. The primary disagreement in Logic concerns whether it inheres in Existence, or it is an interpretation of Existence. Hybrid positions include the view that Logical Interpretation mirrors Existential Logic, and the thesis that Interpretation is itself Existential, namely, an Objective process incarnating in a Subject. The main types of Logic are Deductive, Inductive, and Dialectical. In Deductive Logic, Particularity follows from Universality; in Inductive Logic, Universality from Particularity; and, in Dialectical Logic, a Universal follows from contradictory Particulars. Standard contemporary Academic 'Logic' courses are a type of Deductive Logic that might be called 'Analytic'. Deductive Logic, at its Aristotelian inception, was Interpretation mirroring Existence. Analytic Logic is Interpretative, but uncertain as to its Existential presuppositions. Inductive Logic is non-Existentially Interpretive. Dialectical Logic, notably Hegelian and Marxist, including Interpretive processes, is Existential. Traditional Existential Logic has been Deterministic, because a Consequence inherently following would seem to preclude Freedom. Now, Evolvemental Logic, entailing the increase in Complexity from given conditions, is pervasively Existential, e. g. both in the general organic sphere, i. e.. the combination of mutation and re-integration, and intra-Individualistically, i. e. the combination of Exposition and Propriation. However, it is not Deterministic, because it entails indefiniteness, in its Becoming-Diverse component, e. g. doubling, tripling, etc. are all possible degrees of quantitative Diversification. It is this Indeterminacy that the Individual experiences as 'freedom of choice'.