Will, Reason, Legislation

While Kant is typically regarded as a follower of the 'rational' tradition of Descartes, Spinoza, and Leibniz, his 'critique' of Reason far exceeds the treatments of his predecessors, especially insofar as he proposes definitions of it. Among the most significant results of his more intensive analysis is the insight that Reason is the ground of Legislation, i. e. of the Universal-Instantiation structure of the Law-Case relation. Accordingly, he sometimes characterizes Pure Practical Reason as 'legislative will', in distinction from 'executive will'. Here, that distinction of 'wills' is conceived as a Form-Matter relation, with the term 'Will' reserved exclusively for the executive component of behavior, a principle that is, furthermore, independent of the legislative component. Now, Instances are equal with respect to their common Universal. Nevertheless, as is suggested by his characterization of an ideal society as a 'kingdom of ends', Kant does not follow Spinoza in conceiving a Rational society to be a Democracy.