Will, Democracy, Monarchy

Kant's apparent preference for Monarchy over Democracy, as a Rational ideal, is ultimately derived from his counter-Spinozistic thesis that Virtue and Happiness are not concomitant. For, the sovereign of his Kingdom of Ends is God, whose unique function is to guarantee that Virtue is rewarded. However, the main systematic weakness of that ideal is that Kant's arguments against Spinoza's thesis of the identity of Virtue and Happiness, which precludes any need for such a sovereign, are merely empirical, e. g. 'Unsatisfied need can discourage Virtue'. In contrast, as has been previously proposed here, there is an a priori defense of Spinoza's thesis--that the organic source of 'happiness' is exhilarating Will, i. e. the process of self-activation, with respect to which any passive experience, e. g. being 'rewarded', is only contingently satisfying. Thus, Kant's preference of Monarchy over Democracy seems an expression more of a concession to popular morality than of Rational principle.