Knowledge of Good and Evil

In the deeply-ingrained popular imagination, the 'knowledge of good and evil', that is the topic of Genesis 3, means 'sexual intercourse'. Many of the chronic consequences of that equivalence are familiar--vilification of sexuality, demonization of women, existence regarded as a tribulation, and the fundamental content of 'morality' conceived as genital activity. A significant promoter of this reading of the text is Augustine, who brings both his acquaintance with Platonism and his personal incontinent experiences to his project. However, aside from brief allusions to 'nakedness' and 'labor pains', there is no clear textual grounding to that traditional equivalence. To the contrary, 3:22, where God says, "Behold man is become as one of us, to know good and evil", in the absence of an explanation of how God engages in accursed sexual intercourse, presents a powerful obstacle to the standard reading. So, a sounder interpretation might be that which takes 'knowledge of good and evil' at face value, i. e. as an 'understanding of what is beneficial and of what is harmful', an asset to beings which are in the process of outgrowing a sedentary existence, as they enter a more nomadic phase of development.

In The Beginning

"In the beginning God created the heavens and the earth" is the well-known opening sentence of Genesis. There is plainly no reference to any antecedent of the beginning, and none to 'nothingness'. Hence, there is no textual support for two prominent theological theses--the eternality of God, and that God's act of creation was 'ex nihilo'. The sentence is equally plainly at odds with the concept of God as 'in heaven', i. e. the text states that there are multiple heavens, and, more important, it locates God outside any of them. So, not only is the popular image of God as 'in' heaven without textual support, so, too, is the Ptolemaic equivalence of 'extraterrestrial' and 'divine'. Accordingly, Heliocentrists, notably Galileo, who have been accused of heresy on the grounds of denying that equivalence, are not at all contradicting the Biblical text.

Something, Nothing, Many Things

According to some Ontologists, the fundamental philosophical question is 'Why is there something rather than nothing?'. However, that question is apparently mooted by the theological assumption of the necessary existence of God, i. e. because absolute Nothingness is impossible on that assumption. Nevertheless, the Theologian remains confronted with a modification of the Ontological question--'Why does God create anything?--to which one common response--'As a divine gift to his creations'--is hardly adequate, i. e. that response does not address why a presumed perfect entity does anything at all. Now, that modification suggests, in turn, a more fundamental question for the Ontologist--'Why is the question "Why is there something rather than nothing?" more fundamental than the question "Why are there many things rather than nothing?"?' In the absence of an answer, the Ontologist seems as baffled by Plurality as is the Theologian.

God Is Dead

Nietzsche's expression 'God is dead' has sometimes, when taken literally, bred an angry response. However, the notion of an eternally entity ceasing to exist is more laughable than inflammatory. Regardless, Nietzsche often makes it clear that the referent of the expression is the decline of efficacy in Europe of Medieval Theology. So, insofar as the latter is primarily constituted by attempts to apply Platonist and Aristotelian resources to Biblical and Koranic texts, one 'autopsy' that Nietzsche does perform exposes the unraveling of that application. For example, while Medieval Theologians use Aristotelian logical techniques to prove the existence of God, Kant uses those same techniques to undermine those proofs. However, there is another 'cause of death' that Nietzsche seems to ignore--the Copernican refutation of Ptolemaic astronomy--one consequence of which is the eviction of God from the Cosmos, i. e. the 'heavens' are no longer divine. In other words, while Biblical religions clearly persist a century after Nietzsche's own death, they no longer rely on the intellectual resources that Medieval Theology entails.

The Root of Evil

The original version of the popular expression, 'Money is the root of all evil' is "The love of money is the root of all evil", to be found in the King James translation of I Timothy 6:10. Now, according to Literalism, that principle is true. It follows from that principle that, for example, neither the non-mercenary yielding to temptation in the Garden of Evil, nor Cain's jealousy-motivated killing of Abel, is 'evil'. It also follows from it that a Literalist is committed to opposing Plutocratic ideologies. Thus, a Literalist who supports the unfettered pursuit of wealth is morally confused. Conversely, the moral focus of some contemporary Literalists on sexual activity expresses an abandonment of Literalist principles.

Literalism, Creationism, Eternal Recurrence

The passage from Ecclesiastes, "There is nothing new under the sun", leaves unaddressed whether the sun itself, and anything beyond the sun, are new. However, the preceding text is less equivocal--"That which hath been is that which shall be. That which hath been done is what which shall be done". So, insofar as, as Literalism holds, these passages are true, not only was the creation of the sun nothing new, furthermore, none of the events described in Genesis are new. In other words, Literalism is committed to a theory of Eternal Recurrence, in which the 'creation' to which Creationism refers is a subsidiary episode.

Literalism and the Argument from Design

Some contemporary Biblical Literalists counter Darwinism with the 'Argument from Design'--the claim that the orderliness of the universe proves that God created it. In that context, the argument is weak in three respects. First, it ignores the disorderly aspects of the universe, e. g. an earthquake that kills thousands, including children. Second, as has been previously discussed, that God created the universe does not necessarily preclude the existence of evolutionary processes. Third, and perhaps most damaging, is that that argument is nowhere to be found in Scripture, so, on the Literalist premise, it is, at minimum, extrinsic with respect to the actual texts. Nor is there any evidence in the texts themselves that authorizes any method by which they can be represented as such. Indeed, the Literalist has no resource to refute Nietzsche's thesis that Theory, including that which grounds the Argument from Design, is Interpretation. More generally, nothing--neither Theology nor practice--follows from the texts, according to the Literalist premise.

Literalism, Originalism, Interpretation

Spinoza's pioneering reading of Scripture as metaphorical is grounded in his thesis that all symbolic knowledge is contingent, and, hence, is inadequate. His system also entails a further critique of 'Literalism'--his proposition that knowledge of external objects is always fundamentally knowledge of corporeal modification, when applied to linguistic objects, implies that such knowledge is always fundamentally interpretive. That insight is developed by, notably, Gadamer, who shows that there is no access to a text independent of the antecedent conditions of the reader, i. e. independent of perspective, and, possibly, of prejudice. So, even if it is granted that Scripture is the 'exact word of God', a premise difficult in its own right to prove, that it can be read as 'what God intended' requires an Epistemological theory that usually seems lacking. A similar analysis applies to 'Originalist' claims regarding the reading of the U. S. Constitution--as is the case with Literalism, question-begging solemnity is no substitute for sound theory, even when supported by the threat of violence.

Creationism vs. Big Bang Thoery

Typically unnoticed by both sides in the standard contemporary debate over whether the universe was created by God, or originated in a 'Big Bang', is that they agree that the universe had a beginning. Hence, neither side reckons with the possibility that e. g. a theory of Eternal Recurrence is the correct one, in which case each of them is wrong. Furthermore, neither side seems familiar with Kant's demonstration, in the First Antinomy, that the 'universe' in question neither has a beginning nor does not have a beginning. However, Kant does allow that such theories can have heuristic value, while, similarly Pragmatists hold that they can be compared in terms of explanatory power. Nietzsche goes further to compare them in psychological terms. So, neither invoking Scripture nor implicating mathematical techniques suffices to establish either Creationism or the Big Bang theory as a fact, regardless of the fervor of the proponents of each, or of the grip that their dispute has on the public imagination.

Creationism

'Creationism' usually refers to one or more of the following--1. The description, presented in Genesis I, of the origin of the universe; 2. The description, presented in Genesis I, of the origin of the human race; 3. The description, presented in Genesis II, of the origin of the human race. While Creationism is most frequently invoked as a challenge to Darwinism, that only #3 is effective in that respect seems rarely to be recognized. For, Darwinism is not a thesis about the origin of the universe, and while #3 describes God's creation of Adam directly 'out of dust', #2 only notes that humans were created in 'God's image', not how they were created, i. e. it does not explicitly rule out God's use of an evolutionary procedure for deriving humans from already existing animals. Furthermore, Creationists tend to not acknowledge the apparent inconsistencies between #2 and #3, e. g. that one and the same event occurred on two different occasions, under two different conditions. So, regardless of the fervor of the contemporary controversies, the doctrine that Creationism most directly opposes is, not Darwinism, but the Big Bang theory. And, since there is no clear structural relation between #1 and either #2 or #3, 'Creationism' is more accurately 'Creatorism', i. e. a thesis that posits the existence of a creator of the universe that is independent of the latter.

Monism, Dualism, Binaryism

'Monism' traditionally holds that existence consists in one Substance, with its primary alternative, 'Pluralism', positing a multiplicity of Substances, e. g. 'Dualism' is a special case of Pluralism. However, insofar as 'substance' connotes stasis, 'Principle' might more appropriately characterize the basis or bases of existence conceived as dynamic. Hence, in Spinoza's Monism, while he classifies his dynamic God as 'Substance', 'Principle' might be a more appropriate term for it. In any case, his categorization of God as Substance is distinguished from that of Thought and Extension, and possibly others, as 'Attributes' of that Substance. One problem with these categorizations is that Spinoza does not sufficiently explain the Substance-Attribute distinction, given that they are concomitant. In other words, he does not explain why his system is not Pluralistic, consisting of the Principles Thought, Extension, and possibly others, with respect to which 'God' is no more than nominal, i. e. is no more than a name for their combination. In contrast, the system here consists in two fundamental Principles--the Material Principle and the Formal Principle--the infinite varieties of combination of which constitute all existents. Since 'Dualism' prominently denotes systems consisting in two non-interacting Principles, this 'Formaterial' System can be classified as 'Binaryism'.

Morality, Aesthetics, Interpretation

Nietzsche's thesis, "There are no moral phenomena, only moral interpretations of phenomena", is slightly misleading, because it entails a distinction between a phenomenon and an interpretation that he elsewhere seems to deny. A basis for that denial has been previously presented here, i. e. a demonstration that a 'phenomenon' is a product of construction, and is not merely given, as Phenomenologists tend to presume. On that basis, it also follows that there are no 'aesthetic phenomena', only 'aesthetic' interpretations. Now, as has been previously discussed here, the traditional distinction drawn between 'moral' and 'aesthetic', grounded on that between Doing and Making, is questionable, i. e. Doing has been shown to be Self-Making. On the other hand, any process of interpretation entails what Kant calls "an art concealed in the depths of the human soul". So, even though Kant does not explore the relation between that Art and Genius, it still follows that Moral judgments are subject to Artistic standards.

Mode and Mutant

Efficient Causality is often interpreted as equivalent to Mechanical Causality, so, insofar as Spinozist 'Nature' is governed by the former, it is governed by the latter, as well. Now, for Spinoza, God and Nature are identical, and that God, as has been previously discussed here, is self-creative. Thus, his Nature is self-creative, too. Furthermore, that self-creativity consists in the generation of novel entities, i. e. Modes. So, self-creative Nature consists in an increase in its parts, while maintaining general integrity. But, the pattern of increasing parts while maintaining general integrity, has been previously defined here as an increase in 'Complexity', and an 'increase in Complexity' has been previously defined here as 'Evolvement'. Familiar examples of Evolvemental processes include Growth and Darwinian Evolution. So, Spinozist Nature, too, exemplifies an Evolvemental system, in which modification is isomorphic to mutation, i. e. the difference between a Spinozist Mode and a Darwinian Mutant is one of degree, not of kind. Now, the capacity of Mechanical principles to explain Evolutionary processes has remained questionable. So the adequacy of the classification 'Efficient Causality' to Spinoza's system is, likewise, questionable, regardless of his intentions.

Pantheism and Immanence

As a creator that is separate from its created, the Biblical God is classified as a 'transcendent' cause of the latter. In contrast, Spinoza characterizes the causality of the God of his system as 'immanent', meaning 'indwelling'. So, since Wolfson and Deleuze each interpret the God-Mode relation in Spinoza's system as Whole-Part, each regards 'immanent' as a misleading characterization of the causality entailed. Accordingly, Wolfson proposes that that causality be instead classified as 'transcendent immanent', while Deleuze suggests that 'immanent' applies more accurately to its effects. However, neither correction explains how individual activity instantiates both divine and Modal causality. Each correction, thus, bypasses the more fundamental problem for Spinoza--that 'immanence', which entails 'difference', is an inappropriate classification, however interpreted, for a Pantheistic creator, i. e. one which is identical to both its creating and its created.

Spinozism and Creativism

Qua 'natura naturans', Spinoza's God is clearly a creator, and as self-causing, is a self-creative process. Hence, its creation of a Mode is, at the same time, a self-creative event. Now, according to Spinoza, Modal behavior is either partly or completely active, i. e. he defines 'passive' behavior as at least partly active, and 'active' behavior is an instance of the divine process. Thus, active Modal behavior is self-creative, a characteristic that is only weakly expressed by his definition of the 'actual essence' of a Mode as 'the endeavor to persist in its own being'. Now, it was previously proposed here that either Spinoza's system is inadequately interpreted as 'Creativist', or that it is an underdeveloped Creativism. The foregoing argument demonstrates the latter thesis.

Self-Creativity

In the process of building a house, the distinctions between creator, created, and process of creation, are easier to discern than in the process of Self-Creation. Furthermore, the latter is already complicated by questions of whether the 'I' is unitary or is multiple, and of how internal reflexivity is constituted, as Kant's concept of Autonomy exemplifies, i. e. that concept entails a combination of Transcendental Ego, Empirical Ego, and Legislative Will, without fully accounting for the Elective 'I'. In contrast, the model of Personhood that has been proposed here more smoothly systematizes a process of Self-Creation--the 'creator' is the previously achieved 'I' at the outset of the process; the 'creation' is the actual process, consisting of the interaction of a Formal Cause and a Material Cause; and the 'created' is what one becomes at the end of the process, which, in turn, is the achieved 'I' at the outset of the next process. Lacking in alternative theories of Selfhood tends to be the appreciation that a 'self' is made, not given.

Morality and Creativity

The traditional subordination of human Creativity to Morality implies the thesis of a distinction between them that has been strongly influenced by that drawn by Aristotle--between Making and Doing. That is, for him, Ethics pertains primarily to conduct, i. e. to what one does, of which making something is a special case. However, what one does, according to him, is an expression of character, and character is constituted by one's 'habits', the Greek for which is the root of the word 'Ethics'. Hence, the cultivation of character by habit-formation is a process of character-building. But, character-building is a species of Making. In other words, the Aristotelian concept of Ethics, as a project of character-building, not only collapses his proposed distinction between Making and Doing, it inverts it. As such, Morality is transformed into a species of Creativity, i. e. Self-Creativity.

Creativism

To create is to create something, and any system the fundamental principle of which is creative can be called 'Creativism', not to be confused with 'Creationism', which has a very different connotation in contemporary parlance. Because to create is to create something, incessant energy or motion is not necessarily a creative process. Thus, Schopenhauer's 'Will', Nietzsche's 'Dionysian', and Bergson's 'Elan Vital', are each, in themselves, not Creativist principles. In contrast, Whitehead's 'Process' is Creativist, as is the Material Principle-Formal Principle combination, including its instance, the Will-Comprehension combination, that has been developed here. Similarly, for divine processes in Spinoza's system to be interpreted as Creativist, God's activity must be construed as exhaustively consisting in the production of Modes, and the essence of an individual Mode qua active must be to create. Plainly, either that interpretation is problematic, or Spinoza's system, as is, is an underdeveloped Creativism. Still, the actuality of a Mode as a discrete locus of divine activity distinguishes Spinoza's God from the cited principles of Schopenhauer, Nietzsche, and Bergson.

Wil, Creativity, Evaluation

Traditionally, the value of human Creativity, whether artistic or inventive, has been treated as fundamentally extrinsic, i. e. as subordinate to some greater principle. For example, for Kant, the maximum value attainable by Art is the occasion of a piece's symbolizing the Moral Good. However, that status of Art is based on Kant's privileging of Taste in the Genius-Taste combination that constitutes the creative process. Here, that combination is an instance of the infinitely variable Will-Comprehension interaction, of which that privileging is a special case. In other words, Kant's subordination of Creativity to his Moral principle is arbitrary, thereby suppressing any intrinsic value of the former.

Will, Freedom, Invention

For both Spinoza and Kant, Freedom is a cardinal principle, fundamentally consisting, in each case , in the achievement of self-control, via the supervention of Reason on external influences. The result, for Spinoza, is the transformation of passive behavior to active versions of the same behavior, whereas, for Kant, it is debatable whether or not Reason accomplishes anything positive beyond that supervention. Neither ideal seems derived from examples of human Inventiveness, despite the more robust expressions of Freedom evinced by creative processes. For, to invent, as introducing novelty into a situation, entails at least some independence from antecedent conditions. Furthermore, it issues in mastery not only over external elements, but over the physiological processes that are involved in that mastery, as well, e. g. the invention of the wheel involved not only mastery over wood, but over the physiological processes entailed in the transformation of tree bark into the first wheel. Here, Will is the ground of such novel physiological processes, so it is the ground of a more robust concept of Freedom than that of Spinoza or of Kant.

Will, Invention, Evaluation

Inventiveness seems to have no distinctive value in either Plato's "invention" of a collective ideal, or in that of Spinoza, or of Kant, among others. The lack of appreciation of inventiveness in Spinoza's system is conspicuous, given that his program aims at a Mode's realization of its participation in divine creativity. Regardless, the evaluation of Inventiveness is not inconceivable, i. e. novelty is difference with respect to some given, the quantification of which can ground an evaluation. For example, here, Will is the principle of Diversification in Experience, so quantity of Will can formulate degree of innovation. On that basis, the values of undeniably influential inventions, e. g. the wheel, the telescope, even Plato's Republic, can be codified, and creative behavior can be promoted.

Will, Necessity, Causality

For Spinoza, the Necessity that governs the conceiving of a collective ideal is, following Hobbes, individual self-preservation. For Kant, that Necessity is Reason, though the inclusion of a rewarding God in that ideal has seemed to some to reduce the ideal to merely a more effective means to individual self-preservation. Regardless, the very disputably of what Necessity effects is a reminder that Plato characterizes such ideals as 'inventions', which implies that indeterminacy is a factor in their emergence. Such indeterminacy expresses not a contingent inadequacy in some concept of Necessity, but an intrinsic feature of any such concept. For, insofar as Necessity is conceived as governing a causal sequence, an essential lacuna in the chain is suppressed--the difference between some element in the chain qua effect, and the same element qua subsequent cause. That lacuna introduces an indeterminacy into the sequence that is the ground of inventiveness. Accordingly, here, Material Causality, i. e. Becoming-Diverse, replaces Efficient Causality, which cannot recognize emergent indeterminacy, with Will as the personal Material Principle. Hence, Will is at least part of the parentage of the inventions of Spinoza and Kant.

Will, Necessity, Invention

'Necessity is the mother of our invention' paraphrases a formulation that first appears in Plato's Republic, in which 'necessity' refers to human needs, and 'our invention' to the concept of a political ideal that the dialogue develops. The phrase is a reminder that even a Rational ideal that includes God, such as Kant's Kingdom of Ends, is as much a human artifact as is a blueprint for a simple shelter. Furthermore, it is a reminder of the weakness of Efficient Causality, as Spinoza proposes, as an explanatory principle of human artifice. For, Efficient Causality, while perhaps governed by Necessity, does not account for the inventiveness of artifaction, nor for the cohesion of an artifact such as a rational theory. In contrast, here, Material Causality, has been introduced to ground the former, and Formal Causality, the latter, i. e. Will and Comprehension, respectively, in the context of personal experience. The "our" in Plato's original suggests that he might not agree with the common generalization, i. e. with the thesis that other every other invention is occasioned by Necessity, but, nevertheless, all invention combines Material and Formal Causality in the same way as his does.

Will, Democracy, Monarchy

Kant's apparent preference for Monarchy over Democracy, as a Rational ideal, is ultimately derived from his counter-Spinozistic thesis that Virtue and Happiness are not concomitant. For, the sovereign of his Kingdom of Ends is God, whose unique function is to guarantee that Virtue is rewarded. However, the main systematic weakness of that ideal is that Kant's arguments against Spinoza's thesis of the identity of Virtue and Happiness, which precludes any need for such a sovereign, are merely empirical, e. g. 'Unsatisfied need can discourage Virtue'. In contrast, as has been previously proposed here, there is an a priori defense of Spinoza's thesis--that the organic source of 'happiness' is exhilarating Will, i. e. the process of self-activation, with respect to which any passive experience, e. g. being 'rewarded', is only contingently satisfying. Thus, Kant's preference of Monarchy over Democracy seems an expression more of a concession to popular morality than of Rational principle.

Will and General Will

Kant's innovative notion, Pure Practical Reason, is primarily derived from not the preceding Rationalist tradition, e. g. Spinozism, but from Rousseau's concept of 'General Will', which is an expression of an impersonal 'general Good', rather than the product of a consensus of personal preferences. Kant's assimilation of that concept is best illustrated in his ideal collectivity, 'the Kingdom of Ends', which, as potentially supervening on the forces of Nature, can be characterized as 'super-natural', and, even as 'divine, insofar as God is the sovereign of the collective, as Kant occasionally intimates. Kant's divergence from Spinozism in two important respects is plain--Reason is a non-natural power, and Democracy is not the Rational political ideal. Here, 'Will' is the Material Principle of personal experience, and is manifested as Motility and as Exteriorization. Hence, while a collectivity, like any System, entails a Material Principle, the notion of a general 'Will' is inappropriate for Rousseau's and Kant's ambitions, i. e. by analogy it would apply to the deliberate expansive efforts of a political entity, and not to internal legislation. Furthermore, insofar as Will is also a process of self-extending, the extrapolation of it to Kant's super-natural Deity is more problematic than it is to Spinoza's Extension-constituted God.

Will, God, Artifice

In Spinoza's system, God and Nature are identical, and Modes are part of God/Nature. Thus, in tha system, there are no significant ontological differences between 'divine', 'natural', and 'man-made' processes. Accordingly, the conventional privileging of 'natural' vs. 'artificial', expresses an arbitrary God-Nature-Humanity hierarchy as much as does the characterization of building a fire as 'stealing from the Gods'. Likewise, that Ethics qua Idionomic process of self-cultivation, e. g. qua the enhancement of Will here, is a program of human artifice, is an argument against it only on the basis of an arbitrary theological orientation.

Will, Deontology, Eudaimonism

Kant's deontologization of Ethics has resulted, more recently, in 'Kantian Ethics' being abstracted from its original focus on the structure of Rational Autonomy, to the reduction of it to a mere exercise in applied Modal Logic, i. e. to Deontic Logic. Furthermore, his assimilation of that structure to the burdensome morality of self-imposed duty, diverges from its essentially Eudaimonistic tradition, i. e. for Aristotle and Spinoza, Happiness is Activeness, not Passivity, as it is conventionally taken to be. Now, if Happiness is Activeness, the process of self-activation is, concomitantly, an exhilarating process. Here, self-activation is Will, with respect to which onerous deontological impositions, e. g. Kantian imperatives, are, therefore, unnecessary, if not counter-productive.

Will, Reason, Legislation

While Kant is typically regarded as a follower of the 'rational' tradition of Descartes, Spinoza, and Leibniz, his 'critique' of Reason far exceeds the treatments of his predecessors, especially insofar as he proposes definitions of it. Among the most significant results of his more intensive analysis is the insight that Reason is the ground of Legislation, i. e. of the Universal-Instantiation structure of the Law-Case relation. Accordingly, he sometimes characterizes Pure Practical Reason as 'legislative will', in distinction from 'executive will'. Here, that distinction of 'wills' is conceived as a Form-Matter relation, with the term 'Will' reserved exclusively for the executive component of behavior, a principle that is, furthermore, independent of the legislative component. Now, Instances are equal with respect to their common Universal. Nevertheless, as is suggested by his characterization of an ideal society as a 'kingdom of ends', Kant does not follow Spinoza in conceiving a Rational society to be a Democracy.

Will and Rational Causality

While for both Spinoza and Kant, the 'rational automaton' is paradigmatic for all possessors of Reason, for the latter, but not for the former, it is efficacious, as well. For, for Spinoza, the cause of any behavior is whatever one happens to believe best promotes persistence in being, whether or not that idea is fully rational, whereas, for Kant, Reason functions as an ever present Conscience, thereby exerting influence, stronger or weaker, on all behavior. The challenge for Kant is explain how such Conscience can both have efficacy and yet be independent of antecedent chains of Efficient Causality, the response to which is his establishing the possibility of Efficient, yet 'free', Causality. However, Nietzsche is unimpressed with that effort, diagnosing 'rational conscience' as the internalization of hostile social pressures. Here, in contrast, 'rational conscience' is interpreted as Reason functioning as a Formal Cause in behavior, i. e. as imparting structure to Will, the Material Principle of personal experience. Thus, the cited alternative interpretations are constrained by their respective concepts of Causality--Spinoza, by his commitment to the primacy of Efficient Causality, with Kant recognizing the limits of that commitment, without completely transcending it. On the other hand, Nietzsche does accord primacy to Formal Causality, but in the absence of a recognition of a complementary Material Principle, he can only interpret the interaction of forces, such as that constituting rational conscience, as entailing at least some violence.

Will, Supererogation, Idionomy

For Kant, corresponding to Spinoza's Active-Passive contrast is Autonomy-Heteronomy. Now, one of Kant's concepts of 'autonomy' is 'the performance of duty for duty's sake'. Hence, on that basis, Supererogation, i. e. performance beyond the call of duty, is not 'autonomous', yet it seems to entail self-motivation. So, because of Kant's influential appropriation of the term 'autonomy', the synonymous alternative 'idionomy' has been introduced here. Thus, Will, i. e. self-activation, is an idionomic principle, and, insofar as Supererogation is conceived as self-motivated, it, too, entails Idionomy.

Will, Morality, Supererogation

Supererogatory conduct, i. e. the performance of extraordinary deeds, presents a challenge to systems such as Spinoza's and Kant's, in which 'good' is a characteristic of generalizable behavior. However, the expression 'beyond the call of duty' is as subtly inaccurate as is Nietzsche's 'beyond good and evil'. For, the admirability of at least some extraordinary deeds is a function not of some general norm, but of the perceived capacities of the performer, e. g. rescuing a potential drowner is more praiseworthy of a mediocre swimmer, than it is of an average or expert swimmer. In other words, the primary locus of such evaluation is personal Will, i. e. the extent to which one exerts oneself, with respect to which some social norm is extrinsic, if not irrelevant. Hence, just as Nietzsche's 'beyond good and evil' is, more accurately, 'beyond good-and-evil morality', 'beyond the call of duty' is, more accurately, 'beyond the morality of impersonal duty'.