Socrates as Tragic Hero

Some of the complications of Nietzsche's 'Socrates' category in Birth of Tragedy have already been discussed, but the most significant one might be historical fact itself. There seems to be consensus that the actual Socrates, as opposed to Plato's fictional mouthpiece, received a death sentence for asserting that he knows only that he does not know, thereby challenging the prevailing political myths of the day. Not merely does Nietzsche's characterization of the 'Socratic' as 'optimism' seem inappropriate, but as a socially corrosive figure, whose consequent death is preceded by his acceptance of his fate through some consoling vision or another, the category in Birth of Tragedy that seems most appropriate to Socrates is Tragic Dionysiac Hero. So, perhaps because Nietzsche, at this stage, is a relative Philosophical novice, under the influence of Schopenhauer, his treatment of Socrates in Birth of Tragedy is atypically sloppy.

Will to Power and Aesthetic Theory

Nietzsche's main contribution to Aesthetic Theory is generally considered to be his theory of Tragedy, with its Dionysian and Apollinian categories. However, despite his continuing to dub himself a 'Dionysian' and a 'Tragedian', his mature work overrides his earlier views. With his affirmation of Eternal Recurrence, he detaches himself from Schopenhauerism, by, in particular, separating the inarguable factuality of specific instances of human suffering from both the general thesis that Life is Suffering, and the consequent pessimistic attitude towards Life. Instead, Nietzsche affirms Life in general, including its particular adversities, thereby transforming Pessimism into Joy. This triumph over misery leads him to discover that all experience is Will to Power, and that pleasure and pain are feelings of strength and weakness, respectively, in particular situations, a diagnosis that he recognizes as having been advanced by Spinoza. Accordingly the pleasures afforded by Apollinian contemplation, or by Socratic optimism, is an expression of mastery over afflictive Dionysian circumstance, as is the joyful affirmation of the latter. In other words, Will to Power offers an innovative criterion for Aesthetic evaluation--the degree of strength involved in an Artist's mastery over circumstances, including materials--that is applicable to Tragedy specifically. In Formaterialism, 'degree of strength' is 'degree of complexity'.

Schopenhauer, Nietzsche, and Epiphenomenalism

If Schopenhauer had attributed to Kant a concept of Reason as the idea of Totality, not as merely instumental to self-interest, he could easily have accepted it, as he does with Platonic Forms, as a redemptive Idea. Likewise, Nietzsche, under Schopenhauer's influence in Birth of Tragedy, could have classified Reason as 'Apollinian', rather than as 'Socratic', and, hence, as not antagonistic to Tragedy. But, even granting Kant his concept of Reason, what they still could not accept, the essence of their resistance to the Rationalist tradition, in general, is the attribution to Reason of causal efficacy. For, Schopenhauer radicalizes even Hume's denial of motive power to Reason, by denying to even feelings, because, in his System, all phenomena, irrational as well as rational, are epiphenomenal, i. e. only extrinsic appearances of universal Will. Thus, his Pessimism is grounded in his Epiphenomenalism, because the latter implies that the prevailing presumption of the day, that scientific progress is the path to the alleviation of human suffering, is vain, not to mention that it reduces the messianic Rationalism of his neo-Kantian rival Hegel to fiction. Likewise, for Nietzsche, Rationalism is the enemy of Tragedy, because, unlike the Apollinian, Rationalism presumes that Knowledge has the power to thwart even Dionysus. Conversely, though, any triumph of the Dionysian principle would seem to depend on the validity of the Epiphenomenal interpretation of Reason.

Schopenhauer, Kant, and Pessimism

Schopenhauer mis-reads Kant in three crucial respects. First, he misses Kant's Constructionism, i. e. he misses that the thesis of the unknowability of noumena is not Kant's definitive Epistemological position, but a phase of his Constructionism, i. e. that Knowledge is a constructive process, and that what we construct is knowable. Hence, because he misses this latter phase, Schopenhauer interprets Kant's delimitation of Knowledge as an assertion of the vanity of presumed Knowledge, and, hence, as grounds of Pessimism. Second, he attributes to Kant a concept of Reason that is actually Hume's, namely that Reason is merely instrumental, and merely at the service of selfishness. But Kant's concept of Reason is Leibnizian, i. e. a concept of a Totality that transcends any selfishness, e. g. his 'kingdom Ends'. Hence, Schopenhauer's accusation that Kant's Principle of Pure Practical Reason promotes selfishness, is based on a mis-attribution to it of the Humean concept of Reason. Finally, these two mis-readings set the stage for a third, an interpretation of a betrayal of Reason as one by Reason. Already convinced that Kant's presumed selfish Principle of Pure Practical Reason is a betrayal of the presumed Pessimism of the 1st Critique, Schopenhauer sees as proof of that betrayal Kant's later 2nd Critique introduction of the thesis that Rational Virtue deserves Happiness. Indeed, on the Constructionist interpretation of Kant, the notion of Deserved Happiness does constitute a betrayal, but one of Reason, by Kant's theological commitments. So, if a Pessimist is seeking a target among Kant's three Critiques, it would instead be the 3rd, Kant's defense of Deserved Happiness, that he explicitly describes as his answer to the question, 'What can I hope for?'

Death of Tragedy

The main theme of Nietzsche's Birth of Tragedy is the comparison between ancient Greek tragedy and Wagnerian music, in which he sees the latter as a 'rebirth' of the former. Implied by such rebirth is the death of the former, which, according to Nietzsche, is caused by the influence of Rationalism on Tragedy, the personification of which is what he calls 'Socrates', a third 'god', in addition to Dionysus and Apollo, in the his study. The exact referent of 'Socrates' is unclear, for, as a practitioner of self-reflection, this character indeed represents the historical Socrates. But, as a detached observer, he is closer to Plato, and as an analyst of Tragedy, Aristotle is his predecssor. Now, Nietzsche's primary focus regarding the Socratic influence on Tragedy is the transformation of the latter to Drama, with its problem-resolution structure, and its happy ending, an evisceration of Tragedy. Left relatively unexplored are two other significant historical developments that are due to the introduction of Socratism. First, whereas in ancient Tragedy, the audience is a participant in the suffering and redemption of the hero, Socrates is a detached observer and commentator on what is transpiring. Second, the detachment, in general, of the audience from participation, is a key dimension of the abstraction and extraction of 'Aesthetic experience' from community ritual. In other words, one of the many accomplishments of Birth of Tragedy is that it demonstrates how the death of Tragedy is also the birth of Art Criticism.

Kine-Synaesthetics

The traditional concept of Aesthetic experience consists of three components--Artist, Artwork, and audience. On the one hand, Dance is often treated as instance of this concept, but, on the other, it complicates it. For, a dancer is also an audience, of the Music they are performing to, in which case, the experience includes two distinct types of audience, one also a participant, the other a detached spectator. Furthermore, there are two types of both Artist and Artwork involved--musician and dancer, Music and Dance--and, while traditionally the focus of the performance is on dancing, in contexts such as Jazz and Rock, in which the Music is in part a response to the dancing, classification of the Artform in terms of traditional categories, becomes difficult. In fact, with the rise of contemporary multi-media Art, not only is classification impossible, but the very term 'Aesthetics' becomes obsolete. For, in an event which includes, for example, Music, Dance, and a light-show, which, therefore, entails an audio medium, bodily movement, and a visual movement, all in coordiation with each either, a more appropriate description would be 'Kine-Synaesthetics'. With the latter as the genus of the Art experience, 'Aesthetics' is only a species, and its traditional pre-eminence is arbitrary.

Dance and Aesthetic Experience

For Plato, Beauty is a self-subsistent Form, and the essence of Aesthetic experience is the contemplation of the Form of Beauty. Hence, the Platonist Aesthetic experience is essentially passive. While Kant's Constructionism is revolutionary regarding the Theory-Practice relation, and the nature of Experience in general, its novelty in his Aesthetics is more modest. For sure, the play of Imagination involved in the experiencing of Art is, in contrast with Plato's notion, dynamic, but Kant's analysis in this area still amounts to no more than a modification of the essential Contemplationist character of the Platonist Aesthetic context. Likewise, Dewey's notion of Aesthetic experience as interactive and reconstructive still accepts the Platonist paradigm of the experiencer as spectator. In contrast, Dance is not only an Artform in its own right, it is also an Aesthetic experience, i. e. of Music. As such, it is plainly exemplary of Constructionist Aesthetics--the experience of Music is embodied in the dancer's physical movements--and, hence, of an Aesthetic theory that is a decisive alternative to Platonism. More generally, Dance demonstrates that the essential experience of Artistic creativity is further creativity.

The Sublime, Beauty, and Dance

In the Birth of Tragedy, Nietzsche represents Beauty as the Apollinian principle, i. e. the principle of individuating Form, but, thereafter, there is rarely a reference to the Apollinian. Its disappearance could mark Nietzsche's increasing distance from Schopenhauer's influence. For, initially, at least, Beauty plays the same role in his theory of Tragedy as it does in Schopenhauer's theory of Music--as a palliative for suffering--and the Apollinian seems to be as important to Tragedy as is the Dionysian, Nietzsche's principle of the Sublime. Yet, as Nietzsche continues to place emphasis on the latter, his treatment of Beauty becomes ironic--Beauty is merely illusory, albeit a psychologically necessary illusion. However, with his eventual introduction of Will to Power, which often he characterizes as 'Form-imposing', he seems to have effectively accomplished reducing the Apollinian to a mode of the Dionysian, Beauty to a mode of the Sublime. Nevertheless, such reductionism falls short of explaining why Beauty is necessary to the Sublime, the Apollinian to the Dionysian, or, in Schopenhauerian terms, why Will must individuate. Consequently, Formaterialism rejects this reductionism, and maintains the independence of the two principles: the Material Principle, i. e. the Dionysian, and the Formal Principle, i. e. the Apollinian. Furthermore, it finds in Nietszche's Aesthetic system an example of an Artform which is central to it, and expresses a balanced coordination of the Dionysian and Apollinian, of the Sublime and Beauty. Whereas Schopenhauer contemplates Music, Nietzsche quite explicitly dances to it, and he repeatedly asserts his esteem for Dance. But, Dance is the achieving of bodily Form while under the influence of Music. Hence, it balances the Dionysian and the Apollinian, the Sublime and Beauty.

Concept and Conception

'Concept' is a traditionally central Philosophical notion, usually meaning 'abstract general representation', occasionally with further specification, for more precise use in some theories. In many cases, 'conception' is casually interchangeable with 'concept'. Conversely, though, there is one use of 'conception' for which 'concept' is not substitutable--the biological one, meaning 'initiation of pregnancy'. However, that exclusive connotation of 'conception' does suggest its suitability for a specialized Philosophical use here. Previously introduced has been the process Preception, i. e. the process of acting on a precept. Now, the understanding of a precept differs from that of a merely descriptive proposition, because unlike the latter, it is incomplete without subsequent action. In other words, the difference between the two types of understanding is analogous to that between 'conception' and 'concept'. So, insofar as 'concept' usually refers to the kind of cognitive representation involved in the understanding of descriptive propositions, 'conception' can be defined as 'the understanding of a precept'.

Nietzsche and The Sublime

For Kant, the connection between Aesthetics and Morality is one of analogy, i. e. that Beauty is a symbol of the Good. But, in his System, the highest Good is Rational Virtue being rewarded with Happiness, so, a specifically accurate Artistic symbol of it would be a presentation of 'poetic justice'. Furthermore, in a Morality such as Spinoza's, in which Morality consists in Reason's independence from and indifference to one's suffering, the symbol of the Good would entail the Sublime, not Beauty, and Reason's superiority to it, e. g. one of Plato's depictions of Socrates, insofar as it is fictitious. Now, while for Schopenhauer, Music is an expression of the Sublime, it is not, in itself a symbol of the Good. For, for him, Morality consists in the selfless contemplation of Beautiful Form, as relief from life's tribulations, and while Music may exhibit such Form, it does not exhibit the contemplation of it. In contrast, Nietzsche finds in Tragedy, a symbol of Morality that entails the Sublime. First, he represents the latter as the 'Dionysian' principle, the source of cosmic suffering to presumed individuals. Later, the embracing of the Sublime, which he represents as the affirmation of Eternal Recurrence, is the closest element of his System to a Moral Principle. Hence, the acceptance of fate in Tragedy, e. g. Oedipus', is the Sublime functioning as a symbol of Morality. Nietzsche thus accomplishes what some of his predecessors trend towards, the supplanting of Beauty by the Sublime as the cardinal Aesthetic principle.

Kant and The Sublime

Kant defines the experience of the Sublime as the inadequacy of finite subjective Imagination to infinitude. Because the Sublime thus belittles the subject, it is painful, but insofar as it forces resort to Reason, it is enriching. But, despite its constructiveness in cultivating Reason, Kant regards its systematic significance as only supplemental to that of Beauty. Now, regardless of his stated explanation for that subordination, the Sublime is subversive to the theological agenda of the Critique of Judgement. For, the ultimate agenda of the work is to demonstrate how a Rational being can hope for divinely-caused deserved Happiness, whereas the experience of the Sublime is the promotion of Reason in unhappy circumstances. Abstracted from such theological commitments, Kant's treatment of the Sublime might have taken a different course. He might have proposed that Vitality is a characteristic of any great Art, defined Vitality as 'having a life of its own', and elaborated on the latter as 'existing independently of the context of the Artwork'. He then might have noticed that the context of an Artwork is finite, a book, a score, a stage, a frame, etc., and have thus proceeded to argue that existingly independently of the context is to exceed it infinitely. In other words, with a different theological agenda, Kant might have attempted to demonstrate how all great Art is Sublime.

Natural Beauty

A potential complication for some Aesthetic Theories is the phenomenon of natural Beauty. On the one hand, it seems difficult to argue that sunsets, landscapes, the night sky, etc. are Beautiful. But, on the other, how a Theory is to accommodate such phenomena, if it defines Aesthetic Theory as both the study of Beauty and a Theory of Art, is problematic. For, the synthesis of those implies that natural Beauty is the production of an Artist, which seems impossible to explain without some Theological premise. Thus, though Kant does not explicitly address Theology in the Critique of Judgement until his discussion of Teleology, his association of Purposiveness with the enjoyment of natural Beauty is implicitly Theological. Natural Beauty is also problematic for Mimetic theories of Art, i. e. that are based on the thesis that Art is essentially an imitation of Nature. For, while natural visual Beauty seems exemplary for artifactual visual Beauty, such superiority is not generalizable to the other Arts. As charming as bird song is, it hardly matches the power of human Music; Architecture seems to have no analog in Nature; and, perhaps, most tellingly, certain Natural events are described as 'Poetic Justice', i. e. are interpreted on the basis of artifactual dramatic Art. What such considerations demonstrate is that Aesthetics and Poietics, i. e. the Theory of Art, are not coextensive, insofar as the former is the study of Beauty, Natural and artifactual. On the other hand, if the criterion of the assessment of Art is Creativity or Vitality, i. e. the extent to which an Artwork has a life of its own, then Art can be said to imitate Nature, but only Nature without some traditional Theological assumption.

Beauty, Unity, and Multiplicity

Aesthetics is traditionally the study of Beauty, the essence of which is Harmony. Harmony, in general, consists in the coherence of the elements of an Artwork, and since that manifold is perceivable, one main challenge in Aesthetics is to explain their Unity. One of the enduring strengths of Platonism has been its efficacy in this respect--Beauty is an eternal Form in which a Beautiful Artwork participates. Even one of Platonism's rivals, Empiricism, defers to it on this topic, when Hume admits that Empiricism cannot explain how it is possible for someone to imagine a shade of Blue that they have never previously perceived, simply on the basis of perceiving shades slightly darker and slightly lighter. Platonism's principle that all the color shades are eternal Forms that exist independently of sensory experience, is generalizable to the existence of the Form of Beauty. Instead, the most frequent Empiricist explanation of Beauty, that it is a Feeling in the perceiver, reduces it to matter of arbitrary subjective taste, forcing such ad hoc solutions as Mill's distinction between 'higher' and 'lower' pleasures. One innovative Empiricist solution has been Alexander's notion of Beauty as an 'emergent' property of Aesthetic experience, but this has not been widely embraced by Empiricism, because it deviates from its traditional Atomism. In contrast with both Platonism and Empiricism, Formaterialism rejects their shared analysis that Harmony is a given multiplicity, the transcendent Unity of which being what requires explanation. Rather, it interprets Multiplicity and Unity as abstractions from the interplay of its two dynamic Principles, Becoming-the-Same and Becoming-Diverse, and the genius of the great Art consists in striking a balance between the two. Hence, what is perceivable in Beauty is a balanced tension between Unity and Multiplicity, which, as dynamic, is an expression of the Vitality of the Artwork.

The Art of The Mystery

The Mystery novel is rarely cited as a pre-eminent Artform, but it exemplifies many of the traditionally central concepts of Aesthetic Theory. While the highlight of a Mystery is usually the revelation of whodunit, this element is only the last piece of the puzzle, when included, completes a picture of which it is only one part. This illustrates Dewey's thesis that the experience of Art is a cumulative process. Furthermore, that the reader actively tries to solve the mystery in the course of the reading, demonstrates Dewey's contention that the perception of Art is not passive, but is a reconstructive process. The reader's active involvement, trying to unify the various pieces of the puzzle, also exemplifies Kant's analysis of an Aesthetic experience as the operation of the Imagination in seeking Unity, even though the Understanding is unable to provide it via a determinate Concept, which is its normal cognitive function. Furthermore, that a Mystery can be read as if the author were deliberately challenging the detection powers of the reader, is the attribution to it of Kantian Purposiveness. On the other hand, that an element of surprise is gone from a re-reading of even a superior Mystery, refutes Kant's thesis that the aforementioned procedure of the Imagination is universal to any experience of a great Artwork. Finally, a Mystery is usually evaluated in terms of whether or not there are any holes in the plot. This is an assessment of its internal coherence, just as the determination of whether or not an Artwork is Beautiful is an assessment of how well its parts harmonize. So, while some theories locate Beauty in the perceiver, the Mystery demonstrates how it is an objective property of an Artwork.

Socrates' Defense

'Apology' literally means 'defense', and it is generally recognized that the substance of Socrates' apology, against charges of atheism and of corrupting the youth of Athens, appears in Plato's work that goes by that name. However, less consideration has been given to a post-trial event that is perhaps the greatest evidence of his innocence. Now, his guilty verdict officially entailed a death sentence, but exile was available as an unofficial alternative. And, yet, despite having the resources to escape, Socrates refuses to do so, and dies instead. So, the mystery surrounding his final days is--Why does he refuse to escape? In the Crito, he casually suggests that he is too old to relocate, or that it would be evil of him to disobey the ruling, both unconvincing and well beneath the usual caliber of his argumentation. In the Phaedo, he cites the theory that the Soul survives the death of the Body, so there is nothing to fear from Death. That Socrates actually subscribes to that view is muddied by the fact that it is Plato who is known to endorse it, and the distinction in his writings between the actual, historical Socrates, and the fiction character that serves as Plato's mouthpiece, is often blurred. In contrast, there is a further, possibly more profound reason for his choosing to die--by doing so, he expresses his refusal to acknowledge the validity of the verdict, thereby re-asserting his innocence. Moreover, this willingness to die refutes each of the charges specifically. First, against the atheism charge, it proves his piety. Second, against the charge that he corrupts the youth, it demonstrates that his real example to them is of the courage that it takes to both live and die by principle. So, the real 'Socratic irony' may be that it takes Socrates' dying to prove that he deserve to live, or that it is a deed of this most skilled of arguers that is the most enduring aspect of his legacy.

Assessment and Recommendation in Aesthetics

According to Kant, the central debate of Aesthetic Theory is whether or not there is any disputing taste. Another way to formulate the issue is: whether Aesthetic Judgement has an objective criterion, in which case taste is disputable, or, is only an expression of subjective preference, in which case it is not disputable. While theories have typically been reductionist, and favored one side or the other, Kant, via a disambiguation in the articulation of the seemingly antithetical positions, discovers common ground as a third alternative. Still, this solution, like the other approaches, only perpetuates a conflation that is the source of the debate. They share the assumption that its two sides are rival accounts of one and the same process, Aesthetic Judgement, when they are, rather, different accounts of two distinct processes, Assessment and Recommendation, which are occasionally interrelated. An Assessment of an Artwork determines to what extent it possesses certain properties, e. g. Creativity, Vitality, Beauty, etc., and, is, hence, objective. In contrast, an assertion as to whether or not an Individual might enjoy an Artwork is a Recommendation, and is based, at least in part, on the contingent, and, therefore, subjective circumstances of that person. Often Assessment will serve as part of the grounds for a Recommendation, but it can never sufficiently account for as fundamental a subjective factor in an Aesthetic context as whether or not one has previously experienced a work before. Even Kant cannot universalize the element of the unexpected, that can be such a crucial, and yet subjective, aspect of any Aesthetic experience. So, there are neither objective grounds for compelling a Recommendation, nor is an Assessment, e. g. that one Artwork is more Creative than another, a merely subjective opinion. In other words, recognition of the distinction between Assessment and Recommendation, in the analysis of Aesthetic Judgement, eliminates one of the chronic debates in Aesthetic Theory.

Novelty in Art

The Novel is rarely regarded as a pre-eminent Artform, but the term connotes a characteristic that is essential to Art. Creativity entails Novelty, and manifests it in two main ways. First, an Artwork, as a whole, is innovative insofar as it is unprecedented. Second, the unexpected within an Artwork expresses its Vitality, which may be why Aristotle cites Discovery and Peripety as essential features of any worthy Plot. In the first case, Novelty is in contrast to mechanical reproduction, e. g. cookie-cutter copying of something original, and, in the second, to the introduction of arbitrary elements that are inconsistent with what has preceded. So, Novelty achieves a balance between Variation and Coherence, which qualifies it here as Evolvement. But 'Evolvement' is just a neologistic synonym of 'growth', so Novelty in an Artwork is a manifestation of its Creativity and Vitality, and a property of it that can be objectively assessed. Hence, Artworks can be evaluated as objectively more or less Creative, Vital, and Innovative, and distinguished accordingly.

Enjoyment and Appreciation in Art

The 'shower scene' in Hitchcock's Psycho is generally recognized as one of the most shocking in the history of Cinema, and is one of the most analyzed as well. Arguably, a dissection of how he produces the effects of the scene can contribute to one's enjoyment of it, as well to an understanding of the feeling of Horror, in general, e. g. the role in it played by Vulnerability. From which, it might be concluded that appreciation of the objective features of an Artwork can suffice as an explanation of Aesthetic enjoyment. On the other hand, that analysis of Hitchcock's technique does not account for another dimension of the shock that most viewer's have experienced. That dimension is due to the character, played by a glamorous Hollywood actress, who receives top billing in the movie, being killed off only half way through the film, a completely unexpected turn of events, especially in the context of the movie industry, and, in general, of 1960 America. Most analysts agree that Hitchcock was deliberately attempting to subvert both movie convention and the general culture of the time. However, as illuminating as this analysis might be, and as appreciative of Hitchcock's Artistry one might be because of it, it cannot enhance the experience of the shock of watching the scene, insofar as the latter is a function of unexpectedness. To the contrary, it can only diminish that surprise. So, Aesthetic Theory must distinguish between Enjoyment and Appreciation in Aesthetic Experience, i. e. between its immediate and reflective aspects. While the latter are objective, and, evaluable, the former are contingent, and, so, not open to disagreement. Likewise, any synthesis of Enjoyment and Appreciation can only be contingent, as well, and, thus, beyond objective evaluation.

Objectivity in Aesthetic Evaluation

By defining the basic unit of Art as an 'Experience', Dewey is challenged to explain how evaluation of Art is even possible. For, his concept of Experience is at least in part a function of factors that are unique to an experiencer, which renders it ungeneralizable beyond the circumstantial enjoyment of it, despite Dewey's ineffective struggles to abstract Art-product from Aesthetic Experience. Kant's solution, based on the impersonal commonality of the structures of any such experience, still likewise falls short of grounding any assessment of the Art-product itself. In contrast, an example that helps illustrate the possibility of such an evaluation is a well-known novel that recounts a day in the life of an Irishman, his wife, and some associates. In part because of its use of interior monologue, the description of the day's events are extraordinarily vivid. But, furthermore, the title of the novel, 'Ulysses', indicates that those events parallel the adventures of Homer's Odysseus, on the basis of a comparison, between the 'Age of Heroes' and the 'Age of Man', proposed by Vico. Hence, 'Ulysses' is, objectively, a far more literarily allusive Art-product than it might have been had Joyce called it, say, 'A Day in the Life of Leopold Bloom'. Likewise, more generally, an Art-product can be assessed strictly on objective grounds of its degree of Complexity. This is not to imply that such an evaluation suffices for any experience of a work, but it does illustrate how subjective Aesthetic enjoyment can be determined by characteristics that objectively inhere in the work.

Art and Vitality

Kant draws two similarities between Art and Nature: first, they can both produce Beauty, second, that humans interpret both Purposively. However, his prior commitments seem to prevent him from relating two other elements of the Critique of Judgement. If he had maintained focus on his fundamental insight, that Art inspires imagination, he might have gone on to realize that the Form-Matter combination in Art is similar to dynamic unity in Nature, i. e, Organism. From that, he might have concluded that a necessary condition, at least, of Art, is that it possess Vitality. Even 'static' Artforms are Vital--even what 'still life' paintings capture is life within the stillness; the subjects of sculptures are likewise presented as if they are in the process of some activity, even thinking; and, the wonder of architecture lies in its resolution of dynamic geometric forces. In Aristotle's theory, the object of imitation is always action, and perhaps nothing is more essential to the representation of action than that it is a product of free choice, e. g. Oedipus' behavior is hardly tragic without the contrast between his presumed free will and Fate. The Vitality of Poetry consists not merely in the play of its ideas, nor in the sonic liveliness of its language, but, furthermore, in the interplay between language and imagery. So, if Vitality is essential to Art, the experience of Music is not radically opposed to that of the traditional spectator Arts. But Music itself is not Vital unless later phases of a piece are organic developments of earlier ones, not mechanically added on. Now, Dewey's thesis that the enjoyment of Art is a species of Experience, in general, is equivalent to attributing Vitality to it. And, the assertion here that the fundamental content of any Artwork is Creativity, is equivalent to the thesis that Art must be Vital. So, one key attribute of Creativity is the appearance that it is self-Created, the accomplishment of which is a mark of great Artistry.

Medium and Message

The primary object of McLuhan's thesis, 'The medium is the message', was to distinguish the cultural effects of television, emergent at the time, from those of radio. In part due to the subsequent proliferation of multimedia forms, this application has become somewhat dated, but the phrase retains wider relevance, e. g. to issues in Aesthetics. The basis of its primary distinction, between a 'hot', i. e. emotionally engaging, medium, e. g. radio, and a 'cool', i. e. emotionally detached, one, e. g. TV, is something that Philosophy traditionally glosses over. Whereas the latter usually treats of 'the Senses' in general, one main difference between radio and TV is that the former is primarily auditory, and the latter, visual. So, this distinction between 'hot' and 'cool' Senses, between i. e. Hearing and Sight, accomplishes what Schopenhauer needed a metaphysical theory for--to explain the distinction between unmediated, expressive Music, and mediated, representational Art. Furthermore, 'the medium is the message' implies that the content of an Artwork is essentially no more than a modification of its medium, that e. g. any emotional tone in a piece of music is primarily an expression of intra-sonic capacities, not of some feeling imported to the piece from without. No doubt sad composers compose saddening works, but so do happy ones. Furthermore, McLuhan's formula helps explain how amplified music, with its unprecedented sonic palette, can be expressive in ways that 'acoustic' music cannot, and, vice versa.

Representation, Expression, and Improvisation

Schopenhauer is widely recognized as an innovator in the history of Aesthetic Theory, though it seems less well-known that Rousseau, in some of his earlier works, covers some of the same ground. The point of departure for Schopenhauer's theory is Kant's thesis that the content of Art is the otherwise non-sensible, but from there, Schopenhauer radically diverges from Kant. Whereas for the latter, the non-sensible is the realm of Rational Ideas, for him, it is Will. Accordingly, for him, the pre-eminent artistic medium is not Poetry or any of the Visual Arts, but Music. Furthermore, whereas those traditional media serve to represent non-sensible ideas, the pre-eminence of Music consists in that it directly expresses Will. Hence, one aspect of Schopenhauer's innovation is its focus on Art as non-representationally expressive, the influence of which is apparent in even the visual arts, e. g. Pollock's paintings. Furthermore, the impact on subsequent theory of his emphasis on Music is explicit in the writings of Nietzsche, Adorno, and Langer. Still, neither Schopenhauer, nor any of these successors, seems to have anticipated the development, in the past century, of another special, if not unique, potential of Music. That development is the emergence of improvisatory Music, an Artform which is recalcitrant to even Schopenhauer's reformulation of the Aesthetic experience. Even as expressive, Music shares with representational Art the role of a medium for a content that originates outside that medium, whether it is a represented Rational Idea, or an expressed Emotion. In improvisation, the immediate content of the process is Creativity itself, and whatever might be taken to be represented or expressed is just a mode of Creativity itself. Hence, just as Music demonstrates for Schopenhauer the inadequacy of the Representational theory of Art, improvisational Music exposes the limitations of the Expressionistic theory.

Form, Matter, Creativity

One Philosopher for whom the Artistic experience entails both Form and Matter is Dewey. On his analysis, the physical public substance of an artwork, e. g. a painting, a musical score, a book, etc., is its Matter, while the manner in which an individual, the Artist as much as an audience, personally experiences it is its Form. On Dewey's account, the experience is a dynamic, progressive interplay of Form and Matter, culminating in the integrated personal assimilation of the substance, with 'Beauty' usually referring to an hypostatization of the terminal point of the process. However, one Artform that seems recalcitrant to Dewey's analysis is Dance, the Matter of which, one's bodily movement, is as personal as its Form, i. e. its manner of movement. Presumably, Dewey could argue that Dance is a personal manner of experiencing Music, but he might have more difficulty explaining how that 'Form' becomes 'Matter' to a Dance audience. In contrast, in Formaterialism, every Individual Experience is a combination of the Material Principle, e. g. locomotility, and the Formal Principle, e. g. the guidance of locomotility by attentive consciousness. Accordingly, the guidance of bodily movement in its interaction with paint and a paintbrush, a musical instrument, a page of words, etc. are only special cases of Individual Experience. Furthermore, what an Artwork essentially expresses is this Form-Matter interplay itself, otherwise known as 'Creativity', or, in Formaterialism, as 'Evolvement'. And, the manner in which this expression is effectively experienced is further Creativity, to one degree or another. A stimulated imagination, a perception of 'Beauty', the motivation to further public artistry, are all manners of Creativity in an Aesthetic experience, often progressively so.

Beauty and Creativity

The Kantian analysis of Aesthetic experience entails both an unreflective and a reflective phase. The former is the pleasurable stimulation of the experiencer's imagination by the artwork, while the latter includes the cognition of the form of the artwork, the interpretation of the artwork as part of a Purposive sequence, and the judgement that the artwork either is or is not 'Beautiful'. Now, the inessentiality to the experience of the involvement of Purposiveness has already been discussed. Likewise unnecessarily superimposing are the Platonisms of abstracting the form of the artwork from its content, and of the criterion of judgement, determinate and invariant Beauty. Non-Kantian theories, such as Santayana's, Alexander's, and Langer's, despite their differences, are similarly Platonistic. Instead, absent the Teleological and Platonistic superimpositions, the essence of the Aesthetic experience is the stimulation of imagination, by the interplay of Form and Matter in the artwork. But that interplay is what Creativity is, so, the sole substance of Aesthetic experience is Creativity, the relation of Beauty to which can perhaps be best gleaned from the role that Beauty plays in biological Creativity, i. e. as a stimulus to procreation. Thus freed of the oversimplification dictated by the monolithic criterion of 'Beauty', Aesthetic judgement expressed in comparative terms, e. g. less or more Creative, suffices.

Langer's Platonism

Langer asserts that "music does not ordinarily influence behavior", and that its "affects do not long outlive its causes." Many Philosophers have contested these assertions, but perhaps the best refutation of them is her theory of Art itself--insofar as that theory is, as she explicitly acknowledges, motivated by her experiences of Music, clearly the effects of Music on her have long outlived their causes. What her notion of Art as "the creation of forms" seems to miss is that such creativity can also be transformative, for both the artist and the audience. Pointilist painting illustrates a new way of seeing; 12-tone Music explores a new way of listening; experimental Dance describes new ways of locomotility; and, a Philosophy "in a new key", as she puts it, transforms thinking, though she falls short of noting that it can thereby also transform Conduct. Her failure to recognize the transformative power of Art suggests that her experience of Art is primarily of Symbols as finished products, not of the creation of them, and only to the extent that a Symbol is present to her. Hence, her theory of Art is actually in the oldest of 'keys', namely, Platonism.

Art, Emotion, and Motion

Langer defines Art as "the creation of forms symbolic of human feeling". This definition is based, in large part, on her observation that Music expresses feelings. In the same passages in which she details those observations, she also notes that Music expresses "visible movement". What the connection is between Feeling and Movement, she never makes clear, but the lack of reference to the latter in her definition of Art suggests its subordinate status for her, as does the reduction of the observation "all music is dancing" to the definition of Dance as "emotive gesture". Her subsequent suppression of her original insights about the centrality to Art of Movement reflects two general commitments. First, the distinction that she draws between Form and Symbol, i. e. that the latter, but not the former, is connotative, is vestigial Teleology, analogous to Kant's Aesthetic Judgement, in which Form cannot be conceived as meaningful without reference beyond itself. Second, and she is hardly alone in the Philosophical tradition in this, she accepts Feeling as an unanalyzed primitive phenomenon, just as Emotion, Passion, etc. are typically taken. In notable contrast, for Sartre, Emotion is nothing but thwarted Motion, just as in several other doctrines, Sensation is nothing more than nascent motor activity. Hence, the Artistic expression of Emotion is the release of the latter into Motion, which might also explain the real nature of Catharsis. Accordingly, if Feeling is a species of Movement, and Form need not be connotative, Langer's definition of Art is transmuted into "the creation of forms of movement", with hers as a special case. Furthermore, if, as Spinoza and Nietzsche assert, creativity is joyous, Art has intrinsically concomitant 'emotional' content--grades of Movement felt as modes of Joy, just as specific colors are modes of Light.

Langer and Form

The central notion of Langer's Aesthetic theory is 'Significant Form', best exemplified, according to her, by Music. In her System, Form, in general, is Symbolic, meaning that it is less or more articulated, and it connotes something. The pre-eminence, for her, of Music, is not only that it is the most articulated among the Arts, but that, in a sense, it is itself the Art of Articulation, an insight that references to improvised Music would better support than those to composed Music. What distinguishes, for her, Music from verbal language is that the articulated components of the latter, i. e. words, have fixed connotations, while what the articulated phrases of Music connotes are emotions that vary from situation to situation. Accordingly, she also occasionally characterizes Significant Form as 'Unconsummated Symbol', and 'expressiveness'. The absence of any mention of Kant in these passages prompts wonder as to whether or not she has noted the similarity between the term 'expressiveness' and Kant's 'Purposiveness'. For, the limitation to subjective meaningfulness of Significant Form parallels Kant's analysis that Aesthetic Judgement is subjective, though potentially universally communicable. So, just as Kant's vestigial teleological commitments prevent him from treating the Artistic process as a relation between Form and Matter, that Form needs to refer beyond itself seem to prevent Langer from being satisfied with a definition of Music as 'the Art of Articulation'.

Mimesis and the Mirror of Nature

The possible general Philosophical significance of Mimesis is well-expressed by Rorty's characterization of Philosophy's long and deeply-ingrained tradition of aiming to serve as a 'mirror of nature'. Perhaps the best proof of the accuracy of Rorty's characterization is that the advocates of this tradition themselves affirm that verisimilitude of representation to 'the things themselves' is the cardinal principle of their projects. Even Skepticism's denial of the possibility of achieving such verisimilitude is an implicit acceptance of the Mimetic role of Philosophy. The novelty of Kantianism is to suggest that we construct our experiential world, a thesis that is perhaps best developed by, ironically, Bergson, who is hardly a neo-Kantian. He fleshes out the implicit Constructivism of Kantianism, by conceiving of the empirical world that each of us inhabits, as the product of a structuring, in accordance with our capacities for acting upon it. Such a model complements the Pragmatist principle that Truth is efficacy of action, e. g. the Truth of the proposition 'The chair exists' is determined by the success of one's effort to sit in it. Now, while Rorty withholds any Historical evaluation of the surpassing of Mimetic Philosophy, Evolvementalism regards it as the maturation from naive receptivity, to Individual Idionomy.

Signals and Semaphorics

Despite his pioneering Pragmatism, Peirce's equally pioneering Semiotic, like his less original Phenomenology, remains rooted in orthodoxy. As elaborate as that Semiology is, and as committed as he is to transmuting the fixation of belief into the adoption of a rule of action, all Signs, as he conceives them, are fundamentally descriptive. That is, they are representations of something that pre-exists them, as part of the triadic structure Sign-Object-Interpretant. But, rules of action, i. e. precepts, do not fit easily into that pattern, primarily because they are prescriptive, and, hence, pre-exist their Objects, if the latter ever come to exist at all. A better configuring of of the functioning of prescriptive Signs is Sign-Interpretant-Object, in which the Interpretant is the adoption by the addressee of the Sign as a rule of action, and the Object is their performance of the action. In contrast, the standard designation of the Object of a prescription, a wish in the mind of the prescriber, is as incomplete an explanation as an interpretation that a buzzing alarm clock refers only to what time it is. The distinction between descriptive and prescriptive Signs seems decisive enough to warrant a special classification for the latter, e. g. 'Signals', just as the structure in which they are implicated, Sign-Interpretant-Object, seems distinctive enough to warrant a branch of Semiological study separate from Semiotics, e. g. 'Semaphorics'.

Mimesis, Adaptation To, Adaptation Of

Adaptation can be of two sorts--adaptation to, and adaptation of. In the former, an entity adjusts itself to an environment, whereas in the latter, it adjusts the environment to it. The difference is of great significance to Dewey, the basis, according to him, of the Theory-Practice distinction, and one root of the Science vs. Religion conflict. For example, faced with in an inhospitable environment, some humans attempt to adapt to it by performing actions that aim at appeasing a Deity, while others attempt to adapt it to them, by studying in order to put to use, some of the featuries of that environment. But, other examples suggest that these contrasting types are actually two interpretations of the same process. For example, when an immigrant adapts to a new home by learning the native language, they are, at the same time, adapting that language to their own use. Similarly, a prayer for food is also a possible causal technique, while growing crops is also the integration of a farmer into the local ecosystem. Mimesis is analogously two-faceted: an Elvis impersonator both becomes more like Elvis, and learns a certain style of singing. Likewise, by successfully imitating the mysterious facial expression of the posing Mona Lisa, da Vinci's artifact is itself mysterious.

Abstraction and Mimesis

In Aesthetic evaluation, Mimesis and Abstraction are sometimes contrasted, though the line between them seems difficult to definitively draw. Even the most 'life-like' portrait is an abstraction from its object, simply because of its two-dimensionality. On the other hand, a wild array of blue, white, and red splotches on a canvas could be some painter's imitation of the American flag. A deeper complication lies in the notion of Abstraction itself. In general, Abstraction is the reduction of a manifold of phenomena to a few salient features. But, that is also descriptive of Mimesis. Thus, Abstraction is nothing but Mimesis, with the emphasis on the removal-from-the-object aspect of the latter process.