Monday, August 31, 2015

Negation, Nominalism, Pluralism

Common to Hegelianism and Marxism is the thesis that the word "negation" connotes a universal process. Now, that thesis is vulnerable to two objections. First, a Nominalist one, is that the word only denotes the terms of a transition, i. e. has no real referent independent of them. Second, a Pluralist one, is that, even granting the reality of a Nothingness in between the two terms, there is no proof that it is the same Nothingness in every transition. Thus, according to each objection, "negation" may be equivocal. That Nominalism and Pluralism can be effective remedies to conformist Ideology is plainly neglected by Marx-Engels in their repeated use of the word.

Sunday, August 30, 2015

Reflection and Negation

To the naked eye, the evaporation of something might seem to be a negation of it, but Chemistry has proven that, like other observable events, it is merely a seamless transition. Furthermore, in Practice, one is never actually "doing nothing", e. g. even in a lotus position contemplating Nothingness, one is doing something, nor is a change of activity a mere 'negation' of what one had been doing. In contrast, as Nagle's formulation "view from nowhere" suggests, Negation achieves a substantive status in Theoretical Reflection. But, Practical Reflection only effects a transition from one concrete condition to another. So, the concept of Negation as a self-sufficient process is peculiar to Idealism, and, hence, is inappropriate in Marxism.

Saturday, August 29, 2015

Reflection, Volition, Revolution

In what can be called Theoretical Reflection, the distinction between the subject of reflection and the object of reflection is ontologized, with the former conceived as an incorporeal observer, a concept that often functions as the foundation of an Idealist system. In contrast, according to Practical Reflection, that separation is not given, but is effected, as preparatory to action, i. e. Reflection is a product of Volition. Furthermore, since Action modifies the given, such Reflection initiates a liberation from the latter. So, the potential relevance to Marxism of Practical Reflection is as a revolutionary consciousness, and, hence, as a more appropriate Method than the "Materialist" one adopted by Marx-Engels in the German Ideology.

Friday, August 28, 2015

Method, Reflection, Practice

While Philosophical writing can be either Descriptive or Prescriptive, as has been previously discussed, neither is a distinctively Philosophical mode of discourse. Rather, specific to Philosophy since Socrates is Reflection, expressed in a Reflective Method, which in the Modern era is typically formulated as the grounding of a system in some experiential component, the function of which is often obscured by academic compartmentalization that abstracts it from the rest of the system. Now, in most cases, the object of Reflection is some Mental element, e. g. a thought, a sense-datum, etc., so, neglected by the tradition, the academic focus of which is usually 'Epistemology, is the possibility of a Practical Reflection, i. e. in which the foundational element is some physiological activity, e. g. writing. Accordingly, a Practical Reflective Method seems suitable for Marxism, or at least more so than the unreflective, detached observation that constitutes the "Materialist Method" in the German Ideology.

Thursday, August 27, 2015

Method, Description, Prescription

A Method is a manner of proceeding, so an empirical report of humans and their material conditions is not a "Materialist Method", despite the characterization of it as such by Marx-Engels. Rather, that report is a species of Empiricism, distinctive as a more rigorous effort to avoid the abstractions implicit in the tradition spanning Locke and Hegel, notably the extraction of a sense-datum from the flux of concrete experience. Still, the expression of an allegiance to an Empiricist Method involves a further abstraction that they miss in that passage, though one implicit in one of Marx's insights elsewhere--that what they are most immediately doing is writing, and Empiricist writing is a species of Description, the primary alternative of which is Prescription, a contrast implicit in the 'interpret the world'-'change the world' contrast in the Theses. Now, a Discourse on Method that begins by distinguishing Description from Prescription can be significant for Marxism, because the conflation of the two methods is one of most powerful modes of Ideology, in which a variable preference is disguised as an immutable fact, e. g. most Theologies. Likewise, for example, a more conscientious treatment of Method at the outset of the German Ideology can avoid a conflation of History, which is Descriptive, and a projection of a course of action by which Capitalism is transformed into Socialism, which is Prescriptive.

Wednesday, August 26, 2015

Dialectic and Matter

Generally in Marxism, 'Dialectical Materialism' connotes the principle that a Dialectical process is immanent in all Matter, thereby corresponding to the Hegelian Dialectic of which it is the putative Inversion, according to which a Dialectic is immanent in all Mind. So, just as in the latter the foundational Mental term is the bare "this", the Epicurean atom, with its "swerve", which, in his dissertation Marx champions and analyzes as Dialectical, can be interpreted as the foundational term of Dialectical Materialism, and of a Physics further developed by Engels. However, according to the "Material Method" of the German Ideology, the 'atom' of the system is the individual biological human, which thus serves as one of the terms of Dialectical processes such as sexual reproduction and collaborative labor. Thus, the German Ideology establishes Dialectical Materialism as primarily a social principle, i. e. not as a physical theory, even if that status receives no explicit articulation there or anywhere else. And, since the principle obtains in any simple interpersonal interaction, it methodologically precedes both the Dialectics of Class, and the Dialectics of History.

Tuesday, August 25, 2015

Practice, Writing, Dialectical Materialism

Marx is not the first modern Philosopher to privilege Practice over Theory--he is preceded in this regard by Kant's Practical Reason, by Spinoza's Adequate Cause and his concept of Mind as a tool-maker, and even by Descartes' Discourse on Method, i. e. Method is inherently Practical, even if its content is intellectual. Instead, his novelty in the tradition is his explicit affirmation of his task as essentially Practical. Still, he stops short of recognizing the Materiality of the writing that constitutes both his work and that of each of his predecessors, including Hegel, whose 'Idealism' is actually only an abstraction from the book Phenomenology of Mind. He, thus, also misses an opportunity to recognize an immediate example of Dialectical Materialism--his collaboration with Engels. From that process, he might have derived a concept of Dialectic as entailing Complementary moments, rather than antagonistic ones, which is what he does derive via a secondary abstract operation on the Phenomenology of Mind, i. e. via an "inversion" of Hegelian Idealism.

Monday, August 24, 2015

Reproduction, Natural, Voluntary

According to Smith, the propensity to barter is the distinguishing human characteristic, while for Smith, it is the use of tools. However, the latter is seemingly not related to Dialectical Materialism. In contrast, another example of a distinctively human activity that is directly involved with Dialectical Materialism is the modification of the reproductive process--rhythm methods, fertility drugs, contraception, pregnancy termination, etc. Given that immutable biological laws govern the process of conception itself, these basic examples demonstrate that a "voluntary" activity is always ultimately a modification of some "natural" core, and suggest that the distinction between the two is fundamentally that of Species to Genus, respectively.

Sunday, August 23, 2015

Dialectic, Complement, Negation

Marx derives his concept of Dialectical Materialism via an inversion of Hegel's system. However, an alternative derivation, adhering to his "Material Method", i. e. via concrete observation, is also possible. On the basis, the immediate object of observation is the reproductive process, constituted by components that are in a complementary relation. Now, the Negation of A is simply everything that is not A, which in a finite context, is the Complement of A. Accordingly, an antagonism between A and not-A can be analyzed as a dysfunctional Complementarity, to be corrected by the repair or replacement of inadequate factors. Thus, for example, in Capitalism, the inadequate factor is the Invisible Hand, the presumed integrative force in the system, and, which, judged to be irreparable, can be replaced by the abolition of Private Property, thereby instituting the Complementarity of its parts. So, in a more methodically consistent derivation, Negation and Totality are revealed to be equivalent, unlike in the neo-Hegelian Dialectic, as has been previously discussed.

Saturday, August 22, 2015

Biology and Division of Labor

In the first two paragraphs of the 'Private Property and Communism' section of the German Ideology, Marx-Engels assert: 1. The traditional nuclear family is the foundational instance of "natural" Private Property; 2. Private Property and Division of Labor are equivalent; and 3. Natural Division of Labor is abolished in Communism. Hence, though not explicitly articulated in the passage, the division of labor in the traditional nuclear family is abolished in Communism, perhaps e. g. replaced by a more egaltarian father-mother relation, by communal child-raising, etc. However, they seem to not recognize that an implicit relation undermines the entire sequence. For, the fundamental division of labor in any family is that which originates it--source of sperm and source of egg. So, since there is no natural property relation entailed in that division of labor, #2 is false, and since it remains unaltered by Communism, #3 is false, as well. More generally, the sequence reinforces what was previously proposed--that the larger context of Socialism is Biological, i. e. that it is conditioned by some Vitalist principle.

Friday, August 21, 2015

Marxism, Biology, Vitalism

Just as Smith conceives humans as distinguished from other animals by a propensity to barter, for Marx, it is manufacturing processes that specifies the race. Hence, Biology is the general category of Economic activity in both cases, as well as the ground of their differentiation. Similarly, as distinguished from the traditional concept of it as inert, Marx's concept of Matter is as inherently animated, and, hence, as Biological substance, i. e. Dialectical Materialism is a Biological principle. Finally, by accordingly defining the human species as Homo Faber, as opposed to the traditional Homo Sapiens, Marx implicitly attributes Labor to it as its universal characteristic, from which his thesis that the Proletariat is the universal class easily follows. So, since, Biological concepts are at the heart of Marxism, some variety of Vitalism is an immanent principle in it, and is not an extrinsic interpretation superimposed on it.

Thursday, August 20, 2015

Negation and Growth

As has been previously discussed, Dialectical Materialism can be interpreted as either a totalizing process, or as a negating process, from which it follows that Marxism can be interpreted as fundamentally promoting either Socialism, or Revolution. Now, on the basis of Marx's formulation that the purpose of Philosophy is to "change" the world, it is the latter of each of those two alternatives that is the correct interpretation of his doctrine. Accordingly, Dialectical Materialism can be classified as a Vitalist principle, with Negation equivalent to Growth, and social antagonisms as growing pains. It therefore follows that in revolutionary action, dehumanization of Capitalists is to be avoided. Now, if a Marxist disapproves of that consequence, then the structure of Dialectical Materialism and Marx's own words might need to be modified.

Wednesday, August 19, 2015

Dialectics, Revolution, Motivation

A Dialectical principle is often conceived as a totalizing process, with Synthesis as, if not its telos, its privileged moment. But, Synthesis is equivalent in the Logic to a Negation of a Negation, thereby indicating that it is fundamentally a negating process, an interpretation implicit in Hegel's classification of it as "negative reason", as well as, more recently, explicit in the systems of Sartre and Adorno. Now, the uncertainty bears upon the application of Dialectical Materialism to the Revolutionary process, and, in particular, to the motivation of a member of the Proletariat to initiate action--whether it as a means to Socialist totalization of Capitalist antagonisms, or is an end-in-itself, with Socialism only a temporary stage of development, itself subject to eventual negation. In other words, it is uncertain in Marxism whether what motivates a worker to revolt is the prospect of Socialist solidarity, or is change for its own sake. In any case, the motivation for change cannot be merely to lessen suffering or improve working conditions, each of which expresses a presumably, according to Marx-Engels, superseded Egoist principle.

Tuesday, August 18, 2015

Psychology and Revolution

According to the Materialist concept of Psychology, behavioral pattern is a function of external conditions, beginning with the prevailing means of production. Thus, for example, Selfishness is a reflection of Private Property, whereas Collective Consciousness reflects the collectivization of the Means of Production. However, in Marxism, that concept is itself implicitly a reflection of Capitalist conditions, an expression of the "natural" passivity of the Individual. In other words, the psychological negation of extant conditions that sparks revolutionary action is, at the same time, a negation of that concept of Psychology, a transformation that Marx-Engels do not seem to explain.

Monday, August 17, 2015

Laissez-Faire and Freedom

The term 'laissez-faire' is commonly conceived to connote individual freedom in a Capitalist system. However, to the contrary, it is an expression of submission in it. For, as can be observed when it is usually invoked, it is in response to some potential government action the target of which is a perceived ill, such as income inequality, toxic industrial waste products, etc., i. e. the response is to let 'market forces' correct any problem. In other words, "laissez-faire" is invoked to protect specifically those forces, in order to let them correct the problem themselves, a prescription deriving from Smith's principle that an individual pursue only self-interest, and let the invisible Hand take care of other problems. In other words, the fundamental principle of Laissez-Faire Capitalism is the submission of individuals to market forces, a submission from which Socialism is a liberation.

Sunday, August 16, 2015

Public Use and Private Property

As has been previously proposed, the abolition of private property can be analyzed as the elimination of exclusive use. Hence, a familiar example of a Socialist society is a public library, which, thus, exhibits one of the advantages of that system over Capitalism--more efficient disposition of resources. For, in a public library, unlike in a private collection, a wanted book will not linger unread on a shelf. Likewise, where there is equal access to resources, the sometimes grotesque contemporaneity of excess and deficiency in a society, e. g. wasting food and hunger, multiple residences and homelessness, etc., can be, first, recognized as a problem, and, second, rectified. So, the example of the public library is available to the Socialist as part of a Public Use vs. Private Property argument against Capitalism.

Saturday, August 15, 2015

Property and Use

Marx-Engels offer as a definition of "property": "power of disposing of", with the subsequent implicit definition of 'private' as 'exclusive'. But, 'power' and 'exclusive' are both abstract concepts, and 'disposal' is a special case of 'use'. So, understanding Private Property as Exclusive Use, the abolition of Private Property, i. e. the fundamental principle of Socialism, consists not only in the elimination of exclusivity of usage, but also in exposing Use as the concrete process underlying any concept of Property. Accordingly, that exposure is one of the fundamental features of the transition from Capitalism to Socialism, even if Marx-Engels do not explicitly recognize it as such.

Friday, August 14, 2015

Dialectic and Voluntary

Implicit in the Marx-Engels concept of 'Voluntary' is Individuality, i. e. it is each individual member of post-Revolutionary society that has freedom of choice. Now, they leave under-determined whether in pre-Revolutionary society, i. e. in Capitalism, some activity is voluntary, e. g. that of members of the overclass, or none is, i. e. every member of the society is under the sway of some impersonal force, e. g. History. In either case, the pattern of the transition as such can be clearly characterized as either Individuation or Pluralization, i. e. with respect to Volition. But, how that pattern is inscribed in the posited Dialectical process is unclear, and to reduce it to an instance of 'Negation' only underscores how overworked the latter is in the system. Furthermore, Voluntariness itself does not explain Collective-Consciousness, which requires a further transition from I to We. So, the emergence of the Voluntary moment from the process of Revolution is an indication of the inadequacy of Dialectic Logic, even if Materialist, to the process.

Thursday, August 13, 2015

Nature, Voluntary, Dialectic

As has been previously discussed, the Marxist concept of Capitalism as a natural condition, and that of Socialism as a voluntary one, leaves unexplained the status of the revolutionary process that constitutes the transition from one to the other. Now, Marcuse distinguishes the preconditions of Revolution, which are governed by a naturally destructive Dialectical Necessity, from the voluntary involvement of the proletariat in pushing the destruction to its conclusion, and replacing it with a Socialist system. More precisely, on his account, the moment of transition is constituted by a certain combination of material and intellectual conditions, but he is no more definite than that. Furthermore, he leaves unexplained the laws governing the moment of transition itself, i. e. he provides no principle that explains the transition from natural laws to liberation from them. Perhaps, as he suggests in places, it is the Dialectic itself that, at the moment of extreme negation of existing conditions, negates its own Necessity, resulting in the liberation from that Necessity. But, that analysis leaves unexplained how that negative moment gives way to positive voluntary action, as well as how such a general law applies to the experience of an individual worker. Hence, it remains as much a capricious speculative device as is Smith's Invisible Hand, and, hence, a flaw in a presumed "scientific" a Socialism.

Wednesday, August 12, 2015

Voluntary, Involuntary, Revolution

According to Marx and Engels, activity in a Communist society is "voluntary", while activity in a Capitalist society is "natural", and, thus, by implication, involuntary. Now, separating a Capitalist society from a Communist society is, in their theory, Revolution, but whether or not that activity is voluntary seems undetermined. For example, if Revolution is conceived as a calculated means to a voluntary end, then it, too, is voluntary, while if it consists in mob hysteria, then it is not. Likewise, if it is an inevitable moment in a Dialectical process, it is Rational, not Natural, and, hence, voluntary, while as general History, in which individuals are caught up, it is involuntary. But, perhaps the conclusive factor has emerged in actual events--the recourse in some revolutions to totalitarian measures, which is an indication that Revolution is, in principle, not voluntary.

Tuesday, August 11, 2015

Voluntary and Communism

Kant demonstrates that there is a systematic relation between a psychological state, Autonomy, and a political structure, his Kingdom of Ends. Now, Marx and Engels make an analogous claim, i. e. between Voluntariness and Communism, but without any supporting argument. In other words, they do not explain why someone would freely choose Socialism over Capitalism, and, conversely, subsequent historical evidence seems to show that Communism can be totalitarian. It may be no coincidence that the fundamental principle of Kant's system--Reason--receives no attention in the German Ideology, and, perhaps, can receive no attention in an Empiricist "Material Method".

Monday, August 10, 2015

Material Method, Voluntary Action, Socialism

As Kant argues, mere observation alone does not suffice to distinguish some behavior as either 'voluntary' or 'involuntary'.  But, the more important application of the thesis is to internal observation, i. e. to introspection, which, as Spinoza, also, contends, cannot alone distinguish a motivating idea that is the product of conditioning, from one that is freely adopted.  Now, Marx and Engels implicitly agree with them when noting that an "illusory" motivation can be taken as a "real" one.  But, then they are acknowledging that their "material method", observation of concrete practice, lacks the capacity to distinguish voluntary from involuntary action.  Hence, they cannot recognize Socialism when they see it, and, furthermore, can derive no concept of Socialism from that method.

Sunday, August 9, 2015

Possession and Private Property

Private Property is a species of Possession, which, as Hegel reminds, is the product of a process of Acquisition, of which there are two kinds--grasping and form-imposition, the former ephemeral, the latter permanent.  Now, in the case of the former, derivative devices function to maintain possession, some physical, e. g. a fence, some abstract, e. g. a deed, as well as a law that underwrites it.  But, as the physical examples illustrate, Possession has two dimensions--it keeps the object from leaving, and defends against acquisition from without.  Now, any codification that reinforces the status of a wife as the slave of a husband is an instance of the first dimension, whereas the concept of 'private' connotes exclusivity, and, hence, is an instance of the second dimension, i. e. it is a defense against any acquisition from without.  Hence, contrary to what Marx and Engels posit in the German Ideology, the family is not a foundational example of Private Property.

Saturday, August 8, 2015

First Property and Labor

One definition that Marx and Engels do offer is that of 'property': "the power of disposing of the labor-power of others", on the basis of which they equate Private Property and Division of Liberty. Furthermore, "first" property is that of wife and child for the husband. However, entailed in the definition is "the labor-power of others", e. g. of the wife, the products of which elsewhere in Marxism are conceived as the property of the producers. So, right in front of their methodically observing eyes is an example of Property that is presupposed by their definition of "first property", thereby undermining the soundness of the exposition in this section.

Friday, August 7, 2015

Nature and Privatization

In the first paragraph of 'Private Property and Communism', Marx and Engels equate Private Property and Division of Labor, and by classifying them as "natural", apparently oppose Rousseau's concept of Nature. On the other hand, in the next paragraph, they posit that a "communal interest" that exists "first of all in reality", undergoes a "cleavage" of individual interest from general interest "as soon as" privatization occurs. Now, "as soon as" implies that what they call "natural" is subsequent to an initial condition that Rousseau calls "natural". So, there is a confusion in these passages that could benefit from a standard methodical treatment that includes a definition of 'nature', and an explanation of how that concept relates to Rousseau's.

Thursday, August 6, 2015

Natural and Involuntary

According to Marx and Engels, the father-mother-child arrangement constitutes a basic 'natural' association. Furthermore, their 'natural'-'voluntary' antithesis implies that 'natural' = 'involuntary'. But, if so, then they have no way of distinguishing the involuntariness of the existence and the behavior of the baby, from the conduct of the parents. Likewise, on their proposed generalization, they have no way of distinguishing the involuntariness of the subservient classes in a pre-Communist, i. e. 'natural', society, from that of their bosses. So, at the outset of their methodical presentation of the distinction between Capitalism and Socialism, disambiguating definitions of key terms such as 'nature' and 'voluntary', each of which have a complicated history, might serve them better than the dubious, as has been previously discussed, characterization of one concept of the nuclear family as 'natural'.

Wednesday, August 5, 2015

Natural Society and Voluntary Society

Since the primary theme of Marxism is the transition from Capitalism to Socialism, the section of the German Ideology titled 'Private Property and Communism' presents the foundation of the doctrine. Thus, the very briefly introduced antithesis in the section--natural society vs. voluntary society--is a fundamental principle of the doctrine. However, as has been previously discussed, the example of a 'natural' association that Marx and Engels offer, the nuclear family, is dubiously characterized as such. Hence, the proposed contrast with a 'voluntary' society is equally dubious. So, their methodical development of a 'Scientific' Socialism begins on unsettled ground.

Tuesday, August 4, 2015

Division of Labor and Nature

The proposition, in the German Ideology, that Division in Labor, in general, "is based on the natural division of labor in the family", contains a potentially significant problem for Marxism. For, the biochemical interactions and animal instincts that constitute natural reproductive and child-rearing processes are independent of the exploitative social relations of father, mother, and child, that Marx and Engels attribute to them. Thus, by their own proposed generalization, so, too, is the Division of Labor in Capitalism a distortion of natural associations, and a similar argument can be made regarding Class distinctions. Accordingly, Socialism, while transcending private property, does not necessarily dispense with a Division of Labor or Class distinction, despite what they propose in the section 'Private Property and Communism', but as is implied by the later formulation, "From each according to his abilities". Also, the mistaking of the immediately observable for "natural" in the family constitutes a lapse of an otherwise usually careful method concerning social phenomena.

Monday, August 3, 2015

Materialism and Family

In the German Ideology, Marx and Engels tersely posit that one of the products of sexual reproduction is the Family, which entails a division of labor in which mother and child are "slaves" of the "husband", and which, therefore, consists in a fundamental instance of exploitation. However, this hasty formulation is problematic in several respects. First, the process by which 2 becomes 3 is distinct from that in which 3 becomes a 'family', the contingency of which is proven by examples, in some species, of one of the progenitors departing after the original intercourse. Second, the use of the term 'husband' connotes a conventional role, not a natural one. Third, the existence of matriarchal societies refutes any contention that if there is by nature a dominant member of a family, it is the male. Fourth, a division of labor in the act of insemination is prenatal, as is the subsequent labor process. Now, none of these errors undermines the proposition that the family in the German society of 1845 is exploitative. But, it does not follow that it is so 'by nature', as the presentation seems to contend, nor that a more methodically developed Materialist concept of the family might begin with the proposition that sexual intercourse is constituted by a complementary division of labor.

Sunday, August 2, 2015

Reproduction and Socialism

Marx and Engels use 'reproduction' not only in its usual sexual sense, but also to characterise the day-to-day replenishment of an individual via nourishment, rest, etc. Thus, writ both larger and smaller, Reproduction is the general principle of continuity for the species and its members. Accordingly, insofar as any Means of Production is a means to the goods that ensure daily replenishment, it is also a Means of Reproduction. So, Reproduction is the Materialist counter to Idealist principles of History, e. g. Christian Messianism. However, it is also usually characterized as a survival instinct, e. g. as the Will to Live. Thus, the positing of Socialism as a goal of the Materialist concept of History requires a justification on survivalist grounds, which Marx and Engels do not seem to provide.

Saturday, August 1, 2015

Reproduction, Synthesis, Materialism

To follow Marx's and Engel's own method of the observation of the concrete facts of human existence, the first "condition" of History, prior to, not, as they contend, simultaneous with, production within one life-span, is plainly sexual reproduction. For, without a succession of generations, History is mere biography. Now, one of the moments of the Dialectic is Synthesis, and if there is any moment in human History that plainly evinces the combination of two separate moments, it is the birth of a new member of the species. But, even in the interpretation of the relation between the two prior elements, i. e. a man and a woman, as a adversarial, the interaction that is productive is one of complementarity, not one of antithesis. Accordingly, in a rigorously developed concept of Dialectical Materialism, Hegelian Antithesis is supplanted by Complementarity. Likewise, the process in which a conflict of classes is resolved into Socialism does not exemplify Dialectical Materialism.