Tuesday, June 30, 2009

Matter

Yesterday I discussed how language antagonistic to the Philosophical doctrine Materialism infiltrates everyday discourse, e. g. in the derogatory term 'materialistic'. On the other hand, other common language perhaps unwittingly advocates it. 'Matter', which comes from the same root as 'material', generally has a positive connotation, not merely insofar as it is taken as synonomous with the positive term 'substance', but given that the expression 'it matters' is indicative of importance. Indeed, the very earliest Philosophers can be classified as 'Materialist', in a formal sense. For example, Thales, generally accepted as the first, believed that the fundamental ingredient of existence is Water, while some of his immediate successors countered that it is Fire, or Air, all of which are types of Matter. But Philosophers tend to not take things at face value, so anti-Materialists began to argue that sheerly Intellectual or Spiritual Being or Beings are principles that underly those superficial substances. Aristotle did not as drastically relegate Matter, but he perhaps did more damage to its status, by treating it as a mere passive receptor of Form, thereby completely stripping it of the dynamism that Thales and the others had attributed to it. Modern Science has helped to revive Materialism, not because, as might be commonly thought, it is so antagonistic to Spiritualism, but because it recovers the innate dynamism of Matter, e. g. Water is molecules possessing a certain type of motion; atoms have electromagnetic potency, etc. Accordingly, Materialism, e. g. Marx, Nietzsche, has been revitalized in the past few centuries, and ordinary language is sometimes the unwitting arena of the Philosophical battleground over it.

Monday, June 29, 2009

Materialism

'Materialism' has both a formal Philosophical meaning and a common usage. On the one hand, it is the doctrine that all reality is composed of Matter only, where Matter can be approximately understood as anything possessing mass and volume. It implicitly rejects the independent existence of purportedly 'immaterial' items such as Spirit, Mind, Soul, etc., meaning not so much that they do not exist, but that they are actually themselves some mode of Matter. For example, 'Mind' means nothing more than 'brain' and/or 'brain functions', according to Materialism. In contrast, in common usage, 'materialistic' is a derogatory reference to the pursuit of exclusively physical goods--pleasure, money, possessions, etc. Thus, there is an overlap between the two meanings: according to formal Materialism, everything is physical, so whatever is pursued must be physical. However, the derogatory usage implies a disinterest in e. g. intellectual, spiritual, or aesthetic goods, which the formal doctrine does not. Rather, formal Materialism simply insists that those goods are as Material as money, cars, etc. So, to whatever extent the derogatory usage is a formal critique of Materialism, from, say, the perspective of Immaterialism, it is an underinformed one.

Sunday, June 28, 2009

No Nothing

In some cosmological doctrines, Nothing is the fundamental principle, the true Reality. The main challenge for such doctrines is not to explain Nothingness, as many adherents seem to think and dismiss as irrelevant, but to explain how anything at all, even the Illusion of Somethingness, comes to be generated out of Nothing. Some believe that Genesis accomplishes that, with the account of God's creation of the world. However, Genesis does not express a Nothingness doctrine, not merely because the word 'nothing' appears nowhere in the account, but because something does pre-exist Creation, namely God, hardly a Nothing. Two philosophers have notably tried to counter the thesis of the primacy of Nothingness. Hegel shows how 'Nothing' is actually 'No-thing', a qualifier of the more primary Being, a characterization of the undifferentiatedness of the latter. Sartre derives Nothing from 'Being-for-Itself', i. e. Consciousness, which is a fold in Being in which 'Nothing' is what is between the folds. A further analysis in that direction is that Nothingness is derived from Difference--that 'Nothing' refers to the interstices of the items that are differentiated, and that, more generally, 'Nothing' simply means 'other than'. Perhaps more penetratingly, Nietzsche offers a psychological critique of Nothing-ists. He subscribes to a life-affirming doctrine of Eternal Recurrence, which presents Reality as a plenum. With respect to that principle, all seekers or asserters of Nothingness, even when it is dressed up as 'Heaven', are life-hating escapists, or, to put it precisely, Nihilists. Some might complain that philosophers like Nietzsche take the mystery out of life, to which it can be responded that Existence, not Nothingness, is the biggest mystery of all.

Saturday, June 27, 2009

Honesty and Policy

A familiar saying that does not stand up well to scrutiny is 'Honesty is the best policy'. To begin with, all of the main terms involved are ambiguous. A 'policy' can be either a principle or a strategy, a big difference, given that the former is chosen for its own sake, while the latter is a means to another end. 'Best' varies analogously: as a qualifier of a principle, it means 'most admirable', while as a qualifier of a strategy, it describes what is most expedient, which is hardly equivalent to the former. Finally, 'honesty' has three main usages. First, it can refer to exchange activities, specifically to the objective accuracy of the descriptions of a party involved, e. g. 'an honest broker'. Second, it can refer to the sincerity of someone's feelings, e. g. 'he honestly loves her.' Finally, it can serve as a validation of the expression of hateful attitudes, e. g. 'To be honest, I do not like Blacks'. So, interpreting 'Honesty is the best policy' as the first of these, Honesty is plainly a strategy, since it is being compared to Dishonesty, not to another admirable principle, e. g. Courage. In the second case, it is neither a principle nor a strategy, since sincerity is spontaneous, and precedes any kind of reflective judgment. Finally, Honesty as an expression of hate has been an effective strategy in two spheres--as therapy in some schools of Psychology, and as a means to Political solidarity for some orientations. And, in both cases, admiration has been expressed, though that does not necessarily amount to admirability in some general sense. In sum, perhaps the best gauge of the soundness of 'Honesty is the policy' is the answer to the question, 'Would you trust someone who needs to be told that Honesty is the best policy?'

Friday, June 26, 2009

Astrology and Whitehead

Astrology is a popular source of practical advice that is taken a lot less seriously as a scientific theory. However, potential intellectual validation for it comes from a very unlikely source--the metaphysical system of the distinguished Logician, Mathematician, and Philosopher of Science, Alfred North Whitehead. That system crosses Leibniz with Bergson: it regards existence as in a constant flux of development, with each new event a 'concrescence'. The latter is a convergence of all previously existing entities, some more relevant to the novelty than others, e. g. entities in the immediate vicinity of the novelty are much more relevant than distant ones, which are, nevertheless, still ingredients in the novelty. Thus, every concrescence is a reflection of the state of the universe at the time of its inception. And, hence, in particular, every human birth is a reflection of the universe at the time of its inception. Therefore, the position of celestial bodies at the moment of one's birth indeed says something about what one is, according to Whitehead's metaphysical theory. But, what is not grounded by that theory is the typical way in which it is translated into practical advice. So, it is actually in theory, but not in practice, that Astrology has the greater intellectual credibility.

Thursday, June 25, 2009

Fig Leaf Morality

The latest fodder for comedians, yet another moralistic politician caught with his pants down, is a reminder of the fateful role played in Western Civilization by the fig leaf. The sequence of events in Genesis is, Adam and Eve disobeying God by eating fruit of the tree of knowledge of good and evil, then having their eyes opened, then seeing their nakedness, then feeling ashamed, and then covering up their 'nakedness' with fig leaves. Given that this sequence was based in an act of disobedience to God, it would imply that God was not offended by their nakedness. So, why the very first consequence of this newly-gained knowledge is shame at this nakedness is perplexing: what do they 'know' that they did not know before? Certainly not something that God knew. And, then, there is the fig leaf cover-up, which could only draw attention to a part of the body that previously must have been indistinguishable from the rest. So, insofar as 'literalist' Biblical Morality equates nudity with obscenity, it is plainly at odds with Divine will. Furthermore, it is not so much the case that the cover-up is worse than the crime, as is popularly thought, but that it draws attention to it.

Wednesday, June 24, 2009

Heidegger

Heidegger was one of the most influential Philosophers of the 20th century, and perhaps its most controversial. His most important work, Being and Time, appearing in the 1920s, is a fascinating hybrid of Phenomenology and Pragmaticism, the most innovative notion of which is his original conception of human nature, one that suits the vague classification 'Existentialist'. In the 30s his work, which became more impersonal and elliptical, was accompanied by his advocacy of Hitler and National Socialism. Beyond that, the opacity continued, but there were no further references to Political thought. This connection with Hitler is, obviously, the focus of the controversy surrounding him, and many defenders have argued that whatever was the scope of Heidegger's involvement with the Nazis, it is irrelevant to his philosophical stature. But such a defense is problematic for a notion of human nature which roots Intellect in everyday affairs. On the other hand, minute examination of his theories have failed to expose any unequivocal Nazi element, e. g. anti-Semitism, Master Race talk, etc., in them. However, what is more telling is Heidegger's continued silence even after the demise of the Third Reich--no explanation of his involvement with it, no criticism, no regrets over the suffering of his colleagues, no re-examination of any of his doctrines, nothing. So, what it is inarguable about Heidegger is the cowardice of this silence, the only controversy being the extent to which his reputation should be stained by it.

Tuesday, June 23, 2009

Politics and Rhetoric

In recent years, the distinguished Linguist George Lakoff has been applying this expertise to Political matters, in an attempt to reinforce the Liberal cause. One key notion for him is 'framing', as expressed in his prescription that Liberals need to learn how to frame issues better. For, as he sees it, how a debate is framed can be decisive in how it is received by the public. For example, Conservatives have recently been framing their defense of the Iraq invasion in terms of Iraq being better off without Hussein, which might be more difficult to dispute than if the matter were framed in terms of whether or not deposing Hussein were worth the tens of thousands of casualties, the loss of American credibility, the economic burden, the escape of Bin Laden, etc. However, the relevance of the other main aspect of Lakoff's theory of framing, that it is merely a rhetorical strategy, is unclear in this example, in which the difference between the two frames is analytical, not linguistic. The shortcomings, and even the potential counterproductivity of his program, are more patent in his recommendation that Liberalism present itself in terms of maternal tropes, in contrast with the paternal ones of Conservativism, i. e. nurturing vs. tough love. This proposal is profoundly misguided in two respects. A family is an involuntary association, while Democracy is a voluntary one, so using familial metaphors, of any sort, completely falsifies one of the essences of Democratic activity. Secondly, Democracy is comprised of adults, so to represent citizenry as children, is, again, fundamentally flawed. More generally, Lakoff's notion that Political conflict can be reduced to Rhetoric, implies that the participants are special interest groups seeking to dress themselves up as attractively as possible. Such an implication completely misses the substantive ambitions of pioneering Liberals such as Spinoza, Kant, and Dewey, the language of all of whom is as potentially vital today as it was when originally conceived.

Monday, June 22, 2009

The Body

I have recently argued that a duality that is more fundamental than the traditional 'Mind-Body' contrast is the Cognition-Volition dichotomy. One impediment to achieving that deeper insight has been the use of the notion 'Body' to account for our physical nature. Such a static concept completely falsifies the dynamic quality of corporeality, suggesting the existence of an inanimate object that is independent of its various motions. One point of agreement between the Book of Genesis and Aristotle is their subscription to that concept. Even Spinoza inadvertently validates it, when he defines 'Mind' as the 'Idea of the Body'. What would be more precise is a definition of 'Body' as the 'Idea of Motility'. For, 'Body' is the image of motile corporeality, which is hardly to assert that such an image is an extraneous abstraction for the organism. The unification of bodily motions into a single image, by reflection, is of fundamental homeostatic organic significance, grounding, e. g., the coordination of physical motions essential to any activity. However, to treat such stasis as of the Ontological essence of our corporeality is only to contribute to the denigration of our physicality that has for millennia been so damaging to the understanding of human nature.

Sunday, June 21, 2009

End, Means, and Justification

'The end justifies the means' is a controversial slogan that attracts a lot of criticism for the objectionable actions that it itself is sometimes used to justify. However, the controversy is misguided, because the expression actually is an empty tautology that only serves as a distraction. It is an empty tautology because, any 'End' is, by definition, the reason for the 'Means' to it, and, hence, is its justification. Instead, every action has multiple consequences, and to assert that slogan is to actually maintain that 'One consequence of an action justifies all the others', i. e. that the benefits of one selected consequence outweighs the harm of the others. Hence, the slogan, taken literally, distracts from a consideration of other consequences. For example, the current relative stability in Iraq is now being used to justify the 2003 invasion, implying that what is at issue is a comparison between pre-invasion conditions and the current ones. However, a full and honest assessment of the invasion would take into consideration not merely the deposition of Hussein, but the tens of thousands of casualties, the erosion of American credibility, the economic burden, the escape of Bin Laden, etc. Debate over whether or not the invasion was justified should not be distracted from these consequences.

Saturday, June 20, 2009

Refuting Idealism

A 'Refutation of Idealism' is a species of argument against the position that perceptual experience is 'in one's head', which is not precisely what is always denoted by 'Idealism', but is close enough to not be a misrepresentation. Two of the more dramatic recent versions of that argument were dismissive wavings of a hand, literally so from Moore, and verbally, from Heidegger. Both almost contemptuously reject the very premises of that Idealism, but it is unclear how moved a proponent of the latter would be them. In contrast, Kant took those premises seriously, so securing a much more potentially convincing refutation, by showing the contradiction that they lead to. For, according to those Idealists, stable objects are given only internally; but inner experience is a constant flux, meaning that their experience of stable objects is possible only with reference to stable objects outside of their experience, which Idealism denies existing. A refutation of a different sort can be derived from one of Moore's forerunners, Samuel Johnson, who famously kicked a rock, and asserted 'Thus I refute Berkeley', who was one of the pioneers of this Idealist position. Now, whether or not Berkeley would be moved by such a demonstration, which, after all, would just amount to one more episode in his inner experience, is unclear. But what Johnson's action does show is the limitations of Idealist methodology, which is basically sedentary observation. Instead, if Berkeley were to himself try to kick a rock, he might notice that vision is fundamentally not the passive recording of colors, but an active process coordinated with the motion of the foot. Furthermore, by kicking the rock, he might realize that the fundamental characteristic of all sensory objects is not color, taste, texture, smell, or sound, but resistance.

Friday, June 19, 2009

Rational Self-Interest

'Rational Self-Interest' is a key concept in some Political and Economic orientations. However, it is unclear exactly what it means. The traditional analysis, including that of the school Adam
Smith came from, is that self-interest is an instinctual drive, which would make it irrational, and would, thus, make the phrase 'rational self-interest' oxymoronic. Perhaps some would maintain that self-interest is a product of rational choice. However, given that Reason abstracts from personal differences, it could not be the source of a differentiation between oneself and anyone else. So, again the phrase seems meaningless. On the other hand, perhaps there is a distinction to be drawn between irrational and rational self-interest, for example, between the seeking of immediate satisfaction, and that of a calculated deferred satisfaction. Indeed, many do subscribe to the latter principle, but while the modifier 'prudential' seems appropriate, 'rational' still does not. For, even in Prudence, Reason remains a slave to the passions, as Smith's pal Hume has put it. Furthermore, bringing the full power of Reason to bear on Self-Interest will, again, only demonstrate that if Reason has any interest in selfhood, it is to all selves, equally, therein once more rendering Rational mere Self-Interest an impossibility. So, 'Rational Self-Interest' is a meaningless phrase, probably intended to dignify Selfishness, about which its advocates seem to lack the courage of their convictions.

Thursday, June 18, 2009

Prescriptive and Descriptive Ethics

One standard topic in academic Philosophy is 'Descriptive Ethics', which is a seemingly oxymoronic title. For, while a description is an account of what has already occurred, Ethics is fundamentally concerned with conduct that has yet to transpire. Ethics would seem, rather, to be essentially Prescriptive, insofar as it recommends, advises, or commands possible future behavior. For example, the Ten Commandments are plainly prescriptive. And, yet, what probably the three most prominent Moral Philosophers, Aristotle, Kant, and, Mill, each seems to offer is a Descriptive Ethics. In Aristotle's analysis, everybody naturally seeks the greatest Good, Happiness. Kant, often taken to be a Prescriptive Ethicist, actually only clarifies, articulates, and justifies the 'Categorical Imperative' that people experience as Conscience. Likewise, Mill's 'Greatest Happiness for the Greatest Number' principle is an attempt to explain what is in fact Moral experience. A noteworthy challenge to this eminent tradition of Descriptive Ethics in Philosophy is from Nietzsche. One application of his provocatively expressed distinction between 'Master' and 'Slave' Moralities, is to Prescriptive and Descriptive, respectively. For a Master Morality creates, while a Slave Morality follows, and those are precisely how, respectively, Prescriptive Ethics and Descriptive Ethics present themselves. In contrast, Nietzsche urged future Philosophers to be 'legislators', which he himself attempted to exemplify. His fundmental Ethical principle, 'Act only in such a way that you can will its eternal recurrence', for whatever it is worth substantively, is unabashedly his own prescription.

Wednesday, June 17, 2009

Janus-Faced

The 'I' is Janus-faced, actually two 'I's facing in opposite directions, one forward, the other backward. The prospective one is the I of Motility, the retrospective one, the I of Reflection. They are systematically linked in self-consciousness, e. g. in aesthesia, when one is aware of what one has been doing. That is "has been doing", not "is doing", because what is reflected-upon has to already be there in order for awareness of it to be possible. That is why Reflection is essentially retrospective. Furthermore, that is why Motility of the present always eludes present Reflection--the awareness of it must be subsequent. Hence, the two 'I's are irreducible to one another, despite the numerous efforts throughout history to arrive at a unitary I. Instead, they co-exist in constant tension, as is manifest in the conflicting psychological drives, on the one hand, to achieve closure, but on the other, to generate novelty. And, two pervasive primary psychological dysfunctions are manifestations of conflations of the two--the desire to change the past, i. e. retrospective Motility, and resignation, i. e. prospective Reflection. The achievement of psychological health depends on the effective coordination of these two opposite-directed drives.

Tuesday, June 16, 2009

It's The Thought That Counts

The phrase 'It's the thought that counts' is usually a reaction to someone's attempt to help or benefit someone else that falls short of a hoped-for result. A formal version of the attitude expressed in the phrase is Kant's Moral theory. Kant believed that Piety is the most important moral characteristic, and, so, devises a system in which value attaches first and foremost to the intention behind an action. Opposing Kant in this respect is Mill's Utilitarianism, which places the greatest moral significance on the consequences of an action, on how much happiness it leads to. So, on the Utilitarian analysis, 'It's the thought that counts' is not an expression of moral praise, but one of forgiveness, that implicitly praises only the happiness that would have resulted if the intention had been successfully carried out. On the other hand, the Kantian can argue that there is nothing praiseworthy, as the Utilitarian would have it, about acts that unwittingly or coincidentally lead to happiness. One patch of common ground in this debate is that neither attributes Moral worth to the actual performance an act, e. g. whether it is carried out gracefully or clumsily. But this point of agreement serves as a reminder of the artificiality of the entire debate. For, intention-performance-consequence forms a continual process, with respect to which any phase in isolation is a mere abstraction. Plainly, what would be best would be a caring intention, a graceful performance, and a happy consequence. So, the intention and the consequence in themselves each fall short of ultimate moral worth, acquiring derivative worth only depending on circumstances.

Monday, June 15, 2009

Rational and Irrational

Hume asserted that 'reason is and should be the slave of the passions'. What he meant is that Reason has no motive power in itself, and is involved in conduct only as a calculator of the best means to ends that are set by the Passions. Kant responded by arguing that Reason does master the Passions, not when performing such calculations, but when overriding any specific personal passion with the objective consideration of what any person would do. This exchange is perhaps the most historically prominent phase of the debate over whether humans are fundamentally Rational, or fundamentally Irrational. One point of agreement between Hume and Kant is that a Cause precedes an Effect, which means that they agree that any motive would have to precede action. But, prior to Kant, Reason was always taken to be 'Theoretical', i. e. subsequent to its object. So, in order to defend Rationality, Kant conceives of a volitional 'Practical Reason' that would precede action, and, hence, could therefore, at least in principle, have motive power. In particular, its mastery over Passion, according to his analysis, is based on a respect for the Rational principle. But that leaves him open to the challenge that such respect is the actual motivational force in play, and that respect is another Passion, thereby validating the Irrationalist argument. However, the whole debate, or at least at this phase, turns on the assumption that a cause must precede an effect. That assumption, in turn, presumes that the only cause is Efficient Causality. Instead, Formal Causality can either be simultaneous with or subsequent to its corresponding Matter. So, if Reason and the Passions are construed as having a Form-Matter relation, then neither need be established as prior to the other, and conduct need not be categorized as exclusively Rational or exclusively Irrational.

Sunday, June 14, 2009

The Mind-Body Problem

One of the enduring central topics in Philosophy is the 'Mind-Body Problem'. Most generally, solutions to this problem attempt to explain the relation between mental and bodily events. Some are reductionistic--e. g. the 'Body' is taken to be no more than a mental construct, or the 'Mind' is nothing more than the physical brain. Others present schemes that combine the two in various ways, the main challenge of which is to explain how Mind and Body interact. So, for example, Descartes proposed the pineal gland as a place of intersection, the difficulty of which probably inspired Spinoza to conclude that Mind and Body are parallel, and, hence never interact. In a similar vein are theories which hold that they are two sides of the same coin. One premise that all these, and even the standard rubric share, is the initial segregation of events into 'mental' and 'bodily'. Clues that this classification abstracts from a more fundamental distinction are that there are two types of 'mental' event--cognitive and volitional, and two types of 'bodily' event--sensory and motor. In some of the few cases where this potential complication is noticed, the rogue elements get suppressed, e. g. Epiphenomenal theories that deny that Mind is volitional, or Rationalist theories that deny that the sense organs are essential to cognition. But this suppression implicitly acknowledges the possiblity of a more fundamental division of organic processes, into, say, the afferential ones and the efferential ones, both of which are part mental and part bodily, from which the 'Mind-Body' scheme subsequently abstracts. Hence, the question concerning the relations between mental and bodily events might be more accurately put as the 'Volition-Cognition Problem'.

Saturday, June 13, 2009

Altruism

A familiar epithet in current political rhetoric is 'do-gooder'. Sometimes it is intended as a charge of arrogance, against someone who presumes themselves to be morally superior. More often, it is an insult, implying either hypocrisy or weakness on the part of an opponent. Knowingly or not, underlying these are more profound principles. In some cases, a 'do-gooder' is taken to transgress the maxim that 'God helps those who help themselves'. More generally, the fundamental premise in play is that all human conduct is ultimately selfish. On that basis, hence, some ulterior motive or other, e. g. assuaging a bad conscience, fear of public disapproval, etc., would have to underly any apparent altruistic deeds. But, those who invoke Adam Smith in asserting the Selfishness principle are mistaken, since he, along with his pal David Hume, believed that self-interest was to be coordinated with sympathy for others. Kant also rejected the exclusivity of Selfishness as the prime human motivator, arguing that Reason, as the bridge to the well-being of others, is also a natural human faculty. Still, both of these explanations as to how Altruism can be possible agree with their opponents in subscribing to a theory of Moral Atomism, namely, to the notion that one's well-being and that of others are essentially separate, even if reconcilable. In contrast, Aristotle and Nietzsche derive Altruism from Magnanimity, which means 'great-souled'; a magnanimous person is one whose scope of concern naturally transcends the self-other dichotomy implicit in Moral Atomism. Thus, from the perspective of magnanimity, the charge of 'do-gooder' that is leveled at the performer of Altruism is often an expression of small-mindedness.

Friday, June 12, 2009

Reflection

Socrates may not have been the first Sceptic, but the novelty of his assertion 'I know that I do not know' might lie in its introduction of Reflection as philosophical methodology. Complicating any study of Reflection is that any such study is itself reflective. Furthermore, the word is ambiguous--only a slight spelling variation distinguishes a mental process from a mechanical one, i. e. reflex; it does not in itself distinguish between the act of reflecting from what is reflected upon; and 'reflective' can describe both the subject of the act as well as a surface, e. g. a mirror being observed. In any case, what seems less complicated is that in Reflection, one treats oneself as an object of consideration, which means that one must take an outside perspective on oneself, which entails internalizing oneself imagistically or conceptually. This process of internalization is also Temporalization, because what is reflected upon must precede the reflecting upon it, e. g. one must already be walking if one is to become aware that one is walking. In other words, Reflection creates the structure of successiveness that is the essence of Time. The act is also retentive, since it holds in place what has just transpired, and, hence, is the foundation of Memory. Thus, Time is essentially cumulative, since the later moment retains the earlier one. Finally, contrary to theories of Consciousness which construe it as a relation between a Mind and some outer object, e. g. the consciousness of a chair, Consciousness is fundamentally reflective--e. g. one's 'consciousness of a chair' is actually one's consciousness of one's looking at a chair. In other words, Consciousness is fundamentally Self-Consciousness, and, hence, is fundamentally an act of Reflection, even at the most rudimentary organic level, i. e. kinaesthesia.

Thursday, June 11, 2009

Stoicism

'Stoicism' derives from 'stoa', Greek for 'porch', a label not indicating some human characteristic, but simply referring to a group of philosophers who tended to gather at a porch. These days, 'stoical' generally suggests a bearing up in the face of misfortune, which does retain at least part of the essence of the classical connotation of the term. But though Stoics have never seemed to recognize themselves as such, they are actually Aristotelian 'Eudaemonists'. Eudaemonism holds that Happiness is the greatest Good, and Aristotle argued that Happiness is achieved not through the securing of this or that particular goal, wealth, fame, etc., but through a mode of conduct. That mode is conduct in accordance with Moderation, which to Aristotle meant not too little of something as well as not too much of it, a consideration which has tended to get lost in notions of Moderation that one-sidedly are taken to only constrain excess. Stoicism, too, is a program of self-mastery, but whereas Aristotle prescribes the moderating and balancing of one's pursuits and retreats, the Stoic seeks satisfaction in detachment from external promises and threats, to be achieved only through the complete repression of all desires. Presenting Stoicism in the context of Aristotelian Eudaemonism thus augments the conventional image of it as a bearing up in the face of misfortune, with it both as a similar bearing up in the face of good fortune, and, at root, as a program of self-sufficiency.

Wednesday, June 10, 2009

Nietzsche

One of the best known Philosophers is Nietzsche, but, unfortunately, what is most generally thought to be true of him is almost completely mistaken. The typical image of him is as an immoral anti-Semitic militaristic Aryan supremacist, all aspects of which are wrong. His primary philosophical target was a pervasive version of European Christianity of the 1800s, which he both criticized and diagnosed. One focus of his criticism was the Christian Morality of the era, which he tried to expose as conformist and malignantly unnatural. One phrase that articulates this challenge is 'beyond Good and Evil', in the context of which he sometimes referred to himself as an 'Immoralist'. Since this effort included allusions to the kind of value system that he endorsed, including many points of agreement with Aristotle, the latter rubric was patently ironic. In the context of this project, Judaism is blamed primarily for breeding Christianity, and when differentiating the two, a rarity in that era, Nietzsche often expresses a preference for the Old Testament, and a respect for its people. His alleged militarism is based on a misunderstanding of his doctrine of Will to Power, which he intended as a rival for the traditional Will to Live analysis of human nature, not as an advocacy of brute violence. The concept of an Aryan 'master race' is cobbled together from several different sources, including what can easily be interpreted as a facetious reference to a 'blond beast'. In contrast, in some of the few comments explictly devoted to the topic of evolved humans, he reveals himself to be a eugenicist, proposing that such evolved types would have to be the product of an interbreeding that would combine the best characteristics of all races. Also, none of the superior race treatment has any connection to his concept of a 'Superman', which he proposed as a life-affirming ideal to replace the standard physical-denying image of Christ, which he diagnosed as slowly losing its influence in that place and time. For sure, the radicality of his views, and their provocative mode of expression, left his work susceptible to the growing Fascism of the time, especially once he became incapacitated, and placed in the care of a sister who was involved in that movement. But a conscientious reading of his views suggests that those Fascists were the embodiment not of his ideals, but of the coming Nihilism that he warned about.

Tuesday, June 9, 2009

Atomism

Atomism is a doctrine originated by the pre-Socratic philosophers Democritus and/or Leucippus. The main theses of Atomism are that an Atom is indivisible, that any two Atoms are independent of one another, and, that everything that exists is composed of Atoms, and nothing else. The doctrine was first advanced as a Cosmological theory, and its forerunning of modern Chemistry is obvious. But it has had a profound influence in other areas, as well. Many Epistemologies are Atomistic, such as the British Empiricism which holds that all knowledge is constituted by irreducible sensory data. Capitalism is Atomistic Economics, and it is perhaps no coincidence that in his formative years, Karl Marx studied Democritus. The Soul is treated as an Atom in some Psychological and some Theological theories--the notion of a Soul that travels through life independently of other Souls is Atomistic. And, there are methodological Atomisms, such as 'Analytic Philosophy', which proceeds by breaking down any assertion to its constituent elements. The influence of Atomism endures, despite the fact that Chemistry, which keeps discovering smaller and smaller particles, has cast serious doubt on the premise of the existence of some indivisible ultimate particle. Furthermore, from the other direction, wholist, gestaltist, structuralist, and constructivist theories have all persuasively demonstrated that pattern is as fundamental as the Atoms which are patterned, and that everything that exists is context-bound. Still, Atomism, in one form or another, will always have its appeal in a quest for simplicity.

Monday, June 8, 2009

The Forest and the Trees

'Can't see the forest for the trees' describes an inability to grasp a larger pattern unifying several items that one is perceiving. But the converse is also a shortcoming, perhaps better expressed in different imagery, say, 'can't see the blades of grass for the lawn', which is an inability to appreciate nuanced detail. The underlying cognitive problem is that while one may be able to perceive the trees severally, and be able to perceive the forest, accomplishing both simultaneously seems impossible. Despite this difficulty, we still manage to comprehend the reality of the existence of both the forest and the trees, and, so, to conclude that they are actually two descriptions of the same phenomenon. Why such a conclusion is noteworthy becomes plainer when a similar analysis is applied to another constituent of reality, the human being. It, too, can be regarded as both a Unity and a Multiplicity, or, more specifically, a Soul and a Body. But instead of these being left as two sides of the same coin, they are often treated as existing in separate existential realms, even such that a Soul is taken as capable of surviving the death of the corresponding Body. Likewise, the oneness of the universe is often detached from its parts, and then exalted into a transcendently existing deity. Perhaps where this deity and souls reside is in some treeless forest.

Sunday, June 7, 2009

Free Will and Determinism

One of the staple debates in modern Philosophy is 'Free Will' vs. 'Determinism'. An event is said to be the effect of 'free will' when it is set in motion by a deliberate decision that is itself not the effect of any prior cause. An event is said to be 'determined' when its proximate cause is itself the effect of some prior cause. Free will is thus to be distinguished from spontaneous randomness. Some familiar examples of prior determining causes are pain, divine pre-ordination, social conditions, and genetic predisposition. There have been a variety of positions staked out in this debate, from hard determinists who believe that no human conduct is free, to free will absolutists who maintain just the opposite, with admixture views in between, including some that hold that these are two sides of the same coin, and, hence, are both correct. A standard Determinist argument is that Free Will is an illusion, because the thought that seems to precede an action as its cause is actually a bystander merely recording what is transpiring independently of it. In turn, advocates of Free Will counter that Consciousness is the organic deferral of action, and, hence, the everpresent option of refraining from some action, so, every invocation of an objective influence on what is about to occur is a profound evasion of responsibility on the part of the conscious subject. Interestingly, Aristotle pays only passing attention to the issue, in his attempt to draw a line between voluntary and involuntary conduct, a criterion of primary relevance to the specific topic of Retributive Justice, with the central variable being the influence of knowledge on behavior. This comparatively modest Ancient treatment of the issue suggests that its significance might be less than eternal. For example, given that God is both omnipotent and Good, someone else must be responsible for the existence of Evil in the world. Hence, it must be humans who bring it about, and they can only do so if they possess 'Free Will'. So, absent the theological premises, there is no reason for a problem of such cosmic magnitude to even arise. Instead, as is more plainly the case, how much control someone has over what they are doing is a function of a variety of specific factors, especially their capabilities at that moment, and the immediate circumstances, with control being a matter of degree, not of some absolute condition.

Saturday, June 6, 2009

Realization

Many of us have experienced moments of sudden realization, when the pieces fall into place, seemingly of their own accord, and we arrive at an understanding, e. g. that the butler did it, or that I am in love with her. But because these moments entail a sense of a transition from unawareness to awareness, the suddenness is not an isolated instant, but involves a duration, albeit a rapid one. If such moments seem to be rare occurrences, it is not the type of event that is rare, only its dramaticness. For, all awareness is realization in its structure; all consciousness is fundamentally an ongoing convergent coming-to-awareness of this kind, a synthesis, as Kant puts it, a concrescence, as Whitehead calls it. But, because the latter two focus on the processing of information from the outer world, they miss the fundamental process of realization--kinesthesia, the ongoing confluence of the sensing of all our bodily activities, not merely of those of our external senses. If more Philosophers were peripatetic, their theories of sense perception might not abstract so easily an analysis of e. g. the awareness of visual objects, from that of walking. Or, to put it in Kantian terminology, the structure of kinesthesia is the 'transcendental a priori' of consciousness. As can also be noticed in those moments of dramatic realization, the awareness comes at the end of the process, is a product of the confluence, which confirms Whitehead's thesis that consciousness is arrived at, not pre-given. On the other hand, his concomitant thesis, that the terminal point of a concrescence is a novel 'I', is shown to be inaccurate by those examples. For, the 'I' that we arrive at upon realization is not so much absolutely new, but the result of the incorporation of the new experience into what had been the preceding 'I', demonstrating that with every new experience, one grows, to a greater or lesser degree.

Friday, June 5, 2009

The Problem of Pluralism

Political Pluralism is typically defined as 'the acceptance of the heterogeneity of a population, so that social cohesion is to be achieved by the seeking of common ground, not via unilateral imposition.' Current-day America is said to be 'pluralistic', though the enthusiasm with which the designation is embraced sometimes seems to vary in proportion to movement from Right to Left along the political spectrum. But even at its maximum, 'acceptance' is a stunningly tepid description, a strategy for merely solving a problem, as can be appreciated when compared with doctrines that are affirmations and advocations of principles. In other words, nothing in the standard definition offers an endorsement of political Pluralism in itself, which is not a expression of the general faint-heartedness of the Left, but of the more profound lack of a positive status of Pluralism in any Philosophical system in any tradition. In those, Unity is generally regarded as superior to Multiplicity, whether it is God in comparison with Creation, the One in comparison with the Many, Objective Nothingness in comparison with Subjective Individuality, etc., and in general, the latters are, at best, treated as means to the formers, and, at worst, as cosmic disasters, e. g. 'The Fall'. On the assumption that this prevalent metaphysical disparity between Unity and Multiplicity is indeed a profound error, the only correction is a Philosophical system which establishes parity between them, i. e. that neither is reducible to the other, and that they are of equal value. In the absence of such a system, the political orientations that are more sanguine about Pluralism, Liberalism and Progressivism, will always be at a disadvantage when trying to defend themselves against charges that they are fundamentally breeders of chaos.

Thursday, June 4, 2009

The Enigma of Socrates

The enduring reputation of Socrates is difficult to comprehend. He was not the first Philosopher, having been chronologically preceded by, notably, Pythagoras, Parmenides, Heraclitus, Democritus, and Protagoras, each of whom pioneered a doctrine that is still profoundly influential today. The historical Socrates is often conflated with Plato's fictional character of the same name, but despite the latter's being Plato's mouthpiece, it is Plato who is unequivocally given credit for, e. g. the Theory of Forms, so despite the confusion, Socrates is not credited with that doctrine, either. So, he has no substantive theory associated with him. Meanwhile, heresy, Dialectics, and the maxim 'know thyself', which are often attributed to him, hardly originated with him. One phrase which seems to have coined is 'I only know that I do not know', but he expresses it in specific circumstances, and, even if it does brand him as a Sceptic, he, again, was not the first. Obviously his death is a major factor in his continuing celebrity. But, it is hard to imagine that he was the first person ever sentenced that way. So, maybe what is most intriguing about his end is the fact that the sentence entailed the option of permanent exile, which he refused. For example, this decision opened the way for Plato to speculate that Socrates subscribed to existence of some supernatural realm, which is as plausible an interpretation as any, since the given rationales include: 'Escape would be bad citizenship' and 'I'm too old to move away'. But those, if taken at face value, at this most crucial of moments in his life, are hard to square with Socrates' alleged wisdom. Another possibility is that accepting the exile would have been acknowledging the validity of the charges that he was corrupting the youth. Even if he believed nothing else, it is difficult to accept that he would have conceded that. So, that is one explanation that entails that Socrates allowing himself to be executed was an exemplary principled decision, that avoids commiting him to advocating some supernatural doctrine.

Wednesday, June 3, 2009

Conscience and Consciousness

Despite being virtually identical etymologically, 'Consciousness' and 'Conscience' have very different meanings, and the studies of them have been in striking contrast. While both are mental phenomena, Consciousness pertains to cognition, while Conscience is implicated in Morality, a drastic difference, given the chasm usually held to obtain between Fact and Value. Furthermore, volumes in Philosophy, as well as in related disciplines, are dedicated to Consciousness, while Conscience is rarely to be found as an explicit topic. Still, the latter is implicated in some of the most profound philosophical theories, which are challenged to explain how a most private phenomenon such as Conscience can have such transpersonal import. Hence, notably, Plato theorizes thatIdeas, such as that of the Good, are innate, but obscured in a person until they are 'recollected'. Analogously, Kant offers his 'Categorical Imperative' as an innate voice of Reason, while for Heidegger, Conscience is the 'call of Being', and Freud has his 'Super-Ego'. One naturalistic explanation of Conscience reduces Consciousness to it--Mead shows how the latter is fundamentally a personal internalization of Society, and, hence, even in its cognitive operations, still essentially normative. One shortcoming of this theory is that it fails to account for the absolutely private kinaesthetic processes that constitute Consciousness in its most primitive form. Still, Mead's efforts do more fruitfully suggest how the structure of Conscience can illuminate that of Consciousness. The former, in any of its theories, can be understood as the influence of the social totality on a particular person, experienced as constraint and coordination. Consciousness can be somewhat analogously conceived--synthesis by the whole person of the activities of its various parts, as for example, advance by Kant's 'Transcendental Unity of Apperception'. However, such a notion is restricted by the usual presumption that Consciousness is fundamentally cognitive. Instead, once it is accepted that it is fundamentally homeostatic, then its analogy to Conscience, as a constraint on and coordinator of the manifold of organic activity, is drawn more precisely.

Tuesday, June 2, 2009

The Nature of Number

Many learned people chortle at the superstitions that some have regarding numbers like 13 and 666. But the theory of Number that those superstitions entail is not that far removed from a more intellectually respectable one. Magical powers are attributed to those numbers, which means that they exist, that they exist in a sphere that is removed from ordinary reality, and that they have causal efficacy upon the latter. Pythagoras, and the Idealist ancient Greeks that he influenced, likewise held Number in the same esteem, the difference being that, according to them, the qualities that they manifest in reality are expressive of their numerality--Oneness is Unity, Twoness is Opposition, Threeness is Balance, etc. Later Rationalist theories continued to hold that Numbers are non-sensible, but that their qualities are strictly quantitative. Empiricists inverted that scheme, maintaining that Numbers are merely abstractions from quantities given in sensory experience. Kant explained how they actively structure that experience. More recently, Numbers have been treated as mere symbols on a piece of paper. Now, one premise common to all these theories is that Number is fundamentally cardinal, namely 1, 2, 3, 4, etc. Rarely, if ever, has it been suggested that Number is fundamentally ordinal, namely, that the essence of Numbers is Firstness, Secondness, Thirdness, etc. One indication of the primacy of Ordinality is that while 1, 2, 3, 4, etc. can be abstracted from 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th, etc., the converse derivation seems more problematic. As the perhaps most influential Mathematical theory of recent times, Whitehead and Russell's, demonstrates, the transition from one number to the next requires a recursive 'successor' function, which entails an ordered progressive generation of each number. What this means in non-technical terms is that the essence of Number is given in the activity of counting, not in the occult, rational, or, otherwise.

Monday, June 1, 2009

Winning

A familiar contemporary saying is 'Winning isn't everything, it's the only thing.' This maxim has been challenged from a variety of different directions, usually suggesting some value to be found in losing, occasionally pointing out some disadvantage to triumphing. The very act of competing is often cited as worthwhile--playing is enjoyable regardless of outcome, as is the opportunity to socialize, even with an opponent, not to mention when every participant is well-compensated. Losing, specifically, can be an occasion for learning, whereas winning can breed complacency. Also, while a 'moral victory' is a win withing a loss, a 'Pyrrhic victory' is a loss within a win. Still, none of these seem to effectively override the unalloyed satisfaction to be gotten from winning, which is a successful outcome to a course of action that likely entailed hard preparation, and overcame the resistance of the opposition. But that winning is neither everything, nor the only thing, is posed from another level of achievement. Most players and commentators seem to agree that the highest accolade that can be attributed to a competitor is not 'Winner', but 'Artist'. The quality of victory is a function of the quality of the competition, as the phrase 'winning ugly' implies, as well as of the degree of luck involved: a matter of inches in the placement of a ball, a sudden gust of wind, an unfortunate injury, etc. But artistry in winning entails the fullest mastery of all the elements involved, manifest in the grace, precision, and coherence of the performance. Competitive artistry may not be everything, or the only thing, but it is the best thing, better than mere winning.