Property and Socialism

Ownership is an abstract relation between two inert entities. Hence, even the terms of the collectivization of property are inert, and that fusion is no more than an abstract goal, no matter how derived. Furthermore, as a correction of dehumanizing exploitation it is a mere means to some better condition. Now, the collectivization of property is derived from the concrete dynamic collectivization of the operation of the means of production, according to the Marxist analysis. Furthermore, that collectivization corrects a dimension of dehumanization that even Smith recognizes--social fragmentation. Accordingly, the development of the We, which is essentially Agency, is the essential concrete dynamic feature of Socialism, which, as an improvement of preceding conditions, can therefore be specified as Ethical Socialism. Thus, either Scientific Socialism is essentially an inert abstract scheme, or else it is implicitly Ethical Socialism, to which it is a means.

Socialism, Idealism, We

Marx's personal derivation of Socialism from Hegelianism begins with an external critique of the latter, i. e. a Materialist inversion of the Idealism of the latter. However, a perhaps more direct route between the two begins with an internal critique of Hegel's system. Specifically, while Hegel conceives the terminal point of the Phenomenology of Mind, i. e. Absolute Mind, as an 'I', the overcoming of the Subject-Object opposition that preserves both moments is more accurately conceived as a 'We'. From there, it is easy to argue that 'We' must be a Materialist rather than an Idealist concept, i. e. because it entails a concrete multiplicity, and, furthermore, that it signifies agency. In turn, from 'We act' follows 'We own', i. e. the collectivization of property, the historical occasion of which, according to Marx, is the emergence of the consciousness of the 'we act' of the co-operators of a collective means of production. If Marx misses that derivation, it is perhaps because he fails to recognize that Idealism cannot accommodate Multiplicity, as is explicit in Parmenides' original version of it.

Scientific Socialism and Ethical Socialism

If the consciousness of Class-Conflict motivates a worker to revolt, it is not because they recognize in it a Contradiction. It is because the Conflict, more precisely, consists in the exploitation of workers. Furthermore, if that motivation includes its validation, it is on the basis of the principle that exploitation is unjust. Now, the system that is derived from that principled motivation is sometimes called 'Ethical Socialism', a variety of the same 'Utopian Socialism' that Marx and Engels regard as inferior to Scientific Socialism, i. e. in which Revolution is justified as a response to a moment of Contradiction in a Dialectical Materialist pattern. So, the variety of Socialism that is incipient in Class-Consciousness is not the one that Marx and Engels espouse, even if it is the better-grounded of the two.

Scientific Socialism and Practical Materialism.

Marx and Engels classify their program as 'Scientific Socialism', which they distinguish from 'Utopian Socialism'. By 'Science', they mean 'Dialectical Materialism'. Now, as articulated in the Theses on Feuerbach, the system is also 'Practical Materialism'. Thus required is how a Dialectical pattern governed by Necessity can also entail a voluntary phase. In particular, what is required is an explanation of how the transition from the consciousness of a Contradiction, i. e. of Class-Conflict, is followed by its resolution both necessarily and voluntarily. However, they offer no such account, in the absence of which Scientific Socialism and Practical Materialism remain apparently irreconcilable.

Materialism, Labor, Theory

In the German Ideology, Marx proposes that the foundational Materialist experience is the Labor that produces the means of subsistence, on the grounds that such a process distinguishes humans from other animals. He thereby contrasts himself from both Feuerbach, whose Theoretical Materialist correlate is Contemplation, and Smith, for whom the Propensity to Barter is the specifically human characteristic. However, since many animals clearly exert themselves in the acquisition of food, the formation of shelter, etc., mere Labor does not suffice as a differentiation from them of the human species. Instead, sharper in that respect, is the use of tools in Labor. But, if so, then Theory precedes Practice, as is illustrated in the temporal relation between the rise of modern Physics and the subsequent industrial Technology of his era. So, his Materialism requires a systematic account of the relation between Theory and Practice, and not merely a devaluation of the former in favor of the latter.

Theory, Practice, Contemplation

The main theme of the Theses on Feuerbach is Theory vs. Practice, with Interpretation and Change the species of each, respectively, in #11. Now, as has been previously discussed, Marx's classification of Interpretation as Theory is questionable, since, like Translation, it involves a modification of some given material, and, hence, is a Practical process. Instead, the theme of #5, Contemplation, involves no such modification, and, furthermore, its esteemed status in the preceding Philosophical tradition is well-established, thereby affording him a better example of what he is trying to contrast with Change in #11. However, the primary reason for that esteem is that it is usually conceived as an elevated state consisting in subject-object unity. Accordingly, to justify a devaluation of Contemplation, and, hence, of Theory, he needs to do more than insinuate that it is only a reinforcement of the status quo. More effective, for example, would be to argue that Cognition, including Contemplation, is, organically, nascent Action, from which it follows that Theory in isolation from Practice is only an arrested stage of development of the latter.

Contradiction and Revolution

One Philosopher that Marx is certainly targeting in the 11th Thesis is Feuerbach himself, for reasons that he explains in preceding Theses. The specific 'interpretation' in question is Feuerbach's Materialist proposition that the presumed Spiritual realm of Religion is no more than a projection of, and grounded in, mundane human experience. To that, Marx argues that Feuerbach stops short of questioning the generation of that dualism itself, which, if pursued, exposes the contradictions in social conditions, thereby prompting revolutionary action, i. e. to "change" the world. However, Marx thus reveals only the shortcomings in Feuerbach's Interpretation, without explaining the relation between the cognition of a Contradiction and subsequent Revolution. In other words, by contrasting Interpretation and Change in the 11th Thesis, he severs them, leaving Change groundless, a problem which he addresses only with the presumed Dialectical 'Necessity' that effects the transition from Cognition to Action.

Interpretation, Change, Writing

In the 11th Thesis on Feuerbach, Marx asserts, "Philosophers have hitherto only interpreted the world in various ways; the point is to change it." However, as epochal as some have taken it to be, the passage is flawed in three significant respects. First, the first clause is falsified by the example of Rousseau. Second, his attempt in the second clause to normatively universalize his concept of his historically specific task is not only groundless, it conflicts with his principle that humans are constantly re-making themselves. Finally, the contrast between Interpretation and Change is not as sharp as he takes it to be. For, each of the 'interpretations' to which he refers is actually an instance of a species of writing, i. e. is a product of Labor, made public in order to influence concrete behavior in some respect or another. In other words, even if the purposes of one of his predecessors is not as radical as is Rousseau's, it still involves change in one of various ways. So, as is the case with many of Marx's Historical judgments, this passage, regardless of the attention that it has drawn, is not as incisive as his Economic analyses.

Enlightenment and Empowerment

According to many Capitalists, one's awareness that one is part of a larger collective is 'enlightenment', while to the Marxist, that awareness is, Class-Consciousness, and, hence, empowerment. Now, the Enlightenment-Empowerment contrast parallels the one in entailed in Marx's bold statement of purpose--that the task of the Philosopher is to "change" the world, and not merely to "interpret" it. Problematically implicated, and not effectively addressed, in that declaration is Marx's relation to the Working Class. For, since he himself is not a member of that class, the assertion can only be taken as an expression of a member of another class--that of Philosophers, in which case the Enlightenment-Empowerment contrast therein, as well as the revolution of the concept of function of Philosophy, is independent of its correlate in the Working Class. Furthermore, even given the adequate explanatory application of Dialectical Materialism to a Socialist revolution, how that scheme is relevant to Marx's personal transition from an 'interpreter' to a 'changer' is unclear. The significance of these problems to his immediate one of the overcoming of the injustices of Capitalism is that if the transition to Socialism is part of a more comprehensive development, e. g. a mutation of the species as a whole from Homo Sapiens to Homo Faber, then the value of the transition is a contingent one.

Class, Stratum, Pyramid

Marx's inclusion of Land as a Means of Production tends to obscure the stratification of the category. For example, in a simple case, there is a piece of land, a building on the land, and machinery inside the building. Likewise, there can be three distinct owners of those means of production, i. e. the land-owner, the developer who rents the land and constructs the building, and the owner of the machinery who rents the building. Now, the immediate exploiter of the operators of the machinery is the owner of the manufacturing company, but a portion of those profits ends up in the hands of the developer, with the land-owner the ultimate destination of some of that. So, the concept of Class-Conflict, like that of Means of Production, tends to obscure that the Working Class is the foundation of a pyramidal system, rather than one of merely two opposing tiers.

Class and Action

In one important respect, the Nominalist concept of 'class' is instructive. For, the Marxist can accept the analysis that as an object of Empirical perception, even that of one its members, a Class is no more than a multiplicity. But, if there is a Unity, it is not given as such. Rather, it is first created by the collective adoption of a unifying concept for action. In other words, in Marxism, 'the Working Class', as distinct from a mere multiplicity of workers, is a Practical concept.

Atomism, Capitalism, Class-Conflict

A Capitalist might reject the Marxist concept of Class-Conflict on Atomist grounds, according to which each negotiation, involving two freely bartering parties, is an event independent of any other. Accordingly, even if in each and every wage-negotiation, an employer takes advantage of an employee, 'Class-Conflict' is only a Nominalist fiction denoting nothing above and beyond those multiple events. However, such an argument is inconsistent with elements of Smith's own system. First, according to the latter, the price of any commodity in an exchange is its market-value, a quantity determined by Supply and Demand elsewhere. Second, Smith himself recognizes the inherent tendency in his system to monopoly, and, hence, to its variation, collusion, in which case, one of the parties in a specific exchange is a representative of some unified interest. Finally, Smith's concept of Division of Labor presupposes a Labor-Force that is subsequently divided. So, each of the three fundamental components of a specific Exchange--the two parties, and the resultant price--is, in Smith's own analysis, a derivative instance of some preceding generality. Hence, the Atomist critique of the Marxist concept of Class-Conflict is not a Capitalist one.

Class-Consciousness and Collective-Consciousness

While often treated as a primitive, singular phenomenon, Class-Consciousness is compound, the apparent singularity of which reflects primarily the occasion of its discovery. For, the concept of Class entails a division that generalizes the conflict of interests that obtains in any basic Exchange, but remains undiscovered until the collectivization of the Means of Production, due to the introduction of complex machinery, engenders a collective-consciousness in the co-operators of those Means. It is only then, upon the realization of the shared victimization of exploitation at the hands of wage-earners, that the process of Production is conceived as polarized into antagonistic Classes, which becomes a spur to its overcoming by those victims. But, that overcoming requires the collectivization of private property, resulting in a Class-less society, in which, therefore, the conditions of Class-Consciousness are eliminated. In other words, while Class-Consciousness is a pivotal moment in the transition from Capitalism to Socialism, it is only as a derivative catalyst that does not survive the transition. In retrospect, Class-Consciousness is an underdeveloped stage of a universal Collective-Consciousness.

Private Property and Contradiction

According to an alternative to the standard Dialectical Materialist critique of Capitalism, the fundamental concrete Contradiction of the system is located at its foundation--in basic Exchange, involving two parties, each of which seeks to maximize an increase in private property. But, the satisfaction of both goals is impossible, since each consists in getting something for nothing, so the scenario is constituted by a concrete Contradiction. Accordingly, the abolition of private property negates the antagonism, and sublates the interests of each party, thereby accomplishing the transition to Socialism. Perhaps conspicuously absent in this scheme are Class, Class-Consciousness, and Means of Production. However, the Exploitation of Labor can be defined in terms of a simple exchange between a wage-payer and a single worker, and the Socialist goal is Class-lessness that transcends any specific Means of Production. So, those cardinal features of standard Marxism are, nevertheless, only intermediary moments in it.

Dialectical Materialism and Revolution

In formal Dialectics. a Contradiction is resolved as a Synthesis in which both terms are preserved, e. g. Being and Nothingness as Becoming. Correspondingly, in Dialectical Materialism, class-less Socialism resolves the conflict of Capitalist classes. Now, another Marxist concept of the transition from Capitalism to Socialism is Revolution, the significant characteristic of which in social contexts is Overturning. But, implicated, though not always rigorously addressed, in that imagery is the concomitant fate of the object of Overturning, i. e. of the antecedent upper class. Though, strictly speaking, the latter becomes the underclass as a result of a Revolution, as a matter of historical fact, its members have usually been eliminated, thereby yielding a 'class-less' society, not one that synthesizes the conflicting classes of Capitalism, but one constituted by a strata-less triumphant working class. So, perhaps the greatest challenge to Dialectical Materialism comes from within Marxism itself, i. e. from the concept of Revolution.

Capitalism and Contradiction

While Marx's concept of an "inversion" of Hegelianism is Dialectical Materialism, another, as has been previously suggested here, can be termed 'Dialectical Praxis'. One distinction between the two is their differing correlates of Hegelian Contradiction. While a Material Contradiction is constituted by conflicting forces, a Practical Contradiction, suggested by Kant, and by the Prisoner's Dilemma, consists in self-defeating behavior. Now, both varieties are prominent in Marxist writings. On the one hand, Class Conflict is a Material Contradiction. On the other, Practical Contradiction is exemplified in the following analysis: the profit-seeking Capitalist endeavors to minimize wages, which diminishes purchasing power, and, thus, reduces the possibility of profit-taking from the sales of produced goods. So, it is unclear whether, according to Marxism, the 'Contradictions of Capitalism' are primarily Material, or primarily Practical.

Dialectical Materialism, History, Uncertainty

Theories of Action have tended to suppress the distinction between Attempt and Outcome, thereby presenting a model better suited to mastered behavior, than to either the learning process, or to methodical experimentation. The inadequacy extends to Marx's theory of History, in which humans continually re-make themselves as they re-make the world. Thus, the Necessity that Marxists attribute to Dialectical Materialism dogmatically neglects the inherent Uncertainty of the process, one consequence of which has been some of the later shortcomings with respect to the original ambitions of the doctrine, thereby also exemplifying that suppressed Uncertainty.

Dialectical Materialism and Failure

Engels' effort to counter Newtonian Physics with a Dialectical theory of Matter, abstracts as much as the former does from its historical origin--the experiments of Galileo and others. Now, Experiment entails the possibility of failure, the rare recognition of which is expressed by Peirce's characterization of his theory of Knowledge as 'Fallibilism'. But, that possibility inheres in all human endeavor, including Productivity. Thus, a, and perhaps the, significant flaw in Dialectical Materialism is that it does not accommodate the possibility of failure, whether in the attempt to grow vegetables, or in that to overthrow Capitalism.

Materialism, Theory, Practice

Kant's discovery of Reason as primarily Practical signals not merely a re-interpretation of one and the same power, but a profound transition in its object as well--from Homo Sapiens to Homo Faber, i. e. from passive contemplator to self-determining maker. The maturation has been since reflected in not only the emergence of Pragmatism, but in the Epistemological theories of Bergson and Heidegger, for whom cognition is essentially purposeful, i. e. 'ready-to-hand', rather than observational, i. e. 'present-at-hand', in the terminology of Being and Time. Marx's thesis that humans are constantly remaking themselves as they remake the world, and the classification of Land as primarily a moment in the productive process, place him squarely in that tradition. Thus, his declared inversion of Hegel, from Dialectical Idealism to Dialectical Materialism, is, more profoundly, a maturation from Theoretical Dialectics to Practical Dialectics.

Land, Means of Production, Dialectical Materialism

For Marx, the Means of Production entails both the instruments of Labor and the objects of Labor. So, while his classification of Land, along with all raw materials, as an object of Labor is not peculiar, the implied classification of it as a 'means' in the production of goods is. However, that status illustrates the distinctions between Dialectical Materialism and Dualism, on the one hand, and Naturalism, on the other other. For, common to Naturalism and Dualism is the concept of Nature as, in Phenomenological terms, an In-itself, whereas for Dialectical Materialism, it is For-us. Now, Darwinism, by providing a pre-human history of Nature, presents a formidable Naturalist challenge to Dialectical Materialism, to which the latter can respond by asserting that the Organism-Environment relation that is essential to Darwinism is a Dialectical one, thereby proving that that variety of Naturalism is, in fact, a species of Dialectical Materialism. In any case, the classification of Land as part of the Means of Production seems to be an expression, perhaps a vestige of Hegelian Phenomenology, of a reluctance to conceive it, and other raw materials, as In-itself.

History, Means of Production, Atomism

Marx's proposition, "by thus acting on the external world and changing it, man at the same time changes his own nature", has several important ramifications. It anticipates both the human Self-Determination thesis of Pragmatism and Existentialism, as well as the Ecological concept of the essential interaction of a species and its environment. But of most immediate relevance to his Economic doctrine, it implies that an apparent eternal truth may be historically contingent. So, in particular, the proposition challenges Social Atomism on the grounds that it is an expression of the predominating means of production, subject to supersession as industrialization collectivizes the labor-force. The result is an unprecedented collective-consciousness, in general, and class-consciousness, in particular, i. e. the superseding of Capitalism by Socialism.

Economics, Theology, Evolution

A notable, and influential, attempt to ground Capitalism in a larger context begins with the interpretation of the Invisible Hand as an instrument of divine will, often characterized as a variety of 'Protestantism'. Consequently, Economic results are represented as expressions of the pleasure or displeasure of a deity, often corresponding to preceding behavior, i. e. as rewards or punishments. So, the interpretation, previously discussed, of Economic activity as a phase of Adaptation is another chapter in the Religion vs. Evolution conflict. Shared by the two is a rejection of Smith's thesis that the Nation is the primary locus Economics. But, from there they diverge drastically--the subject of the theological interpretation is an individual, while that of the Evolutionist is the species, i. e. in the latter, even the 'survival of the fittest' is attributed to a characteristic, not, as it is popularly conceived more recently, to an individual. So, if the Marxist were to embrace the Evolutionist interpretation, 'society' would have to be conceived as co-extensive with 'species', as the internationalism of the doctrine suggests that it might.

Economics and Adaptation

By abstracting bartering individuals from any preconditions, including any preceding concept of 'self-interest', Smith establishes 'Economics' as an autonomous discipline. By setting those bartering individuals in the context of ongoing class relations, Marx reinforces that autonomy by supplying it with a 'History', which he occasionally violates with implicit Moral judgments concerning the treatment of workers as commodities. So, by locating that narrative in a more comprehensive Natural History, Darwinism recovers possible preconditions for Economics, thereby challenging its purported autonomy. In particular, the immediate precondition of Smith's barterers, occasionally alluded to by Marx, is their interaction with environing Nature, which Darwinism represents as an instance of adaptive behavior, spanning both breathing and extracting subterranean ore. From that perspective, Economics is a phase of Human Adaptation, with its variations to be evaluated according the criteria of the latter.

Mutation and Technology

The cardinal moment in Evolution is Mutation, the origin of any new development. However, an evolutionary step is incomplete until the novelty, e. g. opposing thumbs, is integrated into the established behavior of an organism. Now, technology is an extension of the body, e. g. a fork is fingernails. Hence, Technology has the Evolutionary status of Mutation. Thus, similarly, a process of integration is required for the incorporation of novel potentials into established practices. So, 'Economics', as Smith and Marx, but not necessarily predecessors, conceive it, is a program for the adjustment of society to Industrialization. Accordingly, the evaluations of Capitalism and Marxist Socialism from the perspective of Evolutionism are as such adjustments.

Darwinism, Capitalism, Socialism

Darwinism involves two main themes--Evolutionism, i. e. the emergence of more complex organisms from less, and Hobbesianism, i. e. the drive to survive. Thus, since so-called 'Social Darwinism', entails the latter, but not the former, it is a misnomer. Likewise, any attempt to ground Capitalism, as a variety of 'Social Darwinism', on Darwinism proper, is inadequate. In contrast, the Dialectic evinces an Evolutionary pattern, i. e. the transition from antagonistic theses to a synthesis that incorporates both. However, Dialectical Materialism, unlike Darwinism, is not a theory of the generating of a new species from a given one. Hence, any attempt to ground Marxist Socialism on the latter is also inadequate. Thus, if Darwinism favors one or the other Economic theory, it is not clear which, or how.

Dialectical Materialism and Evolution

One theme of Marxism is that Capitalism is inherently unjust, to be corrected by the collectivization of the means of production. An independent theme is that human affairs are the expression of an historical process governed by Dialectical Materialism, one episode of which is the transition from Capitalism to Socialism. But, that grounding of the transition is undermined by Evolutionism, according to which, human history is only one phase of a much longer natural history. For, as 'Social Darwinists' show, the application of the principle of 'survival of the fittest' to human history restores Capitalism to its privileged status in human society. So, in the absence of a Dialectical Materialist concept of Natural History, of which human History is a special phase, Marxism might benefit from jettisoning the historical theme entirely.

Economics and Mythology

By demystifying Capitalism, Marx, perhaps unwittingly, mythologizes Economics. For, in order to expose the exploitation shrouded by Theology and Metaphysics, superimposes on that fact a theory of Dialectical Materialism that, regardless of the thesis that it is 'immanent' in the base, is still a contingent superstructure on it. Now, though presented as a theory of History, Dialectic Materialism is, more precisely, a theory of Economic History. So, insofar as he conceives the theory as monarchical among the sciences, Marx essentially deifies both it, and, specifically, Economic activity, even if it is an immanent deity. Perhaps ironically, the demystification of, in turn, Economics is implicit in Engels' later attempt at a Dialectical Materialist, i. e. non-Newtonian, theory of Natural Science, which expands the scope of Dialectical Materialism beyond the merely human, thereby opening the possibility that Economics, too, is a merely human activity, as Smith proposes, also perhaps ironically.

Capitalism and Nature

Smith's Anthropocentrism, previously discussed, is not non-Naturalism. For, his concept of Nature is Newtonian--constituted by atoms interacting mechanistically. Likewise, his individuals are Atomist, the motivational principle of which is mechanistic Behaviorism, i. e. Stimulus-Response. Indeed, the tendency toward Equilibrium in his system, expressed by the Invisible Hand, seems inspired by Newton's third law. But, what is lacking is an adequate definition of the distinction between Human Nature and non-Human Nature, without which, the problem with the abstraction of the former from the latter is not that it is non-Natural, but that it is arbitrary, perhaps reflecting only Smith's ambition to distance Industrialist Economics from Agrarianism.

Economics and Ecology

The ambition, shared by Smith and Marx, to replace Agrarianism with an Industrialist concept of Economics, results in an increasingly anthropocentric object of study. The abstraction from Nature is evident in Smith's cardinal concepts, such as the distinctively human Propensity to Barter, Exchange, Division of Labor, etc. And, while the reliance on Nature, entailed in his focus on Labor, a process of transforming raw material, slightly re-grounds Marxism, Engels' later attempt to develop a Dialectical Materialist concept of Nature only underscores that the Materialism that informs their Socialism is primarily merely human. In contrast with both systems, what might be called an 'Ecological Economics' begins by embedding the human world within Nature, and, then, derives Labor, Exchange, etc. from the interaction of the species with its environing conditions.

Wealth and Natural Resources

Division of Labor presupposes Labor, and Labor consists in the transformation of available raw material. Thus, Division of Labor presupposes the availability of raw material. Likewise, therefore, Smith's proposition, that Division of Labor is the primary determinant of Wealth, suppresses the following: 1. Natural resources are the primary determinant of Wealth; 2. Labor is a secondary determinant of Wealth; 3 Technology is a tertiary determinant of Wealth; and 4. Division of Labor is a function of Technology. A clear and familiar example of #1 is any otherwise barren oil-abundant territory.